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Foreword
2020 is an unusual year in which the COVID-19 pandemic has raged through the
globe, infecting tens of millions of people and killing hundreds of thousands. The
pandemic has not only wreaked havoc on public health systems, economic activities,
and people’s lives, but also has greatly affected and will continue to reshape the
world’s political, economic, and trade patterns.
Just like the coronavirus pandemic, climate change is also a major and urgent
global challenge facing humankind. The difference lies in that the coronavirus
pandemic emerged as a sudden and pressing crisis affects human health and lives,
whereas climate change is a longer-term and deeper challenge threatening humans’
survival and development. We can observe that during the past decades, as green-
house gas (GHG) concentrations continue to climb, climate change andmore frequent
extreme climate events are increasingly threatening humankind’s survival and health,
endangering terrestrial and marine ecosystems and harming biodiversity. The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report elaborated
on eight catastrophic risks brought about by climate change and pointed out that
climate change is no longer a future challenge, but is already an immediate threat.
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has said that the world is at a
life-and-death juncture and has called for all countries in the world to join efforts in
combating climate change, which is the most significant and urgent problem facing
humanity today.
In 2020, in the face of grave crises, especially the coronavirus pandemic and
climate change, people have begun to rethink about the relationship between humans
and nature, and are increasingly aware that people and the environment are an interde-
pendent community with a shared future. People should make more effort to respect,
adapt to, and protect nature, should attach more importance to the harmonious coex-
istence of people and nature, and should coordinate present and future with a view
to planning ahead for global challenges. This means that we must fundamentally
change traditional production modes, lifestyles, and consumption patterns, promote
transformation and innovation, and proceed on a green, low-carbon, and circular
ix
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development path. Climate, development, and environment should not be isolated or
addressed alone. Instead, climate actions, together with economic, social, environ-
mental, health, employment, stability, security, and other issues, should be regarded
as a large-scale system to achieve coordinated development. By taking the path of
sustainable development, people of the world must deal with climate change, protect
the environment, reverse the trend of biodiversity loss, and ensure the long-term
health and safety of humankind.
After the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, it has become the universal consensus
of the international community to achieve economic recovery through green and
low-carbon development. On Earth Day on April 22, Secretary-General Guterres
proposed a global initiative of green, high-quality recovery and urged countries to
stress climate actions in economic recovery measures. As of October 2020, over 100
countries have already committed to being carbon neutral in 2050. The European
Union (EU) unveiled its Green Deal at the end of 2019, and committed Europe to
achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Meanwhile, the EU has issued a roadmap for
policies and measures in seven fields, namely, energy, industry, building, transport,
food, ecology, and environmental protection, to facilitate a green recovery. Germany,
which has the new Presidency of the Council of the EU, has proposed a recovery plan
from the coronavirus pandemic in which there is strong support for green growth and
climate changemitigation is listed as one of the three priorities. Even theUSHouse of
Representatives, which announced on a Climate Crisis Action Plan in June 2020, has
proposed efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C by the end of this century. The plan
points out that addressing climate change should be regarded as a national priority,
aiming to reduce GHG emissions by 88% below 2010 levels in 2050 and to reach
net-zero carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 2050. The plan also details planned
future measures in the areas of economy, employment, infrastructure, public health,
and investment. It has been recognized and supported by Joe Biden, who has just
won the 2020 presidential election.
China has more recently attached great importance to addressing climate change
and has been adhering to green, circular, and low-carbon development as important
strategic measures for promoting high-quality sustainable development. China has
integrated tackling climate change into overall socioeconomic development. Since
the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), China has been promoting low-carbon devel-
opment based on the systematic and binding goal of reducing per capita GDP carbon
intensity. In 2015, China set Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of carbon
emissions peaking around 2030 and peaking at the earliest time possible. Various
policies and measures have been adopted, including adjusting the industrial struc-
ture, conserving energy and resources, improving utilization efficiency of energy
and resources, optimizing energy structure, developing non-fossil fuels, developing
a circular economy, increasing forests as a carbon sink, establishing and operating
a carbon market, and South–South cooperation, to facilitate green and low-carbon
transformation of the entire society. In 2019, per capita GDPCO2 emissions in China
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dropped by 48% from 2005 levels, equivalent to a reduction of about 5.62 billion
tons of CO2 emissions (or 11.92 million tons of sulfur dioxide or 11.3 million tons
of nitrogen oxides). GDP growth during 2005 to 2019 more than quadrupled, and
95% of the poor were lifted out of poverty. The proportion of the tertiary sector rose
from 41.3% to 53.9% while coal consumption dropped from 72.4% to 57.7%, and
non-fossil fuels accounted for 15.3% in primary energy, up from 7.4%. Average life
expectancy increased from 72.9 years to 77.3 years. All the data show that policies
and actions for addressing climate changewill not hinder economic development, but
will achieve the co-benefits of improving the quality of economic growth, cultivating
new industries and markets, boosting employment, improving people’s livelihood,
protecting the environment, and enhancing people’s health.
However, we should also note that, alongside the potential there are huge chal-
lenges in China’s low-carbon transformation. First, the manufacturing sector, with
its high energy and material consumption and low added-value rate, is still in the
middle and low end of the international industrial value chain, posing daunting tasks
of economic structural adjustment and industrial upgrading. Second, coal consump-
tion still accounts for a high proportion of energy use (over 50%). CO2 emissions
per unit of energy consumption are about 30% larger than the world average, making
the task of energy structural optimization formidable. Third, energy consumption
per unit of GDP is still high at 1.5 times the world average and 2–3 times that of
developed countries. Establishment of a green and low-carbon economic system is
arduous work.
Addressing climate change meets the domestic demand for sustainable devel-
opment. Looking to the future, as China’s endeavor to achieve a modern socialist
economy with Chinese characteristics enters a new era, the transformation to green
and low-carbon development is a fundamental way to solve the problems of imbal-
anced and insufficient development, coordinate efforts for promoting economic
development, improving people’s livelihoods, eliminating poverty, and preventing
or controlling pollution, and to realize the goals of building a moderately pros-
perous society in all respects. These goals would realize socialist modernization by
2035 and develop China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced,
harmonious, and beautiful country by 2050.
Addressing climate change is the commonmission of humankind. PresidentXi has
pointed out clearly that China has been actively fostering international cooperation in
its response to climate change, and has become an important participant, contributor,
and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization. From a global
viewpoint, green and low-carbon development has become the irreversible trend in
the economic, energy, technology, and governance systems of all countries, and is
the fundamental path to dealing with humankind’s common crises. China’s efforts to
promote green and low-carbon transformation around the world and to build a human
community with a shared future under the guidance of Xi’s thoughts on ecological
civilization demonstrates tremendous political courage and a sense of mission of
China as a great developing country.
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Therefore, we need to, during the period of the 14th and 15th Five-Year Plans
and even longer into the future, maintain strategic resolve, insist on a green and low-
carbon development philosophy, promote ecological conservation, continue to adopt
active policies and actions to respond to climate change, fulfill all of the NDCs,
and strive to do even better than the NDCs. Faced with an increasingly difficult
international situation at this historic juncture, it is particularlymeaningful to conduct
in-depth research on such topics as how China could plan low-carbon development
strategies, pathways, and measures in a blueprint of socialist modernization in the
new era, how China should assume international responsibilities and obligations
suited to its national conditions and capabilities based on the principles in the Paris
Agreement, and finally, how China should promote and lead the process of global
climate governance.
To address the abovementioned topics, since the beginning of 2019, the Institute of
Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD) of Tsinghua University has
been cooperating with dozens of research institutes to undertake a research project,
China’s Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategies and Pathways, supported
by the Special Fund for Climate Change and Global Green Development of Tsinghua
University Education Foundation and the Energy Foundation. The research institutes
with which the institute has been cooperating include theNational Center for Climate
Change Strategy and International Cooperation, the State Information Center, the
Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (recently renamed the Institute for Ecological Civilization), the Institute of
Science andDevelopment of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Energy Research
Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission, the Department
of Communications and Education of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment,
the Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation of the Ministry of
Commerce, the Academy of Transportation Sciences of the Ministry of Transporta-
tion, and the Department of Energy and Power Engineering, Institute of Energy,
Environment, and Economy, School of Environment and School of Architecture,
Tsinghua University. Based on China’s national conditions, the team, after compre-
hensively considering socioeconomic, policy, energy, and other macro-development
trends and needs, has proposed suggestions on China’s low-carbon development
strategies, pathways, technologies, and policies until 2050 in order to realize the
goals of building a great socialist modern country, a beautiful China, and to achieve
the global warming goals set in the Paris Agreement alongside global sustainable
development.
This comprehensive report builds on, extends, and enriches the reports for the
18 sub-projects in this overall project. We hope that our research findings can serve
as reference for all sectors of society in their research efforts, offer support for the
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formulation and implementation of national low-carbon development strategies and
policies, and help to tell China’s stories well to the world in the general trend of
global green, low-carbon development.
July 2020 Xie Zhenhua
Beijing, China
Preface
Global climate governance has entered the post-Paris Agreement era in which full
implementation is placed at the forefront of climate action priorities. The Paris
Agreement aims to keep global temperature rise well-below two degrees Celsius
while active pursuing efforts to limit it within 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-
industrial levels. It introduced a new bottom-up mechanism where countries submit
their targets and action plans in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
However, the current emission reduction pledges still fall far in achieving the goal of
limiting temperature rise below two degrees. Therefore, the ParisAgreement requests
all binding parties to communicate and strengthen their 2030 NDC ambitions and
actions, and submit their mid-century, low greenhouse gas emission development
strategies by 2020.
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forth the goals,
fundamental strategies and key action plans towards a socialist modernization in the
new era. Aimed at building China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous,
strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful by the middle
of the century. While making new and greater contributions to global ecological
safety and human progress, and the building of a community with a shared future for
humankind. Thus, China needs to align its overall strategies both at the national and
international level, implement its national strategy on climate change mitigation and
adaptation under the guidance of President Xi’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era, conform and lead the low-carbon transition of energy
and economy internationally. By the middle of this century, China should ensure the
attainment of the second centenary goal of building amodern socialist country, itmust
also strive toward the long-term global target set forth by the Paris Agreement for
addressing climate change, and embrace a deep decarbonization pathway consistent
with the global target of capping temperature rise within two degrees Celsius. Thus,
it is also imperative to study and devise a mid and long-term low-carbon emission
development strategy in China now, and incorporate into the overall plan of socialist
development in the new era.
Countries around the world are either formulating or have already submitted their
mid- and long-term low-carbon development strategies. Some developed regions
such as the EU, and the UK, and developing regions such as Chile, Ethiopia and
xv
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Fiji have already committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Thus far, 121
countries have set out mid-century carbon neutrality goals, and 114 countries have
declared intentions to update their 2030 NDCs. The flourishing of alliances and
advocacy organizations for climate action from various industries, enterprises and
NGOs, along with the blooming number of new international rules, industry norms
and social codes of conduct for low-carbon transition have also encouraged countries
to take more ambitious actions against climate change.
In implementing its national climate change strategy, China has incorporated
energy-saving, emission and carbon reduction goals into its Five-Year Plan for
National Economic and Social Development, and carried out institutional safeguards
and policy measures, scoring enormous achievements that received internationally
recognition. In addition, China has submitted an ambitious NDC and action plan
under the Paris Agreement, which should be executed step-by-step in the next two
five-year plans, coupled with enforced measures and actions to ensure the achieve-
ment of the NDC goals. China will adhere to a new set of development principles in
the new era. It seeks to transform development drivers through innovation, reshape
development method through green initiatives, create and form a green, low-carbon
circular industrial system with a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy system,
step up institutional capacity-building for ecological civilization, enable coordinated
governance to facilitate high-quality economic growth between the economy, energy,
environment, and climate change for an all-win scenario. All of the above efforts have
laid solid institutional and policy groundwork to fulfill the 2030 voluntary reduction
commitments and the long-term goal of deep decarbonization.
China upholds Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization and the philosophy
of building a community with a shared future for humankind, actively participating
in and encouraging international cooperation on climate change.Working together to
build an equitable, balanced, andwin-winmechanismof global climate changegover-
nance, to become an active participant, contributor and torchbearer in building global
ecological civilization. The experiences and case study of China’s low-carbon tran-
sition embodying Chinese wisdom and approach to contribute to the global pursuit
of a climate-friendly low-carbon path of economic development.
The coronavirus has taken a heavy toll on the world economy, triggering greater
changes in global political, economic and technological competition, and prompting
an overhaul of the global governance system. This overshadows international cooper-
ation on climate changewith great uncertainty. Now, there is a groundswell of support
internationally to a post-COVID green economic recovery, swifter low-carbon tran-
sition and joint actions against the furthering the effect of climate change, which is
emerging as a global consensus. This will produce a profound impact on countries’
policies and pathways to economic recovery and development in the post-COVID
era. In researching and developing a long-term low-carbon development strategy for
mid-century, China is closely following and leading the global trends of energy and
economic low-carbon transition, contributing to the ecological safety of the planet,
and the survival and development of all humankind that reflects its domestic capa-
bility and international influence. Moreover, it helps foster China’s own economic,
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trade and technological competitive edge to secure sustainable development and
enhance its global competitiveness and influence.
To adapt to the new realities of domestic and international climate change efforts,
the Institute ofClimateChange andSustainableDevelopment ofTsinghuaUniversity,
with the support from relevant authorities, took the leadership in bringing together a
team of more than a dozen domestic research institutions for comprehensive studies
in multiple fields and disciplines on China’s long-term low-carbon development
strategies and pathways, covering 18 sub-projects. This comprehensive report builds
on, extends, and enriches the reports of the 18 sub-projects. The comprehensive report
consists of twelve chapters, each of which has a list of authors as shown below, and
finally, He Jiankun was responsible for the compilation of the draft and short version
report.
Chapter 1: Dong Wenjuan, He Jiankun
Chapter 2: Chang Shiyan, Wang Hailin, He Jiankun
Chapter 3: Ou Xunmin, Tian Zhiyu, Guo Siyue, Bai Quan, Yuan Zhiyi, Wang
Xuecheng, Ouyang Bin
Chapter 4: Dong Wenjuan, Chen Siyuan, Du Ershun, Li Zheng
Chapter 5: Zhou Li, Wang Hailin, Zhang Qiang, Zhang Xiliang, He Jiankun
Chapter 6: Gu Alun, Teng Fei
Chapter 7: Ou Xunmin, Chang Shiyan, Cong Jianhui, Wang Can, Yuan Zhiyi
Chapter 8: Chang Shiyan, Ou Xunmin, Yao Mingtao, Tian Zhiyu, Guo Siyue,
Dong Wenjuan, Du Ershun
Chapter 9: Wang Hailin, Zhao Xiaofan, He Jiankun
Chapter 10: He Jiankun, Wang Hailin, Zhao Xiaofan
Chapter 11: Wang Hailin, Zhao Xiaofan, He Jiankun
Chapter 12: He Jiankun, Li Zheng, Zhang Xiliang, Yang Xiu
The research on China’s long-term low-carbon emission strategy and pathways
aims to provide holistic evaluation on the strategic linchpins, policies and pathways of
implementation for the energy and economic deep decarbonization that would echo
of China’s two-stage approach for socialist modernization: the country’s efforts to
honor and enhance its NDC commitments during the first phase, and achieve the
target of limiting global temperature increase to well-below 2 degrees Celsius and
ideally 1.5 degrees Celsius during the second phase. We hope that our research
findings can serve as reference for all sectors of society in their research efforts, and
offer support for the decision-making of government authorities.
We would like to express our deep gratitude to the Special Fund for Climate
Change and Global Green Development of Tsinghua University Education Founda-
tion and Energy Foundation for their generous support to the research project.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2015, 195 countries and regions signed on to the Paris Agreement, which laid the
institutional framework for global cooperation on climate change after 2020. The
Paris Agreement becomes effective when 55 Parties representing at least 55% of
global emissions join the Agreement, a criteria met on October 5, 2016. Officially
taking effect onNov42016,1 theAgreement established a long-term temperature goal
to combat climate change: keeping the global temperature rise (hereafter increase)
this century well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit
the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C. To achieve this temperature goal, the
Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) as soon as
possible and achieve net zero emission of greenhouse gases in the second half of this
century. By 2020, parties are expected to communicate or update their 2030 NDCs
as well as their mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development
strategies to the UNFCCC secretariat. As of the end of 2019, 195 parties have signed
on to the Agreement; 187 parties have ratified or accepted the Agreement; 184 parties
have submitted their first NDCs and two have updated their NDCs. In addition, 14
other parties have submitted their long-term low-emission development strategies.2
China’s 19th Party Congress laid out the overarching goal and masterplan of
achieving socialist modernization by 2050. Targets and strategies for addressing
climate change that align with the country’s blueprint for development should be
studied and formulated. China, like all nations that have signed the Paris Agree-
ment, is obliged to submit a mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission
development strategy. The research on China’s Long-termLow-carbonDevelopment
Strategies and Pathways emerged out of this context. The project centers around two
areas: (1) given the condition of limiting global temperature increase within 2°C and
1 The Paris Agreement was open for signature from April 22, 2016, to April 21, 2017 and, like the
Kyoto Protocol, would only enter into force when 55 parties accounting for at least 55 percent of
global greenhouse gas emissions ratified it.
2 https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies.
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developing China into a great modern socialist country, the pathways of China’s low-
carbon transition to 2050 from aspects of funding, technology, policy required; and
(2) examining the feasibility for China to deliver carbon neutrality by 2050 under the
1.5°C target, and evaluating the corresponding technical pathways, costs, obstacles
and socioeconomic impact.
1.1 Global Climate Change Impact and Response
1.1.1 The Global Impact of Climate Change
Climate change refers to a rise in the average global temperature, extreme weather
and other climate anomalies caused by increasing CO2 and other greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere caused by human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels and
deforestation, as well as natural changes in the environment. The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change as
“a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural
climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) believes that human activities in the industrial
age have contributed to climate change in two main ways: first, the use of fossil
fuels has led to increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO2, aerosols and other
pollutants, resulting in an increase in the levels of heat-trapping greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere as well as pollution; and second, changes in land use and land cover
affect global climate via reflections between the land surface and the atmosphere.
These reflections modify near-surface energy, moisture, and momentum fluxes via
changes in albedo and surface roughness, among others. According to the IPCC
Fifth Assessment Report, “it is extremely likely (95 percent confidence) that human
influence on climate causedmore than half of the observed increase in global average
surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” [1].
According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) bulletin, the phys-
ical signs and socio-economic impacts of climate change are accelerating as
record greenhouse gas concentrations drive global temperatures towards increas-
ingly dangerous levels. Atmospheric CO2 levels have risen from 357 ppm in 1994 to
405 ppm in 2017. The warming trend in the global climate system continues. Global
mean warming reached 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2018, and the previous five
years from 2014 to 2018 were the warmest years in the modern record of meteoro-
logical observation. In addition, other obvious signs of climate change, including sea
level rise, warming ocean water, ocean acidification, melting glaciers and ice sheets
continue to emergewhile extremeweather and climate events such as tropical storms,
floods, heavy precipitation, heat waves, droughts, cold waves and snow storms have
wrought havoc across continents (Fig. 1.1) [2].
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Fig. 1.1 Global mean surface temperature changes since 1850 (Source World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), 2019. WMO statement on the state of global climate in 2018)
(NoteHadCRUT—UKMetOfficeHadleyCentre for Climate Science and Services and the Climatic
Research Unit of the University of East Anglia; NOAAGlobalTemp—US National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration Global Surface Temperature Dataset; GISTEMP—NASA Goddard
Institute for Space Studies (GISS) surface temperature analysis for the globe; ERA-Interim-
European Centre for Medium-RangeWeather Forecasts; JRA-55—JapanMeteorological Agency’s
the Japanese 55-year Reanalysis)
In the meantime, the impact of climate change is increasingly visible. Natural
disasters, mostly linked with extreme weather and climate events, hit 62 million
people in 2018. Floods affected the largest number of people—over 35 million. It
was estimated that the number of undernourished population increased to 821million
in 2017, partly because of severe droughts linked to El Niño between 2015 and
2016. Climate change has also triggered population displacement. As of September
2018, out of the 17.7 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) tracked by the
International Organization for Migration, over two million were displaced due to
disasters linked to weather and climate events. Climate and air quality have many
interactions,which are exacerbatedby climate change.According to theWorldHealth
Organization, between 2000 and 2016, the number of people exposed to heat waves
grew by around 125 million, while the duration of the average heatwave is 0.37 days
longer compared to the period 1986–2008. Other impacts include the loss of “blue
carbon” ecosystems found along the world’s coasts and ocean in habitats such as
mangrove forests, seagrass meadows, and salt marshes [2].
The IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR15) released in 2018
pointed out that climate change is no longer a future challenge, but an immediate
threat. The report emphasized the need for urgent climate actions. Global warming
has already reached 1°C above pre-industrial levels and might reach 1.5°C as soon as
2030. At this rate, the warming might reach or even surpass 2°C around 2065, which
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would mean that the global temperature increase target set by the Paris Agreement
for the end of the century would be exceeded four decades in advance. The report
also indicated that there is a big difference in climate impacts between 1.5 and 2°C. If
global warming rises from 1.5 to 2°C,more devastating consequences, such as loss of
habitats, melting of ice sheets, sea level rise, will occur. This would further threaten
the survival and development of human beings, and inflict more damage on the
global economy. IPCC points out that in order to hold global warming within 1.5°C,
rapid and far-reaching transformation is required in land, energy, industry, buildings,
transport, cities, and other relevant areas. By 2030, global net human-caused CO2
emissions would need to reduce by around 45% from 2010 levels, reaching net zero
around 2050. Meanwhile, a significant reduction in non-CO2 GHG emissions is also
required [3].
In 2019, the IPCC issued the Special Report on Climate Change and Land, which
underscored the threat climate change posed to food security, how it could be a
driver of desertification and land degradation, and called on countries to use land
in a sustainable manner. Land is of vital importance in the climate systems across
the world. Agriculture, forestry and other types of land use account for 23% of
human greenhouse gas emissions. In the meantime, the terrestrial biosphere absorbs
one-third of carbon emissions from fossil fuel and industry. The land has long been
overtaxed by human activities, while climate change exacerbated the situation. At
2°C of global warming, the risks from permafrost degradation and food supply insta-
bilities are projected to be very high. At 1.5°C, the risks from dryland water scarcity,
wildfire damage, permafrost degradation and food supply instabilities are all on the
rise. Land must remain productive to maintain food security as the population grows
and the negative impacts of climate change on vegetation is expected to increase.
This has posed limits to the role that land can play in addressing climate change. In
addition, it also takes time for trees and soil to effectively store carbon efficiently
[4].
In the subsequent Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing
Climate, IPCC highlighted the urgency of timely, resolute and determined and coor-
dinated actions to address unprecedented and enduring changes in the ocean and
cryosphere. The ocean and cryosphere (the frozen parts of the planet) have served
as a crucial buffer for life on earth against global warming, with the ocean absorbing
more than 90% of the excess heat trapped on earth by greenhouse gases, and soaking
up a quarter of human CO2 emissions. The report assessed and encapsulated a series
of scientific discoveries related to climate change. For instance, the sea level rose
globally by 15 cm during the whole of the twentieth Century, and it is currently rising
at double that speed; if greenhouse gas emissions are not curtailed, by 2100, the rate
of sea level rise will be over 10 times that in the twentieth century; high greenhouse
gas emissions will lead to the loss of over one-third of glacier ice on average by 2100,
threatening people who rely on glaciers as a water resource, etc. With the increase
in ocean surface temperature and acidification, marine life and marine ecosystems
are facing tremendous challenges. Even if the global warming is held at 1.5°C, it
is estimated that as much as 90% of warm water coral reefs that exist today will
disappear [5].
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1.1.2 The Impact of Climate Change on China
China is one of the regions in the world that are vulnerable to climate change. The
country has experienced a faster rate of warming than the global average, which has
produced a significant impact on its water resources, agriculture and ecosystems, etc.
In 2018, warming persisted in the climate system ofChina. Themean surface temper-
ature showed a clear upward trend; extreme weather and climate events increased
with greater intensity; the cryosphere melted faster; and climate risk was on the rise.
The climate change in China in the past 50 years has been sparked by a combina-
tion of rising temperatures due to human activity and natural climatic fluctuations.
Meanwhile, China saw higher rates of warming between the 1970s and the turn of
the century, and rapid urbanization may also have had varying degrees of impact on
local temperature rises [6].
Atmosphere: In line with global surface temperature warming trends, not only
has China witnessed rising surface temperatures, temperatures recorded across the
country have been rising faster than the global average. The past two decades have
been the warmest since the turn of the century, and 2018 was an exceptionally warm
year. From 1951 to 2018, China’s annual average temperature increased by 0.24°C
every decade, and the rate of increase was remarkably higher than the global average.
Consistent with the global and China’s surface temperature warming trends, the
temperature in the upper-troposphere has also shown a notable increase since 1961.
In the meantime, annual precipitation averaged across the country has increased
slightly, with apparent regional and seasonal differences, and extreme precipitation
events has also increased. From a long-term perspective, manual observations and
satellite imagery have shown a decreasing trend of total cloud cover over the country
since 1961. During the same period, consistent with global changes in solar radiation,
the average amount of sunlight reaching the Earth’s surface in China has gone down
steadily.A significant reduction in sunshine duration of 1.4%every decade on average
was also reported. The average terrestrial wind speed has also decreased. Extreme
heat events have seen a sharp uptick since the mid-1990s [6].
Ocean: Climate along the coast is dominated by monsoon winds. Changes in the
East Asian monsoon, subtropical highs and Arctic Oscillation (atmospheric circula-
tion pattern over the mid-to-high latitudes) have generated profound impact on the
variability of parameters such as offshore surface temperature and sea level. China’s
coastal sea surface temperatures have shown significant increase since 1980, rising
by 0.23°C on average every decade between 1980 and 2018, and remained at a
historically high level for four consecutive years between 2015 and 2018. During the
same period, the sea levels along the coast saw fluctuations in an upward trend at
an average rate of 3.3 mm/year from 1980 to 2017, higher than the global average.
China’s coastal areas, featured by developed local economies, dense populations and
fragile ecosystems, are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In the
context of global warming, warmer seas, higher sea levels and increasing intensity of
extremeweather and climate events (such as typhoons, tidal waves, and storm surges)
have all had a sizable impact on China’s marine environment and the socioeconomic
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conditions of the coastal communities [7]. Due to various challenges such as data
collection through ocean observations, climate model uncertainties and water pollu-
tion, current research on the impact of climate change on China’s offshore waters is
still lacking severely.
Cryosphere: China is the largest country at mid- and low- latitudes cryosphere
region. A great deal of research has found that the cryosphere in China has been
shrinking in the past few decades, and this trend has markedly accelerated in the
past ten years and more. The second Glacier Inventory of China confirmed that there
were 48,571 glaciers with an area of 51,800 km2 in the country, where glaciers have
exhibited a general trend of retreat. The total area has reduced by 18% and lost some
243.7 km2 in mass on average each year. Over the past few decades, permafrost
temperatures, principally on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, have risen on the whole.
The specific symptoms include: decrease in size and thickness of frozen ground; rise
in the lower altitudinal limit of permafrost; shortening of period in which the ground
is frozen; increase in maximum thaw depths while larger areas of permafrost are
experiencing melt, and the disappearance of discontinuous permafrost zones. China
has a snow cover totalling to 9× 106 km2, of which 5× 104 km2 is stable. They are
scattered in the accumulation zones of alpine glaciers in western China. In the five
decades between 1958/1959 and 2007/2008, the number of snow-covered days and
the maximum snow depth in spring and autumn slowly dropped, while such days
and depth rose in winter [8].
Extreme weather and climate events: From 1961 to 2018, the interdecadal
changes in the frequency of extreme heat events in China are apparent. The frequency
of extreme daily precipitation events has increased. Since the late 1990s, the average
intensity of typhoons landing in China has risen dramatically. A litany of extreme
weather and climate events such as heat waves, cold waves, drought, heavy precip-
itation, floods, typhoons, sandstorms have become commonplace and resulted in
extensive impacts. Between 1961 and 2018, China’s climate risk index was gener-
ally on the rise, with major changes in stages and upward fluctuations since the
late 1970s. Climate change is and will continue to affect natural ecosystems and
socioeconomic development, with a rise in the frequency and intensity of extreme
climate events such as heat waves and heavy precipitation and growing instability
in the cryosphere. As of today, climate change now constitutes a grave challenge to
a wide spectrum of fields including food security, water resources, ecological envi-
ronment, energy, development of major projects, human health, and socioeconomic
development. With the ongoing pace of socioeconomic development and growing
urbanization, the risks of high temperature, floods, and droughts facing China is
expected to be aggravated. It is imperative that serious attention be paid to climate
security [6].
1.2 Theoretical Framework 7
1.2 Theoretical Framework
The key to tackling climate change lies in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
from human activities. CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil energy accounts
for two-thirds of the global greenhouse gas emissions. The fact that fossil fuel use
is concentrated makes the implementation of emission reduction measures easier.
The ever-increasing demand for energy to support economic development and the
need to cut CO2 emissions are in fundamental conflict. Low-carbon development has
become the only viable path in dealing with climate change under the framework of
sustainable development. It refers to a model of economic growth where relatively
high carbon productivity, high level of economic and social development and quality
of life are achieved with less consumption of natural resources, emissions, and pollu-
tion. At its core lies the development of low-carbon technologies, the improvement of
energy efficiency and energy structure, the establishment of a low-carbon economic
development and social consumption model, the complete decoupling of long-term
economic and social development from GHGs.
The Paris Agreement sets out the goal of holding global warming to well below
2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it within 1.5°C. In order to meet this target, global
emissions of greenhouse gases must reduced sharply, and net-zero emissions should
be achieved by the second half or even the middle of this century. The world must
continue to ramp up emission reduction efforts. All countries, especially the devel-
oping nations, are also faced with pressing challenges in sustainable development
such as economic growth, improvement of people’s livelihood, promotion of social
progress, and the protection of regional ecological environment. The response to
climate change must be aligned with domestic sustainable development priorities.
Meanwhile, cooperation among countries and joint actions must be strengthened to
create win–win for all parties.
1.2.1 Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Climate change and sustainable development have always been intertwined in global
diplomacy and governance. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment (hereafter theAgenda) adopted in 2015 emphasized that the economic, social
and environmental damages are interrelated and inseparable. The 2030Agenda called
attention to the fact that climate change has put at risk the well-being of humanity
and the planet’s life support system. Therefore, the Agenda calls for urgent actions
to combat climate change and its impacts (SDG13), and ensure climate actions and
climate restoration is at the core of the sustainable development transition. Eleven
targets in the agenda explicitly related to addressing climate mitigation, adaptation,
and resilience efforts, while a total of 28 secondary targets are specific climate actions
related. In recent developments, the two agenda of sustainable developmetn adnmiti-
gating climate change are inclined to merge into one discourse. From the perspective
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of the goals set out in the Agenda, sustainable development is presented as a solution
to the humanity’s development problem, and climate change response is the pathway
to solving the global ecological crisis. The ultimate goal of these two agendas is to
achieve global sustainable development [9]. Globally speaking, since Paris Agree-
ment took effect, the actions taken by countries in response to climate change have
also became the key driver for achieving other Sustainable Development Goals [9].
There is a complex relationship between climate change and sustainable devel-
opment. From a systematic point of view, it is a relationship that consists of both
trade-offs and synergies.Within this context, there are also differences in the impacts
of climate adaptation and mitigation efforts on sustainable development. In general,
limitingwarming to 1.5 and2°Cmakes it easier to achieve a number of theSustainable
DevelopmentGoals, such as those related to poverty, hunger, health,water, sanitation,
cities and ecosystems (SDGs 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 15) has been made easier. The avoided
climate change impacts on poverty reduction and inequality eradication would be
greater if global warming were Limiting to 1.5°C warming shows greater poten-
tial, such as in poverty alleviation and inequality eradication. By targeting 1.5°C,
we could reduce the number of people under poverty line due to climate change by
62 million more than the 2°C target. Under the 1.5°C scenario, there are multiple
synergies and trade-offs between mitigation measures and Sustainable Development
Goals, but there are more synergies than trade-offs. Further breaking matters down,
strong synergistic effects of mitigation and sustainable development can be found
in the areas of health, energy, responsible consumption and production and ocean
sustainability (SDGs 3, 7, 12, 14); and trade-offs or negative effects rest between
strict mitigation measures and SDGs in the areas of poverty and hunger reduction,
water, sanitation and energy (SDGs 1, 2, 6, 7). In contrast, the impact of adapta-
tion measures on poverty alleviation, reduction of general inequalities, agriculture,
health, and SDGs is projected to be mostly positive [3].
1.2.2 Promote the Coordinated Governance of Climate,
Energy and Environment
Climate change is a critical environmental challenge facing humanity. In the mean-
time, other environmental problems are also threatening human health and the Earth’s
ecosystems on which humanity depends. In almost all countries, the most impor-
tant driver of climate policy is not only to avoid the long-term effects of climate
change, but also to achieve the SDGs in the short term. The most pressing of which
is combating domestic air pollution [1]. The very sources and impacts of air pollu-
tion and climate change are closely linked (Fig. 1.2). Therefore, seeking policies
or action plans that synergize mitigating climate change and reducing air pollution
enable countries to better integrate short-term Sustainable Development Goals with
the long-term global climate change mitigation strategy, encouraging them to take
more ambitious emission reduction actions. In practice, the close interrelationship
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Fig. 1.2 The global mean radiative forcing of the climate system for the year 2000, relative to 1750
(Source IPCC. 1990. First Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
between environment and climate issues, effective policy measures for one cause
may benefit the other. Coordinated policies and actions, i.e. coordinated governance,
proves to be an effective win–win approach [3].
Many recent studies have suggested that actions to mitigate the impacts of climate
forcing agents can have an immediate positive effect on economic and social welfare
by improving public health and ecosystem sustainability. For instance, amodel-based
analysis found that, compared with the 2°C scenario, stricter short-term emission
reduction measures under the 1.5°C scenario can reduce the number of premature
deaths due to air pollution by 110 to 190 million [10]. Similarly, a comprehensive
assessment of air pollution and climate change mitigation in the Asia–Pacific region
concluded that by implementing 25 measures to improve air quality, CO2 emissions
can be cut by nearly 20% by 2050 [11]. According to a study by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, the average economic value of the health benefits
arising from reduced air pollution ranges from $58 to $380 per ton of CO2 world-
wide, and the health benefits are even more significant in developing countries. In
East Asia, the benefits are expected to be 10–70 times themarginal abatement cost by
2030 [12]. In 2011, the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteo-
rological Organization conducted a comprehensive assessment of control measures
for short-lived climate pollutants, and discovered that these measures can slow the
rate of global warming by half while avoiding 4 to 32 billion U.S. dollars annually of
crop yield losses (estimated using global market prices) as well as 2 to 10 trillionU.S.
dollars each year spent on health damages [13]. The mitigation of climate change has
also created synergies in improving energy efficiency and the development of renew-
able energy. The synergies in these areas are equivalent to 50% to 350% of project
investment. Research shows that in certain forestation projects aimed at mitigating
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climate change, the co-benefits can make up between 53 to 92% of total benefits
[14].
1.2.3 Pathways and Technology Options to Mitigating
Climate Change
Under the pathways for keeping global temperature rise to within 2°C and/or
1.5°C, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions across all sectors, including
industry, building, transport, energy, agriculture, forestry and other land use, is
essential, where technology will play a key role. Across all industries, it is imper-
ative to establish a non-fossil based energy supply system. Energy consumption
by the end-use sectors needs to be revolutionized; industrial production needs to
shift toward low-carbon technology, eco-design, flexible manufacturing systems
and circular economy; carbon capture, storage and removal technologies should
be applied on a large scale; innovations in energy saving and carbon emission
reduction should be coordinated including materials, intelligent manufacturing, and
information technology. In addition, revolutionary technological breakthroughs are
essential.
1. Conserving energy and improving energy efficiency: China has made
improvements in energy efficiency mainly through technological advancement.
Energy conservation and energy efficiency improvement should be the long-
term priorities for low-carbon development. China is one of the countries with
the fastest improvement in energy efficiency aroundthe world. From 2005 to
2018, energy consumption per unit of GDP dropped by 41.5%, the cumulative
energy savings reached 2.12 billion tonnes of coal equivalent (tce). Presently,
China has put in place an energy-saving policy system with Chinese character-
istics, which has evolved from restricting energy intensity alone to coordinated
control of both energy intensity and total consumption. However, daunting chal-
lenges remain in further improving energy conservation and energy efficiency.
In the next stage, efforts need to shift from single pieces of technology and equip-
ment to system optimization, from structural adjustments to quality enhance-
ment and content upgrade, and from curbing the growth in energy consumption
to transforming consumption and reducing demand.
2. Low-carbon transition of the energy mix: Limiting global temperature rise
within and/or 1.5°C requires a non-fossil fuel -based energy system. Coal is
rapidly exiting the energy system, and oil consumption is expected to peak
before 2035. In the past decade, the cost of renewable energy technology has
been effectively reduced, wind and solar power are set to reach grid parity
between 2020 and 2030. The biggest challenge appears on the grid side. When
renewables, which are associated with such issues as supply volitility and uncer-
tainty, become the dominating source of energy, the mechanisms for balance
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management and overall planning in the power systemwill have to undergo qual-
itative changes. Therefore, it is crucial to address the issues of power system
stability and optimized grid operations across time series under the paradigm
of high penetration of power electronics throughout all sections of the power
system, i.e. source, grid and load.
3. Revolutionizing energy consumption in end-use sectors: Electrification is
the most important hallmark of the transformation of energy consumption in
the end-use sectors. Both pathways of 2°C and 1.5°C targets call for deeper
electrification of the end-use sectors. The rate of electrification society-wide
should be more than doubled by 2050. Besides, on average two-thirds of the
energy efficiency potential for end use remains untapped globally. The combi-
nation of energy efficiency technologies with digitalization, intelligent solutions
and additive manufacturing will usher in new potential.
4. Revolutionary advanced technological breakthroughs: By 2050, under a
deep decarbonization scenario that is compatible with the target of holding
temperature rise within 2°C, the marginal abatement cost is expected to show
a rapid, nonlinear upward trend. Technological breakthroughs are essential for
such break through. It is vital to intensify theR&Dand proliferation of technolo-
gies that drive deeper reductions in CO2 emissions, such as large-scale energy
storage and smart grid technologies with high levels of renewables connected
to the grid, negative emissions technologies such as Biomass Energy Carbon
Capture and Storage systems (BECCS), technologies for the production, storage
and utilization of hydrogen energy—a clean zero-carbon secondary source of
energy and an important industrial raw material, and zero carbon manufac-
turing technologies for raw materials such as chemicals, steel, cement, etc.; in
the meantime, the R&D and pilotingof deep emissions reduction technologies
for non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as methane are required to achieve deep
emissions reduction of all GHGs [15].
1.2.4 Nature-Based Solutions
The role of natural ecosystems in mitigating and adapting to climate change is
getting increasing attention, nature-based solutions (NbS) have been put forward
in this context (see Fig. 1.3). It refers to the conservation, restoration and sustainable
management of ecosystem for mitigating climate change, and the use of ecosystem
and its services to help humans and wildlife adapt to the impacts and challenges
brought by climate change [16]. Research on the global carbon cycle shows that
terrestrial ecosystems have absorbed roughly one-third of anthropogenic CO2 emis-
sions since the industrial revolution [4]. NbS can also provide a buffer against the
impacts and long-term risks of climate change.[17], [18]. Therefore, efforts to halt the
loss or degradation of ecosystems, other misuses of land and ocean, and the protec-
tion, restoration, and sustainable management of global ecosystems can ensure that
nature continues to provide these essential services to humanity [19].
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The Paris Agreement recognizes the importance of natural ecosystems in miti-
gating and adapting to climate change, as well as their broader social values.
Throughout the agreement, in the Preamble and Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7, concepts
associated with “Nature-based Solutions” are referred to either directly or indirectly.
In the Nationally Determined Contributions provided by the nations signed on the
Paris Agreement, at least 66%of theNDCs contain some form ofNbS to help achieve
climate mitigation and/or adaptation goals. At present, NbS mostly aim to achieve
climate change mitigation goals through the management, conservation, and restora-
tion of terrestrial forest ecosystems, while the role of grasslands, drylands, wetlands,
coastal and marine ecosystems in climate change mitigation has yet to garner suffi-
cient attention. In this sense, enormous potential remains for the application of NbS
in future climate change mitigation and adaptation programs [20]. According to an
analysis of 16 dynamic global vegetation models provided by the Global Carbon
Project, the increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations and climate change resulted
in an annual mean net carbon storage of ecosystems in China of 85~310 TgC yr−1
[21] from 2000 to 2017. In spite of large uncertainties, the methods based on field
surveys and atmospheric retrieval all point to China’s terrestrial ecosystems being a
major carbon sink (96~435 TgC yr−1) than had, offsetted 6~29% of CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels between 2000 and 2009 in the country [21].
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1.3 China’s Policies on Low-Carbon Transition
1.3.1 Green Development and the Construction of Ecological
Civilization
As a developing country, China faces daunting challenges on the triple fronts of
climate change, environment and development. As of the end of 2018, China’s per
capita GDP is approximately US$ 9,780, while its per capita disposable income was
only US$ 4,266 [22]. In the past few decades, China has relied on a path adopted by
western countries in their early stages of development, extensive growth based on
resources input, thus formed an industrial structure dominated by heavy industries.
After the reform and opening-up in 1978, China followed the example of Japan and
other East Asian countries and pursued an export-led growth strategy, which sought
to create a net export surplus to make up for insufficient domestic demand. This
“extensive growth” and “export-oriented strategy” have directly led to vast fossil
fuel consumption and severe environmental pollution [23]. Meanwhile, the soaring
energy consumption makes China the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon
emitter. China’s primary energy consumption in 2018 amounted to 3.27 billion tons
of oil equivalent (4.68 billion tce), which is 23.6% of the world total. CO2 emissions
in China reached 9.43 billion tonnes in the same year, or 27.8% of the world’s total
[24].
The Chinese government has always had grand ambitions for green development.
As early as the 1990s, sustainable development became part of the top agendas offi-
cially in government documents. In 1992, shortly after the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, the Chinese government released the Ten
Major Measures to Enhance the Environment and Development, which, for the first
time, proposed the implementation of sustainable development strategy in China, and
formulated China’s Agenda for 21st Century, the world’s first national-level strategy
for sustainable development. At the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007, the
philosophy of “ecological civilization” was brought forward. The 18th CPCNational
Congress in 2012 elevated the building of ecological civilization into China’s guiding
principle and governance philosophy. Ecological civilization is also a key building
block of the 13th Five-Year Plan adopted in 2016.
In 2015,the Chinese government issued theOpinions of the Central Committee of
theCommunist Party ofChinaand the StateCouncil onAccelerating theConstruction
of Ecological Civilization. The document evolved the notion of ecological civiliza-
tion from a governance philosophy into a concrete strategy for action. Themain goals
for the development of ecological civilization were established, and the philosophy
of ecological civilization was integrated into all spheres of China’s economic, polit-
ical, cultural, and social development, including the blueprints for the country’s new
model of urbanization, industrialization and agriculturalmodernization.More impor-
tantly, the document proposed the “formation of a full-fledged system of ecological
civilization”, which entailed the improvement of legislation, standards, the system
of property rights of natural resource assets and usage regulation, the monitoring and
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supervision of the ecological environment, the strict observance of the red lines of
resources, environment and ecology, the betterment of economic policies, the roll-out
of market-based mechanisms, the enhancement of mechanism of compensation for
ecological protection, government performance assessment as well as the account-
ability system. In September 2015, theChinese government introduced the Integrated
Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Progress, setting clear target and timeframe
for the reform. By then, ecological civilization had become the overarching policy
to guild China’s economic transformation.
The Chinese government has embraced ecological civilization as a central policy
objective, and elevated it into one of the strategic pillars of the country’s long-term
development. China pursues a coordinated relationship among economic develop-
ment, social progress and environmental protection under the steering of ecological
civilization in a bid to strive for the coordinated and sustainable development. The
country’s efforts in promoting green development have also been recognized inter-
nationally. The UNEP’s 27th council meeting in 2013 adopted a decision promoting
the philosophy of ecological civilization, and in 2015, UNEP published a report enti-
tledGreen is Gold: The Strategy and Actions of China’s Ecological Civilization. The
country’s remarkable achievements and successful practices in building an ecological
civilization and protecting the environment will contribute China’s experience and
wisdom to a global community faced with the common threat of an environmental
crisis.
Resource conservation, environmental protection, andCO2 emission reduction are
the key pillars of China’s efforts in building ecological civilization. In the 11th Five-
Year Plan (FYP), the country has set binding targets for reducing energy intensity and
for the share of new and renewable energy in total energy consumption. The targets
were further tailored to the provinces and municipalities and became an important
metric for evaluating government performance at all levels. The 12th FYP added the
target of CO2 intensity reduction per capita of GDP, and share of non-fossil fuels
in primary energy consumption mix. The 13th FYP put a ceiling for total energy
consumption, strengthened policies on energy conservation and carbon reduction,
and introduced a range of fiscal, tax and financial incentives. China’s 2030 NDC
commitments under the Paris Agreement will also be incorporated and implemented
in the 14th and 15th FYPs. TheNDC targets are an integral part of building ecological
civilization during the 14th and 15th FYP periods.
1.3.2 Xi Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization
and New Development Philosophies for the New Era
The report of the 19thNationalCongress of theCPC laid out the goals, basic strategies
and blueprint of socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics in the new era.
It listed climate change as a major non-conventional security threat, and stated that
China has been actively fostering international cooperation in response to climate
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change, and has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in
the global endeavor for ecological civilization. It was highlighted in the report that
China would pursue environmentally friendly growth and international cooperation
on climate change, protect the planet that humanity depends on, and contribute to
global ecological safety. In regard to the construction of ecological civilization, China
aims to facilitate green, circular and low-carbon development, foster a new model
of modernization with harmonious development between human and nature, while
meeting the growing needs for a better life and a beautiful environment. This echoes
the advocacy of Paris Agreement for a climate-friendly low-carbon economy. The
tremendous progress China has made in energy conservation and economic trans-
formation resulted in part from integrating the management of climate change with
China’s sustainable development. The ultimate goal is a win–win scenario for the
economy, people’s livelihood, energy, environment, and CO2 emission reduction. Xi
Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization has become a key guiding ideology
and a powerful driver for China’s low-carbon transition.
The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC called for intensified efforts
to develop a system for building an ecological civilization, facilitate green develop-
ment, establish a green, low-carbon, and circular economy. The policy measures for
the string of targets and tasks set out in the report, “controlling environment pollution”
and “building a beautiful China” are consistent with the goals of addressing climate
change and mitigating carbon emissions, resulting in win-win solution. An energy
revolution on both the production and consumption sides and the transition to a green
and low-carbon economy are not only crucial measures for protecting the environ-
ment, improving the ecology and building a “beautiful China”, but also key strategies
forCO2 emissions reduction andglobal climate change response. To realize the objec-
tives which “the ecology and environment fundamentally improved, and the goal of a
beautiful China basically achieved by 2035”, having pollution prevention and control
measures that solely rely on improving energy efficiency and “end-of-pipe” tech-
niques are far from sufficient. The total consumption of fossil fuels such as coal and
oil must be reduced so that pollution can be curbed at the source. This will also effec-
tively cut CO2 emissions. Capping and reducing the consumption of coal and oil has
been an important step for the eastern coastal areas in the “blue skies” campaigns, and
will aid in the reduction ofCO2 emissions.Addressing climate change and implemen-
tating emission reduction commitments are also powerful drivers and synergies for
domestic environmental improvement. China is currently translating its new devel-
opment philosophies into concrete actions by transforming the drivers of economic
development through innovation, and reshaping the model of development through
green initiatives. The key to steering theChinese economyonto a track of high-quality
development instead of merely focusing on high-speed growth is to transform the
development model, to improve economic structure, unlock new drivers of growth,
deepen supply-side structural reform, and to increase total factor productivity. These
initiatives will help shift the model of development from extensive growth driven by
additional inputs of labor and capital at the expense of resources and the environ-
ment toward an innovation-driven, green and low-carbon endogenous development
path. They will also boost energy conservation, improve the energy utilization and
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output efficiency. They reflect a paradigm shift that fosters an enabling institutional
environment for promoting low-carbon transition and reforms, setting the stage for
accelerated low-carbon transition of the economic and energy systems.
China’s accelerating low-carbon transitions in its economic and energy sectors
not only aligns with the global agenda on low-carbon development, but also presents
a great opportunity to enhance its global competitiveness and influence. The urgent
call for global response to climate change will reshape the world’s landscape in
economic, trade, and technological competition. Advanced low-carbon and decar-
bonization technologies will become the frontiers of global technological innovation
and competition. As the world undergoes profound changes, the body that masters
advanced technology in the above-mentioned areas will gain initiative and enhanced
competitive advantage. China’s active pursuit of an energy revolution and low-carbon
transition of the economy are integrated with the strategic blueprint for developing
its own technological capabilities and low-carbon development drivers.China also
seeks the opportunity to share its findings and experience in low-carbon transition in
a world-wide context, enhancing global competitiveness and influence.
1.4 Research Objectives and Overall Structure
1.4.1 Context and Objectives
The report from the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party (CPC) of China
put forward the goals, fundamental policies, and main tasks for realizing socialist
modernization in the new era. The reports outlined the goals of developing China
into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, cultur-
ally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful by the middle of the century, becoming a
global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence, and
realizing the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation. The Paris Agreement set out
the goal of holding the increase in global average temperature to well -below 2°C
and pursuing efforts towards limiting it to 1.5°C. To achieve this target, all coun-
tries must increase their efforts to curb and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The
world should cut CO2 emissions to near-zero by 2050, and strive to achieve carbon
neutrality. Addressing the challenges of climate change is a common cause for all
humankind, and China will play an important role in this process as a participant,
contributor and torchbearer.
China’s long-term low-carbon emission development strategies should support
the attainment of domestic development and global response to climate change. By
themiddle of the century, while realizing the goal of building a great modern socialist
country, China should also achieve deep decarbonization development fitted to the
2°Cglobal target. To realize the harmonious coexistence of humans and nature aswell
as sustainable development, China should establish an industrial system of green,
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low-carbon, and circular development as well as a clean, safe, and efficient decar-
bonized energy system with new and renewable energy as pillars. When researching
and formulating China’s development strategies for 2050, we should keep in mind
both our internal and international imperatives, promote both domestic and global
ecological civilization, and achieve the coordinated governance and win–win collab-
oration of both sustained domestic development and global ecological safety. The
19th Party Congress presented the two-stage arrangement of socialist moderniza-
tion. China’s long-term low-carbon development strategy should be formulated and
deployed in accordance with the two-stage arrangement. The period 2020–2035
marks the first stage of China’s socialist modernization fulfilling the strategies and
tasks to realize modernization, as well as the goals and plans for ecological civiliza-
tion and building a beautiful China, China not only would fundamentally improve
the ecological environment, but also would achieve and strengthen the NDCs and
emission reduction commitments. As a result, it would meet standards for both envi-
ronmental quality and CO2 emission reduction. High-quality economic development
would be facilitated in coordinationwith economic, energy, and environmental efforts
to address climate change for a win–win scenario.
In the second stage of socialist modernization, from 2035 to 2050, after having
basically realized modernization and entered a post-industrial society, China’s
economic and social development will be featured by quality, intensive endogenous
growth, and China will have already peaked and lowered CO2 emissions, which is
more conducive to a low-carbon transition. During this stage, the need for global
CO2 emission reduction is more urgent, which should reach 6~7% on an annual
basis. With substantive improvements in the environment and attenuated environ-
mental stress, the goal and strategy of deep decarbonization will take precedence
over the endogenous requirements of resource conservation, environmental protec-
tion and sustainable development in China, and more consideration should be given
to assuming international responsibilities consistent with its ever-increasing national
strength and international influence.Chinamust take the goal of deep decarbonization
through keeping global temperature rise to well -below 2°C and striving for 1.5°C
as a key component of the overall strategy of building a modern socialist country,
and assume its responsibilities and leadership in safeguarding the ecological safety
of the Earth and the common interests of humankind, and contribute to the develop-
ment of humanity. China should examine its due and potential responsibilities and
obligations as determined by the goals and requirements of the Paris Agreement,
gradually expand the scope of GHG reduction efforts from mainly CO2 emissions
from energy consumption to all six GHGs, and develop absolute reduction targets
andmeasures aimed at 2050 that cover all GHGs across the entire economy. The Paris
Agreement requests all parties to submit their 2050 low GHGs development strate-
gies prior to 2020. This project will also provide support for the Chinese government
in formulating and submitting the country’s long-term low-emission development
strategy.
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1.4.2 Research Framework and Scenarios
Focusing on China’s long-term low-carbon development strategy and pathways, this
study encompassed a total of 18 topics (see Fig. 1.4), and pulled together the collec-
tive effort of domestic top research institutions in China. From amacroscopic point of
view, areas under study include the medium- to -long- term socioeconomic goals and
strategies, the coordinated development of the eastern, central and western regions
and their respectivelow-carbon strategies and pathways in the process of urbaniza-
tion, the impacts of international trade and industrial relocation, etc. From a sectoral
perspective, the research covered low-carbon development strategies and pathways
for the energy and power supply sector and themajor end-use sectors such as industry,
building, and transport. In addition, strategies,measures andpathways for non-energy
related CO2 and other GHG emission reductions are also presented under the section.
Policy-related topics under study include energy-saving potential and pathways, the
evaluation of advanced decarbonization technologies, infrastructure investment and
financing, transformation of consumption patterns, and research on coordinated
measures and effect analysis for the climate and environment. Furthermore, the
project explores five comprehensive and integrated topics, including the formula-
tion of vision statement for medium and long-term low-carbon emissions, policy
and institutional support systems, and global climate governance and international
cooperation, etc.
This project consists of both bottom–up and top–down approaches. Bottom–up
approaches include scenario analysis and technical evaluation of energy consumption
and CO2 technologies of all sectors. Top–down approaches include a macro-model
calculation and policy simulation. The study is oriented toward problem-solving and
Fig. 1.4 Project framework of China’s low-carbon transition pathways
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in-depth analysis targeted at China’s actual national conditions and characteristics
of its development stage by focusing on the trends, policies, and pathways of long-
term low-carbon development. The study has conducted policy simulation with the
goal of building a great modern country and realizing deep decarbonization path-
ways, and has analyzed emission reduction pathways, technology support, costs, and
prices driven by the long-term deep decarbonization goal. Four scenarios have been
designed and all topics studied and analyzed based on these four scenarios.
1. Policy scenario: supported by China’s NDCs submitted in 2015 under the Paris
Agreement, action plans, and relevant policies based on the assumption that the
current low-carbon transformation trends and policies remains.
2. Reinforced policy scenario: based on the policy scenario, this scenario further
enhances the intensity and scope for reducing energy intensity (defined as energy
consumption per unit of GDP) and CO2 intensity (defined as CO2 emissions per
unit of GDP) and improves the proportion of non-fossil fuels in primary energy
consumption. Under this scenario, exploring the potential for emission reduc-
tion, controlling totalCO2 emissions, strengthening policy support, and adapting
to the enhanced and upgraded NDCs and actions under the Paris Agreement.
3. 2°C scenario: based on the goal of controlling global warming to within 2°C,
this scenario considers the corresponding emission reduction pathways. In this
scenario, analyzing the emission reduction measures and roadmaps driven by
the deep decarbonization goals to be achieved by the middle of the century, and
demonstrate and evaluate the associated technology and capital needs, costs and
prices, and policy support.
4. 1.5°C scenario: based on the goals of controlling globalwarming towithin 1.5°C
and realizing carbon neutrality, this scenario demonstrates the possibilities and
pathway options for the realization of net-zero emissions of CO2 and deep
reductions of other GHGs emissions by 2050, and evaluating the possible social
and economic impacts.
Among the four scenarios, the reinforced policy scenario and the 2°C scenario are
the primary points of focus of this study. Before 2030 and 2035, the impact on the
fulfillment and updating of the NDCs against the background of the reinforced policy
scenario is the main target for the analysis, with focus on the impact of emission
reduction pathways driven by the 2°C goal on the targets and pathways for 2030
and 2035. After 2035, while realizing the goal of building a great socialist modern
country, the emission reduction pathways and policy support driven by the 2°C goal
become the main targets for study. This study also explores feasibility for realizing
net-zero CO2 emissions and deep emission reduction of other GHGs by 2050 to
attain the 1.5°C goal. It is worth noting that the connections between the scenarios
and the NDCs before 2035 are taken into consideration, as well as the coordination
of low-emission goals and strategies in these two stages.
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1.4.3 Overall Structure
This comprehensive report on the research onChina’s Long-termLow-carbonDevel-
opment Strategies and Pathways, is based on the consolidation of the first 17 topics of
the entire research project (the 18th topic is the comprehensive report), and focuses
on the strategic objectives, key conclusions, roadmaps and policy recommendations.
The report is divided into twelve chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, deals
primarily with the context, theoretical framework, guidelines and overall design. The
second chapter offers an overall analysis of long-term low-carbon emission develop-
ment, and delves into the state and trends of low-carbon development both in China
and internationally under the Paris Agreement.
Chapters 3–6 attempt to outline the scenarios of future emissions of GHGs, key
emission reduction technologies and policy requirements across all sectors. Chapter 3
dedicated to end-use energy consumption and CO2 emissions, is primarily concerned
with the current state of development of the industry, building and transport sectors,
decarbonization pathways, overall energy consumption and carbon emissions, and
activity levels, as well as analysis of the potential costs, and crucial supporting
policies. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the power and energy system, and assess the future
development and policy support needed for the power and energy system based on
power demand from the end-use sectors. Chapter 6 mainly explores the current state
of emissions of non-CO2 GHGs, future emission scenarios and outcomes, and key
emission reduction technologies and policy requirements. Chapters 7–9 consolidate
and evaluate the three aspects of low-carbon technology, transition costs, and long-
term low-carbon development pathways. Chapters 7 and 8 sort through critical zero-
carbon and carbon negative technologies (including hydrogen energy technologies,
energy storage technologies, CCS & BECCS, and zero-emission technologies in the
production of steel, cement and chemical, etc.), and examine their current stages
of development and future investment needs, etc. Chapter 9, devoted to an overall
analysis and evaluation of pathways, integrates in a systematic manner the low-
carbon strategies mentioned in Chapters 3–6, proposes an enhanced NDC pathway,
2°C pathway and 1.5°C pathway.
Chapter 10, titled strategic linchpins and policy safeguards, examines the existing
low-carbon development policies andmeasures in China, and proposes key strategies
to support the country’s low-emission development in the futurewhile taking into full
account China’s goals and strategies for building itself into a great modern socialist
country by mid-twenty-first century. Chapter 11, dedicated to the topic of global
climate governance and international cooperation, delves into the development, prin-
ciples and new realities of the global climate governance system. Chapter 12 offers
policy recommendations for China’s mid—and long-term low-carbon development
goals, strategies and implementation measures.
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Chapter 2
The State and Trend of China’s
Low-Carbon Development
2.1 New Paradigm of Global Response to Climate Change
Under the Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement established the long-term temperature goal to hold global
average temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue
efforts to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C.Basedon a “bottom-up” approach,
countries are asked to set their emission reduction targets and action plans inde-
pendently, and a global stocktake is mandated every five years to assess and drive
collective progress under the new global climate governance mechanism. The global
community has now fully entered the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement,
and arduous challenges and tasks await.
First, there is still a considerable gap between emission reduction commitments
by countries and those necessary to limit temperature rise to well-below 2°C. By
estimate, the annual emission gap by 2030 under the current NDCs would be 12–15
billion tons of CO2e [1], and the world is on track to an average 2.7°C increase by
2100. There is a less than 5% probability of a temperature rise below 2°C, a greater
than 25% probability of a temperature increase above 3°C, and a 10% probability of
exceeding 3.5°C. Therefore, it is imperative that countries implement and enhance
their emission reduction targets and climate actions [2].
Second, a growing number of studies and facts demonstrate that the negative
impacts of climate change ismore extensive,more severe, and accelerating at a greater
speed than originally predicted. In the current high-emissions scenario without rein-
forced actions, there is the risk of temperature rise of 5°C by the end of this century
with the chance of crossing the tipping points or risk thresholds in many areas,
resulting in irreversible catastrophic consequences. For instance, heat waves, which
currently feature an occurrence of less than 5% globally, will happen almost every
year; both the probabilities of flooding and agricultural droughts may increase by
ten folds; China’s grain production will shrink by 20%, and glaciers by 70% [2]. In
essence, if temperature rises too fast and too dramatic in the future, extremely high
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systemic risks to the economy, society, and ecosystem will pose significant threats
to water and food security, urban infrastructure, and the public health system. To
reverse the situation, active steps must be taken to improve the climate resilience of
the economy, society and ecosystem, and prevent climate risks.
Third, the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C highlighted the
urgency of addressing climate change, and reinforced and advanced the goal of
achieving “carbon neutrality” globally. The report, issued by IPCC in October 2018
as per the provisions of the Paris Agreement, not only provides scientific climate
assessment, but also serves to inform decision-makers for negotiations and political
consensus under the UNFCCC framework. The report shows the impacts and risks of
climate change can be dramatically reduced at 1.5°C warming compared to 2°C. But
that would entail much more urgent efforts in emission reduction: emissions should
be down by 45% from 2010 levels by 2030; global net zero CO2 emission and deep
reduction of non-CO2 GHGs is required in 2050. However, at the current pace of
emissions, global average warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052,
resulting in needing even more drastic reductions now. On the other hand, the cost
of 1.5°C will be three to four times greater than the 2°C pathway. The IPCC Special
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C reinforced and advanced the global target of
achieving carbon neutrality by the middle of this century and explored the pathways
for long-term low-carbon emissions reductions, which is expected to influence the
targets and choice of pathways as countries submit their 2050 long-term low-emission
strategies by the end of 2020.
Fourth, developed nations and regions such as the EUhave laid out specific timeta-
bles and action plans for the 1.5°C goal. The European Green Deal announced by
the European Commission in December 2019 aims to make Europe the first climate-
neutral continent, by pledging to cut GHGs by 50–55% by 2030 compared with
1990 levels, and to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, and these objectives will be
enshrined in legislation. The European Green Deal also proposes actions in seven
strategic areas, including supplying clean, affordable and secure energy; mobilizing
industry for a clean and circular economy; building and renovating in an energy
and resource efficient way; accelerating the shift to sustainable and smart mobility;
designing a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system; preserving and
restoring ecosystems and biodiversity; and a zero-pollution ambition for a toxic-
free environment. In 2019, the British government passed legislation to cut GHG
emissions to net zero prior to 2050, making the UK the first country to incorpo-
rate long-term climate targets into official laws and regulation. Although the Trump
administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement, US climate actions have
not come to a halt, and instead moved from the federal level to sub-state levels of
states, cities, companies, and universities. More than 20 states in the US, cummu-
lative accounting for more than 60% of the country’s GDP and 55% of population,
formed the United States Climate Alliance and pledged to honor their commitments
under the Paris Agreement. States such as California, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Washington have all passed legislations setting a goal of 100 percent carbon-free elec-
tricity by 2050 or earlier. In 2019, the NewYork State Legislature passed the Climate
Leadership and Community Protection Act, which mandated net zero emissions in
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all sectors of the economy by 2050—reduction by 85% in GHG emissions from
1990 levels, with the remaining 15% being offset through reforestation, restoring
wetlands, carbon capturing or other green projects. The more urgent the goal of
carbon neutrality, the tighter the constraints on emissions for all countries to achieve
sustainable development and the greater the pressure to bring about low-carbon
transition.
Fifth, the world is giving higher priority to the coordinated governance of climate
change, ecology and environment protection and sustainable development. The
global community is becoming increasingly aware of the interlinkages between
climate actions and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Actions to mitigate and
adapt to climate change will help promote local ecological protection and sustain-
able development, creating extensive synergies. Global climate efforts have triggered
low-carbon transformation of the economic and energy systems, and ushered socioe-
conomic development onto a green, low-carbon cycle and sustainable development
path. This is also the ultimate solution to improving regional ecology and environ-
ment and promoting the coordination of socioeconomic development with the envi-
ronment capacity. Therefore, the increasing awareness of all countries on the urgency
for energy revolution and low-carbon economic transition in the global response to
climate change presents enormous opportunities for the pursuit of domestic sustain-
ability goals. Efforts should bemade to achieve the coordinated governance of energy,
economy, environment, and climate to create awin–win scenario for all parties. In the
meantime, greater attention should focus on the coordination of measures to mitigate
and adapt to climate change.
Sixth, as the world is experiencing profound shifts unseen in a century, the senti-
ments of unilateralism, protectionism and self-interest of some developed coun-
tries have taken a stronger hold in climate negotiations, impeding the implementa-
tion of the Paris Agreement. At the 2019 UN climate change conference (COP25)
held in Madrid, some developed countries sought to advance self-interests in a
non-constructive manner during the negotiations while rejecting the concerns and
demands voiced by the vast majority of other parties, especially the developing
countries. They failed to advance various agendas in a comprehensive and balanced
approach due to a lack of political will to reinforce pragmatic actions, and opposed
to review and advance actions before 2020 while focusing solely on strengthening
the 1.5°C temperature controlling goal. Consequently, the contracting parties were
unable to settle on rules for market mechanism under Article 6 of the Paris Agree-
ment, and to achieve balanced progress and estimated effects in negotiations on key
areas including mitigation, adaptation, funding, technology, capacity building and
transparency. COP25 ended with unfulfilled expectations, and the implementation
of the Paris Agreement remains a serious challenge and daunting task.
Seventh, COVID-19 will significantly reshape the global climate process and
competitive landscape betweenmajor powers. The pandemic has triggered a massive
global economic downturn. Countries will give priority to restoring production,
ensuring people’s livelihood, and remediating deficiencies in the industrial chain
in the post-pandemic era, which might result in weaker actions and policy measures
for climate change and low-carbon transformation. Nevertheless, a consensus is also
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forming around “green economic recovery” in coping with the deeper global crisis of
climate change. The response to climate change will remain one of the front-burner
issues and critical battleground for major powers in their diplomatic efforts. Tackling
climate change represents the shared interest of humankind and high ground of inter-
nationalmoral, so there is also room for exchanges and cooperation amongChina, the
US, the EU, and other regions in this regard. It is imperative for China to coordinate
diplomatic policy and domestic green and low-carbon transition effectively.
2.2 The State and Outlook of China’s Domestic
Low-Carbon Transition
2.2.1 The New Situation of China’s Low-Carbon Transition
The Chinese economy entered a “new normal” after 2013 when the country adopted
new development philosophies, transformed the drivers of growth through innova-
tion, transitioned to green development, and gave full play to the synergistic of envi-
ronmental governance and CO2 emission reduction. The results of China’s energy
saving and carbon reduction measures have exceeded expectations, setting the stage
for achieving its 2030 NDC target.
The “new normal” prompted a shift of China’s economic development from size
and speed to quality and efficiency. GDPgrowth slowed down from an average 10.2%
during 2005–2013 to 6.9% during 2013–2018. In the meantime, the acceleration of
economic restructuring, industrial transformation and upgrading have saturated the
market for energy-intensive raw-materials products and lowered energy elasticity.
Between 2005 and 2013, energy elasticity stood at roughly 0.59 with an annual
drop of 3.8% in energy consumption per unit of GDP, compared to 0.32 and 4.7%
during 2013–2018. The dual reductions in energy elasticity and GDP growth led to a
significant contraction in the growth of total energy demand. During the period from
2005 to 2013, China’s energy consumption grew by 6% annually, and that growth slid
to 2.2% during 2013–2018, which reflected the decreasing energy demand. When
the GDP growth is held constant, the lower the elasticity of energy consumption, the
greater the decrease in energy intensity. However, with constant energy elasticity,
slower GDP growth would make for slower drop in energy consumption per unit
of GDP. The above two factors could offset each other so that the drop in energy
intensity will most likely remain at a level of 3.0–3.5% annually in the future.
While growth in China’s energy demand has been slowing, new and renew-
able energies have kept a robust growth of roughly 10%. As the energy structure
adjustment accelerates its pace, CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumption have
continued to fall. Prior to the “new normal”, CO2 emissions per unit of energy
consumption fell by 0.57% on average annually between 2005 and 2013, as opposed
to 1.38% between 2013 and 2018 under the “new normal”. CO2 emissions per unit
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Table 2.1 Changes in energy consumption and CO2 emissions under the “new normal”
2005—2013 2013—2018
GDP growth (%) 10.2 6.9
Energy consumption elasticity 0.59 0.32
Average annual growth of energy consumption (%) 6.0 2.2
Annual decline of energy intensity of GDP (%) 3.8 4.7
Annual growth of CO2 emissions (%) 5.4 0.8
Annual decline of CO2 intensity of GDP (%) 4.4 5.7
of GDP also increased from 4.4% on average annually in 2005–2013 to 5.7% in
2013–2018, which signified speedier energy transition (see Table 2.1).
In the three years following 2017, the growth of energy consumption and CO2
emissions has rebounded. In 2017 and 2018, total energy consumption rose by 3.0%
and 3.3% respectively, and CO2 emissions were up by 1.8% and 2.2% respectively.
The Chinese economy grew by 6% and energy consumption by 3.3% in 2019. The
total energy consumption was 4.98 billion tce in 2020, realizing the goal of limiting
total energy consumption below 5 billion tce set in the 13th FYP period. Coal
consumption has entered a downward trajectory since 2013. Despite the rebound
in the past two years, total consumption has not exceeded the level of 2013. Gener-
ally speaking, China has moved into a peak platform period of coal consumption,
which still might fluctuate in the future. But with a further slowdown in energy
consumption growth and rapid expansion of renewable energy, coal consumption
will no longer see steady growth. On the whole, as economic growth stabilizes and
high-quality development becomes the norm, the growth of energy demand and CO2
emissions will further ease. Chances are slim for a comeback of the strong growth
experienced prior to 2013.
The COVID-19 put a severe damper on economic growth in 2020, dragging the
average annual GDP growth during the 13th FYP period to below 6%. Energy
consumptions per unit of GDP dropped by 13%, and CO2 emission intensity by
18.8% during the 13th FYP, meaning that China has achieved the 13th FYP target
of reducing CO2 intensity by 18%.
2.2.2 Scenario Analysis of Energy Conservation and Carbon
Reduction During the 14th FYP Period
The 14th Five-Year Plan period marks the first five years for China to embark on a
new journey of building a modern socialist country in all respects. China would
face a series of urgent tasks such as reviving the economy after the pandemic,
ensuring people’s livelihood and remedying the deficiencies of the industrial chain.
Meanwhile, China is also in a critical period of transition to high-quality growth.
During the 14th FYP period, China will adhere to new development concepts and
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speed up the creation of a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy system and
a green, low-carbon, circular, and sustainable economic system. New progress in
energy conservation and carbon reduction is on the horizon.
The current capacity of high energy-consuming industries such as themodern coal
chemical and petrochemical sectors might continue to expand into the early phase of
the 14th FYP period, driving the growth in energy consumption. However, the latter
part of the period will see no more capacity expansion in heavy and chemical indus-
tries, with a slowdown in the growth of energy consumption. As China presses ahead
with industrial transformation and upgrading and high-quality economic develop-
ment, it will witness consistent and steady improvements in energy conservation and
carbon reduction during the 14th FYP period.
China will pursue the new development philosophies, intensify economic restruc-
turing, industrial transformation and upgrading, and strive for high-quality develop-
ment during the 14th FYP period, prompting increasingly faster energy conserva-
tion and carbon reduction. As for GDP growth during the period, the pandemic
has wreaked on the international economy, industrial chain, and global supply and
demand, which will hamper China’s economic recovery and development. Most
domestic research institutions project a roughly 5% of average annual economic
growth under relatively optimistic circumstances during the 14th FYP period.
Following the slowdown in GDP growth, the market for energy-intensive raw mate-
rials such as steel and cement will become saturated and begin to march down-
ward, further pushing down the elasticity of energy consumption. The current stim-
ulus package for reviving the economy, boosting new infrastructure and urbaniza-
tion investment, spurring development of the digital economy and technological
upgrading of traditional industries, and advancing the integrated development of
intelligent urban infrastructure and low-carbon transitions will contribute to the
decline of energy intensity.
Power generation costs for wind and solar will be comparable to that of coal
during the 14th FYP period. Non-fossil fuels could maintain the 7% annual growth
during the 14th FYP period; the non-fossil share of China’s total primary energy
consumption might reach roughly 20% in 2025; and the share of coal will fall further
from 56.8% in 2020 to approximately 51% in 2025. Based on these projections, CO2
emissions per unit of GDPwill drop by roughly 19% during the 14th FYP period. By
2025, total energy consumption can be held under 55 tce, and total CO2 emissions
under 10.5 billion tons. See the table below for more details (Table 2.2).
The 14th FYP period is a critical stage for the green and low-carbon transi-
tion of China’s economy and the attainment of high quality development. On one
hand, China should keep up and drive the current momentum and achievements
made in the energy conservation and carbon reduction by employing active energy
conservation and carbon reduction targets as key instruments for the green and low-
carbon transition and high-quality development of Chinese economy. On the other
hand, China should boost the robust low-carbon transition since the implementation
of the 11th FYP, maintain strategic determination amid economic slowdown, stick
to energy conservation, carbon reduction and high-quality economic development,
and holistically advance other related policies and measures aside from continued
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Table 2.2 Analysis of the effects of energy conservation & carbon reduction by period
12th FYP 13th FYP 14th FYP
Planned Actual Planned Estimated Projected
Average annual GDP growth (%) 7.9 5.7 5.3
Decline in energy intensity of GDP
(%)
16 18.5 15 13 14.7
Non-fossil share at end of period
(%)
11.4 12.1 Approx. 15 15.8 20
Decline in CO2 intensity of GDP
(%)
17 21.7 18 18.8 19
Total energy consumption at end of
period (billion tce)
4.30 < 5 4.98 5.5
Total CO2 emissions at end of
period (billion tCO2)
9.29 9.9 10.4
efforts to establish quantitative energy-saving and carbon-reduction targets. Specific
suggestions are as following:
1. Developing guiding targets for curbing total energy consumption andCO2 emis-
sions. In fact, the target for total energy consumption was formulated and imple-
mented during the 13th FYP period. That, coupled with the target of a non-fossil
energy share, virtually means that a CO2 emissions target has been determined.
It is imperative that target for curbing total CO2 emissions be statedmore explic-
itly during the 14th FYP period so that they are aligned with the policies and
measures introduced to achieve CO2 emissions peak before 2030, and gradu-
ally be integrated with and eventually replace the energy consumption cap. By
capping total CO2 emissions, a ceiling for energy consumption will not be set
for local governments and enterprises. Instead, they are incentivized to develop
and utilize more new and renewable energy, which will promote the green and
low-carbon transition of the economy. A carbon emission allowance system for
enterpriseswill gradually replace the allowance of energy consumption, andwill
be linked with the nationwide carbon trading market currently being developed.
Total CO2 emissions management is more aligned with international norms and
practices than placing a cap on energy consumption.
As uncertainties abound in the future growth of the economy and energy
consumption, if GDP growth exceeds expectations, it will have less of an impact
on energy intensity, but will significantly affect the total energy consumption
target. Therefore, certain amount of leeway should be reserved for a looser target
for total energy consumption than that for energy intensity reduction.
2. Encouraging optimal development zones to peak CO2 emissions first. It was
proposed in the 13th FYP that “China supports optimal development zones
to reach the peak of carbon emissions first.” China’s CO2 emissions could,
in general, plateau after 2025. The more developed eastern coastal areas are
well-positioned to take the lead nationwide in peaking emissions, with some
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cities on track to peak carbon emissions by around 2020. Under this circum-
stance, the target for optimal development zones in the eastern coastal areas
to reach emissions peak ahead of the nation should be included in the 14th
FYP, and developed provinces and cities should be encouraged to formulate
and implement the appropriate plans and policy measures.
3. Driving the peaking of CO2 emissions in energy-intensive industries earlier.
Industrial sector accounts for two-thirds of the country’s total end-use energy
consumption, and is the sector with the most energy-saving potential. With
industrial restructuring, transformation and upgrading during the 14th FYP
period, the industrial sector will be well-positioned to peak its carbon emissions
earlier. The goal of peaking CO2 emissions in the energy-intensive industries
can be stated explicitly in the 14th FYP.
4. Controlling energy-related non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions. China’s current
emission mitigation efforts and commitments are mostly centered on energy-
related CO2 emissions. Starting from the 14th FYP period, the country should
start to manage and rein in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions from indus-
trial production processes, agriculture, forestry, and waste management, and in
particular the production and use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). A monitoring,
reporting, and verification system for all greenhouse gas emissions should be
established with emission reduction measures and actions.
5. Deepening market-oriented reform of the energy management system. The
boomof energy technologies and industrial innovation has accelerated the trans-
formation of the energy industry, although institutional and policy obstacles
remain to be overcome. China must plough ahead with reforms of the systems
of energy management and pricing, and promote the development of distributed
renewable energy. In the meantime, greater progress need to be made in the
establishment of the emissions trading market. It is recommended that during
the 14th FYP period, the coverage of China’s national emissions trading market
is expanded to include major energy-intensive industries as soon as possible
and emissions allowance management is improved to promote the low-carbon
transition of energy and economy through market-based approaches.
2.2.3 Challenges and Arduous Tasks Facing China for Rapid
Low-Carbon Transition
China has scored remarkable and internationally acclaimed success in energy conser-
vation and carbon reduction since the implementation of the 11th FYP. The country
has pursued new development philosophies, sped up economic restructuring and
industrial upgrading, and strengthened energy conservation and carbon reduction
policies and measures under the new normal. Consequently, the rapid rises in energy
consumption and CO2 emissions have been reversed. The energy consumption and
CO2 emissions will, slowly but surely, continue their growth in the near future. Thus
enormous efforts are still required to peak CO2 emissions.
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China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP plunged by 42.4% from 2005 to
2019, down 3.86% year-on-year, much higher than that of developed countries over
the same period. However, due to the unique industrial structure during this stage
of industrialization and urbanization, the share of the industry, especially energy-
intensive sectors, in the Chinese economy is higher than that of developed countries,
and the manufacturing sector is also situated at the middle and low ends of the global
industrial value chain, which are dominated by energy-intensive and low value-added
products. This explains the fact that China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP
still stood at 1.6 times the global average and 2–3 times that of developed countries
in 2017. Tremendous potential exists in the areas of energy conservation and CO2
emission reduction asChina presses aheadwith economic restructuring and industrial
upgrading, although the journey will take a considerable amount of time.
China is well endowed with coal resources, which have always predominated the
energy mix. China has spared no effort to develop renewable energy, and the non-
fossil share of China’s energy mix more than doubled from 7.4% in 2005 to 15.3% in
2019 while the share of coal slid from 72.4 to 57.7%. China still faces tough tasks in
terms of expediting the development of new and renewable energy sources, curbing
and reducing coal consumption and speeding up low-carbon transition of the energy
mix.
The peaking of CO2 emissions means that sustained economic growth will be
completely decoupled from carbon emissions. When fossil energy consumption has
plateaued, increasing alternative energies for coal will not only slow down carbon
emissions, but also curtail and reduce conventional pollutants from the source,
promoting fundamental improvements in environmental quality. Peaking CO2 emis-
sions will be a landmark in the low-carbon transition of China’s economic develop-
ment as well as a historic milestone in the fundamental improvement of the country’s
ecological environment and the building of a beautiful China.
To ensure sustained economic growthwhile peaking carbon emissions, the decline
in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP must be greater than the growth of GDP, so that
the increase in emissions brought by GDP growth is offset by a reduced emission
intensity. Currently, China’s economic growth remains at a level between 5–6%
and is expected to continue tapering off after 2020. After the basic completion of
the country’s industrialization and urbanization drive around 2030, China will have
joined the ranks of high-income countries in terms of national income per capita.
Intensive growth will become the norm and GDP growth will slow further to roughly
4.5–5.0%, still higher than the average of developed countries as well as the global
average. Therefore, efforts on energy conservation and substitution must be intensi-
fied so that the annual decline in emissions intensity of GDP will not be lower than
4.5–5.0%, and emissions peak will occur as soon as possible before 2030.
As China transitions to an increasingly low-carbon energy mix, it is expected to
peak CO2 emissions before it reaches the peak in total energy consumption. Another
key precondition for emission peak is that the drop in CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP must be greater than the growth of energy consumption, so that the increase
in emissions brought by growth in energy consumption is offset by a reduced CO2
emissions per unit of energy consumption, and carbon emissions will plateau or
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trend downward. By around 2030 when GDP growth is projected to be 4.5–5.0%,
the elasticity of energy consumption will also drop below 0.3, bringing the growth of
total energy demand down below 1.5%. Yet the supply of non-fossil energy will need
to sustain its growth of more than 6% on an annual basis in order for the increase in
total energy demand to be met entirely by non-fossil sources. The annual reduction
of CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumed needs to exceed 1.5% and continue
to rise, and CO2 emissions will peak and then turn downward.
ForChina to peakCO2 emissions around 2030, it needs to undertake greater efforts
than its counterparts in the developed world. China will peak its CO2 emissions
earlier in the stage of development than developed countries, who only reached their
emission peaks after industrialization when GDP growth was relatively modest (no
higher than 3% in general) and the annual decline of CO2 intensity of GDP was
below 3%. To peak CO2 emissions around 2030, China needs to secure a 4.5–5.0%
annual decline in carbon intensity of GDP, which in turn entails painstaking efforts
in energy conservation and low-carbon transition of the energy mix, and in particular
the acceleration of new and renewable energy development and the reduction of CO2
emissions per unit of energy consumed. The work on these fronts will play a critical
role in driving the country to peak emissions.
In the long haul, the goals of holding the rise in global temperature below 2°C
or even further to 1.5°C and achieving global net zero emission in the second half
of this century or even by mid-century pose considerable challenges for China. The
majority of EU members had peaked their CO2 emissions in the 1980s while the
United States and Japan also reached their peaks around 2005. There is a 50–70
years of transition from carbon peak to carbon neutrality for these countries. In
comparison, China will only have a window of 20–30 years between its carbon peak
in 2030 and the deadline for net zero emission. Therefore, more ambitious, rigorous,
and faster emission reduction efforts are required for China, and greater challenges
and costs lie ahead.
2.3 China’s Long-Term Economic and Social Development
Prospects
The 19th Party Congress put forward the goals, basic strategies and blueprints of
China’s socialist modernization drive. “By 2020, not only must we finish building a
moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieve the first centenary goal,”
the report of the 19th Party Congress notes, “we must also build on this achievement
to embark on a new journey toward the second centenary goal of fully building a
modern socialist country.”
In the first stage from 2020 to 2035, China will largely realize socialist modern-
ization. The country’s economic and technological progress will experience a giant
leap, and it will become a global leader in innovation. There will be a fundamental
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Fig. 2.1 Related studies on population projections [3–9]
improvement in the environment with the goal of building a beautiful China basi-
cally reached. In the second stage from 2035 to 2050, the country will develop into
a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally
advanced, harmonious, and beautiful. China’s material, political, spiritual, social and
ecological civilizations will be upgraded in all respects. China will rise to become a
leading nation in terms of national power and global impact, and the goal of common
prosperity for all will be basically realized, and a beautiful China will become a
reality.
China’s GDP per capita surpassed 10,000 USD in 2019 and is steadily closing the
gap as an upper-middle-income country with a high-income country. This section
presents the main trends of China’s future economic and social development based
on current national realities and the two centenary goals.
2.3.1 Population and Urbanization Rate
Existing studies have generally made similar predictions regarding the population
trends of China (see Fig. 2.1). The country’s population will hit a ceiling between
2030 and 2035 with 1.4–1.5 billion people, and then trend downward. According
to a projection by the National Health and Family Planning Commission in 2017,
China’s population will likely reach a peak of 1.45 billion in 2030, after which it will
drop to 1.4 billion by 2050.1
Since the beginning of this century, people over 60 years old in China has
comprised more than 10% of the total population, which makes China officially
1 http://news.cri.cn/gb/1321/2017/03/10/661s5236359.htm.
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an aging society. According to the projection of National Population Development
Plan (2016–2030), the growth of the population aged 60 and older will accelerate
sharply from 2021 to 2030, and its share in the total population will hit roughly
25% by 2030. The working-age population will shrink rapidly from 2021 to 2030,
and by 2030, the share of workers aged 45–59 years is projected to reach around
36%. The dwindling labor force and population aging will hurt China’s economic
development. However, the improvement of population skills and the development
of informationization and intellectualization will help offset the decline in the size
of the labor force and ensure sustained economic and social development.
The level of urbanization is one of the key factors underlining China’s economic
development and energy consumption. Existing researches generally agree on the
trends of China’s urbanization in the coming three decades (see Fig. 2.2). Data
shows that permanent urban residents exceeded 60% of the Chinese population in
2019, and by 2050, approximately 75% of the population will inhabit urban areas,
an increase of nearly 20 percentage points compared to 2015. Looking at the trends
by period, some studies suggest that the urbanization rate will surge before 2030
and see slower growth afterwards while others indicate that the growth will be more
evenly distributed in different period. It can be assumed that China’s urbanization
rate will reach 65–70% in 2035 and 75–80% in 2050.
Projections of future population size and urbanization rate are presented below
after incorporating results from various studies (Table 2.3).
Fig. 2.2 Related studies on urbanization rate [4–6, 8–11]
Table 2.3 China’s future population and urbanization rate
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2050
Population (billion) 1.375 1.416 1.426 1.450 1.444 1.395
Urbanization rate (%) 56.1 60.4 64.6 66.9 68.5 75.0
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2.3.2 Economic Growth and Changes in Industrial Structure
China’s economic development is currently in themid to late stage of industrialization
and urbanization. The country’s per capita GDP topped 10,000 USD in 2019 as it
transitions from an upper-middle income economy into a high-income economy. The
historical trajectory of development in developed countries also demonstrates that
after the 10,000-dollarmark is crossed, economic growthwill generally shift from the
pursuit of quantity and scale to quality and efficiency; the share of the industrial sector
will fall while that of the services will grow; the share of traditional manufacturing
will shrink while that of high-tech industries is slated to rise; and economic growth
will slow down butmaintain steady growth as the economy transitions from extensive
to intensive growth. China’s economic development in the future will also by and
large follow this pattern.
In the first stage of China’s socialist modernization efforts from 2020 to 2035, the
country’s industrialization and urbanization will be largely completed. The economy
will fall back to a medium growth and, in the meantime, overtake the US economy as
the world’s largest during this period. Investment growth will slow down but remain
at a high level. Despite the shrinking of the labor force, human capital growth,
labor transfer, coupled with reforms to enhance market vitality, will accelerate the
growth of total factor productivity. With the completion of the massive infrastruc-
ture construction phase, the market for energy-intensive raw materials such as steel
and cement will become saturated and trend downward, with a reduction in the
share of the heavy and chemical industry in GDP. The manufacturing industry will
move toward the mid-to-high end of the global value chain, with improvements in
China’s foreign trade structure and added value. The weight of modern services in
the economy such as information and finance will experience steady growth, and the
country will make notable strides in agricultural modernization. In the meantime,
the consumption structure of Chinese society will undergo enormous changes as the
caliber of demand rises, the middle class expands and the overall purchasing power
of residents increases. Emerging consumption trends driven by the higher needs of
the people such as culture and entertainment, health services, training, and tourism,
will flourish. While capital accumulation will remain the main driver of economic
growth, the role of consumption will take on greater prominence and the contribution
of total factor productivity will continuously expand. Broadly speaking, economic
growth at this stage will feature a slower speed but substantial improvements in
efficiency and quality.
In the second stage of China’s socialist modernization, from 2035 to 2050, the
country will evolve into a post-industrial economy, and urbanization will also have
stabilized and been largely achieved. This phase will be characterized by slower
growth in investment, diminishing labor force and economic growth primarily driven
by services and consumption. From the standpoint of total factor productivity, the
world will witness a new wave of technological innovation with increasing pene-
tration of new technologies in various sectors of the economy. The contribution
of investment to economic growth will take a backseat to technological innovation,
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which will become the core driver of growth. The increase in total factor productivity
will become the main ingredient of economic growth.
Projections on future GDP growth are given in Table 2.4 based on comprehensive
consideration of factor inputs that affect China’s potential growth and the laws of
change as well as findings of other domestic researches (see Fig. 2.3). On the whole,
China’s future average annual GDP growth will feature a steady decline, dropping to
roughly 3% by 2050, which is still slightly higher than that of the current developed
countries. Growth is expected to experience fluctuations in the near term due to the
impact of the pandemic.
Changes in future GDP growth will bear considerable impact on the reduction of
CO2 intensity, the schedule of peaking and the amount of emissions at the time of
peaking. In the wake of the CO2 emissions peak around 2030, economic growth will
be decoupled from emissions, and changes in GDP growth will exert minor impact
on long-term CO2 emissions. This research opts for more optimistic estimates of
pre-2030 GDP growth, or in other words, it chooses a scenario where the path to
peaking emissions is more challenging. Industry, and in particular manufacturing,
has always featured a large uptake in Chinese economy. The secondary industry
made up 40% of GDP in 2018, higher than that of developed countries during their
industrialization. China will maintain its status as a manufacturing powerhouse for
a long time, and will not follow the footsteps of developed countries in the massive
offshoring ofmanufacturing. The secondary industry will still represent considerable
weight in the economy (see Figs. 2.4 and 2.5). The share of the tertiary industry will
rise steadily to reach roughly 60% in 2030 and possibly more than 70% in 2050—on
a par with that of developed countries in the current stage (Table 2.5).
2.3.3 Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions
Future energy demand and CO2 emissions are not only related to factors such as
economic and social development, industrial structure, and technological progress,
but also dependent on strategic goals and policy decisions. The analysis of quantities
and types of energy consumption and CO2 emission trends is not built on projections
of existing trends, but rather, on the scenario analysis of various strategic goals and
policies. In particular, the pathway of emission reduction to reach the goal of the
Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 2°C and 1.5°C will drive ambitious
energy conservation and low-carbon transition of the energy mix. The strategy and
goal of China’s energy revolution in the future must not only provide a clean, safe,
economical, and efficient energy supply for socialist modernization, but also be
aligned with the CO2 emission pathway of staying below 2°C. The long-term energy
strategy ought to be both problem and goal-oriented by coordinating the two major
interests of domestic sustainable development and global ecological safety, as well
as the goals and tasks of the two stages of the country’s development, namely the
fulfillment of NDC ambitions in 2030 and the fundamental improvement of China’s
environment by 2035 during the first stage, and the building of a beautiful China
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Fig. 2.4 Related studies on the share of the secondary industry [6, 9, 14, 15]
and the achievement of deep decarbonization by 2050 during the second stage. The
Chinese government needs to coordinate its efforts and plan ahead, develop an energy
revolution and low-carbon emissions strategy aligned with the two-stage plan of
China’s socialist modernization, strive toward a great modern socialist country and
a beautiful China while pursuing a deep decarbonization pathway consistent with
the target of near-zero emissions by mid-century under the global warming scenario
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Fig. 2.5 Related studies on the share of the tertiary industry [6, 9, 14, 15]
Table 2.5 Reference scenarios for China’s future industrial structure
2015 2020 2025 2035 2050
Primary industry (%) 8.83 7.52 6.89 5.42 3.48
Secondary industry (%) 40.93 37.47 34.10 28.10 24.22
Tertiary industry (%) 50.24 55.01 59.01 66.48 72.30
of 2°C, make contributions commensurate with China’s rising national strength and
international profile, and spearhead the low-carbon transition of the global energy
system and economy.
Most domestic research studies predict future energy demand and CO2 emissions
under the scenario of enhanced energy conservation and substitution. There is a dearth
of studies on the 2°C or even 1.5°C target-driven scenario, where systematic research
is needed. The findings of other domestic researches are illustrated in Figs. 2.6
and 2.7, which suggest that the pathway to achieve the 2°C goal is an extremely
challenging one.Various studies have produced divergent estimates ofCO2 emissions
in 2050 under different policy scenarios in the future. Most studies conclude that
China’s energy-relatedCO2 emissionswill reach between 4–10 billion tCO2 by 2050,
which is also a matter that will receive granular discussion in subsequent chapters of
this report.
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Fig. 2.6 Related studies on future energy consumption [4–6, 12, 13]
Fig. 2.7 Related studies on total CO2 emissions [5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16]
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Chapter 3
End-Use Energy Consumption & CO2
Emissions
3.1 Industrial Sector
3.1.1 Current Development and Trend of the Industrial
Sector
1. State of Energy Consumption and CO2Emissions of China’s Industrial
Sector
As a key pillar of China’s economic growth, the industrial sector constitutes the
dominant source of energy consumption and CO2 emissions. In 2018, the added
value of China’s industrial sector was 30.5 trillion RMB, accounting for 33.9% of
GDP. Energy is consumed by the industrial sector for fuel combustion and raw
materials, etc. [1]. In 2017, The end-use energy consumption of the industrial sector
registered at 2.83 billion tce, comprising 64.8% of the total end-use energy consump-
tion. Energy consumption of the industrial sector is mainly attributable to six energy
intensive industries, including power, steel, cement, petrochemical, chemical and
non-ferrous metal, which made up 75.1% of the total primary energy consumption
of the industrial sector in 2017 [2] (see Fig. 3.1). Industrial CO2 emissions include
those from energy activities and industrial production processes. However, due to
delayed survey and accounting, the statistics of CO2 emissions of the industrial sector
is relatively not up to date and inconsistent with the accounting standard of indus-
trial output and energy consumption. The First Biennial Update Report on Climate
Change reveals that the CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in the industrial and
construction sectors and from industrial production processes in China totaled 8.48
billion tons in 2012, or 91.0% of the total CO2 emissions of the year (including land
use changes and forestry), of which CO2 emissions from fuel combustion of the
industrial and construction sectors stood at 7.28 billion tons, which is 83.8% of the
total CO2 emissions from energy activities.
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Fig. 3.1 Energy consumption mix of China’s industrial sector (2017)
The expanding industrial output has resulted in rising energy consumption and
carbon emissions of the industrial sector, but a notable slowdown has been observed.
In terms of energy consumption, in 2017, the end-use energy consumption of the
industrial sector was 2.83 billion tce, 1.9 times higher than in 2000 with an average
growth of 6.5% year-on-year. [2]. From the perspective of carbon emissions, the
published National Greenhouse Gas Inventory suggested total CO2 emissions from
fuel combustion in the industrial and construction sectors and from industrial produc-
tion processes rose by 3.37 billion tons from 2005 to 2012, averaging 7.5% growth
rate year-on-year, exceeding the 6.1% average year-on-year growth rate of industrial
energy consumption in the same period [3]. Yet as China enters the advanced stage
of industrialization and becomes a post-industrialized economy, a major slowdown
in the growth of industrial energy consumption has been detected with a continuous
decline in end-use energy consumption of China’s industrial sector, which registered
negative growth for two years in a row (2014–2016). Despite a bounceback in 2017,
the figure was still 1.5 million tce lower than that in 2014. From 2011 to 2017, the
industrial sector consumed an additional 186 million tce—a mere 30% of the added
energy consumption in China [2] (see Fig. 3.2).
Improvements are continuously made in energy conservation and emission reduc-
tion policies with sustained enhancement in energy efficiency and optimization in
energy consumption mix. Through continued supply-side structural reform in coal
and steel industries, campaigns and implementation of key energy-saving projects
such as comprehensive upgrading of coal-fired boilers for energy conservation and
eco-friendliness, energy efficiency enhancement of motor systems, reduction and
replacement of coal consumption, energy performance contracting, etc., China has
shown a slowdown in the growth of major energy-intensive products and sustained
improvement in industrial energy efficiency with some sectors ranking among the
global leaders in this regard (see Fig. 3.3). From 2000 to 2016, energy efficiency
grew by one-third for the steel industry and a half for the cement industry in China



































Increment of energy consumption in other sectors
Increment of energy consumption in industrial sector
Fig. 3.2 Changes in added energy consumption in China and in the industrial sector from 2010 to
2017 (Data source: China Energy Statistical Yearbook)
Fig. 3.3 Energy consumption in major energy-intensive products compared to 2010 level (Data
source: Wang Qingyi, Energy in China 2018)
[4]. Meanwhile, through coal reduction and substitution, promotion of electrification
and technical progress in production, notable changes have taken place in the end-use
energy consumption mix of the industrial sector, with 2012 as a turning point, when
a decline was seen in both the total use and the proportion of coal and coke in the
industrial sector, while the consumption of natural gas and electricity had been on
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Fig. 3.4 End-use energy consumption mix of the industrial sector by category (Data source: China
Energy Yearbook 2018)
a sharp rise. In 2017, the share of coal and coke consumption fell back to 44.8%,
while the proportion bounced to 6.8% for natural gas and 24.6% for electricity [2]
(see Fig. 3.4).
2. Outlook on Energy Consumption and CO2Emission Trend of China’s
Industrial Sector
With ample potentials in its development, China’s industrial sector is facing
mounting pressures on energy demand. As the biggest developing country in the
world, China is still in the intermediate stage of industrialization with considerable
space for further growth and growing pressure of energy consumption and carbon
emissions of the industrial sector. Despite being a manufacturing powerhouse, China
trails way behind the US, EU and Japan in terms of core technologies, quality, effi-
ciency and indigenous innovation, etc., with its manufacturing sector on the lower
end of the global arena. At the per capita level, China’s industrial added value was
1.3 times of that of the world average yet merely 35.6% of the US in 2016 [5]. In the
sameyear, China’s per capita industrial end-use energy consumptionwas around 95%
higher than the world average and 16% higher than OECD countries, but still 12%
lower than US [4]. At the global level, industry remains the key pillar for economic
growth with minimal sign of “de-industrialization”. At the constant price of 2010,
manufacturing as a percentage of global GDP climbed from 14.8 to 16.0% from
1991 to 2014 [5]. Despite a slowdown or even decline in total energy demand of the
industrial sector in major developed countries, global industrial energy demand is
set to grow continually. Studies have found that from 2017 to 2040, annual growth in
energy demand of the world industrial sector will average around 1.3%, and major
developed economies such as the US and EU might witness a drop in total demand,
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yet the share of industry in end-use energy consumption will slowly move along a
rising curve [4]. Especially with the onslaught of COVID-19, increasing awareness
of industrial security, independence and controllability is found in all countries, and
the global industrial chain is approaching a new round of restructuring, which spells
mounting strains for China to consolidate, shore up and empower its industrial chain.
The growth in energy demand will see a substantial slowdown as the industry
shifts from extensive growth to quality development. As China transforms from a
“world factory” to a manufacturing powerhouse and moves towards quality develop-
ment, industrial energy demand is set to experience a tremendous slowdown despite
its continued growth. In terms of industrial structure, as China’s industrial economy
advances towards medium and high-end, the mainstay of the industry will shift from
traditional sectors such as steel, building materials, and textile towards emerging
industries of strategic importance, high-tech and advanced manufacturing, with
increasing decoupling of industrial development and energy consumption. Mean-
while, as China succeeds in building a moderately well-off society, its urbaniza-
tion rush is likely to tide off and the demand for major energy-intensive products
will be saturated, which will downsize a portion of the energy-intensive sectors.
Besides, amid a sweeping new round of global industrial revolution, the massive
application of new technologies such as industrial robotics, AI and industrial internet
catalyzed by growing industrial digitalization, internet penetration and intelligence,
the existing mode of industrial production and organizational structure will be
disrupted, producing a far-reaching impact on the energy mix of the industrial sector.
To illustrate, industrial robotics and 3D printing will tremendously boost the energy
efficiency and the electrification of the industry while replacing the traditional way
of production and manual labor arrangement.
As industrial electrification picks up its pace, the peak will occur sooner in carbon
emissions than in energy demand of the industrial sector. CO2 emissions of the sector
hinge on energy demand, energy efficiency and energy mix, among other factors;
with the slowdown in energy demand of the industry, improved electrification and
constant changes in power mix of the society, industrial CO2 emissions will peak
before its energy demand. With emerging industries such as modern manufacturing
on a fast track of development and fossil fuels such as coal being increasingly replaced
in heavily polluted areas, energy demand of the industry will primarily come from
electricity and natural gas with reduced demand for coal and more electric and
lower-carbon energymix. Studies have shown that electricity of non-energy-intensive
sectors will comprise 47% of the end-use energy consumption in China by 2040 [4].
Among industrial sectors, building materials and textile would peak emissions prior
to steel and non-ferrous metals, etc.; while the energy demand and CO2 emissions
of the petrochemical industry might peak later due to the rapidly growing output.
In the meantime, the fast growth of petroleum and coal as raw materials of the
petrochemical industry will also lead to an earlier peak in industrial CO2 emissions
than energy demand.
The transition towards low-carbon industry remains unpredictable, with deep
emission reduction as a daunting task. Ranking the top in industrial output, China
is at the forefront of a new round of industrial revolution with tremendous emission
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reduction potential in employing innovative technologies and promoting integrated
development of industrialization and low-carbon energy, electrification and infor-
mation technologies. However, despite the sustained enhancement in energy effi-
ciency of the industry, the development model featuring high input, consumption,
and emissions has not been essentially reversed. Recently, many key petrochemical
and coal chemical projects, including coal-to-aromatics, coal-to-ethanol, and coal-
to-hydrogen projects, are under planning due to multiple factors, which brings addi-
tional pressure on controlling industrial energy consumption and carbon emissions.
Meanwhile, the prevalent overcapacity and inter-regional imbalance in industrial
development generate substantial challenges for energy-intensive sectors to widely
reduce intensity. With a sizable existing industrial capacity and the limited operation
time of many carbon-intensive plants, a premature retirement would incur massive
sunk asset losses and potential unemployment risk. In addition, the lock-in effect
stemming from the existing market stronghold of carbon-intensive technologies and
industries is another stumbling block for the rapid expansion of low-carbon or zero-
carbon technologies. Industrial transformation is highly associated with high-quality
economic and social development, calling for an overhaul in the pattern of production
and consumption across the society. Studies have suggested that postponing the goal
of industrial transformation to 2035 would mean an extra 100 million tce consump-
tion and 260 million tons of more CO2 emissions from the industrial sector in 2040
[6]. Besides, as globalization grows, changes in international division of labor and
industrial capacity footprint, uncertainties in the policies and market mechanisms
of the carbon market and carbon tax and emerging trends such as CCS technology
would produce major impact on future carbon emission trends from the industry.
3.1.2 Key Findings of Scenario Analysis
1. Total End-use Demand
Under the policy, reinforced policy, 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, the end-use energy
demand of the industrial sector will still rise from the 2015 level, yet at a slower pace
until peaking in around 2030 before a continual decline.1 Under the constraints of
the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, the end-use demand of the industrial sector is to peak
prior to 2025 and drop by approximately 24–32% by 2050 from that of 2015.
As seen in Fig. 3.5 and Table 3.1, a more elaborated analysis reveals that in the
policy scenario, the end-use energy demand of the industrial sector peaks at around
2030 at approximately 2.67 billion tce before sliding to roughly 2.44 billion tce by
1 Note: in this study, processing and converting petrochemical and coal chemical are included in
the industrial sector. The statistics of end-use energy consumption of the industrial sector include
energy consumed as fuel and raw materials and for hydrogen generation in the future, etc., but
exclude energy consumed by means of transportation such as vehicles owned by plants, or coal and
natural gas consumption by captive power plants—slightly different from the statistics released by
National Bureau of Statistics.





























Policy scenario Reinforced policy scenario 2ºC scenario 1.5ºC scenario
Fig. 3.5 End-use energy demand analysis of the industrial sector under different scenarios
Table 3.1 Analysis of end-use energy demand of the industrial sector (billion tce)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Policy scenario 2.18 2.67 2.55 2.44
Reinforced policy scenario 2.18 2.60 2.31 2.05
2 °C scenario 2.18 2.47 2.10 1.65
1.5 °C scenario 2.18 2.07 1.79 1.41
2050; in the reinforced policy scenario, the demand hits the peak at around 2025 at
about 2.6 billion tce before a drop to 2.05 billion tce in 2050; in the 2 °C scenario,
the peak occurs in 2020–2025 at 2.5 billion tce and declines to around 1.65 billion
tce by 2050; and in the 1.5 °C scenario, the peak arrives between 2020 and 2025 at
roughly 2.2 billion tce before a reduction to 1.41 billion tce by 2050.
2. Industrial CO2 Emissions
In the four scenarios, total CO2 emissions from industrial energy activities and
production processes peak prior to 2030 before a continuous drop. CO2 emissions
from industrial energy activities peak in 2030 in the policy scenario, compared to
around 2025 in the reinforced policy scenario or the 2 °C scenario and 2020–2025
in the 1.5 °C scenario.
As shown in Fig. 3.6 and Table 3.2, in the policy scenario, the peak of total
industrial CO2 emissions stands at roughly 5.71 billion tons and the figure falls
to around 4.61 billion tons in 2050, when CO2 emissions from industrial energy
activities reaches 3.69 billion tons and emissions from industrial processes reach
around 920 million tons. Compared to 2020, total CO2 emissions from the industrial
sector diminish by approximately 9.4%, of which emissions from energy activities
contributed a 2.1% reduction in 2050.
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In the reinforced policy scenario, total industrial CO2 emissions are reduced to
roughly 3.42 billion tons by 2050, of which 2.62 billion tons is from energy activities
and 800 million tons from industrial processes; total industrial CO2 emissions are
cut by 32.8% in 2050 relative to 2020, and a 30.5% emission reduction is observed
in energy activities.
In the 2 °C scenario, total industrial CO2 emissions fall to around 1.67 billion
tons by 2050, of which roughly 1.2 billion tons are from energy activities and around
470 million tons from industrial processes; compared to 2020, total industrial CO2
emissions are cut by around 67.2% in 2050, and emissions from energy activities are
down by 68.2%.
In the 1.5 °C scenario, total industrial CO2 emissions reduces to approximately
710 million tons by 2050, of which 460 million tons are from energy activities and
250 million tons from industrial processes; compared to 2020, total industrial CO2
emissions are reduced by 86.1% in 2050, of which 87.8% emission reduction is from
energy activities.
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Fig. 3.6 Analysis of total industrial CO2 emissions under different scenarios
Table 3.2 Analysis on total industrial CO2 emissions (billion tons)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Policy scenario 5.09 5.71 5.17 4.61
Reinforced policy scenario 5.09 5.31 4.37 3.42
2 °C scenario 5.09 4.77 3.26 1.67
1.5 °C scenario 5.09 3.64 2.22 0.71
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Table 3.3 Analysis of CO2 emissions from industrial process (billion tons)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Policy scenario 1.32 1.17 1.04 0.92
Reinforced policy scenario 1.32 1.10 0.94 0.80
2 °C scenario 1.32 0.95 0.70 0.47
1.5 °C scenario 1.32 0.88 0.56 0.25
In industries such as steel, cement, buildingmaterial, and chemical,CO2 emissions
from both energy activities and industrial processes can be cut by substitution of
raw materials or fuels, optimization of technologies and processes, improvement in
system energy efficiency, and development of innovative low-carbon products. By
2050, CO2 emissions from industrial processes is down by approximately 30% from
2020 levels under the policy scenario, 39% under the reinforced policy scenario,
64% under the 2 °C scenario and 81% under the1.5 °C scenario (Table 3.3).
Emission reduction of industrial processes is, on one hand, attributed to industrial
restructuring, technical renovation and the development of alternative raw materials
and fuels. For example, lime may be replaced by raw materials of lower carbon
intensity such as carbide slag, blast furnace cinder, fly ash and steel slag in cement
production to cut emissions. In flat glass production, CO2 emissions from the mixing
process can be halved by replacing dolomite and limestonewithMgOandCaO;while
in the coal chemical industry, new gasification techniques such as pressurized coal-
water slurry gasification and pressurized coal powder gasification help to reduce
CO2 emissions by a large margin. On the other hand, a constant drop is observed in
demand for energy-intensive products owing to industrial restructuring and product
quality upgrading. For instance, under the policy and reinforced policy scenarios,
cement demand falls by around 30% from 2020 to 2050, while even sharper declines
of 62% and 71% are expected under the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios respectively
(Fig. 3.7).
4. Industrial Energy Mix and Electrification
All four scenarios point to a clear trajectory of decarbonization and electrifica-
tion in the industrial energy mix, with smaller share of fossil fuels such as coal
and petroleum and larger uptake of electricity in end-use energy, and distributive
renewable electricity, renewable heating, hydrogen, and biomass are deployed on
a wider scale (Fig. 3.8). The share of non-fossil energy and electricity in end-use
industrial energy demand in 2050 will reach 34.3% in the policy scenario, 45.2% in
the reinforced policy scenario, 66.7% in the 2 °C scenario, and 85.1% in the 1.5 °C
scenario.
Fossil energy sees a continuous decline in the end-use industrial energy demand
with its usage moving from fuel to feeding stock. For example, the industrial demand
for coal, which is mainly used for raw materials and for heating in certain processes,
is continuously shrinking. Compared to 2020, the industrial demand for coal drops by
14.3, 36.2, 77.1, and 92.4% respectively by 2050under the policy scenario, reinforced
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Fig. 3.7 Forecast and analysis of demand for major energy-intensive products under different
scenarios (2020 = 100)
policy scenario, 2 °C scenario and 1.5 °C scenario. Oil demand experiences a minor
reduction of 4.9% in 2050 from 2020 levels under the policy scenario, and even
more dramatic decline under the reinforced policy scenario, 2 °C scenario, and 1.5
°C scenario of 39.0, 65.9, and 82.9% respectively. Much uncertainty lies ahead for
industrial gas demandwith a surge of 220, 110, and 70%respectively under the policy,
reinforced policy, and 2 °C scenarios yet a drop of 40% under 1.5 °C scenario.
It’s essential to reinforce the electrification transformation during the shift toward
a low-carbon industry so that it will become the predominant source of energy.
Specifically, the industrial electrification rate of industrial sector reaches 31.0%,
39.9%, 58.2%, and 69.4% respectively in 2050 under the policy scenario, reinforced
policy scenario, 2 °C scenario, and 1.5 °C scenario. Such progress in China has
visibly outpaced the historical development in general as the period between 2000
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a) Policy scenario b) Reinforced policy scenario









































Fig. 3.8 Analysis of end-use industrial energy mix under different scenarios
and 2015 saw an annual increase of industrial electrification of 0.5%, and under the
2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, such increase would jump to 0.9 and 1.4% respectively
(Table 3.4).
The expanding demand for alternative industrial fuels and raw materials such as
hydrogen and renewable energy has become a key lever for further carbon reduc-
tion in the industrial sector. Under the policy scenario, hydrogen and renewable
energy comprise 3.3% of end-use industrial energy consumption by 2050, and the
percentage is 5.3%, 8.5%, and 15.6% respectively for the reinforced policy scenario,
2 °C scenario, and 1.5 °C scenario (Table 3.5). Fossil fuels would be the main
Table 3.4 Analysis of end-use electrification of the industrial sector (%)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Policy scenario 25.7 26.1 28.1 31.0
Reinforced policy scenario 25.7 27.8 32.3 39.9
2°C scenario 25.7 30.0 41.2 58.2
1.5°C scenario 25.7 37.0 49.8 69.4
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Table 3.5 Analysis of end-use energy mix of the industrial sector (%)
Policy
scenario
2020 2030 2040 2050 Reinforced policy
scenario
2020 2030 2040 2050
Coal 48.2 44.0 40.9 36.7 Coal 48.2 41.3 37.3 32.5
Oil 18.2 19.8 17.9 15.9 Oil 18.8 17.0 15.8 12.1
Natural gas 4.6 7.5 10.2 13.1 Natural gas 4.6 10.8 10.6 10.2
Electricity 25.7 26.1 28.1 31.0 Electricity 25.7 27.8 32.3 39.8
Hydrogen and
others
2.8 2.6 2.9 3.3 Hydrogen and
others
2.8 3.1 4.0 5.3
2°C scenario 2020 2030 2040 2050 1.5 °C scenario 2020 2030 2040 2050
Coal 48.2 39.7 29.6 14.5 Coal 48.2 35.1 24.0 5.7
Oil 18.8 15.0 12.4 8.5 Oil 18.8 9.6 7.2 5.0
Natural gas 4.6 11.7 11.0 10.3 Natural gas 4.6 12.5 8.7 4.3
Electricity 25.7 30.0 41.2 58.2 Electricity 25.7 37.0 49.8 69.5
Hydrogen and
others
2.8 3.6 5.8 8.5 Hydrogen and
others
2.8 5.8 10.3 15.6
hydrogen source in the near and mid-term future before replaced by renewables or
nuclear in the mid- to long term.
5. Energy Conservation and Efficiency Enhancement
To proactively tackle climate change, energy conservation and efficiency enhance-
ment should become the “primary energy” for meeting the rising energy demand of
the industrial sector. By 2050, the industrial output is expected to grow by around 2.6
times despite a reduced weight of industrial production in GDP. Through continuous
optimization of its internal structure, improvement in added value in the products,
and boost of energy efficiency of products and systems, the energy consumption of
industrial output will continue to shrink. Under all four scenarios in terms of end-use
energy consumption, a fall of 66%, 72%, 78%, and 80% in energy consumption
of industrial output is expected between 2015 and 2050, which is an annual drop
of 3.0%, 3.5%, 4.2% and 4.5%, respectively. In comparison, the period of 2000 to
2015 saw an annual decrease of 4.4%, meaning that long-term ambitious actions are
needed for industrial structural improvement and energy efficiency enhancement in
order to achieve the low emission goal of the industry.
In terms of technical energy efficiency improvement, significant potential is
expected in energy-intensive industries such as steel, cement, and electrolytic
aluminum; yet under the deep emission reduction scenario, the potential mainly
arises from technical transformation. In the policy scenario, with a full achievement
of the potential of existing feasible technologies in energy-intensive sectors, the
unit energy consumption is reduced by 10–20% by 2050; in the reinforced policy
scenario, major energy-intensive sectors see a further reduction of 10–20% in unit
energy consumption by 2050 with the global leadership in technology and continual
optimization of technical route; in the 2 °C scenario, world-leading technologies and
















policy scenario reinforced policy scenario 2ºC scenario 1.5ºC scenario
Fig. 3.9 Decrease in unit energy consumption of energy intensive products under different scenarios
complete technical innovations prompt a further drop of 10–15% by 2050. While in
the 1.5 °C scenario, energy is saved mostly from a paradigm shift in the choice of
technologies and raw materials, including the wide use of hydrogen (see Fig. 3.9).
3.1.3 Cost–Benefit Analysis of Investment in Different
Scenarios
1. Assessment of Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction Potential in
Industrial Sector
As the world’s largest manufacturer and amajor developing country, China boasts
an independent industrial system covering a full spectrum of sectors. Standing at the
forefront of a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation,
it’s also challenged by the coexistence of advanced and obsolete production capacity
and the imbalance of industrialization. Much awaits to be done in the promotion
of mature low-carbon technologies and cutting-edge technological innovation for
energy conservation and emission reduction of the industrial sector, where huge
potential also exists in demand reduction, energymix improvement, and upgrading of
smart technologies. A comparison between the policy scenario and the 2 °C scenario
is conducted as an example (see Fig. 3.10).
Under the reinforced policy scenario, the industrial energy demand is set to be 2.04
billion tce in 2050, which can be reduced to 1.62 billion tons under the 2 °C scenario
through a bunch of technological and policy measures. In terms of activities, 50
million tce can be cut in energy demand of energy-intensive sectors through reducing
the output of energy-intensive productswhile 45million tons canbe saved from that of
non-energy-intensive sectors—a total of 95 million tons or 22.6% of the total energy
conservation. In terms of technical route, optimized production processes, especially















Fig. 3.10 Sources of potential of achieving the 2 °C scenario by 2050 (as compared to Reinforced
Policy Scenario)
the massive deployment of deep decarbonization technologies in energy-intensive
sectors helps reduce energy demand by 150 million tce, plus a 80-million-tons cut in
non-energy-intensive sectors—a combined 230 million tons are saved, or 54.8% of
the total energy conservation. In terms of energy efficiency, energy-intensive sectors
are on track to reduce its energy use by 45 million tce by boosting energy efficiency
while 50 million tons can be saved in non-energy-intensive sectors, adding up to 95
million tons or 22.6% of the total energy conservation.
2. Cost–Benefit Analysis of Investment Under Different Scenarios
Now, the industrial sector boasts the greatest potential for emission reduction
among all end-users, but the potential is likely to narrow down in the future with the
rapid proliferation of energy-saving and carbon-reduction technologies and equip-
ment. In the current stage, much potential still exists in emission reduction at low
or negative cost in the industry, yet considering the fact that China shall remain the
world’s biggest manufacturer over a long period of time, plus the inertia of industrial
development and barriers of energy-saving and low-carbon technology progress, the
rising cost of industrial emission reduction and increasing difficulties in deep emis-
sion reduction are inevitable. A look at the sources of emission reduction potentials
shows that technical transformation in industrial production, development in energy
efficiency technologies, and application of renewables mostly depend on an overhaul
of the industrial investment structure and direction; however, a high level of electri-
fication and hydrogen scale-up would rest on the supply of low-cost green electricity
and hydrogen, of which the investment and benefit analysis goes beyond the indus-
trial sector itself. Besides, cutting redundant demand for industrial products depends
on the transition of China’s development model, the progress in China’s industrial
productivity as compared to other countries, the implementation of industrial and
restructuring policies and shifts in consumption pattern, etc. It would be difficult to
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carry out an accurate and quantitative assessment of the direct investment cost and
benefit.
With these factors inmind, this research focuses on analyzing themain investment
increment under the four scenarios, in other words, extra investment associated with
shrinking demand due to restructuring will not be considered while investment in
changes of technical routes, energy efficiency improvement, and energy or material
substitution will be the focus of the study. A bottom-up method is employed and a
production capacity resetting method is used for key sectors such as steel, cement,
and petrochemical to compare the accumulative changes in investment in production
capacity associated with production scale, technology and process improvements,
by 2050 under different scenarios; for other industrial sectors, the accumulative
investment demand for higher energy efficiency and electrification under different
scenarios are compared through case studies of investment in energy conservation and
electrification. For the industrial application of hydrogen, the statistics concerning
investment cost is scant in existing studies and demoprojects,while it remains unclear
whether investment in hydrogen generation and transmission is included. In this
study, a hypothesis ismade that industrial hydrogen consumption ismainly generated
from low-carbon energy without taking into account the investment demand for
hydrogen generation.
Given the complexity of sectors, products and technical processes involved
in the industrial sector, priority-setting and categorization shall be adopted in
calculating energy-saving and decarbonization investment i.e. focusing on energy-
intensive sectors such as steel and cement with non-energy-intensive sectors as
secondary consideration, and categorizing mainstream energy-saving and decar-
bonization technologies into “average energy efficiency” (currently average perfor-
mance), “advanced energy efficiency” (currently advanced performance), “leading
energy efficiency” (globally leading performance) and “near theoretical efficiency”
(close to theoretical energy efficiency) based on technical features, investment
benefit, and application prospects, in order to explore the investment required for
varied levels of penetration and structure of production capacity. Under the policy
scenario, corporate energy efficiency witnesses continued improvement driven by
technical progress, and the sector-wide energy efficiency migrates from “average” to
“advanced” by 2050; under the reinforced policy scenario, cost-effective and energy-
saving technologies are both adopted for the sector-wide energy efficiency to reach
“leading” level by 2050; under the 2 °C scenario, cutting-edge and ground-breaking
technologies and processes are deployed, helping most businesses to hit “near theo-
retical” energy efficiency with zero-carbon energy and carbon-free processes utilized
to some extent; under the 1.5 °C scenario, high cost processes that drastically lower
carbon emissions will be adopted on a massive scale.
Taking cement as an example, according to the Global Roadmap of Cement
Sustainable Development in 2050 published by IEA, low carbon development is to be
achieved in cement industry through enhancing energy efficiency, promoting alterna-
tive fuels, and applying CCS technologies. Building on the aforementioned research
approach and scenario setting, and the investment needed for plants and processes of
varied types of energy efficiency, the incremental investment for the cement industry



































































Production capacity investment per ton of cement
Fig. 3.11 Incremental investment needed for different scenarios for cement industry
and the investment required per ton of cement under different scenarios are calculated
(see Fig. 3.11).
Under the reinforced policy scenario, the energy efficiency reaches “leading” level
with alternative fuels making up 30% of the fuel mix, thus increasing the investment
needed per ton of cement capacity to 840RMB from680RMBunder policy scenario,
while the incremental investment under the reinforced policy scenario and policy
scenario is 30 billion RMB. Under the 2 °C scenario, energy efficiency rises to
“near theoretical level” with the penetration of 50% for alternative fuels and 30% for
CCS, and the investment per ton of cement capacity rises to 1,200 RMB, an extra
investment of 100 billion RMB compared to reinforced policy scenario. Under the
1.5 °C scenario, CCS penetration grows to 80%while alternative fuels rise up to 70%
of the fuel mix, driving up investment per ton of cement capacity to 1,590 RMBwith
approximately 240 billionRMBmore investment than the 2 °C scenario. Specifically,
the application of CCS entails an extra investment of around 250 billion RMB while
retrofitting for alternative fuels requires an extra 40 billion RMB, accompanied by a
drop in energy efficiency investment of 56 billion RMB due to reduced capacity.
3.1.4 Key Pathways and Policy Enablers
1. Structural Transformation and Shrinking Demand
The development of service-oriented economy and inherent restructuring of the
industry will promise more economic output with less energy consumption. Due to










































Fig. 3.12 Comparison of energy consumption per unit of output by sector (2015) (Data Source:
National Statistics Bureau and calculations by the research team)
the huge discrepancy of energy productivity among industries and sectors, gener-
ally speaking, the service sector requires less energy than the industrial sector, light
industry less than heavy industry, and emerging industries less than traditional ones
when generating the same economic output (Fig. 3.12). Changes in industrial struc-
ture, organizational structure and positioning of product value chain of a country
all exert tremendous impact on the energy efficiency of a country in a broad sense.
The replacement of traditional industries by emerging industries will spur economic
restructuring and a fresh round of economic growth, duringwhich the internal restruc-
turing and industrial modernization will boost the efficiency of energy allocation
among different sectors as the energy consumption per unit of output in high value-
added industries is much lower than that of energy-intensive and traditional indus-
tries, providing a strong buttress for the overall energy productivity of the industrial
sector. Studies have found that during the 11th Five-Year Plan period, restructuring
only contributed 4% of energy conservation of the industry, but the figure surged to
34% during the 12th Five-Year Plan period and is on track to approach 50% during
the 13th Five-Year Plan period [7].
Elimination of wastage due to massive demolition and construction and improve-
ment in material strength and quality will cut the demand for energy-intensive prod-
ucts from the source. Statistics show that the demolished housing area in China is
around 37 ~ 41%2 of newly built commercial residential houses, and the demolished
2 In 2002, a total of 120 million m2 of urban houses were demolished in China, or 37.5% of newly
completed commercial residential buildings of 320 million m2 of the same year; in 2003, a total
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buildings of short life cycle account for around 23%of newly built ones in urban areas
[8]. The demolished buildings in China are 25–30 years of age on average despite
their designed service life of 50–100 years. Such massive demolition and construc-
tion have been the cause of severe waste of energy and resources and environmental
pollution. Based on 2.5–3 billion m2 of newly completed buildings annually and an
annual demolition of short-lived buildings comprising 25% of such, an extra 40 to 50
million tons of steel and 220 to 260 million tons of cement are consumed annually.
Taking into account the energy consumed throughout the construction process, an
extra energy consumption of approximately 120 million tce is recorded each year—
around 5% of the current energy consumption countrywide. What’s also generated
from this process are 400 million tons of waste, accounting for roughly 40% of total
waste throughout the year. Apart from waste reduction efforts, wider acceptance
of high-strength products will significantly minimize the use of materials, which
represents a major step to build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly
society. It not only contributes to energy saving and emission reduction, but also
produces apparent economic benefits as such move reduces construction spending
and the overall cost, and is pivotal for facilitating the restructuring and upgrading
of related industries. Taking high-tensile steel bar as an example, such twisted steel
bar of a tensile strength of 400 MPa or above features desirable strength and overall
performance. 12%–14% of steel consumption can be reduced by replacing steel bar
of 335 MPa with that of 400 MPa; while a further 5–7% reduction will be possible
if steel bar of 400 MPa is replaced by that of 500 MPa. The use of high-tensile steel
bars in high-rise or wide-span buildings is even more effective as the use of steel
bars can be cut down by 30%.
The export product mix shall be optimized to reduce the export of “embodied
energy”. China being the world’s biggest trading nation has seen massive export of
“embodied energy” in its huge export to the overseas market. Many researchers in
China and elsewhere have analyzed and calculated the embodied energy export in
China’s foreign trade by the input–output method, concluding that such embodied
energy export has expanded by 3.3 times from 338 million tce in 1995 to 1.438
billion tce in 2010, making up 25.8 and 44.3% of the total energy consumption of the
year. With embodied energy import associated with general commodities and energy
products deducted, the net export of embodied energy soared from 35.67 million tce
in 1995 to 415million tons in 2010, a 10.6-fold increase, and the share in total energy
consumption of the year spiked from 2.7 to 12.8% [9]. The massive growth in net
export of embodied energy arising from the rapid expansion of export constituted a
key driver of the upsurge in China’s energy consumption in recent years.
2. Technical innovation and Circular Economy
Switching from traditional carbon-intensive productionmode towards low-carbon
or zero-carbon techniques and productswhile improving product quality and life span
would deliver high potential for energy conservation and emission reduction. Taking
of 161 m2 of urban houses were demolished in China, or 41.3% of newly completed commercial
residential buildings of 390 million m2 of the same year.
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cement as an example, replacing cement ingredients or fuel with low-grade mate-
rials such as urban waste and industrial waste and by-products can dramatically cut
down energy consumption and emissions. In the chemical fertilizer industry, using
blue-green algae to produce nitrogen or nitrate fertilizers can effectively reduce CO2
emissions fromammonium synthesis. In steel industry, CO2 emissions per ton of steel
usingDRI is only 1/3 of that of BF-BOF steelmaking process, and the integrated elec-
trolysis technology and renewable power process—still under development—could
go one step further to enable near-zero carbon emission [10]. Meanwhile, among ten
innovative energy-saving and decarbonization technologies yet to be commercialized
in electrolytic aluminum industry, such as inert electrode, wet cathode, and multi-
pole slot technology, techniques including carbothermic reduction of alumina and
carbothermic reduction of kaolin are able to save 20–40% energy relative to tradi-
tional electrolysis techniques [11]. Besides, polymer (such as ethylene) production
from CO2 electrolysis process is also under development [12].
Revolutionizing traditional production and consumption patterns, actively devel-
oping circular economy, and reducing industrial output from primary resources
constitute an integral part in driving down energy demand and carbon emissions of the
industrial sector. According to a study by the International Resource Panel, by 2050,
the development of circular economy would reduce global resources exploitation
by 28%, which, coupled with climate policies and actions, can save approximately
63% of global CO2 emissions while ensuring a 1.5% growth in global economic
output [13]. Studies have shown that in energy-intensive industries such as steel,
cement, electrolytic aluminum, and plastics, 3.6 billion tons of CO2 emissions can be
prevented each year by developing circular economy. Taking plastics as an example,
with every million ton of plastics recycled, CO2 emissions from 1 million cars will
be offset [14]. With the aggregate stock of various products reaching a high level in
China, vast potentials are promised in expanding recycling. Research findings have
indicated that by 2050, scrap steel can take up 31–40% in steelmaking; alternative
materials such as mixed materials can account for 35% in cement output; 40% of
primary aluminum can be produced from recycled aluminumwhile 81% of paper and
carton output can be based on recycled paper [15]. By expanding plastics recycling,
demand for ethylene production is set to decline by 1/3 by 2050 [10]. Yet expansion
of recycling is challenged by technological and market barriers as well as policy
inadequacies, etc. Waste landfill is a case in point: landfill cost in China is only 7%
of that in UK, incentivizing a preference for landfill for most plants in China over
the possibilities of reduction and recycling [16].
3. Technological Advancement, Energy Conservation, and Efficiency Boost
The spread of advanced energy-saving technologies and equipment helps to
continuously tap into the potential of energy conservation and emission reduction in
the industrial sector. Despite notable improvement in overall industrial technologies
in China, great potential exists in enhancing overall energy efficiency via leading and
mature technologies. Meanwhile, with technical progress in medium and low-heat
residual heat and pressure utilization and industrial intelligence, new possibilities
for energy conservation and decarbonization keep cropping up. In the steel industry,
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analysis finds that from 2010 to 2020, the potential for energy conservation and
decarbonization arising from technological advancement has exceeded that from
restructuring [17]. Meanwhile, through broader application of 36 typical energy-
saving technologies, the steel industry saw its energy consumption reduced by 7.8%
and CO2 emissions by 10% in 2012, where secondary heating, power generation
with residual heat from sintering and TRT are among the most promising technolo-
gies of energy conservation and decarbonization. Meanwhile, synergistic benefits
such as pollutant reduction and water conservation also bear a major impact on the
technical economic viability. 10 technologies are cost effective measured by energy-
saving benefit alone, while over two thirds are cost effective if co-benefits of energy
conservation, emission reduction and water-saving are taken into account [18]. A
“bottom-up” study on the potential of 28 energy-saving technologies in China’s
steel industry has demonstrated that from 2010 to 2050, the comprehensive energy
consumption per ton of steel can be cut by 30–31% for blast furnace steelmaking and
by 65–76% for electric furnace steelmaking [19]. Further analysis of the emission
reduction potential and cost of the steel industry finds that the extension of mature
energy-saving technologies promises the best potential and cost-effectiveness, which
can deliver a total emission reduction of 818 million tons between 2015 and 2030
and energy savings of 216.9 billion RMB; besides, numerous negative-cost emis-
sion reduction technologies are available in the steel industry by 2030 [20]. In the
cement industry, a clear prospect of emission reduction exists in phasing out obsolete
production capacity and promoting existing mature and efficient technologies. The
alternative fuel technology for cement kiln will demonstrate great potential between
2020and2030while newalternative cement technologywill be very attractive despite
its immaturity at present [21].
A higher level of precise management empowers smart energy use and energy
savingvia bigdata.Thegrowingpopularity of “Internet plus” and ITapplicationmake
real-time monitoring, precise analysis, and dynamic adjustment of energy consump-
tion possible for businesses. In the future, China should place greater priority to
improve the intelligence digitalization of its industrial development, with whole-
process management of the entire energy consumption in production and better
utilization of big data for energy conservation. For instance, the eTelligence at
Cuxhaven in Germany’s energy internet pilot project “E-energy” allows real-time
power supply and demand to be released on the internet platform based on CCHP.
To illustrate, in case of wind power surplus, power companies would send a low
price alert to major industrial users, who would turn on the cooling and heating tanks
to balance energy supply and demand and reduce power bill. For another example,
many of the comprehensive energy service projects widely launched in China enable
online monitoring of energy consumption by installing monitors and sensors on key
equipment in a bid to materialize on-line monitoring of energy use, compile and
analyze data, identify abnormalities and reduce waste. In a word, digitalization and
intelligence application in the energy sector make for systematic, precise and digital
energy conservation and stand to be the “amplifier” of energy efficiency in the future.
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4. Electrification and Changes in Energy Mix
Promoting electrification of the industry while replacing fossil energy with low-
carbon alternatives offer considerable opportunities for emissions reduction. For
sectors with greater potentials such as non-ferrous metal and chemicals, the co-
benefit of low-carbon electricity may bring about deeper decarbonization. But some
researchers argue that as China’s current power mix is predominated by coal with
a high CO2 emission intensity, improved industrial electrification in the short term
makes little difference to emission reduction. In termsof thermal demand alternatives,
tremendous potentials exist with low-carbon electricity-based heat pump and electric
boiler technologies as alternatives for low-temperature industrial heat demand, as
heating demands at lower temperature (below 100 °C) can be met by heat pump,
whose energy efficiency is 2 to 3 times higher than traditional boilers; while for
mid-temperature heat demand (100 °C–500°C), alternative fuels such as biomass,
low-carbon electricity and hydrogen are viable options. Studies have revealed by
2040, heat pump technology would represent a cost-effective solution to cater 6%
of industrial thermal demand worldwide [4]. Besides, EAF, ultrared heating, and
induction heating also provide opportunities, albeit at a limited scale. But for the
industry’s demand for higher temperature, technological revolution is essential if
low-carbon electricity is to replace traditional thermal boilers.
Hydrogen and biomass are pushing their borders in petrochemical, chemical, and
steel industries and are expected to underpin deep decarbonization across the indus-
trial sectors. Expanding the use of industrial hydrogen, especially in combinationwith
hydrogen generation from renewable electricity, could enable substantial reduction
in carbon emissions from industrial production processes and energy consumption.
In the steel industry, DRI technology allows pellets to be directly reduced under
lower temperature with green hydrogen as the reducing agent to produce sponge iron
(directly reduced iron), with vapor and extra hydrogen released from the top of boiler,
where the vapor can be reused after condensation and washing, thus achieving deep
decarbonization. According to the statistics obtained by SSAB, CO2 emissions per
ton of steel producedwith long process technique is 1600 kg (the average level ranges
between 2000 and 2100 kg in other European countries) and electricity consumption
is 5385 kWh; while CO2 emissions per ton of steel produced with HYBRIT tech-
nology is only 25 kg with 4051 kWh of electricity consumed. In petrochemical and
chemical sectors, combining technologies such as renewable electricity and hydrogen
generation from water electrolysis, or developing cutting-edge technologies such as
hydrogen generation from methane decomposition can reduce carbon emitted from
the traditional SMR process. For biomass, studies have shown that increased use
of biomass can replace 15–20% of energy consumption from industrial raw mate-
rials and fuels by 2050; for example, biodiesel can be a source of bionaphtha for
refineries while ethylene can be produced from biopetroleum through dehydration,
the latter already industrialized in Brazil [5]. Yet as things stand, cost remains a main
barrier that impedes wider application of alternative energy in the industry, which
might require synergistic transformation of technological process and infrastructure
system.
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5. Emission Reduction in Industrial Process and Development of Negative
Emission Technologies
CO2 emission reduction from industrial process can be achieved mostly through
alternativematerials or fuels and systemefficiencyupgrade,where limitations abound
in technological options, and deep emission reduction calls for improved technical
process or innovation in materials, etc. Taking cement as an example, replacing
limestone with newly developed adhesive materials can reduce CO2 emissions from
industrial process. Somenewadhesives can even reactwithCO2 to bring downcarbon
intensity in cement production by 30–90%. Meanwhile, some industrial companies
are currently exploring the use of high temperature solar heat to enable lower emis-
sions from alumina calcination in the aluminum industry and limestone calcination
in the cement industry by developing solar rotary kiln [22]. Hydrogen also stands
to be a high achiever in reducing emissions from industrial processes. Electrolyzed
water based on renewables can be used to produce hydrogen-rich chemicals such as
ammonia or methanol for various industries such as precursors (as in nitrogen fertil-
izers), reducing agents (as in low-emission steelmaking) and fuels, while hydrogen
and CO2 can be used for producing olefins and aromatic hydrocarbons.
Embracing negative emission technologies such as CCS will make a significant
difference to the emission reduction target. For instance, in the cement industry, up
to over 90% of CO2 emissions can be captured by post-combustion capture (chem-
ical absorption or membrane separation), oxy-fuel combustion (full or partial), e,
or calcium cycle, etc. In the steel industry, the ratio exceeds 85% via chemical or
physical absorption, membrane separation, and oxy-fuel combustion. In coal chem-
ical industries such as ammonia synthesis, methanol production and coal to olefins,
CO2 captured can be used to produce chemical products such as carbonates, borax,
dicyandymide, hydroxy, etc., which is expected to prevent over 300 million tons of
CO2 emissions.
3.2 Building Sector
3.2.1 Status and Trend
1. Overview of Building Energy Consumption in China
Building sector represents a major energy consumer, consisting of residential
buildings aswell as public and commercial buildings. It refers to the energy consumed
to provide such services as heating, air-conditioning, ventilation, lighting, cooking,
domestic hot water, electric appliances and elevator/escalator, etc. Energy consump-
tion of residential buildings mainly refers to energy consumed during the operation
phase of residential buildings, including energy consumed from the use of various
devices in the building to cater for daily life, study and rest, etc., mostly to meet the
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Fig. 3.13 Final commercial energy and electricity consumption of the building sector in China
(2001–2018)
needs of residents and enhance services. Energy consumption of public and commer-
cial buildings, on the other hand, refers to the energy consumed in the operation phase
of public and commercial buildings to provide their designed functions. Such build-
ings refer to all non-residential buildings except for industrial production facilities,
such as office buildings, schools, hospitals, shopping malls, hotels, stadiums and
gymnasiums, theaters and transportation hubs, etc. Types of energy consumed in
building operation mainly include electricity, coal, natural gas and heat from central-
ized heating system. Currently, building sector accounts for around one third of the
world’s total energy consumption [23].
China’s building sector haswitnessed soaring energy consumption in recent years,
as illustrated in Fig. 3.13 [24]. In 2018, the final commercial energy consumption of
building sector stood at 690 million tce (primary energy consumption converted as 1
billion tce),3 making up approximately 20% of total final energy consumption across
the country; commercial energy consumption and non-commercial biomass totaled
780 million tce (energy consumption of biomass at around 90 million tce). In 2018,
electricity consumption of building sector was 1.7 trillion kWh, an electrification
rate of 30%. The energy consumption and energy use intensity per capita has more
than doubled compared to 2001.
3 Building energy consumption includes direct fuel consumption, heating consumption and elec-
tricity consumption. Generally speaking, the final energy consumption is the sum of these three
categories calculated with electrothermal equivalent method. In this section, considering the scale
of centralized heating in North China where the heating source upgrading has long been the main
task of energy conservation efforts in China, which is not discussed in the chapter of energy supply.
In this chapter, direct heat consumption is converted into primary energy consumption (i.e. coal,
natural gas, electricity etc. needed to generate heat) to sum up, i.e. building energy consumption
in this chapter refers to the sum of direct energy consumption, electricity consumption and heat
consumption converted into primary energy consumption, calculatedwith electrothermal equivalent
method. In carbon emission calculation, direct carbon emission only includes the part attributable to
direct fuel consumption in buildings; while carbon emissions from indirect heating and electricity
are correlated with heating and electricity consumption respectively.



























Fig. 3.14 Carbon emissions associated with fossil energy in the building sector in China (2001–
2018)
In 2018, carbon emissions associated with fossil fuel consumption in building
sector in China totaled 2.09 billion tCO24 [24] as illustrated in Fig. 3.14, of which
indirect carbon emissions fromelectricity consumptionwas920million tCO2, or 44%
of carbon emissions associatedwith the building sector; carbon emissions attributable
to heat consumption in centralized heating in North China comprised 22%. From the
countrywide perspective, carbon emissions per capita from building sector was 1.5
tCO2/cap.
Continuous adjustment and growth of building scale is one of the key drivers for
the spike in building energy consumption in China: on one hand, the ever increasing
building area produces massive future demand for energy consumption in building
operations, as more energy is needed to accommodate more buildings to function
and provide services; on the other hand, a tremendous amount of building materials
are used for massive construction works, and large quantities of energy consumption
and carbon emissions result from the production of building materials.
China has seen a boom in new building construction since 2001 with over 1.5
billion m2 of completed floor area annually and a whopping 2.89 billion m2 in
2014 [25] (Fig. 3.15). However, with changes in the macroeconomic landscape, the
annually completed floor space has diminished since 2015. Yet the massive newly
completed floor area has resulted in continued growth in the building stock in China.
In 2018, total building area in China was approximately 60.1 billion m2, including
24.4 billion m2 of urban residential buildings, 23 billion m2 of rural residential
buildings and 12.8 billion m2 of commercial and public buildings (C&P buildings)
[24].
Despite the surge in energy consumption in the building sector of China, its
intensity is still rather lowcompared to developed countries, as illustrated in Fig. 3.16.
From a historical point of view, energy consumption per capita in most of the
developingworld has experienced a rapid climbbefore levelingoff or a steadygrowth,
but the eventual figure of the plateau varies greatly among countries. Currently the
4 Carbon emission coefficient of electricity is defined as 553 gCO2/kWh.
























Rural residential buildings Urban residential buildings C&P buildings






























Fig. 3.16 Comparison of energy use in buildings per capita between China and other countries
(2017) [26]
energy consumption per capita in China is roughly 0.5 tce/cap, close to that of South
Korea in the 1980s and of Japan or Italy in the 1960s. As China is still undergoing
relatively fast economic growth, there is possibility for another spike in building
energy consumption in the future. In other words, China is now at a crucial juncture
of deciding the pathway toward an energy-efficient building sector, and the choice
would mean a great deal to the future trend, which directly bears on the trajectory of
the total energy consumption and carbon emissions of China.
2. Building Energy Consumption by Sub-sectors
Given the differences in winter heating pattern, building types in urban and rural
areas, lifestyle as well as people’s activities in residential and public buildings
and energy-powered equipment between southern and northern regions in China,
building energy consumption can be grouped into four sub-sectors, namely north
urban heating (NUH), urban residential buildings energy consumption (UR build-
ings, excluding NUH), commercial and public building energy consumption (C&P
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Fig. 3.17 Year-on-year changes in total energy consumption by category (2001–2018)
buildings, excluding NUH), and rural residential buildings (RR buildings) energy
consumption [24].
Each accounting for around one fourth of total building energy consumption
in China, these four categories each features its own characteristics. A look at their
changes between 2001 and 2018 shows a substantial growth in total energy consump-
tion of all categories except for biomass in rural regions that saw continuous decline,
as illustrated in Fig. 3.17 [24].
Changes in total energy consumption and intensity between 2001 and 2018 by
category and the main causes are provided below:
Energy consumption for NUH is rising but with a continuous drop in consumption
intensity, which signals the progress made in building energy conservation and clean
heating in recent years as the average energy consumption per unit of floor area has
fallen from 23 kgce/m2 in 2001 to 14 kgce/m2 in 2018, to which major contributors
include better building insulation, higher proportion of efficient heat sources and
improvement in heating system efficiency.
Total energy consumption of C&P buildings (excluding NUH) registers a four-
fold increase, accounting for the biggest share among the four categories with the
consumption intensity per unit area on constant rise from 8 kgce/m2 to 14 kgce/m2
and electricity use per square meter climbing from 35 kWhe/m2 to 63 kWhe/m2. The
growth in total area of public buildings and proportion of large-scale public buildings
and the expanding demand for energy are the main contributors.
Total energy consumption of UR buildings (excluding NUH) has more than
doubled, with average energy consumption per household rising from 253 kgce/hh
to 469 kgce/hh and electricity consumption per household from 794 kWhe/hh to
1809 kWhe/hh. The increase is mainly attributable to the growing demand driven
by domestic hot water, air-conditioning and home appliances, etc.; with energy-
saving lamps widely used, no significant increase in lighting energy consumption is
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observed in households while the energy consumption intensity of cooking remains
largely unchanged. Yet the growing energy consumption of winter heating and home
air-conditioning in regions with hot summer and cold winter has sparked extensive
debates on the path of energy conservation for heating and air-conditioning.
Commodity energy consumption has doubled in RR buildings, accompanied by
a continuous and rapid drop in the use of biomass. Greater access to electricity,
better income and increased number and use of home appliances in rural households
are the main drivers for the surging electricity consumption per rural households.
Meanwhile, a growing portion of biomass is replaced by other commercial energy,
resulting in the sharp drop in the share of biomass in domestic energy consumption
in rural regions. An analysis on the development of energy consumption in rural
residential households indicates nomajor change in total consumption per household
but a steep reduction in the share of biomass; the commercial energy consumption
and electricity consumption per household rose from 459 kgce/hh to 1131 kgce/hh
and from 435 kWhe/hh to 1770 kWhe/hh respectively while biomass consumption
per household nosedived from 1212 kgce/hh to 612 kgce/hh.
3. Forecast in Related Studies
Much has been studied in the energy consumption of the building sector in China,
of which some results are illustrated in Fig. 3.18.
As is illustrated above, under reference scenario, it is generally believed that
building energy consumption inChinawill experience sustained growth by over 60%;
under the scenario where ambitious energy-saving and emission-cutting measures
are taken, energy consumption of the sector is generally believed to reach a plateau
































Fig. 3.18 Forecast of energy consumption of China’s building sector by some organizations [22,
27–30]
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3.2.2 Scenario Analysis
1. Scenario Design
The following four scenarios are set for this research:
a. Policy scenario
The policy scenario is based on the assumptions that the occupant behavior
modes in China will move towards an intermediate level and that the building
stock and energy intensity will stay on the current track of growth, the energy
consumption per capita by 2050 would draw close to energy-efficient countries
in the developed world, with energy-saving policies in the sector introduced and
implemented on schedule. However, stricter policies arising from the needs to
tackle the climate change, revolutionize the energy system and curb environ-
mental pollution are excluded, and no guidance is provided for people to change
their lifestyle.
b. Reinforced policy scenario
The reinforced policy scenario assumes that the building stock and energy inten-
sity would grow to some extent yet under further control, with energy consump-
tion per capita still lower than the overwhelming majority of developed coun-
tries by 2050, that energy efficiency policies for buildings would be stricter
than the current ones under China’s climate commitment and some form of
encouragement are provided to change people’s lifestyle.
c. 2 °C scenario
The 2 °C scenario is based on the assumptions that existing constraints in
carbon emissions, resources and environment in China are fully considered for
energy consumption in the building sector and that frugality is preserved to the
maximum provided that people’s fundamental demand for a satisfactory liveli-
hood ismet, the policieswill be reinforced across the boardwith policymeasures
proposed to cap energy consumption and carbon emissions and their intensity;
energy-saving technologies will sustain steady development with significantly
enhanced efficiency and slight increase of total energy consumption. The growth
of building stock and energy intensity will gradually decline and total carbon
emissions from the building sector will peak before 2030 for China to meet the
2 °C temperature target.
d. 1.5 °C scenario
Based on the 2 °C scenario, 1.5 °C represents a more ambitious target to be
achieved through a more proactive electrification journey with less use of fossil
fuels and continual improvement in energy efficiency, thus further cutting direct
emissions by 2050 and enabling China to meet the 1.5 °C target.
For clarification, variation in key parameters in different scenario settings is shown
in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6 Parameters set for different scenarios
Policy scenario Reinforced
policy scenario












































































































72 billion m2 by
2050
(continued)
2. Results of Scenario Analysis
A scenario analysis of China’s building stock, energy consumption and carbon
emissions by 2050 is conducted based on the above assumptions. 2050 Energy
consumption by category is shown in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and Fig. 3.19.
Under the policy scenario, building energy consumption would continue its rise
until reaching roughly 990 million tce in 2050, with electrification rate accounting
for 50% of energy consumption and 10% coming from coal consumption; under the
reinforced policy scenario, energy consumption of the sector reaches a plateau by
2030 and starts to fall after 2045, reaching approximately 850 million tce in 2050,
with electrification making up 56% of energy consumption and coal less than 5%;




















































































































Same as under 2
°C scenario
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Table 3.7 Energy consumption by type under reinforced policy scenario in selected years
Unit Fuel type 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Million tce Coal 291 223 171 129 101 77 56 37
Million tce Oil 1 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Million tce Natural gas 163 255 310 336 339 330 312 285
Million tce Biomass 95 67 50 40 40 43 47 54
Trillion kWh Electricity 1.34 1.87 2.25 2.56 2.9 3.28 3.58 3.87
Million tce End-use energy
consumption
714 775 807 820 837 853 855 851
Table 3.8 Energy consumption by category under 2°C scenario in selected years
Unit Fuel type 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Million tce Coal 291 223 141 79 51 33 19 6
Million tce Oil 1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Million tce Natural gas 163 255 277 271 256 235 207 178
Million tce Biomass 95 67 53 58 65 68 71 77
Trillion kWh Electricity 1.34 1.87 2.23 2.51 2.8 3.08 3.39 3.68
Million tce End-use energy
consumption
714 775 745 716 716 715 714 713
Fig. 3.19 Energy use (by fuel type) and carbon emissions under different scenarios
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Table 3.9 Energy consumption and carbon emissions in selected years
Energy consumption
(million tce)
Direct + Indirect Thermal
Emissions
(million tCO2)
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Policy scenario 775 860 995 1000 969 834
Reinforced policy scenario 775 820 851 1000 888 562
2 °C scenario 775 716 713 1000 650 306
1.5 °C scenario 775 692 621 1000 565 81
under 2 °C scenario, energy consumption of the sector begins its downward trajec-
tory from 2020 to around 710 million tce in 2050, with electrification comprising
63%, the use of coal almost phased out and biomass increasing to 77 million tce
thanks to the expanded penetration of efficient use of new biomass resources; under
the 1.5 °C scenario, energy consumption of the sector drops to 620 million tce, with
78% of electrification and biomass energy of around 90 million tce.
A drop is detected in the aggregate of direct carbon emissions and indirect emis-
sions from heating under all scenarios (Table 3.9). By 2050, direct carbon emissions
stand at roughly 831 million tCO2 under the policy scenario, 562 million tCO2 under
the reinforced policy scenario, 306 million tCO2 under the 2 °C scenario and 81
million tCO2 under the 1.5 °C scenario.
Energy consumption by 2030 and 2050 under different scenarios are illustrated in
Fig. 3.20. As is shown in the Figure, building energy consumption is set to continue
its growth for a period of time compared to 2015.With the implementation of relevant
Fig. 3.20 Comparison of energy consumption by 2030 and 2050 under different scenarios
3.2 Building Sector 75
a) Policy scenario b) Reinforced policy scenario 
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Fig. 3.21 Energy consumption under different scenarios (by category)
policies, total energy consumption of buildings would go down, with less use of coal
and natural gas and bigger share of electricity and increased biomass consumption.
3. Development Trend of Energy Consumption by Category
The energy consumption by category under different scenarios is illustrated in
Fig. 3.21.
With continuous improvement in building performance and optimization of
heating source mix in northern China, energy consumption of NUH is expected
to fall continually, with a drop of approximately 30% by 2050 under the policy
scenario and 70% under the 2 °C scenario. In the future, it is advised to prioritize the
use of excess heat from industrial production and various forms of CHP for heating in
northern urban China, and heat pump is recommended for regions where such excess
heat is out of reach. Meanwhile, further progress should be seen in overheating due
to excessive or unevenly distribution of heating.
As the demand for improvement living standards and services still prevails
in China, energy consumption of both UR and C&P buildings (excluding NUH)
continues to rise. Under the policy scenario, energy consumption of urban resi-
dential and public buildings experiences a two-fold and one-fold increase by 2050
respectively, compared to 1.5 times and 50% under the 2 °C scenario. For these two
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types of buildings, proper guidance of service demand and behavioral patterns could
obviously reduce energy consumption.
For C&P buildings, new building construction in the next stage mainly caters
to the demand for better public services and the development of tertiary industry.
Proper control on the number of large-scale and energy-intensive buildings and active
adoption of energy consumption quota are expected to curb the growth of energy
usage. For residential buildings, energy consumption for cooking and lighting has
already entered a plateau and the construction of new buildings going forward are
mostly energy consumed by air-conditioning, heating in regions with hot summer
and cold winter and home appliances.
Growing urbanization is accompanied by a decline in rural population. Despite
the constant rise in energy consumption per household, total energy consumption of
rural residences is on the decrease, dropping by 25% and 45% by 2050 respectively
under the policy scenario and the 2 °C scenario. Energy-efficiency retrofitting of
rural houses will go a long way toward reduced energy consumption, especially in
the northern region. Another key contributor is biomass. Under the 2 °C scenario,
efficient biomass recycled from the fields is preferred by rural residents to meet their
heating and cooking needs in an efficient manner.
4. Carbon Emission Peaking and Near-Zero Emission
The foregoing analysis shows that direct emissions from buildings have plateaued
in recent years and kept falling after 2020.With indirect emissions taken into account,
however, carbon emissions from buildings are on the rise in recent years. In the
context of changes in emissions from electricity under different scenarios, total
emissions from the building sector are illustrated in Fig. 3.22.
The figure shows that under the policy scenario, total carbon emissions from the
building sector peaks around 2030 at close to 2.3 billion tCO2 before starting its
decline in 2035 to approximately 1.56 billion tCO2 in 2050; under the reinforced
policy scenario, total carbon emissions hit the peak around 2025 at approximately
Fig. 3.22 Direct and indirect total carbon emissions of the building sector under different scenarios
3.2 Building Sector 77
2.1 billion tCO2 and fall back to around 1.13 billion tCO2 in 2050; under both the
2 °C and the 1.5 °C scenarios, the peak occurs around 2020 at respectively 2.01
billion and 2 billion tCO2, followed by steady drop in carbon emissions from the
building sector under the 2 °C, gaining speed from 2035 until coming close to 400
million tCO2 in 2050; under the 1.5 °C, carbon emissions begin a steep fall from
2030 and slow down after 2045 until reaching roughly 80 billion tCO2 in 2050.
To make the 1.5 °C scenario a reality and bring about near zero emission, the
following efforts are needed: ambitious move towards higher energy efficiency and
changes in energy consumption mix for buildings; encouragement of green lifestyle
and employment of efficient and green technologies to minimize energy demand;
a much less use of fossil fuels in heating, cooking and domestic hot water; higher
penetration of electrification and rational and efficient use of biomass to reduce
carbon intensity of energy consumption. At present, compared to other scenarios,
no apparent technological barriers exist for the building sector to achieve near-zero
emission, the challenge are mostly associated with the proliferation of technologies,
like pushing for changes and upgrades of heating sources in the north, changes
in residents’ cooking habits and utilization of biomass, etc. Meanwhile, under this
scenario, the proportion of centralized heating in northern urban regions will see a
significant decline because of shrinking coal-fired power and full usage of excess
heat. Higher level of electrification means that natural gas pipelines are no longer
necessary for buildings, and these changes will trigger a shift in the demand for
related infrastructure.
3.2.3 Evaluation of Emission Reduction Technologies
and Pathways
This section will provide an introduction of key emission reduction measures and
their potentials in each of the four categories of energy consumption.
1. NUH (Northern Urban Heating)
The main solution lies in reducing the actual heat needed for buildings, and
upgrading the heat source mix and system efficiency [31].
The former includes higher standards of building envelops to minimize the
heat demand for newly constructed buildings and retrofitting the existing building
envelops. Notable progress has been made through these two steps during the past
three decades, yet there is still room for improvement.Meanwhile, with the urbaniza-
tion drive in China, the existing buildings are gradually overtaking new construction,
which means a growing importance of retrofitting existing buildings for enhanced
energy efficiency.
To improve the heat source mix, it is advised to prioritize low-grade excess heat
from CHP and industrial production. And for buildings where low-grade excess
heat is unavailable, heat pump is recommended. In recent years, with the steady
expansion of clean heating in northern China, CHP is rapidly gaining prominence,
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so are gas heating, heat pumps and industrial excess heat, but such excess heat is yet
to be fully harnessed. Meanwhile, with maturing technology of long-distance heat
transfer, location is less of a constraint for excess heat utilization, which also makes
much more economic sense. Persistent energy-saving renovation and clean heating
penetration, technology development, comprehensive enhancement in system and
equipment efficiency and remediation for overheating heating will also contribute to
energy conservation and emission reduction on this front.
Energy-saving potentials of key measures under different scenarios are illustrated
in Fig. 3.23.
2. Public and commercial Buildings (Excluding NUH)
Energy consumption in this category is set to rise further. But the growth can
be slowed down through enforcing energy saving and emission reduction measures.
In light of the overall principle of capping energy consumption and intensity, the
whole-process building management with curbing actual energy consumption as the
main target will be the central and most effective step to curtail energy consumption
in this category and achieve energy saving and emission reduction [32].
Energy-saving feasibility study should be conducted on building design and reno-
vation plan, where the demand for indoor environment, building stock control, etc.
should be discussed, and passive technologies and renewables such as solar PV
should be fully utilized to optimize the design, save energy and reduce emissions.
For the building equipment and systems, there are already cases of high energy
consumption accompanied by high energy efficiency as a result of the lopsided
pursuit of higher equipment efficiency, i.e. behavioral changes triggered by equip-
ment replacement, eventually leading to muchmore energy consumption. Therefore,
the development of equipment system should address both efficiency and its compat-
ibility with use cases. Meanwhile, to boost electrification of public and commercial
buildings, domestic hot water, disinfection and vapor generation equipment should
gradually switch to electrothermal pump and direct electrothermal appliances, etc.
S1: control building stock; S2: higher standards for new buildings; S3: retrofitting of existing 






0.12 0.06 0.06 0.05
0.11
























Policy scenario Reinforced policy scenario 2ºC scenario
Fig. 3.23 Energy-savingpotentials of variousmeasures in urbanheating in north china (2015–2050)
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Examples have proven that for healthcare facilities with special need for vapor,
production of hot water or vapor with distributed electrothermal approach should be
encouraged as it consumes less energy than centralized gas-fired boilers due to less
heat loss during transmission.
In addition, optimizing operation management represents another major energy-
saving pathway in this category. This includes encouraging users and operators to
adopt more energy-efficient ways of use, and promoting EPC, etc.
Energy-saving potentials of each measure are illustrated in Fig. 3.24.
3. Urban Residential Buildings (Excluding NUH)
Like public buildings (excluding NUH), growing energy consumption is also
expected of this sector, and interventions are needed to mitigate the surge [33].
To upgrade the design of residential buildings, possible measures include
promoting passive energy-saving technologies (such as the use of natural ventila-
tion and lighting, improving building envelope and providing shade on the external
façade of the building, etc.), improving residential community planning and using
more renewable energy such as solar PV.
Studies have shown that lifestyle mostly explains why energy consumption in
China is significantly lower than the developed world. To enable energy-saving and
low-carbon development, its essential to sustain the current green lifestyle. Mean-
while, technologies adaptable to green living shall be developed to avoid luxu-
rious behavioral changes due to technological option. For example, the mode of
using heating and cooling only when needed should be encouraged, and the use of
energy-intensive home appliances shall be discouraged.
Currently, residential buildings are still heavily reliant on gas for cooking and
domestic hot water, prompting greater efforts to increase electrification in the energy
mix. Various types of electric cooking utensils and electric heating for domestic
hot water are mature enough to meet residential needs, and guidance in lifestyle,
S1: control building stock; S2: optimize operation management; S3: energy-saving design of new 
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Fig. 3.24 Energy-saving potentials of various measures for public buildings (Excluding NUH)
(2015–2050)
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especially in the transformation of traditional ways of cooking, is vital to promote
these technologies.
Potential of each measure is illustrated in Fig. 3.25.
4. Rural Residential Buildings
In view of the type of buildings, people’s lifestyle and resources endowment in
rural regions, the notion of “coal-free villages” might be an option in the north and
“eco-villages” in the south to enable energy-efficient and low-carbon development
in rural regions [24].
Compared to urban buildings, rural residences have much room for improve-
ment in terms of building performance, giving rise to the need of green retrofitting
to enhance the energy efficiency. In northern regions, better building envelop is
needed to provide more effective insulation, and passive solar power technology can
be deployed to cut the heating demand in winter; while in southern regions, more
effective insulation is also desired for building performance through passive cooling
technologies.
Now, many rural households are still using traditional biomass or bulk coal for
heating and cooking, which is inefficient and causes indoor air pollution. It is recom-
mended to switch to more efficient appliances for heating and cooking, such as
efficient and clean biomass combustion.
Moreover, optimized energy mix and better use of renewables are also important
steps. Northern regions are advised to reshape the system of rural energy supply with
full use of biomass and solar power, among other renewables to phase out coal in
domestic use. Southern regions, on the other hand, are encouraged to be coal-free
and maximize the use of all renewables.
Potentials of each measure are illustrated in Fig. 3.26.
S1: control building stock; S2: promote green lifestyle; S3: assess energy-saving design of new 
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Fig. 3.25 Energy-saving potentials of various measures for urban residential buildings (excluding
NUH) (2015–2050)
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S1: control building stock; S2: promote green lifestyle; S3: upgrade building performance; S4: 
optimize and upgrade equipment and system performance; S5: improvement of energy system and 



























Policy scenario Reinforced policy scenario 2ºC scenario
Fig. 3.26 Energy-saving potential of various measures in rural residential building (2015–2050)
3.2.4 Implementation Pathway & Policy Recommendations
Joint efforts are indispensable for multiple stakeholders to adopt policy measures
from different angles to secure green and low-carbon development of the building
sector. Given a sound planning of the building size, a robust development roadmap
for low-carbon buildings should be devised with energy demand reduction and
energy structure improvement as the shared targets and the development of energy
technologies and guidance for lifestyle as major approaches.
1. Setting a Cap on Total Building Stock
Total building stock is a significant factor for energy consumption and building
emissions, and appropriate planning to cap total building stock in the future are
necessary for low carbon development of the building sector [34].
One the one hand, the overall building stock must be checked and the total floor
area of civil buildings should be kept under 74 billion m2. Currently the building
area per capita in China is close to and even exceeded the level of some developed
countries in Europe and Asia. Even with the continuous growth of urbanization in
the future, the demand for new buildings is limited based on the current building
floor area per capita. So new construction projects and new buildings must be put
under strict control.
On the other, massive demolition and construction projects must be curtailed
with advancement in maintenance technologies to improve the ratio of maintenance
and upgrading of buildings. During the last two decades, an enormous number of
houses and infrastructure projects have been built in China, and going forward, the
focus should shift from massive construction to massive maintenance, renovation
and function upgrades, i.e. from demolition and construction to life cycle extension
and quality upgrade.
2. Building an Energy Conservation System with “Dual Controls”
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A “dual control” system—policies for capping both total amount and intensity for
building energy conservation—should be created with actual energy consumption as
the core criteria for assessment. It is advised to encourage the introduction of policies
and regulations concerning building energy conservation at local levels on a case-by-
case basis, thus putting into practice the energy consumption and intensity control
measures on the ground. Meanwhile, to facilitate the execution of control measures,
Standard for Building Energy Consumption should be revised and updated and used
as the master standard for creating a supporting standard system [35].
Clear and consistent building energy consumption data is the basis of data-driven
building energy saving efforts. It is recommended to implement Classification and
Presentation of Building Energy Use Data in a timely manner and improve the calcu-
lationof variousmetrics.At the same time, enhancements on the accuracy, availability
and transparency of the rules governing building energy use datawould provide better
support for the energy-efficient and low-carbon development of buildings [36].
3. Realizing Low Carbon Structural Transformation
It is crucial to move toward a new pattern of building energy use and form of
system, and incorporate restructuring efforts in the building sector for low-carbon
transformation in the building development goals [37].
Major steps should be taken to promote all-round electrification, PV buildings
and absorption of renewable power to accommodate the uniqueness of future energy
supply. Mature technologies are available to meet end-use building demand through
electricity, but guidance needs to be provided for people’s lifestyle and behavior
modes, especially for the change of traditional cooking method. Roofs and vertical
façades of buildings exposed to sunlight should be fully harnessed to roll out PV
buildings and increase the renewable power generation of the buildings themselves.
It is suggested to vigorously develop flexible power consuming buildings integrating
DC distribution, distributive power storage and smart charging piles in cities and
towns to alleviate power shortage. In rural regions, in contrast, PV roof and wind
and solar power penetration in DC microgrid should be developed in full scale with
changes in power consumption modes.
Large quantities of fossil fuels are currently used for NUH. The heating potential
of low-grade residual heat fromCHP and industrial production should be fully tapped
as the primary heat source for NUH. Clean heating renovation based on natural gas
boilers should not be furtherly encouraged. Instead of determining power generation
by heating supply in thermal power stations, large-capacity power storage installa-
tions and electrothermal conversion equipment such as heat pump should be built in
heat source facilities to materialize the coordination of heat and power.
Ambitious actions should be encouraged in rural regions to develop and efficiently
use biomass energy and put in place a system of biomass acquisition, processing
and sales. Through compression molding of solid fuels and biogas scale-up, local
biomass resources can be fully tapped to meet local demand for cooking, domestic
hot water and part of heating. This could curb GHG emissions from compost and
straw returning to field while creating opportunities for products and industries in
biomass collection, processing and application.
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4. Providing Guidance for Green Lifestyle
Variance in usage patterns is the key reason for a much-lower building energy
intensity in China than in the developed countries. Apart from encouraging green
lifestyle, it’s also a priority for building energy-saving efforts to design and construct
buildings and systems that are compatible with the traditional way of energy-saving
for residents [38].
The fact that building energy intensity is lower in China than in the developed
world is best explained by the green behavior pattern that should be encouraged
instead of jumping on the bandwagon of a luxurious lifestyle. In line with Master
Plan of Building a Green Life Campaign, guidance for green lifestyle should be
reinforced during campaigns to build green communities as well as green buildings,
and building energy-saving awareness should be raised in other green initiatives in
collaboration with other ministries and commissions.
The need for energy-saving technologies stems from behavioral pattern, which is
in turn subject to the guidance of technologies. While arousing people’s awareness
for a green lifestyle, buildings and systems compatible with user habits should be
designed and constructed. Building designers should prefer nature based concepts
and advocate the preference for distributive AC systems. Technology assessment
should prioritize behavioral pattern consistent with a green lifestyle.
5. Developing Feasible Low-Carbon Technologies
Suitable energy-saving and low-carbon technologies hold the key to energy effi-
cient development of the building sector. Scenario and pathway analyses point to the
need for further breakthroughs in key energy-saving technologies, including clean
heating for northern China, DC building technology enabling flexible power use in
buildings, building and equipment system design and operation methods compatible
with behavioral pattern and renewable energy utilization (such as efficient biomass
utilization, integrated PV building technology), etc.
As evidenced by many cases, the one-sided pursuit for new technologies and
high efficiency may result in high energy efficiency and high energy consumption,
eventually causing buildings to consume more energy [38]. Therefore, technolog-
ical decisions should be made with outdoor weather conditions and corresponding
behavioral pattern taken into account and actual energy consumption as a key metric
for evaluation.
The following roadmap for future low-carbon building development is shaped
based on the above analysis, as illustrated in Fig. 3.27.
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Fig. 3.27 Development roadmap of buildings’ low-carbon transition
3.3 Transportation Sector
3.3.1 Development & Trend of the Transportation Sector
3.3.1.1 Traffic & Carbon Emissions
China has scored enormous achievements in its transportation sector as a leading
country in the scale and capacity of transportation infrastructure. As illustrated in
Figs. 3.28 and 3.29, a sharp rise is seen in cargo and passenger turnover with the rapid
economic growth and social development. Despite an array of proactive measures in
low-carbon development with the adoption of more efficient means of transportation
including vehicles, trains, vessels and airplanes, the sector still see a surge in the
quantity of energy consumption and totalCO2 emissions and an increasing proportion
in total energy use.
Cargo turnover in China has undergone a steep increase in China, reaching 19.4
trillion tons-km in 2019, a 198% increase compared to 2005.
Passenger turnover andurbanpassenger traffic are also on the fast track of increase.
In 2019, intercity passenger turnover registered at 3.54 trillion people-km, 2.61 times
of that in 2005. Meanwhile, urban passenger transport is on the rise—126.6 billion
trips were made in 2005, which grew to 231 billion in 2019, up 82%.
Total energy consumption of transportation rose from 231 million tce5 in 2005
to 505 million in 2019, an increase of 119% and an annual growth of 5.8%, with its
weight in China’s total energy consumption growing from 9.1% in 2005 to 10.7% in
2018.
5 Electricity consumption in the transportation sector is converted into coal equivalent with
electrothermal method: 1 kWh = 122.9 gce.
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Fig. 3.28 Exponential increase in activities, energy consumption and CO2 emissions in the
transportation sector in China (2005 = 100)
Fig. 3.29 Energy consumption and CO2 emissions of transportation in China and their proportion
CO2 emissions from the sector soared from457million tons in 2005 to 954million
tons in 2019, up 108% with an annual growth of 5.3%. The proportion of direct CO2
emissions from the transportation sector in total CO2 emissions in China climbed
from 7.3% in 2005 to 9.5% in 2018.
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Since 2005, CO2 emissions from passenger and cargo transportation has been
rapidly expanding, of which cargo transportation—whose total CO2 emissions are
still on the rise—is responsible for more carbon emissions than any other category
of transportation. CO2 emissions from intercity passenger transportation has been
growing since 2005, albeit at a slower pace comparatively speaking. CO2 from urban
passenger transportation also shows an upward trend with a strong momentum.
Road transport is the biggest CO2 emitter in China’s transportation sector, propor-
tion rising from 72.0% in 2005 to 84.7% in 2019, during which a slight drop is
observed in emissions from railway and waterway transportation; while for aviation
transportation, the increase in CO2 emissions is remarkable, growing from 4.0% in
2005 to 6.9% in 2019.
3.3.1.2 Main Characteristics of Carbon Emissions from Transportation
1. Carbon Emissions from Transportation as a Percentage of Total Emissions
Are Low, but are Rapidly Rising
Soaring energy consumption and carbon emissions have increasingly become a
headache amid a boom in transportation. The strong growth in demand has pushed
up its energy consumption as a percentage of total energy end-use in China from 5%
in 1980 to 9.1% in 2005 and 10.7% in 2019. Its share in total direct CO2 emissions
in the country has also jumped from 6.1% in 2005 to 9.3% in 2019.
2. Road Transportation Comprises the Bulk of Carbon Emissions, but
Aviation is Rising Faster than Any Other Sector
Road transport represents the largest share in the surging CO2 emissions from
transportation, but aviation is making increasing contribution to total emissions. In
2019, the share of road, railway, waterway and aviation transportation accounted
for 84.7, 1.4, 6.9 and 6.9% respectively in total CO2 emissions from transportation.
During the past 15 years, the contribution of road transportation has hovered around
85% while that of railway and waterway experienced a minor decline. A strong
growth is noted in aviation from 4.0% in 2005 to 6.9% in 2019.
3. Carbon Emissions from Gasoline and Diesel Consumption are the Main-
stream
In 2019, the transportation sector took up 10.7% of total energy consumption
in China, and 88.3% of energy consumption of transportation is attributable to oil
products. CO2 emissions from gasoline, diesel and kerosene accounted for 35.18,
52.53 and 6.88% respectively of energy-basedCO2 emissions from the transportation
sector in 2019, of which gasoline and diesel added up to 87.72%, an overwhelming
majority of the total emissions.
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4. Indirect Carbon Emissions from Electricity Consumption Can’t Be
Ignored
Despite a modest share of transportation in electricity consumption in the current
stage, a steep rise is expected with the future development of railway transport,
urban rail transit, tram, trolleybus, EVs and electric vessels. A full life cycle analysis
indicates that CO2 emissions from power generation that corresponds with electricity
consumption should not be overlooked.
3.3.1.3 Future Trend of Carbon Emissions of the Transportation Sector
As is illustrated in Fig. 3.30, a range of studies have demonstrated that CO2 emissions
from China’s transportation sector will witness rapid growth in the short- and mid-
term and gradually slow down in longer term. By 2050, annual CO2 emissions under
the baseline scenario will surge to 1.8 to 2.4 billion tons, a strong growth momentum
projected by themajority of forecasts and scenario studies, which signify that without
proactive and continuous mitigation policies in place, CO2 emissions are likely to
double or triple from the current level [39–43].
These studies show that with the completion of industrialization and upgrading of
industrial structure, the mix of transportation will be continually optimized with
increased proportion of low-carbon transportation, innovation and wider appli-
cation of low-carbon transportation equipment and technologies, which stand to
dramatically reduce GHG emissions from the transportation sector.
Fig. 3.30 Forecast of CO2 emissions from the transportation sector in China by 2050 [39–43]
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3.3.2 Future Development and Scenario Setting
3.3.2.1 Transportation Demand, Structural Changes and Technological
Development in the Future
1. Learnings from International Experience
Currently, passenger and cargo transportation and their associated energy
consumption and carbon emissions in China are still on the increase, standing in
stark contrast to the decline after a phase of growth in many developed countries,
some of whom have put in place a full-fledged transportation infrastructure system
whenChina is still in the phase of rapid development. In parts of the developedworld,
urbanization and motorization have been brought to fruition with minor growth in
private car ownership. By comparison, urbanization and motorization are pressing
ahead in full speed in China with a rapidly increasing number of private cars on the
road and a peak is not yet in sight. Despite the differences in the stage and characteris-
tics, the transportation sector in China does share a similar path of development with
the developed nations, and their course of development as well as the experiences
and lessons for low-carbon transportation are valuable references for China [44].
International experience suggests that the decline in carbon emissions from
passenger transportation faces tough challenges and proper guidance should be
offered to encourage rational consumption. The relative trend of changes in carbon
emission intensity from passenger transportation worldwide demonstrates the unit
energy consumption may grow with rising demand for comfortable travels, resulting
in the continuous increase in carbon emission intensity [45]. Between 2007 and 2018,
the private car ownership inChina skyrocketed from57million in 2007 to 204million
in 2019, with a average growth rate of 8.8% year-on-year. The exponential growth
has led to a sharp rise in carbon emissions. In 2013, private cars overtook taxis as the
biggest contributor to carbon emissions in urban passenger transport. With relatively
less roomandmore challenges of reducing the carbon emission intensity of passenger
transportation in China, it’s essential to come upwith a holistic plan to strike a perfect
balance between energy conservation, emission reduction and service improvement.
To this end, public awareness for a sensible consumption pattern holds the key, which
should neither compromise convenience, safety and comfort of travels for the sake
of emission reduction nor pursue maximum comfort at the cost of excessive carbon
emissions.
Vast potentials, however, are observed in cargo transportation where efficiency
improvement is paramount. Throughout the past decades, China’s economyhas flour-
ished with a remarkable rise in demand for bulk goods such as steel and cement,
among other materials for infrastructure, which are primarily transported by road.
For example, cargo turnover of road transportation experienced an annual growth
of 8.6% from 2005 and 2019, and 90% of road transportation depends on fossil
fuels for energy, prompting continual increase in carbon emissions. On the other
hand, demand for urban home delivery has apparently picked up with the advent of
e-commerce, from which carbon emissions as a percentage of freight transport has
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nearly doubled from 2010 to 2019. In the future, modern logistics should be given
much greater priority with enhanced organized transportation and efficiency to lower
the energy intensity and carbon emissions from freight transport.
Optimized transportation structure, intermodal transportation, adoption of
advanced means of transport and low-carbon energy technologies and smart trans-
port solutions are the major avenues for low-carbon development of the transporta-
tion sector. By employing a mixture of measures such as planning, pricing, invest-
ment, publicity, education and organization, passenger and freight transport should
be encouraged to switch from carbon-intensive options such as cars and trucks to
railway, waterway and public transportation with less carbon emissions. High-speed
rail and intercity rail should be built to link cities and light rail, maglev and suburban
railway are recommended in urban environment formore intensive city or city cluster
to formwith the aid of energy-efficient, large-capacity and high-speed transportation
modes, thereby shaping an intensive and low-carbon transportation supply system.
The development and application of new transportation technologies, alternative
fuels, IT and smart transport should be valued, especially when it comes to alter-
native fuels and new transportation technologies, together with a clear roadmap for
technology innovation.
2. Analysis of Transportation Demand and Structure
In freight transport, demand will change gears from high speed to a slower but
steady growth, of which the transport of bulk cargo will peak prior to 2030 while the
demand for high-value, decentralized, small-sized and time-sensitive cargo deliveries
will pick up rapidly; low-carbon policies will also steer towards an enhanced freight
transport structure.
Chinese economy has shifted from a high-speed growth to high-quality develop-
ment with more progress in supply-side structural reform. The growth in demand
for cargo transport will slow down, but as industrialization and urbanization forge
ahead, such demand will maintain a medium growth before 2030. China will embark
on a new journey of new industrialization underpinned by technological innovation
from 2030 to 2040, during which the growth in industrial output and cargo transport
will slacken off. Cargo turnover will move toward the peak after 2040 and slowly
decline afterwards.
In 2018, China took the world’s top spot in the output and transport of bulk
goods. With greater strides in terms of supply-side structural reform, shift in devel-
opment mode, economic structure and transition of growth drivers, the heavy chem-
ical industry is set to report a slower growth, cutting the demand for bulk goods
such as coal, iron ore and steel. It is expected that the demand for transporting bulk
commodities will reach a high plateau from 2020 to 2030 before a decline after 2030
as urbanization and massive infrastructure works come to fruition. Given the sheer
size of China’s territory and population and uneven resources endowment, no drastic
reduction is expected even after the peaking of bulk commodity transport, which
would be kept relatively stable in the short term.
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Logistics is becomingmore “personalized” thanks to internet-based customization
and the shift from centralized to decentralized reinforced control of industrial produc-
tion, among other new trends, which has rapidly driven up the demand for decentral-
ized and small-sized cargo transportation. Meanwhile, the demand for small-sized,
multiple-lot and high-value freight transport is rising as a result of improved living
and consumption standards, which also requires faster, more convenient and more
timely delivery and spurs the growth of cargo transportation by air and road. A
remarkable increase is noted in the share of high added-value and lightweight prod-
ucts, whose value per unit of transport far exceeds bulk commodities. These changes
in the category of goodswill drive sustained growth of containers and express delivery
transportation.
With continuously upgraded road network and the advantage of “door-to-door”
delivery, road will remain the primary means of cargo transportation. The weight
of railway and waterway transportation is subject to policy measures: forceful low-
carbon transportation policies will shift part of the cargo transport from road to
railway and waterway, resulting in an increased share of railway and waterway
turnover; incentives for railway-waterway intermodal transportation will also foster
new opportunities in railway and waterway transportation.
With economic restructuring taking place in China, bulk goods transportation by
road such as coal, grain and mineral ores will gradually move towards railway and
waterway, while road will undertake more small-quantity, multiple-lot, lightweight,
high added-value and time-sensitive cargo transport. On the other hand, with the
increase in the length of highway and improvement in logistic delivery system, the
average distance for road cargo transport will be longer. Passenger transportation
will see the total demand rapidly pick up, but the growth would be dragged down as
urbanization slows down. The booming city clusters will spur the growth in inter-
city passenger transport while urban passenger transportation is set to grow further,
driving the development of private cars and public transport.
More often than not, rapid urbanization is accompanied by high total demand
and growth of passenger transport, while in later period of urbanization, the demand
is featured by a high volume but minor growth. Currently in the medium phase of
urbanization, China is expected to enter a transition period by 2030 when industrial-
ization and urbanization move from medium to medium-to-late phase with a mid- to
high-speed growth in passenger transport. Between 2030 and 2050, China’s urban-
ization will gradually mature, which means a slower growth in passenger transport
as urbanization loses its momentum.
An important embodiment of the urbanization drive in China, city clusters will see
strengthened economic and social ties, and the share of intercity passenger travels
between major city clusters grows in total passenger transport across the country.
Demand for urban travels will continue to rise with ongoing urbanization and
economic growth. The emergence of new technologies and new models such as
autonomous driving and carpooling will encourage more people to travel by car for
speed and comfort; when better infrastructure becomes available and awareness of
low-carbon and green mobility gets stronger, public transportation might also be a
preferred option.
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3. Development Trend of Transportation of Typical Freight Categories in
China
The composition of freight categories for railway, inland waterway, coastal water-
borne and expressway artery transportation is shown in Table 3.10. The transport of
different categories of cargo varies in proportion among these means of transporta-
tion, with bulk goods accounting for over 90% of railway and 52.6% of expressway
[46].
Table 3.10 Artery transport cargo mix by category and proportion of bulk freight in China
No. Category Proportion of Bulk Freight (%)




1 Coal and coal products 61.39 25.38 8.19
2 Oil, natural gas and their
products
3.5 5.4 4.8
3 Metal ores 10.79 8.83 0.96






6 Cement 0.92 3.72 3.94
7 Non-metal ores 2.26 2.34 3.47
8 Wood 0.63 0.18 2.07
9 Grains 2.77 1.97 2.68
10 Chemical fertilizers and
pesticides
2.2 0.24 0.94




13 Chemical raw materials
and products
1.31 1.74 6.08







16 Others 3.63 20.83 7.22
17 Total 100 100 100
Sub-total of Categories 1–9 91.5 74.88 52.6
Data source: data collected by the research team
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The following forecast is conducted on the trends of transportation of coal, steel
and smelting materials, building materials, grains, containers and express deliveries
(Table 3.11):
1. Coal transportationwill remain stable in short termand report substantial decline
in mid and long term.
2. Transportation of smelting materials, especially steel, will experience a steady
fall [47].
3. Transportation of building materials such as cement will show a downward
trend, but a slight increase will occur with wood.
4. Total grain transportation sees no major change with continuously improving
transportation mode.
5. A sustained growth is expected for container transportation.
6. Transportation of express deliveries will sustain rapid increase.
4. Development in Transportation Technologies
Future innovations in transportation technologies will speed up green and low-
carbon development of the transportation sector. With higher penetration of elec-
trification in railway, lightweight vehicles and fuel and power saving technologies,
wider acceptance of autonomous driving, eco-driving and fleet, upgrading of engine
and vehicle manufacturing technologies in road transportation, application of precise
flight management technology and biofuels in aviation, remarkable progress will be
made in transportation technologies, which will in turn contribute to higher energy
efficiency and emission reduction. Faster market penetration of clean energy and new
energy vehicles and vessels and accelerated use of aviation biofuels will catalyze
cleaner and lower-carbon energy supply in transportation.
Progress in railway transportation technology is mainly manifested in the level
of electrification and lightweight vehicles. In light of the progress in railway elec-
trification rate, lightweight trains, power and fuel efficiency and smart management,
etc., energy consumption from railway is on track to drop by 15–30% in 2030 and
35–50% in 2050.
Advancement in road transportation technologies ismainly demonstrated bybetter
fuel economy. For over a decade, fuel consumption of passenger vehicles in China
has continued to fall. According to the statistics from MIIT, corporate average fuel
consumption (CAFC) was 7.02 L/100 km in 2015, followed by an average growth
of 1.7% annually after the implementation of Phase I Standard of Fuel Economy
in 2006. Made in China 2025 and Energy-Saving and New Energy Vehicle Tech-
nology Roadmap have specified targets for reduction in fuel consumption for varied
passenger car technologies,which have been supported bymultiplemeasures adopted
by the national government. Phase IV Standard of Passenger Vehicles has entered
into effect in 2016 with stricter fuel consumption standards in the future. Given
the technological upgrades in engine and vehicle manufacturing, eco-driving, truck
fleeting and road network optimization, energy consumption by road transportation
is set to fall by 35–50% in 2030 and 55–70% in 2050.
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Technological progress in waterway transportation is mainly reflected in vessel
building standards. With vessel scale-up technology and vessel type standardization,
its energy efficiency will increase by 20–50%.
Such progress in civil aviation, on the other hand, is most remarkable in terms
of flight management technology and biofuels. With the development of delicacy
flight management technology, biofuel application and development and use of new
engines/aircrafts, energy efficiency of aviation is projected to improve by 20–70%.
China has seen an upsurge in new energy vehicles (NEV) in terms of production
and sales, which boast tremendous potential for future growth. From 2011 to 2018,
annual sales of NEV shot up from less than 10,000 to 1.256 million units, making
China the world’s biggest NEVmarket. The production and sales of fuel cell vehicles
(FCV) hit 1527 units. The industry has grown to over a hundred billion yuan from
a few billion at the outset. The industrial chain, consisting of upstream mineral
resources and key rawmaterials, mid-stream core components such as battery, motor
and controller and downstream vehicle and charging piles, has evolved and matured,
with the emergence of many world-leading businesses. As the market takes off, the
end sales and penetration will continue to climb. From the second half of 2017, many
countries have announced plans and timetables to ban the sale of oil-fueled vehicles.
Studies have shown that in light of the development stage of Chinese carmakers,
industrial structure and transportation conditions, China is expected to impose the
ban (except for trucks for special purposes and heavy-duty trucks) around 2030 to
pave the way for NEV.
NEV will be quickly universalized in the future and become the overwhelming
market mainstream by 2050. Energy-Saving and New Energy Vehicle Technology
Roadmap issued by the national government in 2016 stated that NEV, including EV,
will partially replace vehicles with internal combustion engines by 2025, and its
ownership will account for 2–3% of the total, and such replacement will be scaled up
by 2030 to 5–10%.According to CATARC, themanufacturing cost of BEVwill be on
the par with the average HEV by 2025 and further reduced to the level of traditional
vehicles by 2033, after which BEV will enjoy the best cost-competitiveness among
its peers, and the market will be the lever for wider acceptance of NEV. Based on
consumer choice, it is expected that annual sales of BEV and NEV will respectively
make up around 60 and 70% by 2050, when NEV will be the overwhelming market
mainstream, of which FCV will comprise a bigger share in the category of coaches
and mid- to heavy-duty trucks.
Biomass energy represents the future of clean energy for aircrafts. Studies have
indicated that compared to conventional fuels, the use of biofuels during cruising
will cut CO2 emissions by 60–98%, with which biofuels can be directly mixed for
use. IATA has unveiled a forecast report and introduced plans and roadmap in this
connection. Given that biofuels are fully adaptable to the existing aviation system
and will not cause erosion of rubber sealing elements of fuel pipes, no major changes
will be needed in aircrafts or ground systems. It is expected that 30% of aviation fuels
around the world will be biofuels by 2030, and 50% by 2040.
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3.3.2.2 Introduction of Scenario Setting
Building on the above analysis, one should see that with new climate targets such
as the “carbon peak” and the strategic move to build a strong nation through trans-
portation development, transport is moving ever closer to the goal of low-carbon
growth.
Meanwhile, with the application of mobile internet, IoT, cloud computing, big
data and other new technologies, disruptive innovations have taken place in NEV,
energy storage and autonomous driving, and the notion of “internet+ ” has permeated
into all areas of transportation, which has given birth to new business models and
revolutionized the transportation landscape.
CO2 emissions from transportationwill be subject tomultiple factors in the future,
such as the model and pattern of transportation, energy efficiency of conveyance,
relations between public transportation and private cars, tendency in transportation
demand, etc.
Four scenarios, namely the policy scenario, reinforced policy scenario, 2 °C
scenario and 1.5 °C scenario, are set in this study. Energy consumption and
carbon emissions of the transportation sector are calculated with the metrics in
the four scenarios for comparison and analysis. Parameters used by the research
include emergence of new business models such as shared mobility, change in
consumer mindset, penetration of new energy means of transportation, applica-
tion of autonomous driving, optimization of transportation structure, technological
advancement in transportation and spatial layout of infrastructure, etc. (see Table
3.12).
3.3.3 Analysis of Different Scenarios
3.3.3.1 Energy Consumption and Carbon Emissions
As shown in Fig. 3.31 and Tables 3.13 and 3.14, given the current development, total
energy consumption of the transportation sector undergoes rapid growth until around
2040, and peaking around 2035 will not happen unless strong policy interventions
are conducted.
As is shown in Fig. 3.32, Tables 3.15 and 3.16, given the current development,
total carbon emissions of the transportation sector grow rapidly until around 2040,
and peaking around 2030 will not happen unless strong policy interventions are
conducted.
Under the policy scenario, total carbon emissions are on continuous rise. Despite
the decline in carbon emissions per unit of turnover/passenger traffic, total CO2
emissions grow continuously as the growth in passenger and cargo turnover and
urban passenger traffic outpaces the decrease in unit energy consumption until it
peaks at 1.16 billion tons in 2040.
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Fig. 3.31 Energy consumption of transportation sector by scenario in China between 2015 and
2050 (million tce)
Table 3.13 Energy consumption of transportation sector by scenario in China between 2015 and
2050 (million tce)
Total Policy scenario Reinforced policy scenario 2 °C scenario 1.5°C scenario
2015 430 430 430 430
2020 514 514 514 514
2030 599 590 583 583
2050 585 471 402 346
Under the reinforced policy scenario, with the optimization of transportation
vehicle structure, technological innovations and proper allocation of resources, total
CO2 emissions from the transportation sector continue to grow and peak around 2035
before declining.
Under the 2 °C scenario near zero emission, regional and urban–rural transporta-
tion can be better coordinatedwith higher efficiency through strengthened connection
of comprehensive transportation hubs; growing application of “internet+ ” in trans-
portation enhances the level of intelligence in transportation; an optimized transport
structure rationalizes passenger and cargo transportation of railway, road, waterway
and civil aviation; more modern transportation equipment and better fuel mix are
made possible through technological progress; more ambitious penetration of NEV,
including EV, among other measures, enables a peak of total CO2 emissions from
the sector around 2030 at 1.075 billion tons.
Under the 1.5 °C scenario net zero emission, through further development of
intermodal transportation, transportation improvement, accelerated use of electri-
fication and hydrogen and application of low-carbon technologies in aviation and
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Table 3.14 Energy consumption of transportation sector by category in China between 2015 and
2050 (million tce)
Year 2015 2020 2030 2050
Policy scenario Total 430 514 599 585
Gasoline 132 158 179 193
Diesel 242 277 306 267
LPG 0 1 2 6
Natural gas 15 17 18 14
Electricity 16 23 33 40
Hydrogen 0 0 0 1
Aviation fuel 25 38 58 58
Biofuel 0 0 2 7
Reinforced policy scenario Total 430 514 590 472
Gasoline 132 158 173 111
Diesel 242 277 299 210
LPG 0 1 2 8
Natural gas 15 17 19 11
Electricity 16 23 37 68
Hydrogen 0 0 0 1
Aviation fuel 25 38 57 52
Biofuel 0 0 3 11
2 °C scenario Total 430 514 583 402
Gasoline 132 158 165 69
Diesel 242 277 295 160
LPG 0 1 2 10
Natural gas 15 17 20 8
Electricity 16 23 41 97
Hydrogen 0 0 0 2
Aviation fuel 25 38 57 21
Biofuel 0 0 3 35
1.5 °C scenario Total 430 514 583 340
Gasoline 132 158 165 21
Diesel 242 277 295 47
LPG 0 1 2 10
Natural gas 15 17 20 4
Electricity 16 23 41 191
Hydrogen 0 0 0 18
Aviation fuel 25 38 58 4
Biofuel 0 0 3 46
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Fig. 3.32 CO2 Emissions from the transportation sector in China from 2015 to 2050 (Note
international aviation is not included in aviation, and ocean shipping is not included in water
transport)
Table 3.15 Total carbon emissions from the transportation sector in China from 2015 to 2050
(million tons)
Year 2015 2020 2030 2050
Policy scenario 877 991 1155 1109
Reinforced policy scenario 877 99,100 1112 804
2°C scenario 877 991 1075 550
1.5 °C scenario 877 991 1037 172
ocean navigation, total CO2 emissions from transportation would peak around 2030
at 1.04 billion tons before a drastic decline to around 172 million in 2050.
A comparative analysis of the four scenarios suggests that compared to the policy
scenario, energy carbon emissions from the transportation sector are down by 10.2%
in 2040 under the reinforced policy scenario; the emissions are down by 7.8% in
2030 under the 2 °C scenario and by 84.7% in 2050 under the 1.5 °C scenario.
3.3.3.2 Analysis on the Trend Towards Electrification
Under the policy and reinforced policy scenarios, oil products—primarily diesel
and gasoline—are the biggest energy consumers in the transportation sector through
2050. As indicated in Table 3.17, under the 2 °C scenario, and 1.5 °C scenario
in particular, more ambitious measures would be adopted to expand electricity
consumption in transportation as a replacement of oil products, including promoting
the penetration of NEV and railway electrification. Major steps would be taken to
boost EV development for road transportation to embrace electrification.
“Pure electric drive” should be deemed as the mainstream technical pathway.
Owners of PHEVs are to be encouraged to use the motor-driven (CD) mode for their
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Table 3.16 CO2 Emissions from transportation in China from 2015 to 2050 (million tons)
Year 2015 2020 2030 2050
Policy scenario Total 877 991 1155 1109
Road 748 814 914 945
Railway 12 17 23 16
Aviation 48 73 107 89
Waterway 68 86 110 58
Reinforced policy scenario Total 877 991 1112 804
Road 748 814 881 649
Railway 12 17 21 17
Aviation 48 73 109 79
Waterway 68 86 101 59
2 °C scenario Total 877 991 1075 550
Road 748 814 846 426
Railway 12 17 21 13
Aviation 48 73 108 62
Waterway 68 86 100 48
1.5 °C scenario Total 877 991 1037 172
Road 748 814 816 119
Railway 12 17 20 2
Aviation 48 73 104 2
Waterway 68 86 96 48
Table 3.17 Electricity consumption of transportation by scenario (billion kWh)
Policy scenario Reinforced policy scenario 2 °C scenario 1.5 °C scenario
2020 220.6 220.6 220.6 220.6
2030 286.4 368.1 418.7 561.9
2050 324.3 553.1 790 1592.2
rides.Due considerations should be given to the penetration of energy-saving vehicles
and hydrogen-based FCV as well as alternative fuels. Moreover, the construction of
charging infrastructure shall be accelerated to prepare for the electrification of road
transportation.
3.3.3.3 Key Measures for Net Zero Emission
Analysis has suggested that under the 2 °C scenario, CO2 emissions from trans-
portation by 2050 would stand around 550 million tons, of which aviation and water
102 3 End-Use Energy Consumption & CO2 Emissions
transport encounter more challenges in emission reduction because of their depen-
dence on traditional petroleum-based fuels. A host of interventions must be done in
order to achieve net zero emission.
CO2 emissions from the transportation sector can be further reduced to around
100 million tons via energy efficiency enhancement and massive use of biofuels and
hydrogen in aviation and water transportation. Key measures include replacing 125
million tons of refined oil with 31 million tons of biofuels and 19 million tons of
hydrogen in the transportation sector to avoid approximately 370million tons of CO2
emissions.
3.3.3.4 Summary of Scenario Analysis
If the current trend—rapid economic and social development and accelerated indus-
trialization and urbanization—is to continue, total carbon emissions from the trans-
portation sector is bound to rise sharply until around 2040. Onlywith powerful policy
tools can the peak occur around 2030. A swift reduction in emissions can be made
possible through further development of intermodal transport, enhanced transport
structure and faster penetration of electrification and hydrogen.
Under the 2 °C or 1.5 °C scenario, total carbon emissions from transportation hit
the peak around 2030 at roughly 1 billion tons. Under the policy or reinforced policy
scenario, refined oil represents the biggest component of energy consumption in
transportation until 2050. The 2 °Cor 1.5 °C scenario, however, the soaring electricity
consumption in transportation, replaces a large chunk of refined oil, which would
quickly decrease the total emissions onwards.
The massive use of biofuel and hydrogen in aviation and ocean freight trans-
portation helps drive down CO2 emissions from transportation to approximately 170
million tons in 2050, close to net zero emission.
3.3.4 Goals, Pathways and Policy Recommendations for Low
Carbon Development
3.3.4.1 Goals and Pathways of Low Carbon Development
Table 3.18 provides the roadmap for the migration toward low-carbon development,
with metrics including total carbon emissions, spatial layout, vehicles, transportation
structure, transport services and low-carbon governance, etc. 2025, 2035 and 2050
are selected as the milestones.
Carbon emissions from the transportation sector is expected to peak in 2035 with
a clean, low-carbon, multi-model and efficient modern comprehensive transportation
system taking shape. The infrastructure capacity of various means of transportation
is adequate but not excessive. The overall coverage of infrastructure network further
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Table 3.18 Low carbon development targets of the transportation sector
No. Metric
category

































































expands with weakness largely disappearing and the accessibility and smoothness
of domestic travel substantially improved. A modern, user-friendly and efficient
comprehensive hub system are in place with efficient connection between different
means of transportation, more convenient passenger transfers and much greater
efficiency in cargo transshipment. Passenger and cargo transportation structure are
rationalized with growing freight transport via railway and water; eco-friendliness
of infrastructure, resources utilization efficiency and supporting services for clean
energy transportation are substantially enhanced, and the proportion of clean and
efficient transportation vehicles ranks top among global leaders.
By 2050, near zero emission should become a reality in the transportation
sector, and the green and low-carbon development of the sector is aligned with
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the call to build a strong and modern socialist nation and a transportation power-
house. The synergy of technology, management and innovation should shape low-
carbon transport to make clean and low-carbon vehicles and industrial chain, and
improvemanagement efficiency across the board.A low-carbon, integrated and three-
dimensional transportation network is created through the greening of the whole
process and full life cycle of transportation. An all-day green development system
of transport infrastructure emerges, compatible with the environmental capacity of
resources and in harmony with work, life and the ecosystem. Cleaner and lower-
carbon means of transport gain further prominence with new energy or clean energy
applied in almost all new means of transport.
3.3.4.2 Strategic and Policy Recommendations
To build a clean, low-carbon, intermodal and efficient integrated modern transporta-
tion system, the following recommendations are made for the scientific development
of low-carbon strategies and policies for the transportation sector:
1. Ensure an earlier peak of energy demand of the transportation sector. Fully
harness the role of electricity, hydrogen and biofuels as alternative fuels;
further improve the transportation mode and demand management, peak energy
consumption of transportation somewhere between 2030 and 2035 and enable
a remarkable drop in consumption in the wake of the peak.
2. Set the targets for carbon emission peak of the transportation sector. Given
that road transports remains the principal source of energy consumption and
direct CO2 emissions and boasts tremendous potential in energy replacement,
sometime around 2030 might be defined as the target for CO2 emission peak
for the entire transportation sector.
3. Explore the pathway for near zero carbon emission in transportation. Actively
tap into the potential for technology application in subsectors facing greater
challenges in carbon reduction; devise a net zero emission plan in order for
aviation and water transport system to massively adopt biofuels and hydrogen
around 2050.
4. Vigorously promote NEV development. Support groundbreaking EV technolo-
gies and plan ahead for the charging infrastructure; speed the penetration of EVs
in the passenger car segment; facilitate a ban on gasoline passenger vehicles by
2040; speed the electrification of coaches and trucks; meanwhile, secure a spike
in EV and FCV ownership.
5. Stricter fuel economy standards for cars and other means of transportation to
gradually enhance transport energy efficiency. Improved fuel economy repre-
sents one of the very effective steps to curb energy consumption and GHG
emissions in the near, mid and long term.
6. Optimize transportation structure and enable a shift of long-distance passenger
and freight transport towards railway and waterway, which shall remain the
backbone of mid- to long-distance transportation of bulk commodities; further
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utilize assembly/evacuation ports and reduce the use of heavy-duty diesel trucks
for long-distance transportation of bulk commodities; transport not suitable for
road, such as long-haul passenger duty, should switch to aviation or railway to
reduce inappropriate need for road.
7. Enforce transport demand management across the board and encourage green
and low carbon mobility. Urban public transportation should be prioritized in
the planning, land approval, finance and right of way; accelerate the construc-
tion of BRT, bus lanes and rail transit, and slow traffic such as bicycle and
pedestrian lanes; large-capacity public transport system should be developed;
exercise differentiated transport management and hold down the rise of private
car ownership; enhance management and control measures through driving up
the user cost of private cars and discourage the use of private cars on the road.
8. Reinforce financial incentives such as green transport finance and taxes. Employ
policy packages comprising market-based policy measures, i.e. carbon tax,
license tax, congestion charge and parking fee as well as mandates and control
measures, i.e. biofuel standard, fuel economy/carbon standard in order to
ensure the coordinated and effective management of demand, energy and CO2
emissions of the transport sector.
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The global shift towards low carbon energy faces the dual challenges of continually
growing energy consumption and carbon emission reduction [1]. The power system
is transforming from fossil fuels to low-carbon non-fossil fuels as the main energy
source of the power system, which will be instrumental to the goal of energy tran-
sition. In terms of future demand, the proportion of electric power is expected to
grow in global energy consumption, with a 90% increase by 2040 from now, and one
fifth of the growth will come from China [2]. On the supply side, the trend of clean
electricity will continue with renewables and nuclear energy representing the main-
stream of power generation, replacing fossil energy. The future of thermal power
plants will, in large part, hinge on the cost and scale of application of carbon capture
and storage (CCS); while for the power grid, the large share of intermittent solar and
wind power will bring unprecedented challenges in stability and flexibility for the
power system. From the standpoint of end users, on the other hand, the electrification
rate will continue to rise in final energy consumption, replacing fossil fuels [1][2][3].
The power sector is the key of the decarbonization of China’s energy system.
With the world’s largest power generation sector, China produced nearly one fourth
of the world’s power in 2018 with its power sector consuming approximately 50%
of the country’s coal, and carbon emissions from power generation and heating
supply accounts for around40%of energy-related carbon emissions inChina.Various
studies have indicated that the power sector needs to take the lead in carbon neutrality
and even negative emission by the middle of the century. The core and biggest
challenge in China’s power sector transition lies in its massive coal-fired power
units, which made up 48% of the world’s total installed coal-fired capacity in 2018.
These power units in service are technically advanced with a short service life of 12
years on average, employing nearly 4 million people, including those in the upstream
coal industry. Coal power and coal-related industries are major contributors to local
economy. For example, coal-related industries accounted for 17% of GDP of Shanxi
province in 2018. It is foreseeable that the decarbonization of China’s power industry
will have a far-reaching impact on the society, economy and technology and so
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on. Therefore, it is urgent to find the pathway that is technically feasible, safe and
affordable under the temperature rise control targets of 2°C and 1.5°C set by the
Paris Agreement.
4.1 Power Demand Forecasting and Research Methods
Electric power consumption in China totaled 6.85 trillion kWh in 2018. From the
supply side, 69.1% of this came from fossil fuels and 30.9% from non-fossil fuels, of
which 26.7% was from renewables and 4.2% from nuclear power. On the consump-
tion side, the share of electric power in end user energy consumption is on a constant
rise in recent years, reaching 25.5% in 2018 with an average annual increase of
0.65% since 2015 [4]. By end-use consumption mix, the industrial sector remains
the biggest electric power consumer, which, despite the fluctuations in recent years,
comprised 70.4% in the total end user electric power consumption in 2017; a growing
momentum is observed in the proportion of the building sector in end user power
consumption in recent years, reaching 27.8% whereas the agricultural sector took
up a mere 1.8%. In future, the level of electrification of end-use sectors is expected
to significantly increase in China, with electric power gradually becoming the most
important component in terminal energy mix.
4.1.1 End-Use Sectors’ Demand Forecast
Under China’s long-term deep decarbonization strategy, CO2 emissions will peak
around 2030, and energy consumption will gradually enter and remain at the plateau
from 2035 to 2050 under different scenarios. During the plateau period, total energy
consumption tends to stabilize, and economic and social development is gradually
decoupled from energy and resource consumption. Meanwhile, end-use sectors,
such as industrial, transport, and building, need to achieve deep decarbonization.
While energy conservation and energy efficiency keep intensifying, electrification
also accelerates to replace coal, petroleum, and other fossil energy sources of direct
combustion and utilization. Hydrogen consumption or production using renewable
and nuclear power will also help to increase the share of electricity in end-use energy
consumption and the share of energy used for power generation in primary energy
consumption, resulting in a faster growth rate of electrification than that of energy
consumption.
According to the forecast on future power demand by various research institutes,
the power consumption in 2050 will range between 11.7–14.4 trillion kWh [1][2][5–
12] under the 2°C scenario, and between 14.4–15.2 trillion kWh under the 1.5°C
scenario. In this study, a bottom-up method is applied in the power demand forecast,
i.e. future power demand is calculated mainly based on the future predictions of
end-user sectors such as industrial, building, transport, etc. Under all scenarios, end
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users will see a remarkable improvement in electrification with a growing trend
of power consumption, of which the industrial sector will be the cornerstone in
driving electrification. As is shown in Table 4.1, under the policy scenario, reinforced
policy scenario, 2°C scenario and 1.5°C scenario, the power demand in 2050 will
respectively reach 11.384 trillion kWh, 11.91 trillion kWh, 13.13 trillion kWh and
14.27 trillion kWh, an increase of 0.66 times, 0.74 times, 0.92 times and 1.08 times
from the power supply in 2018.
Under the 2°C scenario, power demand will rise notably in all sectors, where the
industrial sector is to become the main driver for power demand, with an increase
of 3.21 trillion kWh from 2017 to 2050, which is followed by the building sector
with a growth of 1.81 trillion kWh and the transport sector where electric power will
replace part of fossil fuels as a major part of the energy mix. The transport power
demand is expected to climb from close to zero to 0.79 trillion kWh; the power
loss in the agriculture sector would see a 0.5 times increase (see Fig. 4.1). It should
be noted, however, that industrial restructuring, energy conservation and efficiency
improvement, among other factors on the demand side are taken into consideration
in calculating the end user power demand. A significant growth in power demand is
still expected under the 2°C and the 1.5°C scenarios as more ambitious actions will
be taken for end user energy consumption electrification.
Massive emission reduction and decarbonization of end users will imply tremen-
dous changes and challenges for these sectors, for which improvement in energy
efficiency and electrificationwill provide themost important solutions. Taking decar-
bonization in the industrial sector as an example,measures to achieve decarbonization
in the whole production process include using zero-carbon energy to provide power
and heating, altering technical processes, adopting CCS to tackle carbon emissions
from fossil fuel combustion and production process, switching to alternative feed-
stocks, etc. The biggest obstacle in decarbonization in the building sector is heating
and cooking as 100% electrification is already achieved in lighting, cooling and home
appliances. For transport, it requires fully electrified road transport, but for aviation
and shipping where zero carbon emission is not within reach, efforts must be done to
enable electrification for short-distance travels and opt for new carbon-free materials
to make long-distance travels possible [13]. This will depend on the cost reduction
of existing technologies (such as CCS and hydrogen-fueled steelmaking) and the
emergence of new technologies and processes (such as hydrogen power generation
and vehicle to grid).
4.1.2 Scenario Setting and Research Methods
In scenario setting for the power sector, emission reduction pathways are defined
based on two phases in line with the overarching guidelines of the project. The policy
scenario and the reinforced policy scenario are structured for Phase I from 2020 to
2030, guided by the target of the first stage of China’s modernization drive, i.e. basic
realization of modernization, fundamental improvement of ecological environment
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Fig. 4.1 Composition of power consumption increase by end users under the 2°C scenario
and overall fulfilment of the goal of building a beautiful China. In addition, the
low-carbon policies shall be strengthened, the implementation program and action
plan as pledged in the nationally determined contributions shall be carried out and
reinforced, following the timetable of carbon emission peaking by 2030 and meeting
the target of peak emission control. For Phase II from 2030 to 2050, emission reduc-
tion scenarios consistent with global temperature goals are studied and determined,
targeting global emission reduction paths for 2°C or 1.5°C as well as the goals of
developing China into a great modern socialist country and building a beautiful
China. The four scenarios are conceived as follows:
1. The policy scenario: extension of the current policy trend of the power sector
based on China’s nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted in
2015. By 2030, the share of non-fossil energy shall exceed 20% in total energy
supply (equivalent to 42% of non-fossil energy in total power supply).
2. The reinforced policy scenario: enforced emission reduction based on China’s
NDCs submitted in 2015. By 2030, power produced from non-fossil energy
shall surpass 50% of total power generation; by 2050, non-fossil energy as
a percentage of total energy supply shall exceed 50% (equivalent to 80% of
non-fossil energy in total power supply).
3. The 2°C scenario: emission scenario consistent with the global target of 2°C by
2050, followed by net zero emission between 2065 and 2070.
4. The 1.5°C scenario: emission scenario aligned with the global target of 1.5°C
by 2050, when negative emission is supposed in the power sector.
In this paper, a mathematical model, named the Long-term Multi-regional Load-
dispatchGrid-based (LoMLoG)model has been developed for a quantitative analysis
of the power sector under various scenarios. The LoMLoG model is to determine
the least-cost development pathway of power sector with the constraints of meeting
future power demand and realizing low-carbon targets. The objective function of this
model is minimizing the total system cost in the planning horizon (2018–2050 in
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this paper), which is composed of capital cost, operation and maintenance cost, fuel
cost and power transmission cost.
LoMLoGmodel features its high spatial–temporal resolution and technical details.
China is divided into 17 regions based on resource endowment and grid structure.
Existing and proposed interregional power transmission lines are set as fixed param-
eters whilst the incremental transmission capacity in the future are set as variables to
be optimized along with power generation capacity. The balance of power generation
and demand is based on different regions instead of a single country. In the real power
system, the fluctuation of power load requires load dispatch at every moment. Hourly
power balance is reflected in the model in order to describe the seasonal and daily
variability of power demand and renewable energy availability. Each year is divided
into 4 seasons (spring, summer, autumn, winter) and a representative day is selected
in each season. Therefore, each year has 96 time slices in total. As a result, this model
is able to simulate daily and seasonal balance of power system, with considering the
temporal fluctuation of renewable generations.
4.2 Low-Carbon Pathways for the Power Sector
Power transformation pathways in each country are closely linked to its resources
endowment, power source mix, economic development, and other factors. Regarding
technological pathways, a consensus of various studies points to the necessity to
vigorously tap into non-fossil power and develop technologies to enhance grid
stability and flexibility. But these studies vary in the level of development for different
non-fossil power sources. Among the available studies, a maximum of 630 GW
[9], 540 GW and 510 GW [7] are forecasted for hydropower, nuclear power and
intermittent renewable energy (wind and solar) respectively by 2050.
4.2.1 Installed Capacity and Power Generation of Different
Emission Reduction Pathways
In this study, the nuclear power is supposed to maintain a steady growth to reach
approximately 327GWby2050. For gas-fired power, despite its lack of price compet-
itiveness, a size of 200 GW is set for 2050 considering its role in system balance
and grid stability. According to the review of China hydropower survey in 2003, the
theoretical reserves of water resources of all river basins are 694 GW, of which 542
GW are technically exploitable and 402 GW are economically exploitable. There-
fore, the hydropower capacity by 2050 is set at 410 GW in this study. Raw materials
of biomass industry in China mainly consists of agricultural and forestry residues,
organic waste and energy crop/plants, with total available resources reaching nearly
600 million tce by 2050. Biomass liquid fuel technologies will be commercialized
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after 2030, biomass power generation will stabilize at around 106 million tce around
2030 [14], which is the basis for power generation from biomass and BECCS in
this study. The installation and power generation from other sources are selected by
the LoMLoG model for minimal social cost. As the cost of intermittent renewables
will continue to fall in various forecasts, renewables will be the preferred option in
models aiming at minimal cost.
Power installation in the future will be dominated by non-fossil energy, the share
of intermittent energy (wind and solar) will see a remarkable increase, and coal-
fired CCS and BECCS will be applied under the 2°C and the 1.5°C scenarios. As
is illustrated in Table 4.2, total installed capacity of the power system will hit 3619
GW, 4291 GW, 5686 GW and 6284 GW respectively under the policy scenario,
the reinforced policy scenario, the 2°C scenario and the 1.5°C scenario. The weight
of non-fossil energy and intermittent renewables in the installed capacity is set to
steadily rise under all four scenarios, where the proportion of non-fossil energy
will respectively stand at 73.1%, 81.8%, 93.1% and 93.9% and that of intermittent
renewables is forecasted to reach 54.1%, 64.5%, 79.4% and 81.3% by 2050. Coal-
fired power with CCS and BECCS would reach an installed capacity of 68 GW and
32 GW respectively under the 2°C scenario, and would expand to 149 GW and 48
GW under the 1.5°C scenario.
Changes in power generation mix suggest that newly emerged demand is mainly
met by power from non-fossil sources, which, in the long-term, will further replace
coal-fired power stock to meet low-carbon emission goals. As is illustrated in Table
4.3, with other energy sources increasingly replaced by electric power for end users,
total power demand in 2050 will reach 11.38 trillion kWh, 11.91 trillion kWh, 13.1
trillion kWh and 14.27 trillion kWh respectively under the policy scenario, reinforced
policy scenario, the 2°C scenario and the 1.5°C scenario, while power generated
from non-fossil energy will comprise 65.0%, 74.8%, 90.5% and 91.1% respectively.
Increase in the share of intermittent renewable energy will also be seen in 2050
under the policy scenario, the reinforced policy scenario, the 2°C scenario and the
Table 4.2 Generation fleet in 2050 under different scenarios (unit: GW)
Policy scenario Reinforced policy scenario 2°C scenario 1.5°C scenario
Coal 773 583 123 32
Coal with CCS 0 0 68 149
Gas 200 200 200 200
Nuclear 280 327 327 327
Hydro 410 412 414 416
Wind 1063 1387 2312 2740
Solar 893 1380 2205 2367
Biomass 0 2 6 5
BECCS 0 0 32 48
Total 3619 4291 5686 6284
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Table 4.3 Generation by technology in 2050 under different scenarios (unit: trillion kWh)
Policy scenario Reinforced policy scenario 2°C scenario 1.5°C scenario
Coal 3.64 2.62 0.45 0.11
Coal with CCS 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.79
Gas 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.38
Nuclear 1.97 2.38 2.35 2.34
Hydro 1.44 1.48 1.47 1.48
Wind 2.51 3.06 4.87 5.75
Solar 1.48 1.98 2.96 3.11
Biomass 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03
BECCS 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.29
Total 11.38 11.91 13.13 14.27
1.5°C scenario, reaching 35.1%, 42.3%, 59.6% and 62.1% of total power generation.
Under the 2°C and the 1.5°C scenarios, the share of intermittent renewable energy is
predicted to surge to around 60% by 2050, presenting a greater challenge for system
balance and grid flexibility. Compared to the 2°C scenario, power generation from
coal-fired CCS and BECCS will soar under the 1.5°C scenario.
Under the reinforced policy scenario, non-fossil fuels will take up 25% of primary
energy consumption by 2030, while 50% of total power generation will come from
non-fossil energy, whose proportion in primary energy consumption will hit 50% in
2050. As is shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the installed capacity and power generation
of coal-fired power will continue to shrink, with a drop of nearly 50% in 2050 as
compared to 2020. The installed capacity of natural gas power will reach 200 GW by
2050. But its share in total power production is insignificant due to its primary role
Table 4.4 Installed capacity in selected years under the reinforced policy scenario (unit: GW)
2020 2030 2035 2040 2050
Coal 1100 992 914 772 583
Coal with CCS 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 110 140 155 170 200
Nuclear 53 136 184 232 327
Hydro 380 412 412 412 412
Onshore wind 205 585 752 1005 1315
Offshore wind 5 5 5 5 72
Centralized PV 164 362 434 502 934
Distributed PV 51 228 362 382 446
Biomass 18 30 29 17 2
BECCS 0 0 0 0 0
Total installed capacity 2086 2890 3247 3497 4291
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Table 4.5 Power generation in selected years under the reinforced policy scenario (unit: trillion
kWh)
2020 2030 2035 2040 2050
Coal 4.63 4.52 4.09 3.59 2.62
Coal with CCS 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.37
Nuclear 0.39 1.00 1.37 1.74 2.38
Hydro 1.31 1.49 1.52 1.53 1.48
Onshore wind 0.42 1.27 1.65 2.21 2.78
Offshore wind 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.28
Centralized PV 0.21 0.51 0.62 0.76 1.39
Distributed PV 0.05 0.32 0.51 0.55 0.59
Biomass 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.01
BECCS 0 0 0 0 0
Total power generation 7.3 9.4 10.1 10.8 11.9
in peak regulation. Speedy growth and ambitious scale-up are needed for nuclear,
wind and solar power, with the three combined taking up 72.1% of total installed
capacity and 62.3% of total power generation by 2050.
Under 2°C scenario where net zero emission is to be achieved around 2050 in
the power sector, the emission reduction pathway before 2030 is mostly the same as
that under the reinforced policy scenario, while more ambitious actions are essential
after 2030. In addition, CCS and BECCS are vital to the 2°C scenario. Compared
to the reinforced policy scenario, coal-fired power will see a steep reduction under
2°C scenario, with an installed capacity of merely 123 GW in 2050, apart from 68
GW of coal-fired CCS and 32 GW of coal-fired BECCS in the installed capacity
(see Table 4.6). Moreover, the 2°C scenario calls for redoubled efforts in wind and
solar power, whose installed capacity would overtake that of the reinforced policy
scenario by 67% and 60% respectively, and the power generation would growth by
59% and 50% (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7).
4.2.2 Application of CCS and BECCS Technologies
The future capacity of coal-fired and gas-fired units to be retained in China depends,
in large measure, on CCS and its combination with bio-energy, i.e. BECCS tech-
nologies. Capturing 90% of carbon emissions, coal-fired power plants with CCS will
make it a relatively low-carbon power generation technology. BECCS is a negative
emission technology that can offset the residual emissions from the power sector.
The penetration of CCS depends on its cost reduction in the future, whereas both
cost reduction and biomass resources availability are indispensable factors for the
scale-up of BECCS. Some studies argue that 400–700GWof coal-fired power should
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Table 4.6 Installed capacity in selected years under the 2°C scenario (in GW)
2020 2030 2035 2040 2050
Coal 1100 1022 925 643 123
Coal with CCS 0 0 5 16 68
Gas 110 140 155 170 200
Nuclear 53 136 184 232 327
Hydro 380 414 414 414 414
Onshore wind 205 656 889 1295 2221
Offshore wind 5 5 5 25 91
Centralized PV 164 385 504 671 1518
Distributed PV 51 230 324 423 686
Biomass 18 37 36 24 6
BECCS 0 0 0 3 32
Total installed capacity 2086 3025 3441 3916 5686
Table 4.7 Power generation in selected years under the 2°C scenario (in PWh)
2020 2030 2035 2040 2050
Coal 4.62 4.35 3.88 2.93 0.45
Coal with CCS 0 0 0.04 0.11 0.40
Gas 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.40 0.39
Nuclear 0.39 1.01 1.38 1.73 2.34
Hydro 1.31 1.51 1.53 1.52 1.47
Onshore wind 0.43 1.39 1.95 2.82 4.52
Offshore wind 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.34
Centralized PV 0.21 0.52 0.73 1.02 2.14
Distributed PV 0.05 0.32 0.45 0.58 0.82
Biomass 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.04
BECCS 0 0 0 0.02 0.19
Total power generation 7.3 9.6 10.5 11.4 13.1
be reserved by 2050 for basic load, peak load regulation and heating purposes, yet
the existing units should be retrofitted for higher flexibility and combined heat and
power generation (CHP). Our results are basically consistent with these studies if
gas-fired generator sets are included.
CCS and BECCS technologies will play important roles in the 2°C and the 1.5°C
scenarios. Under the 2°C scenario, CCS is expected to scale up in coal-fired power
plants by 2035 and hit an installed capacity of 68 GW by 2050 with 320 million
tonnes of CO2 captured; BECCS, on the other hand, will be used in large scale
by 2040 and reach a capacity of 32 GW by 2050 with 190 million tonnes of CO2
captured. Under the 1.5°C scenario, the scale-up of CCS is moved up to 2030, with
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Fig. 4.2 Installed capacity and carbon storage capacity of CCS and BECCS
a capacity of 149 GW by 2050 and 600 million tonnes of CO2 captured in the same
year, and an aggregate capture of 4.13 gigatonnes ofCO2 from2040 to 2050.BECCS’
deployment will soar from 2040 onward, reaching 48 GW by 2050 with 280 million
tonnes of CO2 captured (see Fig. 4.2).
4.2.3 Carbon Emission Trajectories of the Power Sector
Under Different Scenarios
The carbon emission trajectories of the power sector under the four scenarios are
illustrated in Fig. 4.3. Under the policy scenario, carbon emissions from the power
Fig. 4.3 CO2 emission trajectory of the power sector under each scenario (including CCS)
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sector continue to rise slowly until it peaks in 2025 at 4.25 billion tons CO2 and
then downward to 3.29 billion tons in 2050. Under the reinforced policy scenario,
the emissions prior to 2030 stay on the same trajectory with policy scenario but fall
rapidly after 2030 and to 2.09 gigatonnes in 2050. In this study, the target of “non-
fossil energy comprising 20% of primary energy consumption by 2030” in the 2015
version NDCs is integrated into the policy scenario, and the target of “non-fossil
energy representing 50% of primary energy consumption by 2050” is incorporated
into the reinforced policy scenario, which is also characterized by a scale-up of
renewables before 2030 and the rise of non-fossil energy to 25% of primary energy
consumption by 2030. The carbon trajectories of both scenarios point to a failure
in attaining the 2°C goal, i.e. China’s current mid- to long-term energy and power
policies and targets fall short of the 2°C target set in the Paris Agreement.
In this study, strengthened efforts in emission reduction are seen in the 2°C and the
1.5°C scenarios compared to the policy and reinforced policy scenarios prior to 2030,
and the efforts are sped up after 2030 for the sake of the 2°C and the 1.5°C targets.
Under the 2°C scenario, carbon emissions from the power sector hit the peak in 2023
at 4.21 billion tons and take a nosedive after 2030, falling to merely 320 million
tonnes by 2050. Under the 1.5°C scenario, the power sector sees its emissions peak
at 4.21 billion tons in 2023, followed by a steep drop after 2030, reaching a negative
emission of 160 million tonnes by 2050 with the aid of BECCS. As is illustrated
in the above figure, the carbon trajectory features a sharp fall after 2030 under the
1.5°C scenario, which presents daunting challenges in the short term to the industry,
technology, market and policy, and puts enormous pressure on emission reduction
in later phase with the massive retirement of coal-fired power units after 2030.
4.2.4 Demand for Emission Reduction Technologies Under
Different Scenarios
Among carbon emission technologies under the four scenarios, nuclear, renewables,
CCS and BECCS hold the key to deep emission reduction in the power sector.
Relative to the policy scenario, the reinforced policy scenario witnesses the contri-
bution of hydro, nuclear and renewables to emission reduction, to which wind and
nuclear power are the biggest contributors. Compared to the policy scenario, the 2°C
scenario sees hydro, nuclear, renewables, CCS and BECCS aiding with emission
reduction, coupled with intensified efforts after 2030, and wind and solar power are
the biggest contributors. Under the 1.5°C scenario, though no extra emission reduc-
tion technologies are adopted, the penetration of existing technologies and emission
reduction efforts increase significantly (see Fig. 4.4).
Table 4.8 shows the technology demand of different emission reduction trajec-
tories in two timeframes (2020–2030, 2030–2050). The difference in the growth
of installed capacity is observed between 2020 and 2030 due to cost changes of
technologies and different schedules for deep emission reduction. Between 2030
4.2 Low-Carbon Pathways for the Power Sector 121
Fig. 4.4 Carbon emission reduction by different technologies









2020–2030 24 38 45 71




2020–2030 14 38 40 42




2020–2030 3 3 3 3




2020–2030 8 8 8 8




2020–2030 0 1 2 1
2030–2050 – 1 – 1 0 1
and 2050, deep emission reduction emerges in all pathways, where key emission
reduction technologies (wind, solar, energy storage and cross-regional power trans-
mission) all scale up to a similar high level. To be specific, the scale of wind and
solar power installation is equally considerable, but due to variance in technological
pathways and schedule of deep emission reduction, the size of power installation
differs greatly between 2020 and 2030. Due to restrictions of cost and raw material
utilization, impede biomass power generation can’t play the major role for emission
reduction.
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4.3 Crucial Problems and Solutions for the Low-Carbon
Transition of the Power Sector
4.3.1 Operation Security of the Power Grid
China is about to enter a phase that features high penetration of renewables with
large-scale clustered integration and high-penetrated distributed integration. In that
phase, it will provoke drastic changes for the power system. With the integration
of high penetrated renewables, highly uncertain and volatile wind and solar power
will be evolved from the supplementary to the primary power sources, and the oper-
ation and planning mechanism of power generation systems will be fundamentally
changed. The coaction of high volatility in the generation side and the massive
distributed sources in the demand side will then fundamentally change the operation
and planning mechanism of power transmission and distribution systems. Besides,
with the widely application of power electronic interfaces in renewable generation
technologies, transmission facilities and load devices, the whole power system is
changing towards a power electronics dominated trend. The features of low inertia,
weak immunity, andmulti-timescale response in power electronic deviceswill lead to
a fundamental change in the stability mechanism and control methods of power elec-
tronics dominated power systems. Therefore, there are two key scientific difficulties
required to be addressed: (1) the scarcity of power system flexibility and the structure
evolution of power transmission and distribution networks due to the strong uncer-
tainties from both generation and demand sides; (2) multi-timescale coupled stabi-
lization mechanism and optimal operation of power electronics dominated power
systems.
To tackle these challenges raised by the renewables integration, the combination
of multiple technologies with varying costs is necessary for the power system (as
shown in Fig. 4.5). When the share of renewable generation is not high (<30%),
lower cost technologies, such as improved prediction of renewable generation, flex-
ibility retrofit of thermal power plants, and advanced flexible scheduling, can be
utilized to address the problems including generation ramping, peak-load regula-
tion and power reserve. More expensive technologies, including flexible genera-
tion, pumped storage, cross-regional transmission, renewable energy curtailment,
and biomass power generation, can be adopted as auxiliary approaches. When the
share of renewable generation is over 30%, renewables’ uncertainty and volatility
will make a significant impact on the power system planning and operation, compli-
cating the power system operation behaviors. In that case, multiple energy system
integration is recommended to leverage gas storage, heat storage, cold storage, and
other low-cost storage devices for offsetting the fluctuation of renewable generation.
Other advanced technologies such as demand response, CSP (concentrating solar
power) and emerging energy storage solutions (compressed air energy storage, flow
battery and super-capacitor) are also optional. But these technologies are still in the
demonstration stage and far from commercial scaled application, and hence are rela-
tively expensive. When the share of renewable generation is over 50%, these above
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Fig. 4.5 Challenges and solutions for high penetration of intermittent renewable energy (Note
CAES—compressed air energy storage; CSP—concentrating solar power; HVDC—high voltage
direct current; HVAC—high voltage alternating current)
technologies will not be enough, due to new challenges including low inertia and
seasonal supply–demand mismatch. In such a case, virtual synchronous generation
(VSG) may need to be deployed to increase system synchronous inertia and thus
strengthen the system stability. Seasonal supply–demand mismatch problem can be
tackled either by seasonal energy storage (such as heat or cold storage) or more
expensive solutions such as energy routers or power-to-gas devices (Fig. 4.5).
With the growing share of renewable generation, more flexible resources are
needed to satisfy the peak-load regulating capacity requirement in the power system.
The role of coal-fired power units is gradually shifted from satisfying basic load
demand to providing flexibility and peak regulation services from 2030, while the
corresponding installed capacity is also reducing. The intermittent renewable energy
integration is supported by the flexibility retrofit of thermal power plants and the
power gird interconnection before 2030. After then, the carbon emission reduction
will accelerate, the penetration of renewables will further increase, and the genera-
tion capacity of flexible coal-fired power units will also reduce. Large-scale energy
storage is necessary to accommodate renewable energy, especially in InnerMongolia,
Xinjiang, Shandong, and northwest China.
The cross-regional power grid interconnection can provide flexibility for renew-
able energy integration and enhance the optimization of resource allocation. The
cross-regional power grid interconnection should be further strengthened and reaches
1.8–2.7 times of current cross-regional transmission capacity level by 2030 under
different scenarios. After 2030, due to the limited availability of exploitable renew-
able energy resources in eastern and central China, northwestern China shall become
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Fig. 4.6 Total capacity of inter-regional power distribution
a key area in renewable energy development to meet the demand for sustained
emission reduction. Meanwhile, supporting facilities such as long-distance power
transmission lines should be built to reach 3.5–6.2 times of current cross-regional
transmission capacity level by 2050 under different scenarios (see Fig. 4.6). The
research results show that the cross-regional transmission capacity requirement
in 2050 respectively are 788 GW (policy scenario), 903 GW (reinforced policy
scenario), 1212 GW (2°C scenario), and 1387 GW respectively (1.5°C scenario).
Energy storage could be categorized into short-term daily energy storage and
long-term seasonal energy storage.Daily energy storage aims tomitigate renewables’
volatility and address the daily power mismatch between renewable generation and
load demand, while the seasonal energy storage enables seasonal energy transfer to
address the monthly energy mismatch. In terms of energy storage requirement, the
total capacity of 574 GWh, 677 GWh, 1168 GWh, and 1334 GWh will be needed
respectively under policy scenario, reinforced policy scenario, 2°C scenario, and
1.5°C scenario. The energy storage capacity requirement in 2050 under 2 and 1.5°C
scenarios are expected to be 2 times and 2.3 times of that under policy scenario (see
Fig. 4.7).
4.3.2 Retirement of Coal-Fired Power Units
A country’s choice for transition pathway is closely related to its resources endow-
ment, power source mix and economic development level, etc. Duplicating the expe-
rience of developed countries in the retirement of coal-fired units would not be a
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Fig. 4.7 Energy storage capacity demand
practical option for China. Despite the consensus on the necessity of decarboniza-
tion in current studies, opinions are highly different on the capacity of coal-fired
power that can be retained in the future. Some studies conclude that China is able
to reach the Paris climate targets with lower economic cost, phasing out coal-fired
power completely between 2050 and 2055 [13][15]; while others argue that 400–700
GW of coal power will be necessary in 2050 for basic load, peak load regulation and
heating, on condition that existing units are retrofitted in terms of flexibility and CHP
[6]. The retained capacity of coal power allowed for China will, in large measure,
hinge on the potential and progress of CCS and BECCS, where research is severely
insufficient [16].
The stranding of coal power assets is a matter of wide concern among various
stakeholders. In this research, the cost of stranded coal-fired power assets is defined
as the residual value of fixed assets in case of early retirement before reaching the
expected service life. Besides, early retirement refers to the fact of being put out of
economic service in the conventional sense, with some units still capable of offering
valuable services such as complementing the power load shortage at certain time
slot as the backup. The cost of stranded coal-fired power assets varies significantly
under different scenarios—707.9 billion RMB for the 1.5°C scenario, 60.9 billion for
the 2°C scenario, 3.1 billion in the policy scenario and 3.2 billion in the reinforced
policy scenario. Figure 4.8 illustrates the interannual variation of stranded coal power
assets under various scenarios. On the whole, under the 1.5°C scenario, most of the
stranded cost is incurred between 2031 and 2046, with a peak between 2038 and
2044 in particular. Under the 2°C scenario, the peak of stranding arrives between
2046 and 2048.
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Fig. 4.8 Year-to-year stranded cost of coal power assets from 2018 to 2050
4.4 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This study shows that for the power sector, the emission reduction pathway based
on the NDC of 2015 and related reinforced measures fall short of the 2°C and 1.5°C
targets. To accomplish the emission reduction goals set in Paris Agreement, actions
should be ramped up in the power sector to secure an earlier emission peakwith faster
andmore ambition.Majormeasures include scaling up the development of non-fossil
and renewable energy, accelerating the phasing-out of coal-fired power plants and
massive deployment of CCS technologies. In the transition of the power sector,
appropriate solutions must be explored for safe operation of power grid, retirement
of coal-fired power fleet, investment as well as the research and deployment of CCS
and BECCS technologies.
1. Development of non-fossil energy represents the ultimate approach for
decarbonization of China’s power sector, so measures must be taken to
ensure the scale and pace of such development.
It’s imperative to study the proper policy measures to boost renewable energy
development, both in terms of the scale and speed. This Study found that China’s
power sector shall rely on non-fossil energy for its decarbonization, and on inter-
mittent renewables for deep decarbonization in the long run. Under the 1.5°C
scenario in particular, the development of various renewables has almost hit
the ceiling of economically available resources with environment and ecolog-
ical preservation taken into full account. Under the 2°C scenario, the annual
installed capacity of wind power should stay above 45 GW between 2020 and
2030, and above 83 GW between 2030 and 2050; while for solar power, at least
40 GW between 2020 and 2030 and 79 GW between 2030 and 2050.
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2. The 14th Five-Year Plan must keep a tight rein on addition of coal-fired
power units and make full use of the stock
Some suspended or postponed coal-fired power projects have been re-approved
in an effort to spur domestic demand and stabilize growth in the wake of
COVID-19 and the subsequent economic downturn, resulting in a rebound of
coal consumption. To reverse the situation, it is suggested that the number of new
coal-fired power projects should be strictly controlled during the 14th Five-Year
plan period and that the overwhelming majority of incremental power demand
be met by renewable energy. More support should be provided for renewable
energy in new infrastructure construction and remove the barriers and chal-
lenges in this connection. While avoiding increase in coal power capacity in
principle, efforts should be made to enable a functional shift of coal-fired power
and fully usage of existing coal-fired power. Major steps should be taken to
enhance the flexibility retrofit of existing power units prior to 2030, after which
the role of coal-fired power should shift from basic load provision to peak load
regulation service. The 2 and 1.5°C scenarios require a transformation of coal-
fired installations into peak-shaving units with prolonged shutdown for some to
act as standby units. A large amount of social resources and investment cannot
be recovered due to the sharp decline in the utilization rate of coal-fired power
units. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a capacity cost recovery mechanism
to properly handle the problems arising from the transformation of coal power
units.
3. Spare no effort to develop and deploy energy storage technologies,
strengthen inter-regional power transmission channels, and advance power
market reforms
With high penetration of intermittent renewable power, higher flexibility is
required to meet the need of hourly peak load regulation. The year 2030 will be
a watershed, before which peak regulation depends on flexibility retrofit of coal-
fired units and power grids interconnection and mutual support; whereas after
this point, new construction of energy storage units is required to accommodate
the surge in renewable power, especially in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Shan-
dong and northwest provinces. Therefore, it’s important to proactively develop,
demonstrate and utilize energy storage technologies, develop green financing
tools to support the massive construction of inter-regional power transmission
lines. Deep decarbonization of the power sector in future hinges, from a policy
standpoint, on the power market mechanism, hence the need to advance power
market reforms and minimize total social cost via market levers.
4. Formulate roadmaps for the R&D, demonstration and application of grid
technologies to secure a high penetration of intermittent renewable energy
Compared to conventional flexible power sources such as coal-fired power, the
volatility and seasonality of intermittent renewable energy can seriously affect
the safety operation of grid. As the penetration of wind and solar power grows,
the grid is increasingly featured by the randomization of power and energy
balance, diversification of operation modes, scarcity of flexible resources, and
complication of stabilizationmechanism, etc.As challengesmount, it’s essential
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to employ an array of technologies to ensure the normal working order of the
grid.
When the share of renewable generation is less than 50%, extra flexibility
resources would be required to offset the volatility and uncertainty of renew-
able generation for the timescale from minute to hour. This is mainly achieved
through increasing frequency regulation capacity, peak-load regulation capacity
and power reserve capacity. Major technical solutions include flexibility retrofit
of coal-fired power plants, demand response management, multiple energy
system integration, cross-regional power transmission, concentrating solar
power and electrical energy storage. None of these solutions can address
the renewable energy integration problem by itself alone. A reasonable and
economic combination is necessary, and the optimal technology portfolio
depends on the generation and transmission structure of power systems, as well
as the maturity and economics of each technology.
When the share of renewable generation is more than 50% (up to 60% under
the 2 and 1.5°C scenarios in this study), novel renewable energy integration
challenges will arise, including low synchronous inertia, frequency stability
issue, more periods with renewable generation higher than load demand, and
the seasonal energy imbalance between renewable supply and load demand. The
power system security operation requires to strengthen the system synchronous
inertia, tackle the surplus renewables and the seasonal energy imbalance. The
former can be addressed by equipping virtual synchronization in renewable
power plants, while the latter calls for seasonal energy storage. Both technolo-
gies are currently under the development or the demonstration phase. Strength-
ened R&D and investment are supposed to promote technology maturity, cost
reduction and large scale application through the supports from technology,
policy, and markets.
Compared to conventional flexible thermal power plants, the strong volatility
and uncertainty and seasonal mismatch feature of intermittent renewable energy
bring significant impacts on power system secure and economic operation. As
the penetration of wind and solar power grows, the power grid is increasingly
featured by the randomization of power and energy balance, diversification of
operationmodes, scarcity of flexible resources, and complication of stabilization
mechanism, etc. It is essential to employ an array of technologies to ensure the
secure and economic operation of power grids.
5. CCS should be highlighted as a technology of vital importance for more
R&D and demonstration. It’s particularly important to advance geological
exploration for potential underground CO2reservoirs.
Based on current understanding of renewable resources in China, this study
shows that the zero carbon transformation would be impossible for the power
sector without large-scale application of CCS and BECCS technologies, unless
revolutionary technological breakthroughs take place. Therefore, CCS should
be highlighted as an important technology, and the research and demonstra-
tion of the technology should be accelerated to achieve breakthroughs in
capture technology, lay a solid foundation for the whole process technology
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integration and large-scale demonstration, strengthen the policy research on
CCS industrialization, and strengthen international cooperation and technology
transfer.
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Chapter 5
Primary Energy Consumption and CO2
Emissions
5.1 Analysis of China’s Future Primary Energy
Consumption
5.1.1 Total Primary Energy Consumption
Based on the previous analysis of energy demand of end users in Chapter 3 and
power sector in Chapter 4, the primary energy consumption under policy scenario,
reinforced policy scenario, 2 °C scenario and 1.5 °C scenario is shown in Fig. 5.1.
The comprehensive analysis data of various scenarios is illustrated in Tables A.1–A.4
which can be found in the appendices of the report.
Under the policy scenario, China’s total primary energy consumption increases
rapidly between 2015 and 2040 from 4.94 billion tce in 2020 to 6.06 billion tce in
2030, and to 6.10 billion tce in 2040.With the achievement of socialistmodernization,
China’s industrial structure dominated by energy-intensive sectors will gradually
shift to one driven by service and high-tech sectors, with further improvement in
energy efficiency, total primary energy consumption in 2050 will slowly reach 6.23
billion tce.
Under the reinforced policy scenario, from 2020 to 2040, China experiences
continuous growth of total primary energy consumption, followed by a dip from 2040
to 2050, which is consistent with the strategic goal of China’s social and economic
development. With the tightening of carbon constraints and the improvement of
energy efficiency, China’s total primary energy consumption would see a decrease
as a whole, peaking at 6.02 billion tce in 2040 before dropping to 5.63 billion tce in
2050, 600 million tce less than the policy scenario.
Under the 2 °C scenario, with strengthened carbon constraint, enhanced energy
efficiency and increased energy saving on the demand side, China’s total primary
energy consumption peaks at 5.64 billion tce around 2030 before transitioning to
5.20 billion tce in 2050. As short-term drastic improvement is seen in the level of
© China Environment Publishing Group Co., Ltd. 2022
Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development of Tsinghua University et al.,
China’s Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategies and Pathways,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2524-4_5
131
132 5 Primary Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions
Fig. 5.1 Total primary energy consumption under the four scenarios
energy efficiency improvement and demand energy saving the 2 °C scenario, total
primary energy consumption drops slightly under the 1.5 °C scenario compared to
the 2 °C scenario between 2015 and 2030, hitting a peak of 5.34 billion tce in 2025
before a moderate decline to 5 billion tce in 2050.
Power consumption by end users is converted into primary energy equivalent,
producing a breakdown of primary energy consumption by sector under various
scenarios, as shown in Fig. 5.2. If primary energy consumption of the power sector is
separately calculated and only the direct use of primary energy by end users is taken
Fig. 5.2 Mix of primary energy demand under four scenarios
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2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Direct use of primary
energy consumption by
end users
Industry 1.62 1.88 1.23 1.62 1.73 0.69
Building 0.55 0.51 0.37 0.55 0.41 0.26
Transportation 0.49 0.55 0.40 0.49 0.53 0.30
Other sectors and losses 0.12 0.22 0.5 0.12 0.09 0.04
Conversion of primary energy power generation 2.18 2.83 3.57 2.18 2.89 3.91
Total consumption of primary energy 4.94 5.98 5.63 4.94 5.64 5.20
into account, the reinforced policy scenario and 2 °C scenario would look differently
in Table 5.1.
5.1.2 Mix of Primary Energy Consumption
Under the four scenarios, with the constraint of decarbonization, primary energy
composition inChina by2050 features anoverall trendof accelerated coal elimination
and sharp rise in the share of non-fossil fuels. The composition of primary energy
consumption in major years (2020, 2030 and 2050) under the four scenarios is shown
in Fig. 5.3 and Table 5.2.
Fig. 5.3 Total primary energy consumption and its composition in major years under different
scenarios
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• In the policy scenario, the total coal consumption decreases annually from 2.84
billion tce in 2020 to 2.18 billion tce by 2050, edging down 0.9% on an annual
basis. Oil consumption rises from 890million tce in 2020 to 1.1 billion tce in 2030
before falling to 920 million tce in 2050. Continuous growth is seen in natural
gas consumption from 430 million tce in 2020 to 690 million tce in 2030 and
870 million tce in 2050. Non-fossil energy consumption experiences an annual
growth of 3.6% from 790 million tce in 2020 to 2.26 billion tce in 2050. Under
such scenario, by 2050, coal, oil, natural gas and non-fossil energy represents
34.9%, 14.8%, 14.0%, and 36.3% respectively in the energy mix.
• In the reinforced policy scenario, total coal consumption drops steadily since
2020 from 2.84 billion tce to 1.42 billion tce in 2050, an annual decline of 2.3%.
Oil consumption grows from 890 million tce in 2020 to 980 million tce in 2030
before falling to 640 million tce in 2050. Natural gas consumption climbs from
430 million tce in 2020 to 770 million tce in 2030, then shows a downward trend
and slides to 670 million tce in 2050. Non-fossil energy consumption jumps from
790 million tce in 2020 to 2.9 billion tce in 2050, averaging an annual growth of
4.2%. Under such scenario, by 2050, coal, oil, natural gas, and non-fossil energy
each takes up 25.3%, 11.3%, 11.9%, and 51.5% respectively in the energy mix.
• In the 2 °C scenario, total coal consumption rapidly decreases from 2.84 billion
tce to 470 million tce between 2020 and 2050, a 5.8% drop on an annual basis.
Oil consumption falls from 890 million tce in 2020 to 400 million tce in 2050.
Natural gas consumption, after a rise from 430 million tce in 2020 to 710 million
tce in 2030, goes down to 520million tce in 2050. Non-fossil energy consumption
soars from 790 million tce in 2020 to 3.81 billion tce in 2050, growing at 5.4%
annually. Under this scenario, by 2050, coal, oil, natural gas, and non-fossil energy
comprises 9.1%, 7.7%, 10.0%, and 73.2% respectively in the energy mix.
• In the 1.5 °C scenario, total coal consumption foresees a steep fall from 2.84
billion tce in 2020 to 270 million tce in 2050, dipping 7.5% year by year. Oil
consumption starts its drop since 2020 from 890 million tce to 150 million tce in
2050. In the wake of a climb to 660 million tce in 2030 from 430 million tce in
2020, natural gas consumption spirals down to 280million tce in 2050. Non-fossil
energy consumption, on the other hand, surges from 790 million tce in 2020 to
4.31 billion tce in 2050, an average annual growth of 5.8%. Under such scenario,
by 2050, coal, oil, natural gas, and non-fossil energy makes up 5.4%, 3.0%, 5.5%,
and 86.1% respectively in the energy mix.
Given the above analysis, in the transition from the policy scenario to 1.5 °C
scenario, the decarbonization speed of the energy system continues to accelerate,
non-fossil fuel energy becomes the main source in the primary energy consumption
mix. However, to materialize these scenarios calls upfront strategic planning, as the
earlier the transition, the better it is for the entire energy system.
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5.1.3 CO2 Emissions Under Different Scenarios
Analyzing from the macro perspective on the overall primary energy consumption
and CO2 emission from fossil fuel burning, in the transition from the policy scenario
to 1.5 °C scenario, CO2 emission from primary energy consumption would witness
a steady decline, and carbon emissions from primary energy consumption under the
four scenarios would fall from 10.25 billion tCO2 in 2020 to 9.09, 6.18, 2.92, and
1.47 billion tCO2 in 2050. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion under various
scenarios are illustrated in Fig. 5.4 and Table 5.3.
The changes in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion under the four
scenarios are mainly illustrated as follows:
• Non-fossil energy grows importance in primary energy consumption mix. By
2050, its consumption soars to 4.31 billion tce under the 1.5 °C scenario from
the original 2.26 billion tce under the policy scenario, its share in primary energy
consumption is 86.1% under the 1.5 °C scenario as compared to 36.3% under the
policy scenario.
• There are striking differences in the year and level of CO2 peak. In the policy
scenario, energy-related CO2 emissions will peak around 2030 at about 11.0
billion tCO2. In the reinforced policy scenario, the peak occurs between 2025
and 2030 at around 10.6 billion tCO2. In the 2 °C scenario, the peak will move up
to 2020–2025, and reduced to about 10.3 billion tCO2. To embark on the 1.5 °C
pathway sooner, swift reduction in energy-related emissions is required around
2020.
Fig. 5.4 Pathway of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning under the four scenarios in China
(excluding CCS)
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4.94 10.03 5.98 10.61 5.63 6.18
2 °C
scenario
4.94 10.03 5.64 9.42 5.20 2.92
1.5 °C
scenario
4.94 10.03 5.25 7.44 5.00 1.47
• Great difference exists in the speed of total CO2 emissions reduction. In the policy
scenario and reinforced policy scenario, the average decrease of total carbon
emissions after peaking in 2030 stands at 0.9% and 2.6% respectively, compared
to 5.7% and 7.8% in the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios.
The breakdown of carbon emissions by sector under the policy scenario, rein-
forced policy scenario, 2 °C scenario and 1.5 °C scenario is illustrated in Fig. 5.5.
In all scenarios, carbon emissions from industrial sector makes up the largest share.
Fig. 5.5 Breakdown of CO2 emissions under all scenarios
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With the development of low-carbon electric power supply technology and nega-
tive emission technology, the power sector stands to be the biggest contributor to
emissions reduction with a drop from 4.06 billion tCO2 in 2020 to 3.29 billion, 2.09
billion, 490million, and -150million tCO2 in 2050 under four scenarios respectively.
Total CO2 emissions from the building sector are curtailed, falling from 1.00 billion
tCO2 in 2020 to 830 million, 560 million, 310 million and 80 million tCO2 in 2050
respectively. CO2 emissions from transport experiences a minor growth before 2030,
followed by an accelerated decline afterward to 1.11 billion, 800million, 550million
and 170 million tCO2 by 2050.
5.2 Economic Analysis of Emissions Reduction
in the Energy System
5.2.1 Introduction of the Energy Economic Analysis Model
TheComputableGeneral Equilibrium (CGE)method canwell characterize the corre-
lation and interconnection between the economic and energy systems. This project
employs the Global Energy Economy Computable General Equilibrium model (C-
GEM) developed by the Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy of Tsinghua
University to explore the socio-economic impact of China’s low-carbon policy inter-
vention from the perspective of global energy economy balance. As the world moves
into a new phase of addressing climate change after the Paris Agreement, and as
China embarks on supply-side structural reform amid the economic “new normal”,
the C-GEM team reintegrated sectors in the model, improved the power and energy-
intensive industries, modified the energy substitution relationship, enhanced the
automatic efficiency improvement factor, revised parameters of China’s economic
structure underlying the model, and updated and verified the data of global energy
economy.
The C-GEM model can depict in detail the flow of elements, goods and services
in economy and energy systems. Through factor input and intermediate product
input, producers churn out domestic final products under certain technical condi-
tions, some of which are supplied domestically to meet domestic market needs,
while others are exported to the international market. Apart from domestic supply,
total domestic demand for goods also comes from imports. Residents, governments,
and other consumers, through production factor sales and taxation, obtain dispos-
able income that is partly used for personal consumption and partly placed in saving,
which then translates to investments, the combination of personal consumption and
investment makes up the total domestic demand. Energy input (as part of the inter-
mediate input) and carbon emissions allowance (as a scarce input) also enter the
production process, thereby linking the economic system and the energy system.
Given a perfectly competitive market, producers seek maximized profits through
cost minimization with given production technologies. At a given income level,
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consumers maximizes their utility through preference selection. Given certain output
level, domestic products and import and export commodities generate maximized
sales revenue through the pricing mechanism. Production factors are best allocated
for supply and demand in the production process.
C-GEM uses GTAP 10 as the basic database embedded in the model, with 2014
as the base year, putting together data from economy, energy, and bilateral trade in
65 industrial sectors across 141 countries and regions. A global computable general
equilibriummodel is then formulated, while accommodating the sectoral breakdown
of official energy and economic statistics in China, capturing 17 regions and 21
sectors globally (19 production sectors and 2 consumption sectors). Furthermore,
the policy scenario, reinforced policy scenario, 2 °C scenario, and 1.5 °C scenario
are built within the model to diagnose carbon price changes and GDP losses in the
low-carbon transition.
5.2.2 Carbon Price
Carbon price levels from 2020 to 2050 under the four scenarios are shown in Table
5.4. Noted that carbon price incentive mechanism in this study contains all policies
for emission reduction adopted by the entire energy and economic system except
the policies for renewable energy development and natural gas utilization. Carbon
price, in this context, represents the marginal cost of abatement in the process of
CO2 emission reduction, thus reflecting the force of policy measures under different
scenarios. Under policy scenario, reinforced policy scenario, 2 °C scenario, and 1.5
°C scenario, carbon price gradually climbs from RMB 46/ton in 2020 to RMB 265,
510, 1364, and 5,701/ton in 2050. By 2050, carbon price in the 2 °C and 1.5 °C
scenarios is 5 times and 21 times of that in the policy scenario, and 3 times and 11
times of that in the reinforced policy scenario. This means that in order to fulfill the
most stringent emission targets, the whole society would have to bear a very high
cost.
Table 5.4 Carbon price under different scenarios (Unit: RMB/ton, at constant 2011 prices)
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Policy scenario 46 73 99 139 192 245 265
Reinforced policy scenario 46 79 106 152 238 351 510
2 °C scenario 46 86 126 199 344 583 1364
1.5 °C scenario 46 106 166 285 622 1609 5701
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Fig. 5.6 GDP losses under different scenarios
5.2.3 GDP Losses
To promote deep decarbonization while securing sustainable economic and social
development, it is essential to strengthen policy measures and ensure sufficient flow
of investment. For the economic system, a cut in CO2 emissions entails costs and
sacrifices. Figure 5.6 provides the GDP losses of the reinforced policy scenario, 2
°C scenario and 1.5 °C scenario as opposed to the policy scenario. The reinforced
policy scenario features relatively minor GDP losses of less than 1% by 2050, or
approximately 0.7%. By contrast, the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios are characterized by
greater GDP losses, which grow to 1.4% and 3.8% by 2050, almost 2–5 times larger
than in the reinforced policy scenario, reflecting to fairly high economic losses by
China for the sake of the most stringent emission targets.
5.3 Synergy Between Deep Decarbonization
and Environment Improvement
Cutting back on fossil energy consumption reduces CO2 emissions while reducing
SO2, NOx, PM2.5, and other conventional pollutants at the source, facilitating
achievement of environmental standards and the “Beautiful China” target [1]. China’s
mid-long term environmental targets indicate that by 2035, all major cities and
regions should meet the national standard of PM2.5 concentration below no more
than 35µg/m3 [2] and by 2050, PM2.5 concentration below 15µg/m3 for all regions.
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The Jing-jin-ji (Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, respectively) Region and its periphery
areas, Fenhe-Weihe Plain and Yangtze River Delta are the key regions for China’s
environment improvement programs. In 2015, the average concentration of PM2.5 at
all monitoring stations in China stood at 53.1 µg/m3, and the three regions reported
81.3, 60.4, and 55.0µg/m3 respectively. Only 29.1% of Chinese cities fell within the
standard [3].
In the policy scenario, the national PM2.5 concentration falls to 19.2 µg/m3 by
2030, down 63.8% from 2015. Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its periphery areas, Fenhe-
Weihe Plain and Yangtze River Delta witness a decrease estimated at 59.8%, 65.4%,
and 65.5% respectively. By then, air quality will see a dramatic shift across the
country, with the Fenhe-Weihe Plain and Yangtze River Delta no longer being major
PM2.5 pollution areas. 96.6% of Chinese cities would have been met the Class two of
environment quality standard of 35 µg/m3 on an annual average. Though one third
of cities would have reported a concentration level less than 25 µg/m3, over 30% of
cities in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region and its periphery areas would fall short of the
target. The level of PM2.5 pollution in 2050 remains at par with that in 2030, with
most regions far behind the 15 µg/m3 target and some places in Jing-Jin-Ji Region
and its periphery areas still struggling with PM2.5 pollution. By 2050, the national
PM2.5 concentration is reduced to 14.0 µg/m3, and that in Jing-Jin-Ji Region and
its periphery areas, Fenhe-Weihe Plain and Yangtze River Delta drops to 24.9, 14.6
and 14.0 µg/m3respectively. Only 76.0% of the cities in China and 4% of cities in
Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its periphery areas measures up to the Class one standard of
15 µg/m3. In general, the policy scenario foresees a great decline in national PM2.5
concentration, but big gaps still exist if China is to achieve 35 µg/m3 by 2030 and
15 µg/m3 by 2050.
The reinforced policy scenario sees notable reduction in PM2.5 concentration as
compared to the policy scenario. By 2030, PM2.5 pollution is somewhat improved in
key areas such as Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its periphery areas compared to the policy
scenario. China as a whole, Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its periphery areas, Fenhe-Weihe
Plain, and the Yangtze River Delta is down to 17.3, 29.7, 19.8 and 16.1 µg/m3 by
2030 respectively. But the 35 µg/m3 target remains a challenge for 3.6% of cities in
China and 9.6% of cities in the Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its periphery areas. By 2050,
PM2.5 pollution in China under the reinforced policy scenario is markedly alleviated
compared to the policy scenario, with that in China as a whole, Jing-Jin-Ji Region
and its periphery areas, Fenhe-Weihe Plain and the Yangtze River Delta falling to
10.1, 19.3, 11.4 and 9.3 µg/m3, with some regions achieving 15 µg/m3 in principle.
However, 10% of Chinese cities and over 65% of cities in Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its
periphery areas fall short of the 15 µg/m3 Class one standard, presenting a health
hazard that shouldn’t be neglected.
In the 2 °C scenario, PM2.5 concentration in China, Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its
periphery areas, Fenhe-Weihe Plain and Yangtze River Delta is reduced to 16.2,
28.0, 8.2, and 16.0 µg/m3 by 2030. All regions meet 25 µg/m3 except for Jing-Jin-Ji
Region. By 2050, concentration further declines to 8.3, 14.1, 9.6, and 7.5 µg/m3,
with no region in China classified as PM2.5 high pollution zone, with majority of the
regions realizing the 15 µg/m3 standard. Though the 10 µg/m3 goal is achievable
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in 81.7% of Chinese cities, but only 28.0% of cities in Jing-Jin-Ji Region meet
this standard. In comparison, under the 1.5 °C scenario, all Chinese cities meet the
15 µg/m3 target, with 88.8% reaching the 10 µg/m3 target. But over 40% of cities
in Jing-Jin-Ji Region and its periphery areas still fall short under this target.
In summary, achieving the deep decarbonization target under the 2 °C or even 1.5
°C significantly improves the environment quality. Even under the policy scenario,
China’s air quality sees considerable reduction in SO2, NOx, PM2.5 concentration,
but it remains a challenge to meet the target of 35 µg/m3 by 2030 and 15 µg/m3
by 2050 in key regions. The 2 °C scenario goes a step further to realize the 35
µg/m3 by 2030 and 15 µg/m3 by 2050. And 1.5 °C scenario trumps the previous
two scenarios to bring about fulfillment of 10 µg/m3 target by 2050. In other words,
deep decarbonization goal will drive substantial improvement of the environment
and secure the success of building a “beautiful China”.
Figure 5.7 shows the number of premature deaths from PM2.5 exposures by 2030
and 2050 under various scenarios. Deep decarbonization will speed up the PM2.5
reduction while ensuring better public health. In 2015, 1.379 million people died
prematurely due to PM2.5 exposures in China [4]. In the policy scenario, with contin-
uous high PM2.5 levels and the aging society, the number of premature deaths is
1.629 million and 2.424 million by 2030 and 2050 respectively, up 18.2% and 75.8%
from the 1.379 million in 2015. In the reinforced policy scenario, the number is
brought down to 1.541 million by 2030, an 88,000 people reduction than that in the
policy scenario, which highlights the contribution of emissions reduction on public
health, and by 2050, the health benefits are magnified with 545,000 fewer deaths.
Both policy scenario and reinforced policy scenario see increased premature deaths
Fig. 5.7 Number of premature deaths from PM2.5 exposure by 2030 and 2050 under various
scenarios
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by 2030 and 2050, suggesting that the health benefits of improved air quality under
such scenarios are insufficient to offset the health losses from the ageing population.
Under the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, the number of premature deaths from PM2.5
exposures by 2030 is 1.387 million and 1.26 million respectively, an 8,000 people
increase and a 118,000 decrease compared to that of in 2015 respectively, equivalent
to a 14.8% and 22.6% reduction than that of in the policy scenario. The number
of such deaths falls to 1.065 million and 782,000 by 2050, a 23.2% and 37.9%
reduction compared with 2030. Concludingthat with the profound transformation of
energy mix and tightening of control measures, the health benefits brought by air
quality improvement can offset most of the health losses from population ageing and
changes in demographic distribution.
5.4 Policy Suggestions
1. Implement coordinated measures for win–win outcome in economic develop-
ment, environmental protection, and carbon emissions reduction
China actively now pursues a new development philosophy under the new normal
of its economy, working to achieve innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared
development by fostering new growth drivers through innovation, while shifting its
growth model through green development. Green development, in essence, seeks
to boost the harmonious coexistence between human and nature while pursuing
green and low-carbon development, thereby promoting the coordinated and sustain-
able development of economy, society, resources, and environment. This echoes the
path of climate-friendly low-carbon economic development advocated in the Paris
Agreement. China’s enormous strides in energy conservation, carbon reduction, and
economic transformation are also attributed to the combined efforts in addressing
climate change and promoting domestic sustainable development. China has become
a major contributor and leader in driving energy transition and low-carbon economic
transformation in the world.
The key to green and low-carbon development lies in promoting the reform of the
energy systemand transformationof economicdevelopmentmodel.With the ongoing
industrialization and urbanization in China, the economic takeoff is hampered by
resource and environmental constraints. It’s important to facilitate revolution in
energy production and consumption, save energy, enhance energy efficiency, cap
fossil fuel consumption, and vigorously develop new and renewable energy, promote
the low-carbonization of the energy mix in a bid to curb conventional pollutants and
CO2 emissions. Domestic efforts in conserving environment and building ecological
civilization are consistent with the goals and measures of addressing climate change
and protecting ecological safety of the earth, and extensive synergies can be harnessed
in this regard. It’s essential to devise holistic plans for coordinated progress, aim
for sustainable domestic development, and ramp up goal-driven initiatives for long-
term low-carbon development and emission reduction. Currently, given the enhanced
prevention and treatment of environment pollution, tightened emission standards, and
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control measures of conventional pollutants in the use of coal, petroleum, and other
fossil fuels, more focus should be placed on cutting and replacing coal and oil in
the end-use consumption, increasing the share of electricity in this mix, pacing up
the development of renewable energy, and increasing the share of renewable power
generation in primary energy consumption in an effort to set the stage for faster
growth of renewables amid a slowdown in total energy demand. The substitution of
non-fossil power generation for coal and oil in the end consumption could enable
the dual effect of environment improvement as well as CO2 emission reduction.
2. Optimizing energy mix is major task and long-term goal for achieving
low-emission development
Under the policy scenario, non-fossil energymakes up 22.4% in 2030, further rises
to 36.3% in 2050 in the energymix; coal consumption reaches peak around 2030, and
its proportion reduces to 34.9%by2050.Under the reinforced policy scenario, energy
mix is improved in comparison to the policy scenario, with coal and oil dropping by
1.6 and 1.7 percent respectively, and natural gas and non-fossil increasing by 1.5 and
1.8 percent by 2030 respectively. Coal consumption meets its peak around 2020 at
2.84 billion tce, and its proportion drops to 25.3% in the energy consumption mix by
2050. In the same year, non-fossil energy in primary energy consumption increases
to 51.5% as a dominant energy source. Under the 2 °C scenario, power generation
from coal, natural gas, and biomass with CCS would have evolved around 2040,
with non-fossil energy and fossil energy with CCS (carbon-free energy in short)
taking over the energy mix. Non-fossil energy as a percentage of primary energy
consumption is 28.6% in 2030 before jumping to 73.2% in 2050. Under the 1.5 °C
scenario, power generation from coal, natural gas and biomass with CCSwould have
been developed around 2035, with non-fossil energy in primary energy consumption
standing at 38.7% in 2030 before hitting 86.1% in 2050.
As things stand, the installation of coal-fired power units would reach approx-
imately 1.1 billion kilowatts at the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan period, with
adequate capacity to support future growth of electricity demand. But in the long
run, such capacity will inevitably diminish, and extra caution should be exercised
for new installations. In principle, no new coal power units should be added to avoid
waste. Furthermore, a shift in coal power usage should be considered for the full use
of existing units. Major steps should be taken to make existing coal power plants
more flexible prior to 2030, and these plants should gradually undertake more peak-
shaving task than the provision of base load. Under the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios,
some coal power units need to retire before the end of their service life, which causes
tremendous waste of social resources and investment. Therefore, an orderly with-
drawal mechanism for existing coal power units should be created for the appropriate
management of retiring units.
3. Industrial structure upgrade and technological innovation underpin and
safeguard the energy revolution
On its way to a wholistic modernization, China can’t afford to replicate the path
and model of developed countries, new modes of production and new drivers of
modernization should be fostered. The traditional pattern of China’s economic devel-
opment resulted in inefficient resource allocation with mounting economic risks.
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The adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure can dramatically mitigate the
economic impact from the low-carbon transformation. Therefore, accelerating the
transformation of the development pattern is a crucial step along theway to achieving
China’s economic modernization. Meanwhile, the global energy transformation will
prompt major changes in the mode of economic and social development worldwide,
thus affecting the dynamics of international economic and technological competi-
tion. One important trigger and strategic goal ofmajor countries inmitigating climate
change is to increase its competitiveness in advanced energy technologies. Only
with more breakthroughs and massive application of key low-carbon technologies
for technological and institutional innovations can low emission pathway be made
much more accessible.
To start, multiple technological means should be adopted to ensure a high uptake
of renewable energy. As more wind and solar power is fed into the grid, grid itself
is increasingly challenged by the balance of power, diverse operation pattern, scarce
flexible resources, and complicated stabilitymechanism. Themounting challenges of
grid operation calls for various technical solutions to ensure the smooth continuous
operation of the grid. More peak-frequency modulation and reserve capacity are
often used in case intermittent renewable energy comprises less than 50% of power
production, which entails a sound portfolio of technologies, which in turn hinges
on the structure of power sources and grid as well as the maturity and economy
of various technologies. If intermittent renewable energy reaches over 50%, virtual
synchronization and seasonal energy storage technologies should be adopted for the
renewable power generators. These two technologies are still under development or
demonstration, thus more R&D and investment are crucial to enhance their maturity
and cost reduction through a mixture of technology, policy, and market means in
order to prepare for their massive application.
Secondly, efforts should be made to actively promote the R&D and application
of energy storage technology, strengthen the construction of trans-regional power
exchange channels, and press ahead with power market reform. As the grid oper-
ates with more intermittent renewable energy, power systems need to provide better
flexibility to meet hourly peak demand. Prior to 2030, peak regulation through flexi-
bility upgrading and grid interconnection could well accommodate the integration of
intermittent renewables. After 2030, with carbon emissions accelerating, the share
of renewables further increased, and the installed capacity of flexibility-supporting
coal power on the decline, new energy storage units need to be built for intermittent
renewables, especially in InnerMongolia, Xinjiang, Shandong, and northwest China.
Therefore, proactive steps should be taken to develop, demonstrate and apply energy
storage technology, create green financing tools to provide funding for building
massive cross-regional power exchange channels. Deep decarbonization of the power
industry in the future, from the policy standpoint, rests on the improvement of power
market mechanism. This provides the rationale for continued reform of the power
market and the use of market means for minimum total social cost.
Lastly, step up the R&D and industrialization of advanced energy technologies.
Alongside renewable energy technologies such as solar andwind, nuclear technology
and hydrogen technology, energy storage, and smart grid technologies, China should
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place particular attention to CCS and advanced nuclear technology with more focus
on R&D and demonstration. Studies have found that the power sector won’t succeed
in its migrating to the 1.5 °C carbon-free pathway without revolutionary technolog-
ical breakthroughs. With this in mind, CCS should be deemed as a key technology
with intensive R&D and demonstration to set the scene for large-scale application. In
addition, with coal long taking the center stage in China’s primary energy consump-
tion—nearly 60% by 2020—and urgent global emission reduction targets and high
carbon prices, apart from efforts in clean coal and its efficient utilization, CCS will
be a major alternative technology by 2040. CCS may sequester hundreds of millions
of tons to one billion tons of carbon, playing a pivotal role in emission reduction in
the long run. Given the difficulty of replacing fossil fuels in chemical and cement
industries, BECCS technology, as a relatively predictable negative emission tech-
nology right now, will be instrumental to achieving ultra-low emission targets in the
future.
4. Market mechanism and leverage pricing signals to encourage low-carbon
green development should be improved
Studies show that China’s low-carbon energy transition must be accompanied by
forceful policies and legislations, including laws and regulations, targeted policies for
renewable energy development and natural gas utilization, market mechanisms like
carbon trading, and institutional mechanism reform, etc. By translating all policies
other than the targeted policies for renewable energy development and natural gas
utilization into carbon price incentives, under the policy scenario, themarginal cost of
CO2 emissions reduction is approximately CNY100/ton in 2030, and CNY 265/ton
in 2050. Under the reinforced policy scenario, the cost is around CNY106/ton in
2030 and CNY510/ton in 2050. As for the 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, the cost in
2050 soars to CNY1,364 and CNY 5,701 /ton respectively.
Low-carbon development entails clear policy guidance and, more importantly,
long-term market signals. It’s essential to stay rooted in reality, deepen reform in
energy prices, ensure equitable access to quality energy services for low-income
families to boost harmonious social development, alongside efforts in curbing irra-
tional consumption and promoting energy conservation. In particular, institutional
reform of the energymarket should be strengthened to restore the attributes of energy
as a commodity so as to create a just, fair, and effective market structure and system.
Carbon market will be a major institutional safeguard for the early peak of CO2
emissions in China, and part and parcel of ecological civilization in the country.
Now, on top of the carbon trading pilots in five cities and two provinces, China has
launched a single national carbon market, which will be continuously expanded and
improved. Carbon market is a crucial policy tool that seeks to minimize the cost of
emission reduction for the whole society and helps attain national target of emis-
sion reduction through government-led market mechanism. It quantifies the value
of carbon emission quotas and environmental capacity as scarce public resources
and production factors and internalizes the social cost of resource and environmental
losses, thereby encouraging the conservation of fossil energy, the development of
new and renewable energy, and the transformation of energy mix. The accounting,
monitoring, reporting, and verification systems built for the unified national carbon
5.4 Conclusions and Policy Suggestions 147
market also constitute the main institutional guarantee for building a green, low
carbon, and circular economic system in China. It’s important to create holistic plans
for the varied indicators and assessment of energy conservation and emissions reduc-
tion, for instance, to coordinate the implementation of energy use right of enterprises
and emission allowance systems. Compared with the right to energy use, the emis-
sion allowance system stresses not only energy saving, but more importantly, the
development of alternative energy sources by encouraging enterprises to tap into
distributed renewables and focus on the curtailment of coal, oil and other fossil
fuels, which is more aligned, in a comprehensive manner, with the vision of energy
revolution featuring a clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient system of energy supply
and consumption.
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6.1 Scope and Status of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions
There is still a substantial gap between the IntendedNationallyDeterminedContribu-
tions (INDCs) submitted by countries to theUNFCCC secretariat and the lower levels
of emissions needed to hold warming below 2 °C and 1.5 °C. If the temperature rise
is to be limited to 2 °C, total emissions in 2030 must be reduced by another 15 billion
tons of CO2e on top of the existing INDCs; and to enable 1.5 °C, 32 billion tons of
CO2e must be cut. This means that from 2020 to 2030, an annual emission reduction
of 2.7% is required to achieve the 2 °C goal, and emissions must be cut by 7.6% on
average annually to cap warming below 1.5 °C [1]. CO2 emissions which accounts
for the largest share of greenhouse gases, are a major cause of global climate change.
However, a great many studies also highlight the unneglectable impact of non-CO2
GHG emissions. The Fifth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change shows that non-CO2 emissions have consistently
hovered around 25% of the global GHG emissions. A host of international agencies,
including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), anticipate that non-CO2
emissionswill continue to rise in the future, andwithout effective control, could offset
efforts in carbon reduction. Studies have demonstrated that the reduction of non-CO2
GHG emissions, as a vital alternative emissions reduction plan, features the edge of
being low-cost, highly flexible and responsive, and synergistic, hence its extensive
application in developed countries. To narrow the emissions gap, the reduction of
non-CO2 GHG emissions has gained more prominence and interest in the global
response to climate change.
To effectively mitigating GHG emissions in tackling global climate change, Arti-
cles 4.1 and 12 of the UNFCCC stipulate that national communications—the most
critical component of which is national inventories of anthropogenic emissions and
removals by sinks of all GHGs—are an obligation of Parties to the Climate Change
Convention. The 16th and 17th sessions of the Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC held in 2010 and 2011 adopted decisions 1/CP.16 [2] and 2/CP.17, which
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mandated that beginning in 2014, non-Annex I Parties shall submit a biennial update
report covering national GHG inventories, mitigation actions, finance, technology
and capacity-building needs and support received that is consistent with the Party’s
level of international support, and that the report should be subject to international
consultation and analysis.
The non-CO2 GHGs covered in this report are primarily methane, nitrous oxide,
and F-gases. The main emission sources and sectors involved are presented in Table
6.1 (CO2 emissions generated from industrial production processes are analyzed in
Chapter 3).
This chapter summarizes non-CO2 data fromofficial emissions inventories such as
the Initial National Communication on Climate Change of the People’s Republic of
China [3] (hereinafter referred to as the Initial Communication), the Second National
Communication on Climate Change of the People’s Republic of China [4] (here-
inafter referred to as the Second Communication), the PRC’s First Biennial Update
Report onClimateChange [5] (hereinafter referred to as theBiennial UpdateReport),
and the Second Biennial Update Report on Climate Change. The specific results are
shown in Fig. 6.1.
Table 6.1 The scope of non-CO2 GHG emissions defined by this report
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Fig. 6.1 Non-CO2 GHG emissions in China
In 1994, China’s total non-CO2 GHG emissions stood at 980 million tCO2e. That
number rose to roughly 1.49 billion tCO2e in 2005, and more than 2.06 billion tCO2e
in 2014. In 2014, non-CO2 GHGs comprised 16% of China’s total emissions, as
shown in Fig. 6.2. Methane emissions, which stemmedmainly from energy and agri-
culture activities, made up 56% of total non-CO2 emissions and were approximately
three times the level in 1994.
Total GHG emissions from waste treatment amounted to 195 million tCO2e, of
which 100 million tCO2e arose from the treatment of solid waste (landfill, incin-
eration, and biological treatment), accounting for 52.4% of total emissions, and 91
million tCO2e resulted from wastewater treatment, or 47.6% of the total. HFCs
Fig. 6.2 Breakdown of GHG emissions by gas in 2014
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were first introduced into the market by developed countries in the late 1980s and
weremostly used as rawmaterials to produce refrigerants, foaming agents, fire extin-
guishing agents, aerosols, and chemical products in a wide array of industrial sectors.
SF6 emissions principally involve four sectors: power transmission and distribu-
tion equipment (electric equipment for short), magnesium smelting, semiconductor
production, and SF6 production. Currently, China has, by and large, ceased the use
of SF6 [6, 7] in the production of semiconductors and magnesium, and electric
equipment is now the primary source of SF6 emissions. Studies have shown that the
increase in global SF6 emissions mainly stems from Non-Annex I countries, and
in particular China [8]. The global warming potential (GWP) of perfluorocarbons
(PFCs) is 6,500–9,200 times that of CO2, and its main emission sources are the
production of electrolytic aluminum, which contributes over 95% of the emissions,
and semiconductors [9]. Therefore, the emission of non-CO2 GHGs from industrial
processes constitutes an essential part of China’s overall strategy on climate change.
6.2 Scenarios and Results of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions
Four scenarios are outlined in this chapter to examine non-CO2 emissions and reduc-
tion potential. 2015 is chosen as the base year, and 2050 the target year. The policy
scenario is used as the basis for comparison, and a reinforced policy scenario is built
on of that to intensify the reduction in non-CO2 GHGs under the current policy. The
2 °C scenario is also built to accommodate the trend of non-CO2 GHGs under fore-
seeable emission reduction policies and technological potential. Last but not least,
the 1.5 °C scenario is created to examine various emission reduction policies and the
potential of applying all possible emission reduction technologies available.
The differences between the various scenarios lie, on the one hand, in the changes
in activity levels, and on the other hand, in the degree of diffusion of emission reduc-
tion technologies. Changes in the activity levels of industries are, in large measure,
aligned with changes in the level of economic development. Take methane emissions
from coal mining as an example.With the continuous advancement of China’s policy
on curbing coal-fired power, coal production has seen a steady decline, which has
in turn played a critical role in reining in methane emissions from mining. Emission
reduction pathways for various industries mainly include the complete reduction of
demand, replacement of demand, end-of-pipe recycling, disposal and decomposition
measures. The latter scenario always represents more aggressive emission reduction
targets and higher levels of technology adoption than the previous one. With the
progression of scenarios, each is assigned a more intensified position in such aspects
as the level of technology diffusion and demand reduction than the one before.
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6.2.1 Non-CO2 GHG Emissions Under the Policy Scenario
Under the policy scenario, non-CO2 GHG emissions climb from 2.17 billion tCO2e
in 2015 to 3.17 billion tCO2e in 2050, up 46.2% with an average annual growth
of roughly 1.1% (Fig. 6.3 and Table 6.2). The growth of emissions primarily arises
fromHFC refrigerants and the agricultural sector during the 2015–2050 period. Non-
CO2 GHG emissions from the waste sector largely remain stable, and energy-related















Non-CO2 emissions: by sector
Non-CO₂ in industry Energy Agriculture Waste Refrigerant
Fig. 6.3 Non-CO2 GHG emissions under the policy scenario
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Table 6.2 Non-CO2 emissions under various scenarios (excluding LULUCF) (GtCO2e)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Policy scenario 2.44 2.97 3.13 3.17
Reinforced policy scenario 2.44 2.78 2.63 2.37
2 °C scenario 2.44 2.49 2.15 1.76
1.5 °C scenario 2.44 1.94 1.59 1.27
6.2.1.1 Methane
Under the policy scenario, CH4 emissions amount to roughly 1.22 billion tCO2e in
2015 and grow by 14.2% to 1.39 billion tCO2e in 2030, up nearly 0.9% year-on-year.
However, between 2030 and 2050, CH4 emissions are slated to drop by an average
of 0.7% annually, to 1.2 billion tCO2e in 2050.
In terms of the distribution of emissions by sector, coal mining is the largest
source of methane emissions. CH4 emissions from coal mines are projected to slide
slowly from 540 million tCO2e in 2015 to 530 million tCO2e in 2020 before falling
steadily to 310 million tCO2e in 2050. Between 2015 and 2030, the share of methane
emitted during coal mining ranges between 38.8 and 44.2%, and that number drops
incrementally to 25.5% by 2050. Enteric fermentation in animals and rice cultivation
in the agricultural sector are alsomajor sources ofCH4 emissions.Methane emissions
from these sources are estimated to rise from nearly 470million tCO2e in 2015 to 580
million tCO2e in 2030, and to 630 million tCO2e in 2050. Their share in total CH4
emissions, by and large, stabilizes at 38.5–42.4% from 2015 to 2030, and climbs to
52.8% by the middle of this century, a growth of nearly 10 percentage points from
the base year. Landfilling waste also contributes to CH4 emissions. Emissions from
this category are slated to maintain a growth trajectory from 80 million tCO2e in
2015—6.8% of total methane emissions—to 104 million and 80 million tCO2e in
2030 and 2050, respectively, with the share rising to 7.5% in 2030.
On the makeup of emission increase, the growth in CH4 emissions amounts to
roughly 167 million tCO2e between 2015 and 2030. The most significant drivers of
growth are enteric fermentation, oil and gas leaks, and the landfilling of solid waste,
which resulted in 120, 30, and 20 million tCO2e, respectively. The increase in CH4
emissions is reduced by 180million tCO2e between 2030 and 2050, during which the
primary source of growth is intestinal fermentation—40 million tCO2e. The decline
in coal consumption leads to a continuous reduction in methane emissions during
the mining process after 2030. Approximately 180 million tCO2e is projected to be
cut at the end of the model’s time-frame compared to 2030.
6.2.1.2 Nitrous Oxide
Under the policy scenario, N2O emissions stands at roughly 490 million tCO2e in
2015 and are projected to register a 44% growth and increase at an annual average
6.2 Scenarios and Results of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions 155
of 2.3% to reach 700 million tCO2e in 2030. The growth of N2O emissions slows
dramatically between 2030 and 2050 when they maintain at a level of less than 700
million tCO2e.
On the sources of emissions, the fertilization of agricultural soils using nitrogen
fertilizers and manure is the largest source of nitrous oxide emissions. Under the
policy scenario, N2O emissions from nitrogen fertilizers are slated to grow steadily
from 360 million tCO2e in 2015 to peak at 450 million tCO2e in 2020, and then
witness gradual growth in the ensuing plateau period. This projection largely aligns
withChina’s commitment to peak the use of nitrogen fertilizers in 2020 as proposed in
itsNDC.The proportion ofN2O emissions fromusing nitrogen fertilizers andmanure
is set to decline gradually from 74.0% in 2015 to 66.9% of total N2O emissions. The
sources of N2O emissions are diverse. Apart from the primary sources—agricultural
soils, the production of nitric acid and adipic acid in industrial processes, waste-water
treatment, and animal manure management in the agricultural sector all contribute
to N2O emissions, with adipic acid representing the largest share. Under the policy
scenario, N2O emissions from adipic acid production peak at 210 million tCO2e in
2025, with the share growing from 14.1% in 2015 to 27.7% in 2030 before trending
slightly downward to 24.2%.
From 2015 to 2030, N2O emissions grow by roughly 220 million tCO2e, of which
the biggest drivers are adipic acid, nitrogen fertilizers, manure management and the
use of manure as a fertilizer, contributing 130 and 80 million tCO2e, respectively.
Between 2030 and 2050, the increase in N2O emissions is significantly reduced
to 20 million tCO2e. The major sources of growth during this stage are manure
management, energy activities, and the use of manure as a fertilizer. As emissions
from other sources are slated to decrease, all growth stems from the above-mentioned
sources.
6.2.1.3 F-Gases
Under the policy scenario, F-gas emissions soar by 93.8% from roughly 450 million
tCO2e in 2015 to 870 million tCO2e in 2030, averaging 4.5% growth annually.
Between 2030 and 2050, the growth sees a notable drop to around 1.9%. Emissions
in 2050 are up 181% relative to the base year, reaching 1.27 billion tCO2e.
On the distribution of emissions by sector, HCFC-22 production and air condi-
tioning are the biggest contributors to F-gas emissions. Emissions from HCFC-22
production are projected to grow steadily from 110 million tCO2e to the peak at 160
million tCO2e in 2025 before entering a plateau. In the meantime, emissions from
indoor, automobile and commercial air conditioning witness exponential rise at an
average of 4.5% annually from 220 million tCO2e in 2015 to 430 million tCO2e in
2030, double the level relative to the base year. Between 2030 and 2050, the growth
slows to around 2.3%. Total emissions hit 690 million tCO2e, up 213% from the base
year. Resulting from the substantial increase in emissions from air conditioning, the
share of F-gas emissions from HCFC-22 production in the total F-gas emissions is
projected to plunge from 38.8% in 2015 to 23.9% and 16.9% in 2030 and 2050,
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respectively. The share of F-gas emissions from air conditioning jumps from 50.9%
in the base year to 66.4% in 2030 and 76.4% in 2050.
F-gas emissions are expected to climb by 420 million tCO2e from 2015 to 2030,
the biggest drivers of which are air conditioning and HCFC-22 production, which
contribute 290 and 40 million tCO2e, respectively. Together they account for 89.2%
of the total increase, of which the contribution of air conditioning stands at 77.8%.
From 2030 to 2050, the increase in F-gas emissions falls to 390 million tCO2e. At
this stage, emissions attributed to air conditioning, the chief source of increase rise by
260 million tCO2e, comprising over 95% of the total increase. Air conditioning and
indoor cooling are the largest growth drivers, accounting for approximately 77.5%
of the total increase.
6.2.1.4 Carbon Sink
Forest carbon sinks and grassland carbon sinks/emissions are vital parts of the global
carbon cycle in terrestrial ecosystems. The cycle mainly consists of photosynthesis,
respiration, the burning and decaying of biomass, and the decomposition of soil and
other organic matter. Forests store large amounts of carbon. Forest biomass is most
closely linked to the stage of the life cycle, and the accumulation rate of carbon is the
largest inmiddle-aged forestswhilemature and over-mature forests—whose biomass
largely ceases to grow—are in equilibrium with a net carbon balance. This report
presents three scenarios for evaluating changes in forest carbon sinks. The policy and
reinforced scenarios are similar and thus merged into one. Under the three scenarios,
China’s forest stock keeps continuous growth through to 2050, and the changes in
carbon uptake and storage by forests are precisely in sync with that of forest stock.
However, carbon sink capacity reflects the rate of change in forest carbon storage
during a given time interval (one year or multiple years) and the ability to cleanse
carbon accumulations in different periods.
Under the policy/reinforced policy scenarios, the primary consideration is to
appropriately implement measures such as creating new forest areas, increasing the
share of young and middle-aged forests, and harvesting mature forests, so that by
2030, the forest stock jumps by more than 20% compared with 2015, while the
carbon sequestration capacity increases by less than 1% to reach 412 million tCO2,
and Chinese forests’ capacity to absorb and store carbon grows gradually to 424
million tCO2 in 2050, almost double the amount in 2015. Under the 2 °C scenario,
more sophisticated and intensifiedmeasures are adopted, including afforestation, and
the judicious selection of plant species, growth rate and age for afforestation. The
carbon sequestration capacity is projected to hit 654 million tCO2 in 2030 before a
slight decrease to 502 million tCO2 by 2050. Under the 1.5 °C scenario, the capacity
exceeds 900 million tCO2 in 2030, and in 2050, the forest stock surges by 90% over
the 2015 level, and the carbon sequestration capacity increases by 1.7 times to reach
576 million tCO2.
Carbon emissions and sequestration in grasslands are part and parcel of the
ecosystem carbon cycle. Themajority of carbon sequestered in grasslands is stored in
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vegetation and soil organic matter. There are numerous types of grasslands in China
with great discrepancies in carbon storage capacities. Climate and vegetation zonality
exert a profound impact on the carbon storage capacity of grasslands. Changes in the
carbon storage volume and area of grasslands are closely associated with grassland
management policies and measures after 2020. Wetlands, forests, and grasslands
are collectively known as the three major terrestrial ecosystems. Wetlands sequester
carbon primarily through soils and plant biomass, with the former accounting for over
90% of total carbon storage in wetlands. An analysis of the scenario in this paper
shows that the capacity of China’s grasslands and wetlands to sequester carbon from
the atmosphere remains at roughly 200 million tCO2 in 2050.
It can be established from the scenario analysis in conjunction with related
research that the capacity of China’s forests, grasslands, and wetlands to store carbon
stands at 700–800 million tCO2 in 2050.
6.2.2 The Emission Reduction Potential of Non-CO2 GHGs
Under the reinforced policy scenario, non-CO2 GHG emissions are estimated to peak
around 2030 before entering a plateau and experiencing a gradual decline. The peak
is at roughly 2.78 billion tCO2ewith an average annual growth of around 1.7%during
this period. From 2030 to 2050, emissions slowly drop to 2.37 billion tCO2e, down
0.8% year-on-year. Emissions are reduced by roughly 25% compared with the policy
scenario. Detailed data are shown in Table 6.3 and Fig. 6.4. The emissions of non-
Table 6.3 Non-CO2 GHG emissions in 2030 and 2050 under the reinforced policy scenario
(MtCO2e)
CO2 CH4 N2O F-gas Subtotal
2030 Energy activities 583.9 584
Industrial processes 149.7 205.4 355
Agriculture 580.0 438.0 1018
Waste management 212.1 38.1 250
Refrigerants 573.4 573
LULUCF carbon sinks −612 −612
Total emissions −612 1376 626 779 2169
2050 Energy activities 400.4 400
Industrial processes 52.0 284.4 336
Agriculture 622.0 456.0 1078
Waste management 168.3 33.7 202
Refrigerants 350.56 351
LULUCF carbon sinks −624 −624
Total emissions −624 1191 542 635 1743
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Fig. 6.4 Forest carbon sink scenarios
CO2 GHGs are expected to peak simultaneously with CO2 emissions in 2030 under
this scenario. Due consideration should be given to establishing non-CO2 peaking
targets in China’s future NDC ambitions, which will underline the importance of
non-CO2 GHGs to the country’s overall climate strategy. Currently, nearly one-third
of the emission reductions in developed countries is achieved through the abatement
of non-CO2 GHGs, which indeed warrants wider attention.
Under the 2 °C scenario, non-CO2 GHGemissions are estimated to peak in 2025 at
approximately 2.51 billion tCO2e, with an average annual growth of 1.5% during this
period, falling to 1.76 billion tCO2e in 2050, down 1.4% annually. Comparedwith the
reinforced policy scenario, non-CO2 emissions are slashed under the 2 °C scenario to
1.76billion tCO2eby2050, roughly 44% lower than the policy scenario.Under the 1.5
°C scenario, non-CO2 emissions peak in 2020 at 2.38 billion tCO2e before dropping
to 1.2 billion tCO2e in 2050, around 60% lower than the policy scenario and half of
its peak. The details are presented in Table 6.4 and Fig. 6.5, which show that even
when all emission reduction technologies are adopted, themost radical efforts toward
cutting non-CO2 GHG emissions would fail to deliver near-zero emission by 2050.
Moreover, the costs of technologies for near-zero emissions are exceedingly high. It
is estimated that there would be a gap of at least 1.2 billion tCO2e. Therefore, early
opportunities must be seized upon when it comes to the emission reduction of non-
CO2 GHGs, and the aggressive implementation of negative emission technologies
holds the key in the latter phases.
In 2015, non-CO2 GHG emissions amounted to roughly 2.17 billion tCO2e, of
whichmethane, nitrous oxide, andF-gases took up 56.3%, 22.8%, and 20.9%, respec-
tively. Under the policy scenario, emissions of various GHGs increase in 2050, albeit
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Table 6.4 Non-CO2 GHG emissions in 2030 and 2050 under the 2 °C scenario (MtCO2e)
CO2 CH4 N2O F-gas Subtotal
2030 Energy activities 476.9 477
Industrial process 123.6 190.5 314
Agriculture 515.0 415.0 930
Waste management 196.6 37.6 234
Refrigerants 532 532
LULUCF carbon sinks −854 −854
Total emissions −854 1188 576 722 1633
2050 Energy activities 201.1 201
Industrial process 19.7 213.7 233
Agriculture 466.0 406.0 872
Waste management 134.4 28.9 163
Refrigerants 291.32 291
LULUCF carbon sinks −700 −700
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Fig. 6.5 Non-CO2 emission reduction in different scenarios
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Fig. 6.6 Volume and share of non-CO2 GHG emissions in different scenarios
at different rates. F-gas emissions spike to account for 40.1% of total emissions while
the share of methane emissions is down to 37.9% and that of nitrous oxide emis-
sions remains broadly unchanged. The details are presented in Fig. 6.6. Under the
reinforced policy scenario and the 2 °C scenario, methane still represents the highest
share in 2050 at about 50.3% and 45.5%, respectively. The sharp rise of F-gas emis-
sions pushes up their shares under the two scenarios to 26.8% and 28.7%, both higher
than the levels in 2015. Under the 1.5 °C scenario, the share of methane emissions
is 5 percentage points higher than that of F-gases, standing at 40.5% of the total,
which means methane remains the largest source of non-CO2 GHG emissions. The
proportion of nitrous oxide emissions sees moderate growth to 25%. However, the
gap in the share of emissions among the three is be narrowed.
Based on comparisons of the various scenarios, it is anticipated that as socio-
economic development and energy transition accelerate, CO2 emissions will take
a nosedive, and the share of non-CO2 GHG emissions will grow year by year. In
2015, non-CO2 gases comprised roughly 18% of all GHG emissions (national net
GHG emissions being 11.2 billion tCO2e). In 2050, the share of non-CO2 GHG
emissions in the reinforced policy scenario is projected to rise to 37%, and it further
grows to 58% under the 2 °C and 95% under the 1.5 °C. Therefore, prompt efforts to
curtail non-CO2 emissions are vital to fast-track China’s low-carbon transition and
development.
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6.2.2.1 Methane
CH4 emissions are set to drop by a certain extent under the reinforced policy scenario
compared with the policy scenario. CH4 emissions peak in 2030 at 1.37 billion
tCO2e under the reinforced policy scenario; under the 2 °C scenario, its peaking
occurs earlier in 2020 at a reduced level of 1.22 billion tCO2e; and under the 1.5 °C
scenario, the peak is moved up further to the time around 2015 at 1.22 billion tCO2e;
in 2030 under the reinforced, 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, CH4 emissions amount to
1.38 billion, 1.18 billion, and 790 million tCO2e, respectively, down 0.7%, 14.2%,
and 43.0% from the levels in policy scenario.
In terms of the distribution of emissions reduction by sector, under the 2 °C
scenario, total CH4 emission reduction is 200 million tCO2e in 2030. The sectors
contributing the most to the reduction are coal mining, solid waste treatment, rice
cultivation, enteric fermentation, and animal manure management, with 140, 20, 20,
and 20 million tCO2e cut, respectively.
Under the 2 °C scenario, the reduction of CH4 emissions grows to 400 million
tCO2e in 2050, which is primarily attributed to coalmining, animal intestinal fermen-
tation, rice cultivation, and solid waste management, which witness a cut of 190, 170,
and 10 million tCO2e respectively. More ambitious efforts on non-CO2 reduction are
seen in the 1.5 °C scenario, with emission reduction reaching 590 million tCO2e in
2030 and 680 million tCO2e in 2050. A comparison of the scenarios reveals that part
of the increase in emissions reduction in 2030 comes from the coal mining process,
while the growth in 2050 is chiefly due to efforts coal mining, animal intestinal
fermentation, and solid waste treatment.
6.2.2.2 Nitrous Oxide
N2O emissions under reinforced policy, 2 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios witness a down-
ward trajectory relative to the policy scenario, with the overall decrease exceeding
that of CH4 emissions. Under the reinforced policy scenario, N2O emissions trend
slowly downward after peaking in 2020, and maintain at 560–650 million tCO2e
from 2030 to 2050. At 2 °C scenario, the peak of N2O emissions arrives in 2020
at 650 million tCO2e. At 1.5 °C scenario, the peak remains in 2020 at a slightly
reduced level of 580 million tCO2e. Under these three scenarios, N2O emissions in
2030 amount to 630, 570 and 420million tCO2e, which are 11.9%, 18.9% and 40.6%
lower than the policy scenario.
In termsof the distributionof emission reductionby sector, under the 2 °Cscenario,
N2O emissions are cut by 240 million tCO2e in 2030, and the sectors with the
highest contribution are nitrogen fertilizer application, animal manure management
andmanure as a fertilizer,whichhelp reduce 77, 23 and20million tCO2e respectively.
In 2050,N2Oemissions are downby150million tCO2e,mostly fromenergy activities
such as nitrogen fertilizer application and biomass combustion and mobile sources,
which contribute 80 and 64 million tCO2e respectively. The 1.5 °C scenario sees
stronger efforts in N2O emission reduction, which rises to 280 and 380 million
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tCO2e in 2030 and 2050 respectively. The incremental part was mainly achieved
through the emission reduction measures during the production of adipic acid and
nitrogen fertilizer application.
6.2.2.3 F-Gases
The emissions of F-gases start to decline slowly after 2035 under the reinforced
policy scenario, while the growth of F-gases in the 2 °C scenario and the 1.5 °C
scenario largely slows down after 2030 after peaking at 730 million tCO2e, which
is 16.3% lower relative to policy scenario. In 2050, F-gas emissions are 510 million
and 440 million tCO2e, down 60.3% and 65.5% compared to policy scenario.
The 2 °C scenario is characterized by a F-gas reduction of 140 million tCO2e
compared with the policy scenario, the biggest contributors being household air
conditioners,HCFC-22 production and automobile air conditioners,with an emission
reduction of 80, 30 and 30 million tCO2e. By 2050, emission reduction rises to 760
million tCO2e, mostly from refrigerant substitution in household and automobile air
conditioners, which reduce 470 million and 290 million tCO2e respectively. The 1.5
°C scenario features rising emission reduction to 150 and 830 million tCO2e in 2030
and 2050. It is found that the increase of F-gas emission reduction in 2030 is largely
contributed by the production process of HCFC-22 (120 million tCO2e), while the
contribution in 2050 mainly comes from the production process of HCFC-22 (20%),
household air conditioners (19%) and automobile air conditioners (19%), etc.
6.2.2.4 Carbon Sink Analysis of Land Use and Land Use Changes
Land use is responsible for 25%of global greenhouse gas emissions,with agricultural
production directly responsible for 10–14%; and the other 12–17% are caused by
vegetation changes, including forest degradation [10]. The greenhouse gas inventory
report of China’s land use, land use changes and forestry in 2014 covers green-
house gas emissions and carbon sequestration from six types of land use, including
woodland, agricultural land, grassland, wetland, construction land and others. The
enormous potential of land use in cutting greenhouse gas emissions has long been
neglected. The sustainable management of land use and regulation of land carbon
cycle not only facilitate carbon emission reduction per unit of land area, but also
carbon storage of soil.
Stopping deforestation and massive tree planting represent one of the most effec-
tive approaches, as healthy forests support local economic development by ensuring
water security, improving soil health, and helping regulate the climate. Under the
reinforced policy scenario, China’s forestry carbon sink in 2030 can reduce 412
million tons of CO2, which not only mitigates climate risks, but also enhances adap-
tation to climate change. And the 2 °C scenario sees even higher contribution of
forest—a reduction of 654 million tons of CO2—a potential that should be reckoned
with.
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Comparedwith forest ecosystem, grassland carbon sink/carbon absorption ismore
susceptible to natural factors. Temperature, precipitation and evaporation are the
main climatic factors affecting the carbon cycle of grassland ecosystem. Yet human
measures for grassland preservation and restoration are also crucial for enhancing
its potential of carbon sequestration. For the existing grasslands in China, the carbon
sequestration potential of the three measures of enclosure, grass planting and conver-
sion of cultivated land to grassland reaches 39.06Tg·a−1 [11], equivalent to the carbon
sequestration capacity of 140 million tCO2.
Forestry, grassland and wetland are major components of China’s emission reduc-
tion efforts, and the international community is also turning greater attention to the
role of forestry and grassland in global emission reduction. Forestry and grassland
are unique in coping with climate change, as they can be either “carbon sources” or
“carbon sinks”, depending on the actions and measures of humanity.
6.3 Important Technologies and Measures to Reduce
Non-CO2 GHG Emissions
6.3.1 Key Technologies for Non-CO2 Emission Reduction
6.3.1.1 Industrial Process
Greenhouse gas emissions from industrial production are mostly attributed to the
process of physical and (or) chemical changes, which confines available emission
reduction pathways to rawmaterial substitution or the choice of solvent and reducing
agent, with only a few technological options to choose from, hence the need to
leverageother technologies fromdownstreamproductionprocess tomaximize energy
conservation and emissions reduction in the industry.
N2O emission reduction technology in industrial production process can be
grouped into source control technology, process control technology and end treatment
technology according to the stage of its action or workshop section.
• Cyclohexane production is the mainstream technology in China for producing
adipic acid, whose capacity in this regard comprises over 95% of the total output
of adipic acid in the country, and the N2O source control mainly takes place
through substituting other raw materials or methods for the cyclohexane adipic
acid capacity. First appliedby Japan-basedAsahiKaseiCorporation, the cyclohex-
anol method enables N2O emission reduction thanks to the dramatically reduced
consumption of hydrogen and nitric acid compared to the cyclohexane method
despite similar raw materials. Not only that, literature reveals other N2O-free
pathway for adipic acid production [12], which features 30% hydrogen peroxide
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under the effect of sodium tungstate and catalyst for a direct oxidation of cyclo-
hexene into adipic acid, with a 90% yield. Yet this technology—yet to be industri-
alized—is not attractive unless hydrogen peroxide is cheap enough and the policy
framework puts a tight leash on N2O emissions. Devoid of nitric acid oxidation,
butadiene [13] and ozone plus ultraviolet irradiation [14] are also free from N2O
emissions, and are currently under laboratory research.
• No process control technology is available in adipic acid industry to reduce N2O
emissions. But the end control technology of catalytic decomposition is available,
whose mechanism is similar to the end control of nitric acid industry. Still, it’s
not a viable option given its apparent drawback in high catalyst cost and short
lifespan.What is more commonly used in China is thermal decomposition [15] for
terminal treatment, a method that directly sends N2O tail gas into the incinerator
and decomposes it into N2, O2 and NO at high temperature without catalyst, and
recycles part of the nitric acid and waste heat. But its flaw lies in the consumption
of fuel, whose combustion produces additional carbon dioxide emissions. Other
literature outlines the direct purification of N2O in chemical production process
before being recycled to produce phenol and medical nitrous oxide anaesthetic,
etc. These methods are closely associated with the demand-side pricing factor of
downstream products and have not been commercialized yet.
As the substitute for theOzoneDepleting Substances (ODS) of CFCs andHCFCs,
HFCs have witnessed notable growth in its global consumption and emissions along
the journey to phase out ODS and aremostly used as refrigerants, foaming agents, fire
extinguishing agents, aerosols and raw materials for chemical products, involving a
range of industrial sectors.
1. In the refrigeration and air conditioning industry, fluorine-containing gases, as
refrigerants, exchange energy with the outside through changes in their thermal
state for the purpose of refrigeration.
• For small car air conditioning, the refrigerant alternatives mainly include
HFO-1234yf, CO2, HFC-152a and Mexichem AC6. A slightly flammable
refrigerant, HFO-1234yf has got the nod for United States SNAP, Europe
REACH and China new material registration, and has been widely commer-
cialized, with more than 60 million vehicles using the refrigerants globally
in 2018, including some Chinese brands with car exports to Europe and the
United States. CO2, a natural workingmedium, has been used successfully as
a refrigerant. For small and light systems such as automotive and mobile air
conditioning, CO2 systems represent a promising option. HFC-152A enjoys
the potential of fuel-saving, low refrigerant price, higher system efficiency
and available deceleration for refrigeration, but lacks a full-fledged SAE
(Society of Automotive Engineers) standard.
• The refrigerant alternatives for indoor air conditioners mainly include HFC-
32 andR290, the former being a slightly flammable refrigerantwhose cooling
performance is comparable to HFC-410A with less refrigerant charge under
the same refrigerating capacity. The technology has been adopted in the
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markets of Japan, Europe and the United States. R290, with fairly close
physical parameters to HCFC-22, is a very close direct substitute, plus its
GWP is less than 20 and is 15% more efficient than conventional systems.
However, its flammability raised concern from the United States, which
outlawedhydrocarbons as an alternative toHFCs. SeveralChinese companies
have established production lines for R290 air conditioners. With enhanced
safety, heightened safety awareness and the enactment and improvement of
regulations, R290 is poised to gain more penetration in air conditioning.
• As products vary greatly in the refrigeration for industrial and commercial
air conditioners, a wider portfolio of alternatives is available. Apart from the
CO2 and HCs mentioned above, natural working medium ammonia, with
zero ODP and GWP, represents an environmentally friendly refrigerant with
outstanding thermal and physical properties, large cooling capacity per unit
volume, small viscosity, low price and high operating efficiency. Ammonia
refrigerant is still being used in many large industrial systems, including
mid-and-large freezers in China. Nevertheless, its toxicity and flammability
have always been a cause for concern.
2. Cyclopentane demonstrates themost practical value out of HCs foaming agents.
Comparedwith otherHCs foaming agents, it features the lowest thermal conduc-
tivity, which explains its best thermal insulation performance. A relatively
mature technology, hydrocarbon is already widely used in PU foam industry.
Water is arguably a universal foaming agent for PU foam; it’s environmen-
tally friendly, safe and requires no changes of foaming equipment compared to
other alternatives; besides, it’s the most economically viable option considering
the cost of equipment and plant renovation and changes in product produc-
tion. HCFO-1233zd and HFO-1336mzz, with their non-flammability, lowGWP
value, high energy efficiency and superior insulation performance, represent
extremely promising newgeneration foaming agents, which have obtained certi-
fication of US SNAP and the EU REACH. Honeywell and Arkema have regis-
tered the patent for HCFO-1233zd foaming agent, while Dupont owns the patent
for HFO-1336mzz, but the massive worldwide penetration is yet to begin.
3. There are three main approaches for cutting HFC-23 emissions:
• Incineration of HFC-23. A mainstream solution to the treatment of HFC-
23 in businesses at home and abroad, the method includes thermal oxygen
decomposition and plasma digestion, etc. As China is involved in CDM
projects implementation, HCFC-22 producers mostly opt for incineration
and decomposition to dispose HFC-23, and the technologies are mature.
• Reducing HFC-23 by-product rate. By improving the production process of
HFC-22, developed countries have managed to keep the by-product rate of
HFC-23 at 1.5 ~ 3%, and below 2% on average. At present, due to process,
equipment or management obstacles, the by-product rate of HFC-23 hovers
at a high level of 3% in most domestic enterprises.
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• HFC-23 recycling, that is, converting HFC-23 into fluoride compound with
economic value through chemical reaction, and achieving the effective
utilization of fluorine resources.
6.3.1.2 Agricultural Production
The sources of agricultural GHG emissions mainly include animal intestinal fermen-
tation, animal manure management, rice cultivation and agricultural land, which
account for 24%, 16%, 19% and 40% of GHG emissions respectively.
1. The emission reduction technologies in rice fields can be divided into five
categories: variety selection, water management, fertilizer management, tillage
management and new technologies [16–18], as shown in Table 6.5.
The study shows that if nitrogen fertilizer application in the rice field is reduced
from 225–450 kg N ha−1 to 90–200 kg N ha−1, N2O emissions from rice field
would be down by 42%. A 10–70% drop in nitrogen fertilizer would make for an
8–57% reduction in N2O emissions without significant impact on CH4 emissions
from rice fields and SOC fixation [19]. Water-saving irrigation technologies, such as
shallow wet irrigation, controlled irrigation, intermittent irrigation and film-covered
dry farming, have been made widely available. Such water-saving irrigation tech-
nologies not only saves large quantities of water for rice, but also lowers greenhouse
gas emissions. Other studies suggest that controlled irrigation can effectively reduce
the global warming potential, and the total amount of CH4 discharged from paddy
fields under controlled irrigationwould be down bymore than 80% [20]. Under inter-
mittent irrigation, CH4 emissions of the paddy field was 5.4% of that under contin-
uous flooding. Despite a 6.5-fold increase in N2O emissions, the comprehensive
greenhouse effect under intermittent irrigation is reduced by 90% [21].
Table 6.5 Methane emission reduction technology system in rice field
Category of emission reduction technologies Specific technology
Variety selection Low emission variety
Water management Control irrigation
Shallow wet irrigation
Intermittent irrigation
Combination of intermittent drainage and baking
during growing period
Fertilizer management Reducing nitrogen fertilizer application
Biogas residue replacing farm organic manure
Tillage management Paddy-upland rotation of rice oil and rice wheat
New technologies Coated controlled release fertilizer
Methane inhibitor
Biochar
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Table 6.6 Technology system for reducing nitrous oxide emissions from upland fields
Category of emission reduction technology Specific technology
Variety selection Low emission variety
Fertilizer management Reducing chemical nitrogen fertilizer application
Mixing organic fertilizer (farm organic fertilizer,
biogas residue, straw, etc.) and chemical fertilizer
Test soil formula fertilization
Deep placement of nitrogen fertilizer
Tillage technology Conservation tillage (less or no till, wheel tillage,
straw mulching or returning to paddy field, etc.)
New preparations Nitrification inhibitor
SRFs and CRFs
2. The emission reduction technology system of nitrous oxide in upland can be
grouped into four categories: variety selection, fertilizer management, tillage
technology and new preparations (see Table 6.6).
Nitrogen fertilizer reduction is the most direct approach for reducing dryland.
Studies show that if nitrogen fertilizer is reduced by 10–30%, N2O emissions from
wheat, corn and vegetable crops would be down by 11–22%, 17–30% and 27–45%,
respectively [19]. Analysis indicates that for different types of farmland, including
wheat, corn, and vegetable field, adding nitrification inhibitors serves to bring down
N2O emission coefficient by around 40%. SRFs and CRFs, which enable nitrogen to
be slowly released for the sustained crop absorption and growth, is the best alternative
to traditional organic fertilizer and the preferred choice for enhancing utilization of
fertilizer and reducing its environmental impact.
3. The GHG gases in livestock and poultry breeding mainly stem from CH4 in
livestock and poultry intestines and CH4 and N2O produced in the process of
excrement management. At present, GHG emission reduction technologies in
livestock and poultry industry include four categories [16, 17, 22, 23], namely
grain ration management, improved breeding, feces collection and storage, and
feces treatment (as shown in Table 6.7).
Studies find that feed conversion can reduce CH4 emissions by 4–6%, and
improving the management of feed or energy intake can facilitate a 11% reduc-
tion in CH4 emissions (equivalent to reducing 142.7 kg CO2e of CH4 emissions per
head of beef cattle per year). Revising the feed mix of ruminants, especially adding
lipid additives, can slash CH4 by about 15% (equivalent to reducing 142.7 kg CO2e
of CH4 emissions per head of beef cattle per year) [19].
4. The past 30 years have witnessed an overall increase in China’s surface soil
organic carbon (SOC) pool, which have served as a carbon sink (see Table
6.8). The annual carbon sequestration of soil at a depth of 20 cm in farmland
ranged from 9.6 to 25.5 Tg, and the depth of 30 cm from 11 to 36.5 Tg. Carbon
sequestration rate per unit of cultivated land is 74–184 kg C/ha per year at 20
cm depth and 85–281 kg C/ha per year at 30 cm depth [24].
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Table 6.7 GHG emission
reduction technology system














Improved varieties Cultivate high-yield varieties
Feces collection and storage Dry feces collection
Separation of feces and urine
Feces drying treatment




Feces treatment Integrated nutrient management
Anaerobic digester
Aerobic compost directly









Tillage No or less tillage
Soil management Degraded soil remediation
Land reclamation
Fertilizer management Organic fertilizer use
Pasture plant management Improved grassland
variety/grassland component
Pasture animal management Proper grazing density (grazing
capacity)
Adjusting grazing density proves to be a major contributor to avoiding soil SOC
loss and promoting grazing for soil carbon sequestration. High grazing intensity
significantly reduces soil SOC content. Studies find that by lowering grazing density
from high to medium or low level, the soil SOC content would increase by 0.77
tons of CO2 ha−1 yr−1. Rest-rotation grazing could enable a 1.48% improvement in
the soil SOC, or 1.06 tons of CO2 ha−1 yr−1. Remediation of degraded soil could
increase the soil carbon sequestration by 4.22 tons of CO2 ha−1 yr−1.
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Fig. 6.7 Key areas for China’s non-CO2 GHG emission reduction (MtCO2e)
Figure 6.7 illustrates the aggregate non-CO2 gas emission reduction in selected
sectors in 2030 and 2050 under the 1.5 °C scenario. It’s found that the six
sectors of coal mining, HCFC-22 production, household air conditioning, animal
intestinal fermentation, nitrogen fertilizer application and automobile air condi-
tioning contributed to the largest reduction of total non-CO2 gases, standing at 410,
200, 90, 60, 60 and 30 million tCO2e respectively in 2030, which adds up to 82.6%
of total reduction. In 2050, the figure is 520, 170, 300, 220, 110 and 160 million
tCO2e respectively, with a minor drop of the cumulative contribution to 78.3%.
6.3.1.3 Summary
Given the characteristics of non-CO2 emission reduction technologies occurring in
different stages during implementation, this report groups them into six technology
categories, namely complete reduction of demand, replacement of original demand,
improvement of production mode and utilization efficiency, end-of-pipe recovery,
disposal and decomposition.
In 2030, non-CO2 gas emissions in the 2 °C scenario are 490million tons less than
the policy scenario, which is primarily attributed to complete reduction in demand,
replacement of original demand, and end-of-pipe recycling, disposal and decompo-
sition—steps that account for 37.6%, 17.6%, 21.5% and 10.9% of total emission
reduction. The emission reduction of non-CO2 gases in the 1.5 °C scenario grows by
540 million tons relative to the 2 °C scenario, which derives from increased end-of-
pipe recycling, disposal and decomposition, strengthened efforts in demand reduction
and substitution in the early stage—measures that contribute 28.5%, 23.0%, 27.6%
and 13.3% of emission reduction respectively.
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In 2050, the composition of technology category for non-CO2 gas emission reduc-
tion in the 2 °C scenario is similar to that in 2030,with complete reduction of demand,
replacement of original demand, end-of-pipe recycling, disposal and decomposition
contributing 55.2%, 19.9%, 11.6%, and 6.5% to emission reduction. In contrast to
2030, the incremental non-CO2 emission reduction under 1.5 °C scenario is primarily
due to early demand reduction and substitution, with much less contribution from
end-of-pipe disposal and decomposition. Additional emission reduction from the
above three measures is estimated at 150, 210, and 160 million tCO2e, or 47.1%,
26.6% and 14.8%, respectively.
Research and practice suggest that in the near and medium term, the spread and
use of end-of-pipe recycling and disposal measures, such as the recovery of coalbed
methane and the catalytic decomposition and treatment of industrial exhaust gases,
should be prioritized for the reduction of non-CO2 gas emissions. In the long run,
more contribution is expected from the steady progress of upfront demand reduc-
tion or substitution, such as the encouragement of a healthier diet structure and
substitution of new refrigerant with low GWP.
6.3.2 Key Measures for Non-CO2 Emission Reduction
This report classifies non-CO2 gas emission reduction technologies into three
stages—early stage, intermediate stage and behind stage, based on the phases and
modes of emission reduction behaviors (as shown in Table 6.9).
The early stage—prior to the release of non-CO2 gases—includes two groups of
emission reduction measures, namely complete reduction of demand and replace-
ment of original demand. The so-called demand reduction represents the curb and
reduction of activity levels of the emission sources, including transforming the energy
system to cut coal consumption and subsequently dampen activities in coal mining;
encouraging a shift to healthier diet to reduce the consumption of red meat, which
indirectly leads to the decrease of the stock of livestock breeds; and diverting solid
waste from landfill to incineration to cut back on the amount of landfill at the source,
thus achieving a decline in emissions before landfill gas is generated. For the replace-
ment of original demand or activity level, typical examples can be found in auto-
mobile air conditioning, where HFC-134A with a higher GWP value is replaced by
HFO-1234yf with a lower GWP value as a refrigerant, and the use of R290 as a
working medium replaces R410a in indoor air conditioning.
The intermediate stage refers to the process of non-CO2 gas generation, and
the emission reduction measures comprise improvement of production mode and
utilization efficiency. Typical measures of the former include: promoting the combi-
nation of wet irrigation and intermittent irrigation in rice planting process, and of
intermittent drainage and baked field during growing period; rationing the concen-
trated/coarse feed ratio for livestock raising; substituting automatic quenching anodic
effect and non-effect aluminum electrolysis process for the original production line
with obvious anodic effect in the aluminumsmelting industry. The emission reduction
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Table 6.9 Grouping of non-CO2 emission reduction measures
Stage Type Emission source Measure
Early stage Complete reduction of
demand































Intermediate stage Improvement of
production mode
Rice planting Promote the combination
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Table 6.9 (continued)
Stage Type Emission source Measure








Coal mining Closed combustion,
oxidation treatment











measure through enhancing utilization efficiency mainly include the popularization
of soil test formula fertilization in the application of nitrogen fertilizer to improve
the efficiency of nitrogen fertilizer.
The behind stage, meaning post non-CO2 release period, primarily features end-
of-pipe recycling, disposal and decomposition for non-CO2 emission reduction. To
illustrate, CH4 emissions from coal mining and solid waste landfill can be recycled
to generate electricity; and emissions from HCFC-22, nitric acid and adipic acid
production require heat treatment or catalytic processing to be eliminated.
6.3.3 Emission Reduction Cost of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions
Research shows the marginal cost curve of non-CO2 emission reduction features a
flat pattern in the first half but a pretty steep trajectory in the latter half (as shown in
Fig. 6.8), which indicates that despite the physical constraints of emission reduction
technologies, non-CO2 emissions can be further reduced through a proper level of
carbon tax. However, the marginal cost of emission reduction sees a surge when
certain emission reduction threshold is crossed. Modeling suggests the threshold
ranges from 40 to 50% of emission reduction in 2030, and from 50 to 70% in 2050.
Moreover, owning to technology limitation, zero emissionof non-CO2 gases is hard to
come by—around 40% of such emissions remain stubborn under the 1.5 °C scenario.
With a carbon price of CNY 20/tCO2e, N2O, F-gas, CH4 would be down by
31.2%, 12.9% and 14.5% respectively in 2030 and by 50%, 21.5% and 42.5% in
2050—equivalent to a reduction of 53 million tons and 130 million tCO2e by 2030
and 2050. Under the reinforced policy scenario, the cost of emission reduction in
2030 stands at CNY 3.85 billion and CNY 16.05 billion in 2050; whereas the 2 °C









































































Fig. 6.8 Cost curve of Non-CO2 emission reduction (2030 and 2050)
scenario sees the cost soaring to CNY 10.58 billion in 2030 and CNY 30.62 billion
in 2050. Furthermore, the maximum economically achievable emission reduction is
limited by the physical constraints of technologies. Once carbon is priced aboveCNY
200/tCO2e (around $30/tCO2e), the level of emission reduction would not increase
in proportion to price rises. Assuming the cost of technology remains constant, the
cost for non-CO2 emission reduction in the 1.5 °C scenario wouldmultiply that in the
2 °C scenario by a minimum of 3–5 times. Future R&D and technological advances
may result in a reduction in technology outlay. Yet due to the scarcity of data on the
cost reduction of non-CO2 emission reduction technologies, future cost reduction
prompted by technological progress is not taken into account in this study.
The conclusion is that, first, such non-CO2 gases as methane is an aggressive
greenhouse gas, whose greenhouse effect is equivalent to 80 times of CO2 in 20
years. So it’s essential to take non-CO2 emission reduction seriously by creating
a strategy that targets non-CO2 gases under the umbrella of the national strategy
for long-term low-carbon development. Second, the potential for cutting non-CO2
gases can be fulfilled in the early period through low cost technologies and carbon
pricing. But when certain threshold is reached, deeper emission reduction can only
be enabled through behavior change to reduce the activities, which renders emis-
sion reduction more challenging. Third, the cost and difficulty of non-CO2 emission
reduction demonstrate non-linear rises after the threshold, prompting the use of nega-
tive emission technology for the remaining emissions in order to achieve net zero
greenhouse gas emission by 2050.
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6.3.4 Nature-Based Solutions
The notion ofNature-based Solutions (NbS) first appeared in theWorldBank’s report
entitledBiodiversity, Climate Change, and Adaptation: Nature-Based Solutions from
the World Bank Portfolio World Bank (2008–09), which underscored the importance
of biodiversity conservation for climate change mitigation and adaptation. “Nature-
based Solutions” is a nature-inspired solution that supports and utilizes nature to
address social challenges with effective and appropriate means, enhancing social
resilience, and bringing economic, social, and environmental benefits.
“Nature-based solutions” fall into three categories based on different ways of
using ecosystems:
• The direct use of ecosystems with no or minimum intervention, such as natural
ventilation for air purification, rain flood management through urban green space;
• The repair of ecosystems such as soil management and restoration of soil
ecosystem function;
• The imitation of nature to create ecosystems, such as new green roofs and green
wall façade to adjust microclimate.
Nature-based climate solutions produce both economic benefits and efficiency
perks, and showcase fully the importance of trees, soil and other natural elements in
tackling climate change. The proposition of nature-based climate solutions provides
a path toward the harmonious development of man and nature, and is expected to
inspire more ambitious and effective actions and reasonable use of various resources
by Contracting Parties on climate change issues.
Forestry carbon sink is a practical embodiment of “nature-based solutions” for
managing climate change in the forestry and grassland sectors. It taps into the carbon
storage service of forests through afforestation, strengthened forest management,
reduced deforestation, preservation and restoration of forest vegetation, etc. Under
the policy and reinforced policy scenarios, China’s forest stock is on track to reach
20.8 billion cubic meters in 2030 and 26.2 billion cubic meters in 2050, and the
forestry carbon sink is stabilized at a level of 400 million tons per year. The 2 °C
scenario would push up the stock to 22.7 billion and 30 billion cubic meters in 2030
and 2050 respectively with a carbon sink of 650 million tons in 2030 and 500 million
tons in 2050.
Considering the analysis and conclusions of related research, plus around 200
million tons of carbon sink in grassland, wetland and forest products, it is generally
estimated the total carbon sink of China would reach at 700 to 800 million tons
by 2050. As non-CO2 gas emission sources are relatively dispersed, and the cost for
reducing themwould experience a non-linear surge after reaching a certain reduction
rate, hence enormous challenge in driving emissions down on this front. This neces-
sitates the efforts to tap into carbon sink potential, which is one of the important
avenues to near-zero emissions. It is advised to coordinate agroforestry and rural
development strategies to unleash the full potential of blending technology-based
and nature-based solutions, and make better use of the sinks from agroforestry and
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land use change in order to offset technically difficult emission reductions in other
sectors.
References
1. UNEP. The Emissions Gap Report 2019. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-201
2. UNFCCC. Decision 1/CP.16, the Cancun Agreements. Bonn, Germany; 2010. [2018-02-26].
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf
3. NationalDevelopment andReformCommission (2004)Climate change initial state information
of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/chnnc1c.pdf
4. National Development and Reform Commission (2014) Second National Communication on
Climate Change of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.ccchina.org.cn/archiver/ccchin
acn/UpFile/Files/Default/201302181420/20138656.pdf
5. Ministry of Ecology and Environment. The People’s Republic of China’s first biennial update
on climate change. http://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/ydqhbh/wsqtkz/201904/P02019041952273
5276116.pdf
6. Xuekun Fang, Xia Hu, Greet Janssens-Maenhout et al (2013) Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) emis-
sion estimates for China: an inventory for 1990–2010 and a projection to 2020. Environ Sci
Technol 47:3848–3855
7. Gao Feng, Cao Yancui, Liu Yu, Gong Xianzheng, Wang Zhihong (2016) Analysis of factors
influencing greenhouse gas emissions from raw magnesium production in China. Environ Sci
Technol 39(05):195–199
8. Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) (2011) Emission Database
for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), release version 4.2. European Commission, Joint
Research Centre (JRC)/Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). http://edgar.
jrc.ec.europa.eu (accessed April 9, 2018)
9. Xiang Zhen (2011) Mitigation of perfluorocarbons in response to global climate change.
Environ Ecol Three Gorges 33(04):15–18
10. Paustian K, Lehmann J, Ogle S et al (2016) Climate-smart soils. Nat 532(7597):49
11. Guo Ran, Wang Xiaoke, Lu Fei et al (2008) Current status and potential of grassland and soil
ecosystems in China. Ecologica Sinica 28(2)
12. Kang Li (1999) A “green” route for the production of adipic acid. Pet Nat Gas Chem Ind
(02):118
13. Hao Jingquan, Hua Weiqi, Cha Zhiwei, Li Shikun (2012) Development of adipic acid
production technology and market analysis. Mod Chem Ind 32(08):1–4
14. Shi Huaxin (2015) New technology for synthesis of adipic acid without N2O. Energy Conserv
Emiss Reduct Pet Petrochem 5(02):40
15. JJiang Yu, Xu Yekun and Ai Xiaoxin (2008) Review of N2O emission reduction technology in
adipic acid production. Chem Des Commun 44(09):56–57
16. Dong Hongmin, Li Yue, Tao Xiuping, Peng Xiaopei, Li Na, Zhu Zhiping (2008) China
agricultural greenhouse gas emissions and emission reduction technologies. J Agric Eng
10:269–273
17. Mi Songhua, Huang Zuhui (2012) Screening of applicability of greenhouse gas emission
reduction technologies and management measures for agricultural sources. Chin J Agric Sci
45(21):4517–4527
18. Wang Xiaomeng, Sun Yu, Wang Qi, Song Qiulai, Zeng Xiannan, Feng Yanjiang (2018)
Research progress on greenhouse gas emission and emission reduction in paddy fields.
Heilongjiang Agric Sci 07:149–154
19. Nayak D, Saetnan E., Cheng K et al (2015) Managing opportunities to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions from Chinese agriculture. Agr Ecosyst Environ 209:108–124
176 6 Non-CO2 GHG Emissions
20. Peng SZ, Yang SH, Xu JZ et al (2011) Field experiments on greenhouse gas emissions
and nitrogen and phosphorus losses from rice paddy with efficient irrigation and drainage
management. Sci China Technol Sci 54(6):1581
21. Li Xianglan,Ma Jing, XuHua, Cao Jin-liu, Cai Zucong, Yagi Kazuyuki (2008) Effects of water
management on seasonal changes of CH4 and N2O emissions in rice growing period. J Agric
Environ Sci (02):535–541
22. Guo Jiao, Qi Desheng, Zhang Niya, Sun Lvhui, Hu Ronggui (2017) Current situation and peak
forecast of greenhouse gas emission from livestock industry in China. J Agric Environ Sci
36(10):2106–2113
23. Li Shunjiang, Liu Jing, Du Lianfeng, Ma Maoting, Bi Xiaoqing (2018) Technology model for
reducing pollution from large-scale livestock and poultry breeding. World Environ (03):56–58
24. Wang Chong, Yu Dongsheng, Zhang Haidong, Zhao Yongxiang, Shi Xuezheng, Wang Ning
(2014) Study on the significant change characteristics of soil carbon pool and its influencing
factors in farmland in typical black soil region. J Soil Sci 51(04):845–852
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternationalLicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if you modified the licensed material.
You do not have permission under this license to share adapted material derived from this chapter
or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 7
Technical Support for Long-Term Deep
Decarbonization
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report
on Global Warming of 1.5 °C released in October 2018, achieving the 1.5 °C target
requires net-zero CO2 emission by the middle of this century. And this necessitates
the innovations and applications of a wide array of key revolutionary technologies.
Long-term deep decarbonization development of the world and China entails a
variety of medium- and long-term emission reduction technologies. To enable the
1.5 °C target, the analysis on potential and cost of deep decarbonization technologies
is essential.
Comprehensive cost–benefit analysis of deep decarbonization technologies under-
pins technology selection and emissions strategy. This chapter begins by analyzing
the comprehensive impact of multiple energy efficiency and low-carbon technolo-
gies in terms of technology maturity, economic impact, social impact, environmental
impact and ecological impact, followed by a roadmap for the development of major
technologies.
In this chapter, over ten deep decarbonization technologies were diagnosed
and evaluated, including research and development progress, cost effectiveness,
development potential and policy requirements.
7.1 Comprehensive Cost–Benefit Analysis of Long-Term
Deep Decarbonization Technologies
7.1.1 Research Background
China’s decarbonization technological advances are playing a leading role. The emis-
sion reduction potential of traditional technologies is limited, and the contribution
of rational demand and structural adjustment and optimization has been on the rise.
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China still has tremendous potential for energy conservation and carbon reduction
by using negative and low-cost technologies, which may grow with technological
progress and structural upgrade. Deep emissions reduction in end-use sectors calls
for the development of low-carbon or zero-emission technologies, processes and
products, collaborative innovation of disruptive energy technologies, new materials
and information intelligence, and the deep integration of advanced technologies with
the shift of green consumption concepts and behavior patterns.
A spate of domestic and international studies has identified carbon capture and
storage (CCS), advanced nuclear energy, hydrogen energy, and geoengineering tech-
nologies, as well as technologies in the building, transportation, industrial, and
energy storage sectors as crucial medium- and long-term emission reduction tech-
nologies (see Fig. 7.1). Most of these studies develop roadmaps for the development
and deployment of emission reduction technologies based on industry demand and
technical economics, without comprehensive cost–benefit analysis (i.e. impacts on
environment and ecology). Thus, further research is needed.
As shown in Fig. 7.2, existing research mainly focuses on the research and
development of new technologies and cost reduction of existing emission reduc-
tion technologies. Domestic research primarily concentrates on technical details and
the improvement and dissemination of existing technologies, instead of focusing
on the new technologies and other related as the international studies did. The
current mainstream perception ofmedium and long-term emission reduction strategy
is more of qualitative understanding, with more interest on improvement of avail-
able technologies and systems, cost reduction and proliferation, and less attention
to potential new technologies and quantitative assessment of their emission reduc-
tion potential. Furthermore, most of the existing research is based on technical and
economic costs estimation, lacking goal-driven mid- and long-term technological
Fig. 7.1 Examples and classification of mid- and long-term emission reduction technologies in
domestic and international research
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Fig. 7.2 Comparison and analyze of mid- and long-term emission reduction technologies in
domestic and international research
strategies or roadmaps that accommodate ecological and social impact after the
massive penetration of such technologies.
7.1.2 Dimensions of Analysis
As shown in Table 7.1, this study selects renewables (wind and solar), biomass,
negative emission technology (CCS), hydrogen, nuclear aswell as other technologies,
such as demand-side management and energy efficiency improvement technologies,
and synthesizes the conclusions on impact assessment in existing studies.
Among these technologies, opinions are divided on the technology maturity of
demand side management. Some studies suggest that this kind of technology is fairly
mature as it’s widely used in daily life. But there is still much room for improvement
from a climate perspective, for example, to what extent car-sharing will reduce the
demand for cars. There is still big gap in the studyof demand influencedby technology
breakthroughs, while the impact of economic, social, environmental and ecological
on the demand is relatively certain.
As shown in Fig. 7.3, this study rises above traditional technical and economic
analysis, and sorts out the diverse categories of technology maturity, employ-
ment, environment, ecology, population health, public acceptance and other factors.
Comprehensive cost–benefit analysis of wind, solar, biomass, carbon capture and
storage, hydrogen, and other technologies is provided in detail, and the conclusions
can be reference for holistic evaluation of medium and long-term emission reduction
technologies.
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Table 7.1 Conclusion of comprehensive impact of mid- and long-term emission reduction
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Fig. 7.3 Comprehensive analysis framework of key technologies for deep decarbonization
7.1.3 Horizontal Comparison of Key Technologies
and Priorities
Table 7.2 illustrates the horizontal comparison of seven key technologies in terms of
their comprehensive cost–benefit from six dimensions. A quasi-quantitative analysis
is conducted on the whole despite possible controversies.
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Note + and − signify subjective qualitative judgment of technology impact, of which + denotes
positive impact, and − refers to negative impact, and the number of + suggests level of impact
Opinions are divergent on the technology maturity of demand side management,
however, there is rising consensus that demand side management produces posi-
tive impact on environment, ecology and population health. In general, demand side
management and energy efficiency technologies feature universal benefits and repre-
sent the key priority areas for future low-carbon development. Yet their potentials
and scale are subject to uncertainties in terms of future technological progress and
breakthroughs as well as policy implementation.
Renewables such as wind and solar power generation have positive employment
and health benefits, with relatively high technology maturity and a high degree of
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public acceptance. Thus, these renewables could be the priority for developing long-
term emission reduction technologies. But their exponential growth should accom-
modate the eco-friendly spatial layout. For instance, installation of such facilities in
high-risk areas could potentially pose local ecological damage, hence precautions
are needed.
The amount of biomass is relatively small compared with other renewables, but
the maturity of technology is higher. However its impact on the environment and
people health cannot be generally described due to its wide variety and various
ways of utilization. For example, biogas power generation helps reduce environment
pollution, but indoor biomass combustion can be detrimental to human health and air
quality. From an ecological viewpoint, the rapid development of biomassmeansmore
consumption of land and water resources, andmore land was inapproriately explored
with abundant artificial irrigation generates mounting risks for the ecological system.
The utilization of biomass should be integrated with other sectors such as transport
and power generation, and should be intensified to avoid negative impact on health.
Experts pointed out thatChina’s hydrogen technology relies on policy support, and
technological breakthroughs.While the key barriers for nuclear power are ecological
risks and low public acceptance.
Zero emissions technologies, in particular CCS, are not mature. If future power
system still highly dependent on coal-fired generation, the large-scale deployment
of CCS and other zero and negative emission technologies would bring negative
impacts on environment, not to mention ecological and commercial risks or public
acceptance obstacles.
This study assesses the ecological and health impact of the five key technologies
on emission reduction cost (see Fig. 7.4). It’s observed that improvement in energy
efficiency brings all aspects of benefits; the development of wind, solar and other
Fig. 7.4 Schematic diagram of abatement cost changes of China’s keymid- and long-term emission
reduction technologies considering ecological and health impacts
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renewables, with the benefits for local environment and population health, features
certain overall benefits; biomass, hydrogen and CCS involve high cost of emission
reduction because of their potential ecological risks or environmental impact.
It should be noted that, with a comprehensive evaluation, the cost of emission
reduction from of energy efficiency improvement, renewables such as wind and
solar, biomass, hydrogen, and CCS are increasing in turn. It is expected that with the
decarbonization of the power industry, the cost–benefit analysis and comparison of
these technologies will be subject to more changes.
7.1.4 The Strategic Importance of Advanced Low-Carbon
Technologies to Deep Decarbonization
As shown in Fig. 7.5, power supply system, energy system and strategic technologies
in the technology innovation system are mutually reinforcing. Deep decarboniza-
tion entails the development of advanced low-carbon technologies as a strategic
support. With close interplay between the technology innovation system and the
energy system, the selection, management, and breakthrough of technologies all
coincide with the development of energy system.
In general, the development of low-carbon technologies in the energy system will
be complemented by technological innovation and revolution in the whole society.
Specifically, the low-carbon technologies of the power supply system are interre-
lated with the energy Internet, energy big data, energy and artificial intelligence
Fig. 7.5 Mutual support of strategic technologies in power system, energy system, and technolog-
ical innovation system
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technologies of the energy system, and are further correlated with the development
of industries such as information technology, newmaterials and high-end equipment.
7.1.5 Conclusions and Suggestions
Aholistic assessment of such dimensions of low-carbon technologies as employment,
environment, ecology, health impacts and public acceptance, would improve the
assessment on technology potential, cost effectiveness and spatial layout, which
would also help to promote the synergies between carbon emission reduction and
sustainable development.
Technologies of demand side management and energy efficiency have positive
effects on sustainable development, and represent the key priority areas for the future
of low-carbon development. Yet their potentials and scale are subject to uncertainties
in terms of future technological progress and breakthroughs.
Renewables such aswind and solar power could be the priority ofmid-to long-term
emission reduction technologies. But their exponential growth should accommodate
eco-friendly spatial distribution and forestall potential ecological risks.
Resting only on marginal land and rainwater irrigation, energy crop farming
cannot meet the demand of deep emission reduction in China. Near-term devel-
opment of energy crops primarily serves the transport sector. Yet given its potential
risks of taking up land resources and straining water resources, it should be deemed
as a transitional technology for the low or even zero carbon transportation before
electrification takes hold in the sector. The long-term development of energy crops
should concentrate on the supply of power and heating of the electricity sector, with
the installation of CCS at the end of the pipe.
Hydrogen is projected to serve a high percentage of end-use energy need by 2050
with considerable potential for emission reduction. Hydrogen market in China has
huge potential. Its development in the future hinges on the level of cost reduction as
demand soars.
Negative emissions technologies, such as BECCS, are not mature for now.
Large scale deployment of negative emission technologies would most likely trigger
adverse local environmental impact, not to mention their ecological and commercial
risks as well as public acceptance challenge. Therefore, it should be viewed as the
backup technology for mid-and long-term emission reduction, and more research is
needed.
Nuclear energy is instrumental in securing clean, safe and reliable power supply.
Meanwhile, it can boost jobs along the industry chain, and take the role of a major
contributor to deep decarbonization of the power system in line with the targets of
temperature limit. Despite its great potential, nuclear power in China is hampered
by such challenges as supply chain development, cost, safety, and political factors.
Thus, stronger policy support is essential for its future development.
For future development, this chapter puts forward the following suggestions.
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• Strengthenmulti-dimensional and systematic research on the cost–benefit of emis-
sion reduction technologies, and identify the spatial variation pattern of diverse
technologies under varied future scenarios and varied constraints.
• Speed up efforts in building a market-oriented system of green technology inno-
vation, and harness the role of various market in promoting the development of
emission reduction technologies.
• Make systematic and continuous efforts to establish an innovation system for
demand side management and energy efficiency technologies; employ a mixture
of levers such as policy design, R&D of science and technology, education and
publicity to raise public awareness, boost penetration of new products and tech-
nologies, foster innovation of the consumption pattern and improve the demand
structure.
• Ensure the strategic security of green technology industrial supply chain, and
speed up the breakthrough of bottleneck technologies.
• Explore the pathway of strengthening intellectual property protection and
enhancing the balance of interests of intellectual property to prompt technological
development and diffusion.
• Create a diverse investment and financing guarantee mechanism for the R&D of
strategic technologies and a risk sharing mechanism for backup technologies.
• Deeply engage in global cooperation and trade in green technologies via the Belt
and Road Initiative and the South-South Cooperation Framework, and facilitate
global cooperation on emission reduction technologies and build a shared future
for the technological innovation community.
7.2 Evaluation of Deep Decarbonization Technologies
This section analyzes and evaluates 12 deep decarbonization technologies under four
categories in terms of their R&D progress, cost effectiveness, development potential,
and policy requirements, etc.
7.2.1 Deep Decarbonization Technologies for Energy
and Power Storage Systems
With a high proportion of intermittent renewable power fed to the grid in the future,
large-scale energy storage, smart grid and distributed renewable energy network
technologies are essential for the safe and stable operation of the power system.
1. Electrochemical Energy Storage Technology
As of the end of 2018, the cumulative installed capacity of energy storage projects
worldwidehad reached181.0GW,ofwhich, pumped storagewas the largest, standing
at 170.7 GW, or 94.3% of the total. Electrochemical energy storage takes second spot
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with 6,625.4 MW, of which lithium ion battery held the largest capacity at 5,714.5
MW.
Table 7.3 compares key operating and economic parameters of energy storage
technologies. Recent years have seen extensive research on energy storage tech-
nologies, especially electrochemical energy storage, with commercial demonstration
and applications in massive grid connection with renewables, demand-side storage,
frequency regulation, etc. [1]. But large-scale deployment is yet to be commercial-
ized. Despite continuous cost reduction of lithium battery in recent years, there is
still a big gap compared to the cost of pumped storage [2, 3], and challenges in
technology, cost, and business model need to be overcome in order to gain penetra-
tion. Superconducting magnetic energy storage, supercapacitor, flywheel, and other
energy storage technologies feature low cost per unit output power, but their unit
energy costs are high, hence mostly applied for high-load and short-time occasions
[4, 5] without massive adoption. Continuous revenue is the driver for the develop-
ment of energy storage technologies, most of which, due to the cost barrier, have not
been extensively used. The good news is the cost of electrochemical energy storage
is rapidly falling, as studies found, and is on track to reach a level comparable to
pumped storage.
With the improvement of safety, lifespan, and energy conversion efficiency, the
market of lithium ion battery for electric energy storage has seen steady growth.
Nowadays, domestic lithium battery technologies primarily consist of three main-
stream routes: lithium iron phosphate (LiFePO4) system, NCM system, and lithium
titanate system. Considering the return of investment, lithium iron phosphate battery
is being commercialized at a faster pace. The safety and stability of NCM lithium
battery are mediocre. Lithium titanate battery has relative low energy performance
compared with the other two, but it has excellent low temperature performance
and can be used over ten thousand times under the condition of high charging and
discharging rate. Battery energy storage technologies has flourished in the world
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in recent years, and represent a major route for the development of energy storage
technologies.
The barriers for lithium battery energy storage technology lie in recycling and
safety. The internal temperature of NCM battery rises to 200 ~ 300 degrees when it
is subjected to collision, acupuncture, overcharging, or short circuit, which triggers
reactions of anodematerials and the subsequent swelling and explosion, among other
safety hazards. Plus, control measures are not readily available when accidents occur.
2. Hydrogen Energy Storage
Hydrogen production through renewable energy electrolysis attracts great inter-
ests as hydrogen can be used as a cross-seasonal and cross-regional means of energy
storage.
Different from traditional battery energy storage, the technology of hydrogen
energy storage utilizes water electrolysis to produce hydrogen and store energy in
the form of gaseous fuel, which can be used in chemical industry, hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles, and gas stations, etc. Such technology is not only good for local application,
but also long-distance transportwith the aid of natural gas pipelines.Hydrogen energy
storage technology is a major branch of power-to-gas (PtG) technology—the process
of converting electrical energy into gas, usually hydrogen, which is injected into a
natural gas pipeline or converted to methane by methanation.
The core concept of power-to-gas emerged as early as the nineteenth century.
But it’s not until 2009 that the first power-to-gas equipment was launched. So far,
the practical application of both technologies has been rather limited. Relatively
speaking, Power-to-gas is used more often and is mainly concentrated in Germany
and other European countries. In the aforementioned projects, the transformed gas is
either fed into the natural gas pipeline or directly used for transportation and power
generation.
The German government is pinning its hope on power-to-gas, which is deemed
in some studies as the silver bullet for the energy transformation of the country.
The northern part of Germany has the largest concentration of wind farms, whereas
electricity is primarily consumed in the south. Thus, Germany chose to convert
electricity into hydrogen for storage and replace direct power transmission.1
Relevant studies show that, since hydrogen storage technology is still at the stage
of R&D and demonstration, which is hard to evaluate future cost precisely. Plus, it
entails more energy conversion than electrochemical energy storage, which makes
for greater energy loss and equipment investment, hence greater difficulty in cost
reduction.
At present, the overall efficiency of operational power-to-gas demonstration
projects is roughly 60%. The conversion efficiency of each project depends on the
specific power-to-gas technology. As shown in Table 7.4, the investment cost and
life span of varied power-to-gas technologies are different—the larger the power-
to-gas capacity, the smaller the investment per unit of capacity. The AWE (Alka-
line water electrolysers) represents a better choice for large-scale application than
PEME (Proton Exchange Membrane electrolysers); whereas the technical constraint
1 http://www.juda.cn/news/19716.html.
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Note 1 Nm3/h = 0.0899 kg/h。
aThis set of data is related to the rated power. Varied power makes for data variance
of BM (Bio-Methanol) makes it suitable for small power-to-gas projects despite
its higher efficiency and lower cost, and CM (Chemical Methanol) should be the
preferred option for methanation for large power-to-gas projects. Annual oper-
ating/maintenance costs of power-to-gas stations are generally considered to be
around 5% of fixed investment costs. Studies estimate that the average daily oper-
ating cost of AWE and CM is approximately $3500–5300, and that of PEME and
BM combination is roughly $1400–2300.
China also attaches great importance to the research of power-to-gas technology.
The R&D and demonstration project of 70 MPa hydrogen stations based on renew-
able energy/hydrogen storage was launched during the 12th Five-Year Plan period,
with a focus on the application of power-to-gas in hydrogen stations for fuel cell vehi-
cles. The research and demonstration project for direct hydrogen production through
wind power and fuel cell power generation system was also deployed, targeting key
technologies for wind power hydrogen and fuel cell integrated system. However,
compared with the strategic planning and rapid development of hydrogen storage
technology in advanced countries, there is still a big gap in key technologies and
applications for China.
Currently, the cost of hydrogen storage in power-to-gas technology remains persis-
tently high for twomain reasons. Firstly, the electrolytic hydrogen production device
is expensive. Economical operation can only be ensured with high utilization and
a long running time throughout the year. Secondly, the energy conversion process
incurs heavy loss of energy. Therefore, the key to the development of hydrogen energy
storage technology is cost reduction and efficiency improvement. Only focusing on
technical issues would not be enough to enhance the integrated energy application
of hydrogen. Newer and more applications should also be developed to make new
business models possible.
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3. Nuclear Hydrogen Production Technology
Nuclear hydrogen production uses the heat generated by nuclear reactors as the
main energy source, to make the large amount of hydrogen produced from hydrogen-
containing substances (e.g. water or fossil fuels) in an efficient and carbon-free
manner.
The pathway of developing nuclear hydrogen production technology should take
into account the following factors: technical features (including capacity, purity of
hydrogen, end-user, and waste management), cost (i.e. price of hydrogen, technical
economics evaluation, and R&D cost, etc.) and risk (technology development, matu-
rity, and R&D), etc. The process heat provided by the reactor must be utilized to
achieve the efficient conversion of nuclear energy to hydrogen. Themainstream tech-
nologies include thermochemical cycle (sulfur-iodine cycle and mixed sulfur cycle)
and high-temperature steam electrolysis. The former mainly involves chemical tech-
nology with a more complex process yet easier scale-up, so is suitable for large-scale
hydrogen production. The latter is mainly determined by material technology, and
its process is simple, which applies to small-scale hydrogen production.
Currently, the pressurized water reactor (PWR), which is widely used for power
generation, is mostly utilized for power generation due to its relatively low outlet
temperature. High temperature gas-cooled reactor is considered as one of the most
suitable types for hydrogen production on account of its high outlet temperature,
inherent safety and proper power.
The past decades have witnessed continued worldwide research efforts on
hydrogen production via nuclear energy.
1. Japan: from the 1980s to now, Japan Atomic Power Agency (JAEA) has been
conducting research on high temperature gas-cooled reactor and hydrogen
production through iodide-sulfur recycling. The outlet temperature of its propri-
etory 30 MW high temperature gas-cooled test reactor (HTTR) was further
raised to 950 °C in 2004. Combinedwith its commercial reactor (GTHTR300C),
the co-generation of heat and power based on sulfur-iodine circulating hydrogen
is being developed, and basic designs including cost estimates have been
completed.
2. United States: themain research has been focusing on sulfur iodine cycle, mixed
sulfur cycle and high temperature solid oxide electrolysis hydrogen production.
In 2003, a preliminary evaluation and cost estimate of HTGR combined with
sulfur-iodine circulating hydrogen production was conducted, which showed
that the most important factors affecting the cost were nuclear thermal cost and
electricity price of hydrogen production unit.
3. Canada: The supercritical water cooling reactor (SCWR)was developed, but the
maximum output did not meet the demand for iodide-sulfur cycle. Then, a new
cycle—copper-chlorine cycle—was proposed and developed with around 400–
500 °C reaction temperature only, and supportswith a net output of hydrogen and
oxygen fromwater. The feasibility of the cycle has been verified by experiments,
and a modification scheme for the model has been proposed to solve potential
problems.
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4. Argentina: At the end of last century, a recycling hydrogen production scheme
from iron chlorine, cobalt chlorine, vanadium chlorine and vanadium chlorine
was proposed. As estimated that the energy efficiency of the four methods are
roughly 26%, 25%, 27% and 71%, respectively.
5. China: Institute of Nuclear andNewEnergy Technology of Tsinghua University
developed and designed a sulfur-iodine cycle and high-temperature steam elec-
trolysis system, and built an integrated laboratory-scale bench with hydrogen
production capacity of 100 NL/h. At the end of 2013, the facility verification of
the I-S closed cyclewas achieved, and the production rate of hydrogen reached to
60 NL/h. The schedule is to complete the research on key equipment and tech-
nologies of high-temperature gas-cooled hydrogen reactor by 2020, validate
the pilot project of high-temperature gas-cooled hydrogen reactor by 2025, and
carry out the project demonstration of ultra-high-temperature reactor—nuclear
energy hydrogen–hydrogen production and hydrometallurgy by 2030.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the Coordinated
Research Program (CPR) in 2012, in order to evaluate the technical economics of
nuclear hydrogen production. TheCPR intended to assess the technical and economic
potential of nuclear hydrogen production by comparing alternative technologies, and
through information sharing among member countries. Except for China, Members
from 11 countries are currently involved in the project, such as US, Germany and
Japan. Nuclear power routes identified for hydrogen production could be: super-
critical water-cooled reactor (SCWR), pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR), high
temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) and prismatic gas-cooled reactor (PRISM).
Possible technologies for hydrogen production could be: sulfur-iodine cycle, copper-
chlorine cycle, mixed sulfur cycle, steam methane reforming and high temperature
electrolysis.
Based on the data produced by 2014, IAEA estimated the cost of four avail-
able technologies using HEEP software: Canada CANDU pressurized-water reactor,
China INET HTR-PM, Germany HTR-Modul and Japan GTHTR300C ultra-high
temperature reactor, corresponding to CASE I, II, III and IV. CRP estimated the
average cost of hydrogen under four scenarios (excluding costs of storage and trans-
portation) at $2–3/kg, with about 40% coming from hydrogen production and 60%
from nuclear heat production. Considering the unique economic feature in different
regions, the fluctuation would be around 20%.
As shown in relevant studies, the cost of nuclear hydrogen production would
decrease in the future, depending on the large-scale industrialization of technologies.
Around 2030, the costmay drop to a level of competitivewith conventional processes.
4. Deep Decarbonization Technologies for Power Sector
Low-carbon power generation, smart grid, energy storage, demand-side response,
and energy Internet techonologies will be the key to support net zero emission of the
power system.
Smart grid and energy Internet are crucial deep decarbonization technologies to
the power sector with five key technologies. As combined with renewable power
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generation technologies, a zero emission power system with 100% clean energy
could be achieved.
Key technology 1: Virtual synchronization technology. Virtual synchronous
technologymainly simulates the characteristics of the synchronous generator, such as
the ontology model, active frequency modulation and reactive voltage regulation, so
that the grid-connected inverter could be comparablewith the traditional synchronous
generator considering operation mechanism and external characteristics. Distributed
power sources, such as energy storage, wind power, photovoltaic, electric vehicles,
etc., are mostly connected to the distribution network in the form of an inverter inter-
face, which provides a well application scenario for virtual synchronous generators.
Virtual synchronization technology can increase the stability of new energy access
and improve the potential of power grid to absorb clean energy.
According to studies, the cost of virtual synchronous machine renovation for
wind farm is around 100 RMB/kW. There is no additional cost of standard virtual
synchronous machine for new wind farms. The renovation of virtual synchronous
machine of photovoltaic power plant adds the cost to about 600 RMB/kW. The
standard virtual synchronizer for new photovoltaic power plant adds the cost to 200
RMB/kW. The cost of centralized virtual synchronizer is 220 RMB/kW, when a
continuous decrease of energy storage prices followed, the construction cost would
fall to around 100 RMB/kW by 2050.
Key technology 2: Solar thermal power generation technology. Solar thermal
power generation collects solar energy by reflecting sunlight to solar collector, and
provides high-pressure superheated steam to drive steam turbine for power generation
through heat exchanger. The heat storage medium heated by solar energy can be
stored in huge containers that can still turn a turbine to generate electricity hours
after sunset. As the working mode of wind power and PV is greatly affected by the
weather, the green power from wind and PV is random and intermittent. Therefore,
the grid has an upper limit to accept the green power from wind and PV. Solar
thermal power generation technology can provide controllable and low-randomness
clean and green power, and also improve the potential of power grid to absorb clean
energy.
According to professional forecasts, the investment of solar thermal power gener-
ation in the future will decrease by 10% year-on-year. At present, the unit kilowatt
cost of solar thermal power generation in China is about 12,000 ~ 14,000 RMB/kW,
which will drop to 9,000 ~ 11,000 RMB/kW by 2050. The normalized power gener-
ation cost of solar thermal power plant will fall to 0.67 ~ 0.76 RMB/kWh by 2020,
and 0.50 ~ 0.56 RMB/kWh by 2050.
Key technology 3: Grid-side energy storage technology. It is difficult to harness
the systematic and overall benefits of energy storage from power generation side
and demand-side, as it has small energy storage capacity, scattered installation,
and unlikely to follow unified grid regulation. On the contrary, as grid-side energy
storage is usually large in scale and connected to the dispatching center at all
levels. It contributes to the operation of the power system including load regula-
tion, frequency regulation, blocking relief, voltage support, reactive power control,
emergency standby in case of failure, etc. Grid-side energy storage also can ensure
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the spatial–temporal transfer of renewable energy, adjust frequency with thermal
power units, and participate in various auxiliary power services, which could greatly
improve the potential of the grid to integrate clean energy.
As shown in the research, the cost of existing energy storage technology is about
0.62 ~ 0.82 RMB/kWh. In the future, with further improvement of cell structure and
process and material utilization, the system could be used by up to over 7,000 times,
and the electricity cost of power plant would be reduced to about 0.3 RMB/kWh
by 2050, while meeting the need of large-scale commercial application of energy
storage.
Key technology 4: Demand-side response technology. Demand-side response
refers to users actively changing their inherent power consumption patterns to
respond to power supply by reducing or shifting the power load in a certain period, so
as to ensure the stability of the power grid. Demand-side response can be divided into
two categories: price demand response and incentive demand response. It can make
up for the poor flexibility and slow response of conventional units on the power-
supply side, greatly enrich the dispatching resources of the power grid, and enhance
the flexibility of power grid dispatching. This technology can regulate the load to a
certain extent, bring about flexible adjustment of energy use on the demand-side, so
as to improve the integration of new energy on the power supply side equivalently,
and also increase the potential of the grid to absorb clean energy.
Research shows the cost of demand response technology is extremely low,
standing at 0.001–0.004 RMB/kWh now due to the low investment required in
hardware and software. In the future, with the tariff reform of power transmission
and distribution, mature market mechanism, and cost reduction of communication
technology, the cost of demand-side response can go down by another 20% by 2050.
7.2.2 Deep Decarbonization Technologies for Industrial
Processes
CO2 emissions in steel, cement and other industrial processes are difficult to reduce
deeply, which requires the promotion of decarbonization technologies.
1. Hydrogen Steel Making Technology
Generally speaking, long-process steel production mainly consists of three
processes. First, iron ore is reduced to iron (commonly known as crude iron or pig
iron). Next, crude iron is further decarburized to create crude steel, which is finally
formed into different types of steel. Since the greenhouse gas emissions of the steel
industry mainly come from the crude iron and crude steel production processes,
direct reduction technology based on hydrogen and CCS are two important options
to reduce CO2 emissions. Compared to the end-of-pipe solution of CCS, hydrogen
steelmaking replaces coke and other fossil fuels for reducing iron ore to crude iron,
which helps eradicate CO2 emissions and becomes one of the best decarbonization
technologies known to the steel industry.
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If hydrogen itself is produced in a zero-carbon manner, either through water
electrolysis or by applying carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology to methane
steam reforming or coal chemical production of hydrogen, direct hydrogen reduction
to iron can help enable carbon-free steel production.
Currently, there are three projects in Europe that are focusing on hydrogen steel
technology: HYBRIT, SALCOS and H2Future/Susteel. The first two are mainly
based on the existing reduction technology, whereas the last one uses the plasma
melt reduction technology, but none of which need CCS or CCUS. SSAB in Sweden
has launched a hydrogen direct reduced iron (DRI) pilot plant, which aims to achieve
zero carbon steel production by the early 2040s. Salzgitter Steel in Germany is also
conducting a pilot project, and Arcelor Mittal, the world’s biggest steel producer, is
also brewing this technology. Japan, South Korea, the United States and China are
all have hydrogen steel projects under planning or demonstration. In China, Baowu
Group has collaborated with China National Nuclear Corporation and Tsinghua
University on hydrogen steelmaking in 2019, and is planning to work with Rio Tinto
group on low-carbon metallurgy innovations.
Studies showed the cost estimate of hydrogen steel is fuzzy. Researchers from
Tsinghua University estimated the cost of nuclear steelmaking by referring to param-
eters of the direct reduction project of Japan JAEA. Although hydrogen reduction
steelmaking has not been commercialized, it can be calculated from the price of direct
reduction steelmaking. Using the 10-year average price of steel from 2000 to 2010
as a reference and setting $670/ton steel for coke blast furnace and $675/ton steel
for natural gas reduction, then the estimated cost of nuclear hydrogen is $2.45/kgH2,
and that of hydrogen steelmaking through nuclear is $628/tons of steel. Some studies
suggested that hydrogen steel will be well positioned to compete with conventional
processes.
By the progress of major hydrogen steelmaking projects around the world, this
technology has great potential in the future, but its implementation cost is relatively
high (see Table 7.5). Chances are predicted to be slim for its massive scale-up by
2030, and its potential is set to be released around 2050.
In 2018, the global steel output stood at 1.8 billion tons. If taking CO2 intensity per
unit of steel product as 1.8-tons/ton steel, the carbon emission of the steel industry
was about 3.2 billion tons. If the current direct reduction technology can achieve a
50% reduction in emissions, 1.6 billion tons of CO2 emissions can be saved in the
steel industry. By adopting the technological combination of EAF and zero carbon
electricity, an overall reduction of 80% could be achieved (2.5 billion tons of CO2).
On hydrogen energy demand, in 2018, China produced around 900 million tons
of crude steel (including roughly 800 million tons of long-process steel). If 50 kg
of hydrogen is required for reducing each ton of iron, with hydrogen-based tech-
nology utilized in the long-process steelmaking, then approximately 40 million tons
of hydrogen is needed.
2. Low-Carbon Chemical Technology based on Electricity and Hydrogen
CO2 emissions in the petrochemical industry mainly come from atmospheric
pressure reduction, catalytic reforming, catalytic cracking, hydrogen production,
ethylene, ammonia synthesis, and other installations and power engineering [6].
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Table 7.5 Major global hydrogen steelmaking projects






















































































7.2 Evaluation of Deep Decarbonization Technologies 195
Table 7.5 (continued)






























































Carbon emissions from heat and electricity consumption account for more than 60%
while emissions from fossil energy only made up less than 40% [7]. CO2 emissions
of this industry are different from any other manufacturing sector. The contribution
of fossil fuels is not only about the energy released by combustion, but also from
the coupling process of chemical reaction and energy conversion, in which a large
amount of carbon is fed into the products through chemical reaction.
In the future, there would be three major ways to reduce carbon emission in the
petrochemical industry. The first and foremost is the adjustment of energy supply
and raw materials, including the source of heat and electricity, raw material, and
corresponding process update, i.e. reducing the source of carbon emissions from the
process and techniques. The second is the improvement of energy efficiency and
fundamentally reduce energy consumption. Finally, some processes in petroleum
and petrochemical production are characterized by high CO2 emission concentra-
tion, such as coal hydrogen production, ethylene glycol production, acrylonitrile
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production and methanol production, etc. Then, CCUS technology can be used to
collect and store or utilize the carbon dioxide emitted.
In a word, developing low carbon chemical technology based on power and
hydrogen, implementing technical processes to produce methanol, olefins, hydro-
carbons, synthetic ammonia, refined oil, and other petrochemical products based
on electricity and hydrogen, and reducing or replacing coal, petroleum, or other
fossil energy as chemical raw materials, are of crucial importance to achieve deep
decarbonization.
2.1. Technical Route of Producing Methanol by Electric Hydrogen
This technology is to use hydrogen and pure CO2 to produce methanol. Table
7.6 shows the comparison of such technical process with the traditional one in
terms of the technical parameters of energy consumption and emission. As is shown
below, methanol produced by electric hydrogen has significant advantages in carbon
emission reduction.
Compared with the traditional petrochemical route, the economic cost of this
technology is relatively high. The main challenge lies with the fixed cost of elec-
trolytic cells, which accounts for about 75% of the total fixed cost. Depending on
different electrolysis technologies, the current methanol synthesis cost is approxi-
mately 6,000–13,000 RMB/ton, far higher than the current traditional technological
pathways. The cost is expected to drop to 4,400 RMB per ton by 2050.
2.2. Olefin MTO/MTP Technology Based on Methanol Production from
Hydrogen and Pure CO2
Methanol to Olefins (MTO) and Methanol to Propylene (MTP) are two important
new chemical processes. At present, MTO and MTP technologies in China are quite
mature. In the current MTO/MTO processes, the yield of low carbon alkenes such
as ethylene and propylene can reach more than 80%.
The attainment of the zero carbon target for this technological route primarily
hinges onmethanol synthesis. If the previous methanol synthesis route is considered,
the olefin technological route can also achieve negative emission.
However, similar to the technological route of producing methanol based on
hydrogen and pure CO2, its economic cost remains high, and the key is to reduce
the cost of electrolytic tank. Considering the price fluctuation of coal and oil, the
current cost of coal to methanol olefin is about 4,000–5,000 RMB/ton, while steam
cracking of traditional mixed oil costs approximately 5,000–8,000 RMB/ton. The
olefin cost of methanol production based on hydrogen and pure CO2 will be more
Table 7.6 Comparison of methanol production through electric hydrogen with traditional
petrochemical technological pathway
Methanol per ton Petrochemical route Electric hydrogen route
Total energy consumption (GJ) 37.5 39.7
Carbon emissions induced by raw materials (t) 0.97 −0.79
Carbon emissions in process (t) 0.52 0.123
Total carbon emissions (t) 1.49 −0.67
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than 10,000 RMB/ton. At the current methanol market price of 1600 RMB, the olefin
cost of this technological route will still rise by more than 2000 RMB/ton even if
future methanol cost based on hydrogen and pure CO2 is reduced to 4400 RMB/ton.
2.3. Technical Route of Synthetic Ammonia by Electricity and Hydrogen
Synthetic ammonia is the product of nitrogen and hydrogen under the joint action
of high temperature, high pressure, and catalyst. At the moment, the existing tech-
nology relies on coal or natural gas to produce the hydrogen needed for ammonia
synthesis. The most important source of carbon emissions from synthetic ammonia
is hydrogen production processes. This ammonia synthesis technology is based on
electric hydrogen, instead of coal and natural gas as the raw material to produce
hydrogen.
Table 7.7 shows the comparison of such technological route and the traditional
petrochemical route by technical parameters of energy consumption and emissions.
It can be seen that the synthetic ammonia of hydrogen produced by electric power
has significant advantages in reducing carbon emissions.
The economic cost of this technology is relatively high, which is roughly twice
or more than traditional technologies. Some studies suggest that the cost per ton of
synthetic ammonia in Chile and Argentina is around $460–700, which is slightly
higher than the $300–600 per ton of synthetic ammonia produced from the existing
steam methane reforming technology imported to Chile. The cost of synthetic
ammonia based on electric hydrogen in northern Europe is likely to be 431–528
euros per ton in 2050, which is close to the market price.
2.4 Oil Products Produced by Hydrogen and Pure CO2 via Fischer-tropsch
(FT) Synthesis
In both crude oil refining and coal-to-oil technologies, hydrogenation process is
neccessary, because the hydrogen content in crude oil and coal is insufficient to meet
the demand of subsequent light oil products. As one ton of hydrogen is produced by
water gas conversion, one ton of carbon dioxide would be emitted.
For every one ton of naphtha and gasoline produced by a traditional crude oil
refinery, about 0.4–0.5 ton of CO2 is emitted, and around 0.17–0.2 ton of CO2 is
discharged for every one ton of diesel [8]. For coal-to-oil technology, its carbon
Table 7.7 Comparison of technology of synthetic ammonia based on electric hydrogen and
traditional petrochemical technology
Methanol per ton Traditional petrochemical
technology
Electric hydrogen technology
Total energy consumption (GJ) 35.04 45.1
Carbon emissions induced by
raw materials (ton)
1.33 –
Carbon emissions in processes
(ton)
0.5 0.12
Total carbon emissions (ton) 1.83 0.12
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emission per unit oil product is very highwithout CCS technology, at roughly 5.5–6.9
tons of CO2 [9].
The technology of producing oil products from hydrogen and pure CO2 via FT
synthesis relys on electric hydrogen, then use hydrogen and CO2 to prepare syngas
through the reverse water gas conversion reaction in order to synthesize oil products.
Since hydrogen is produced without water and gas conversion, carbon emissions can
be greatly reduced. Given that hydrogen production accounts for more than 25%
of the carbon emissions from traditional technologies, carbon emissions per unit
product of the technology can be reduced by more than 25%.
Compared with the traditional petrochemical technology, the economic cost of
this technology is relatively high. The main challenge lies in the cost of electrolysis.
Taking diesel as an example, the cost estimates of oil product synthesis based on
different electrolysis technologies vary greatly. Some studies show that current cost
is 4100–7000 RMB/ton, which is close to the traditional technologies, but the main-
stream studies argue that the current cost is between 11,000–22,500 RMB/ton, which
is much higher than the level of about 4,000 RMB per ton of traditional technology.
The cost is expected to drop by 2050, but the cost per ton would still exceed 10,000
RMB.
3. Low-Carbon Cement Technology of Raw Material Substitution
Carbon dioxide is released in the process of calcining raw material into clinker
to produce cement. The material ground to a certain degree of fineness after mixing
in proportion by calcareous, clayey and a small amount of adjustment raw materials
(sometimes mineralization agent and crystal seed are added; coal is also added to
shaft kiln production) is known as cement rawmeal. The substitution of rawmaterials
has become a vital technology for low-carbon cement production.
As long as each chemical component in raw meal is proportioned properly, a
variety of cement clinker conforming to standards can be produced. The traditional
cement raw meal mix is shown in Table 7.8.
Producing clinker from alternative raw materials helps save raw material costs,
reduce emissions, alleviate environmental pollution from all varieties of industrial
by-products and save a bundle on the cost. The avaliable alternative rawmaterials are
shown in Table 7.9, including calcium carbide slag, iron tailings, steel slag, silicon
slag, silica sludge, and paper sludge.
Table 7.8 Content of main chemical substances in each component of traditional cement raw meal
and burning loss rate
Content of chemical constituents (%) Burning loss rate (%)
SiO2 Al2O3 Fe2O3 CaO MgO
Limestone 5.58 0.42 0.31 50.58 1.51 39.75
Slag 34.72 10.86 1.85 38.4 9.67 1.2
Sandstone 66.09 8.9 4.06 6.66 3.5 8.37
Sulfate slag 10.51 2.84 65.21 8.69 3.64 5.52
Bauxite 39.18 32.00 12.38 0.92 0.14 14.35
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Table 7.9 Content of main chemical substances of available alternative materials and burning loss
rate
Content of chemical constituents (%) Burning loss rate (%)
SiO2 Al2O3 Fe2O3 CaO MgO
Carbide slag 2.29 2.45 0.36 68.35 0.78 23.48
Iron tailings 37.67 4.11 30.67 7.72 2.99 9.07
Steel slag 12.00 2.83 23.57 42.16 10.48 –
Silicon-calcium slag 22.07 2.41 5.00 57.75 0.81 10.84
Quartz sludge 85.96 3.73 1.57 0.51 0.26 4.51
Paper mill sludge 28 20 2.7 40.8 5.4 49.64
The chemical composition and content of various alternativematerials are suitable
for substitution, and some of them are even better than the original ones in terms
of adjustment material content. When using alternative materials, it is necessary
to pay attentions to the proportion of various raw materials and make appropriate
adjustments to the subsequent processes.
The following obstacles, nonetheless, impede the extensive and continuous use
of alternative raw materials in the cement industry.
Raw material supply. The global reserve of alternative materials is a technical
challenge that hampers the wide use of alternative materials in cement plants. For
example, the global output of granular blast furnace slag and fly ash in 2008 and
2007 was approximately one billion tons per year, which was insufficient for the
high utilization rate of the global and cement industries.
Properties of cement products. Compared with the ash produced by fossil
fuels, some alternative materials have different composition and content. The clinker
composition produced by these materials in the kiln features has tremendous fluctu-
ations. If the phosphorus in clinker exceeds the limit, the early strength of cement
produced will decrease and the setting time will also be longer. In addition, the use
of alternative materials can affect the long-term strength of the cement.
Economic challenge. Adjust the cost of purchasing, handling, and transporting
raw materials to cement plants may result in additional costs.
In short, tapping into low-carbon cement technology based on alternative raw
material, developing and applying alternative materials, and optimizing the mix of
the raw materials, are all serve to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. But the cost of
these technologies constitutes a major barrier, which calls for more technological
breakthrough.
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7.2.3 Deep Decarbonization Technologies for Transport
Sector
The use of electricity and hydrogen instead of fossil fuels in the transportation sector
represents a crucial deep decarbonization technology. It is essential to accelerate the
development and proliferation of technologies for electric vehicles and hydrogen
fuel cell vehicles.
1. Electric Vehicle Technology
Electric vehicles mainly consist of battery electric vehicles (BEV) and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV). The former is driven by electric motors with elec-
tricity as the power source, while the latter is driven by internal combustion engine
and motor separately or simultaneously, and the power is generated from gaso-
line, diesel or electricity. Many countries are actively taking measures to promote
the strategic transformation of traditional gasoline vehicles and vigorously develop
electric vehicles.
Despite the rapid progress in technology and performance, electric vehicles
are yet to be competitive in terms of comprehensive cost. Breakthroughs have
beenmade in key components such as electricmotors, electronic controls, and battery
management systems, with continuous improvement in system integration, vehicle
performance and comfort as well as power consumption. At present, the volumetric
energy density of lithium-ion batteries for cars is 200 ~ 300 Wh/L, and the battery
cycle can reach 1000 times. The light vehicle battery market is dominated by NCM
lithium batteries with high energy density, whereas lithium iron phosphate with
higher cycle life and safety performance is the mainstream for medium and heavy
vehicles. On the whole, the total cost of electric vehicles is currently higher than
that of traditional internal combustion engine vehicles, which is largely driven by
the high battery cost. With the breakthrough of key battery material technology, the
cost of battery is on the decline.
The technologies and comprehensive performance of electric vehicles will
witness tremendous improvement in the future. The comprehensive efficiency of
powertrain and energy efficiency of vehicle will see significant improvement, with
a dramatic reduction in vehicle power consumption, and the driving range will be
equivalent to that of gasoline vehicles. Car bodies and parts and components will be
much lighter through steady expansion of aluminum-magnesium alloy, high-strength
steel, and carbon fiber materials, etc. The energy density and safety of lithium-ion
batteries will be greatly enhanced, and innovative batteries will be gradually applied
and commercialized on a large scale. In addition, with breakthroughs of Internet,
big data and artificial intelligence and their rapid penetration into the automotive
industry, new technologies and models, such as telematics, vehicle-to-grid (V2G),
autonomous driving, vehicle-road collaboration, and intelligent manufacturing, will
get flourished.
In the future, the comprehensive cost of electric vehicles will keep decreasing,
and narrowing the gap with gasoline vehicles. With more stringent global regula-
tions for car emissions, traditional internal combustion engine (ICE) technology will
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be further complicated, prompting rising cost for gasoline vehicles. In comparison,
with the improvement in energy density of electric vehicle batteries, performance
enhancement, and lower cost of comprehensive research, development, and manu-
facturing, the cost of electric cars will keep falling. Therefore, the comprehensive
cost of electric vehicles will be superior over traditional internal combustion engine
vehicles by 2025, and the cost will be competitive over gasoline vehicles and PHEVs
by 2030, and the best comprehensive value/performance will be achieved by 2050.
The charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EV) is undergoing rapid
development. With surging sales and ownership of electric vehicles, charging facil-
ities also show a rising trajectory. Countries vary in their priorities in supporting
charging infrastructure. For instance, the United States provides incentives primarily
in the form of tax relief and direct investment; Japan concentrates on supporting tech-
nology R&D and innovation; while China employs a mixture of policy instruments,
covering planning, finance, infrastructure, technology, electricity, etc. Countries also
vary in their charging technologies and standards, with diverse models of commer-
cial operation for charging facilities. The comprehensive scale-up of high-power
charging technology is now underway.
With increasing ownership of EVs, the relationship between vehicle
charging/discharging and power grid has become another point of interest. EV
energy storage can meet the needs of load regulation, frequency modulation, and
grid connection of renewables by participating in auxiliary services and demand-side
response. Especially with the increasing integration of renewable power in the future
electric power system, EV energy storage will become a major flexible resource for
the power system.
In short, the rapid development of EV technology and industrialization, declining
cost, booming development of charging infrastructure, and the increasingly compet-
itive overall cost over traditional ICE vehicles, will underpin deep decarbonization
of the transportation sector.
The following obstacles hinder the development of EVs which needs partic-
ular attention:
1. The EV market is still primarily driven by policy factors, and market forces
should promptly come into play to drive the market growth. There is also
a dilemma as to which one should take the precedence over the other:
infrastructure or vehicles.And the foundation of theEV industry remains fragile.
2. With the growing EV penetration, the sustainable supply of lithium, nickel,
cobalt and other key resources needed for batteries is facing severe challenges,
and the environmental pollution from the recycling and disposal of batteries is
another issue for concern. In China, for example, the lithium reserve is around
3.2 million tons, or roughly 20% of the world’s total reserves. However, due
to the poor resource endowments and lack of industrial competitiveness, 70%
of lithium supply in China depends on import. Nickel and cobalt resources are
extremely scarce, accounting for only 3.4% and 1% of global reserves respec-
tively, with over 60% and 90% of import dependency. With the massive scale-
up and usage of EVs in the future, the scarcity of key battery resources will be
202 7 Technical Support for Long-Term Deep Decarbonization
exacerbated.Moreover, the production, scrapping and recycling of batteriesmay
cause serious pollution to the environment, such as the discharge of waste water,
waste gas and waste liquid from the production process, electrolyte leakage in
the process of recycling, the spread of heavy metals, and dust from materials
dismantling, etc. The current battery recycling technology and the market are
underdeveloped, and disposal processes are immature. The efforts to establish
the recycling system have just started, and the legal framework is far from
enough.
2. Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicle Technology
Hydrogen fuel vehicle technology represents the key technology pathway for
low-carbon transformation in the field of automobile transportation. It involves the
production, storage, transportation, filling, and final use of hydrogen energy for
vehicles, including hydrogen energy supply, fuel cell system, stack, and fuel cell
vehicle related technologies.
Regarding hydrogen production, storage, transportation, refueling technologies
and infrastructure construction, countries have formulated the technology roadmap
for hydrogen production and corresponding infrastructure plans in light of their
respective resource endowments, which are in line with hydrogen fuel cell vehicles
(FCV) development and scale-up plans.
Hydrogen production: mainstream technologies are fossil fuel reforming
hydrogen production, industrial by-product hydrogen (chlor-alkali industry, coal,
coke oven gas production), biomass gasification/fermentation hydrogen production,
water electrolysis, etc. The technologies and equipments for hydrogen production
from coal, natural gas and alkaline water electrolysis, are all ready for commer-
cialization, and currently hydrogen production from fossil fuels represents the over-
whelming mainstream. The capacity of China’s hydrogen production exceeds 20
million t/a, of which direct hydrogen production from fossil fuels such as coal gasi-
fication and natural gas reforming accounts for about 70%, industrial by-product
hydrogen production takes around 30%, and water electrolysis and other technolo-
gies cover less than 1% [10, 11]. Now, more than 90% of hydrogen in the world
is used in petrochemical and ammonia synthesis industries. With growing demand
brought by the development of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, great changes might take
place in the technology mix of hydrogen production [12].
Hydrogen storage: The mainstream technologies include compressed gas
hydrogen storage, liquefied hydrogen storage, metal hydride hydrogen storage, and
adsorption hydrogen storage, etc. Compared with other technologies, compressed
gas hydrogen storage and liquefied hydrogen storage are relatively mature, but fall
short of industrialization. At present, the technology of gas hydrogen storage with
steel hydrogen cylinder below 45 MPa in China has been very mature, and the inter-
national R&D and demonstration efforts are all moving towards 70 MPa. Liquid
hydrogen storage with high efficiency is the R&D priority of all countries. However,
as liquid hydrogen storage and transportation require ultra-low temperature equip-
mentwith certain technical barriers, liquid hydrogen for civilian use ismainly applied
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inEurope, Japan and theUnited States,whereasChina uses liquid hydrogen primarily
for aerospace and military purposes.
Hydrogen transportation: road, waterway, and pipeline, etc. are common
approaches for transport. Road and waterway transport technologies are subject to
the development of hydrogen storage technology and relatively suitable for short-
distance and small-scale transport. Gas hydrogen pipeline suits large scale and long
distance transport for cost reduction. Pipeline transport is well developed in foreign
countries, with Europe and the United States having built 1,500 km and 2,400 km
of pipelines for hydrogen transport respectively. In contrast, the length of hydrogen
pipeline in China is only 300–400 km, and the longest is the “Baling-Changling”
pipeline, which extends about 42 km with a pressure of 4 MPa [13].
Hydrogen fueling: According to statistics of Germany organization (H2station
s.org), there were 369 hydrogen fueling stations in operation worldwide by the end
of 2018, including 273 ofwhichwere open to the public, and the others were in-house
stations owned by institutions and enterprises. Germany, Japan and SouthKorea have
all announced plans to build hundreds of refueling stations by 2030, and have each
set up joint ventures for this purpose. China has 17 hydrogen refueling stations in
operation and 38 stations under construction.
Fuel cell system and the electric reactor technology both meet the demand for
vehicle applications. At present, the power system of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles
features a cell-fuel cell hybrid system. Aside from cell and fuel cell technolo-
gies, atmospheric/variable pressure gas technology, battery management technology,
braking energy recovery technology, and battery thermal management technology
also serve important roles.
In terms of FCV technology, the overall performance hasmeasured up to commer-
cial scale-up. Fuel cell buses and trucks are under demonstration. Hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles will see greater potential in the field of heavy-duty vehicles. The Technology
Roadmap for Energy Efficient and New Energy Vehicles specifies a timetable for the
development of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. By 2020, 2025 and 2030, China aims to
have 5,000, 50,000, and over a million FCVs on the road respectively.
In short, the development of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles entails a robust indus-
trial chain consisting of hydrogen production, storage, transportation, refueling, and
the production and management of fuel cell and car body, etc., together with the
improvement of infrastructure. At present, fuel cell systems and stack technology
could reach automotive level and the performance of FCVs, on the whole, is up
for commercialization. Fuel cell buses and trucks are also under demonstration and
enjoy a broad prospect for development with mature technology and cost reduction.
The following challenges hinder the development of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle
development and merit particular attention:
1. High cost, energy consumption, and carbon emissions in hydrogen production
process.
As CCS technology has not been widely adopted, its effect on carbon emissions
from fossil fuel hydrogen production is not immediately apparent compared to
direct hydrogen production from fossil fuels. The purity of industrial hydrogen
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by-products cannot meet the needs of fuel cells, thus a purified process with
separation technology such as pressure swing adsorption (PSA) is needed,which
causes a huge amount of energy consumption. Given the mainstream adoption
of thermal power in China, clean electric hydrogen remains a long way off.
2. The industrial foundation of hydrogen storage, transportation, and refueling
remains weak, with stunted growth in related industries and inadequate
technologies.
The infrastructure of hydrogen refueling stations and hydrogen transport
pipelines is seriously underdeveloped in the world. It is estimated the full-
fledged hydrogen infrastructure costs at least $2 trillion. At present, worldwide
investment in this connection still caters to the pilot stage, and large investment
is not yet in sight. The efficiency and safety of the existing hydrogen storage
and transport equipment need further improvement. Taking the double-layer
vacuum spherical hydrogen storage device as an example, its daily evaporation
rate is between 0.2% and 0.5%. Vehicle-mounted hydrogen storage materials
also require further development to enhance their capacity weight ratio.
3. Urgent improvement is needed for key fuel cell technologies of China, as well
as localization of key components.
While being commercialized, hydrogen fuel cells fall short of meaningful mass
production. The design of electric reactor, battery cost, battery power density, conver-
sion efficiency, and service life are all hinder the industrialization of hydrogen
for automobiles, and further breakthroughs are essential. Furthermore, localization
of key materials and components is another impediment. Key components such
as membrane electrode catalyst, proton exchange membrane, air compressor, and
hydrogen reflux-pump all rely on import. Besides, the technical capability of fuel
cell companies needs further improvement.
7.2.4 Negative CO2 Emission and Carbon Geoengineering
Technologies
CCS and geoengineering are important alternatives for achieving deep decarboniza-
tion. Under the deep emission reduction target, CCS can be applied to fossil energy
power generation, coal chemical industry, and petrochemical industry to secure deep
decarbonization of fossil energy utilization. BECCS is able to capture and store
carbon dioxide emissions from biomass power generation and thermal utilization,
making for a CO2 negative emission technology.
1. CCS Technology
CCS technology consists of three steps: capture, transport, and storage. Step one:
capture. First adopted in oil refining and chemical industries, etc., carbon capture
refers to the process of separating and purifying carbon dioxide to a high concentra-
tion state. ThreeCCS technologieswidely accepted are pre-combustion capture, post-
combustion capture, and oxygen-enriched combustion. Step two: transport. Mainly
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through pipeline and low-temperature storage tank, this step involves the transport, in
a leak-proof manner, of high concentration CO2 to the designated venue for storage.
The last step: storage/sequestration. By sealing saltwater layer, deep unexploitable
coal seam, and waste oil and gas reservoir, this step embeds and stores CO2 in
the deeper stratum of the earth, so that it would be completely isolated from the
atmosphere.
Research onCCScost and demonstration projects have suggested such technology
requires huge investment and high operating costs, and call for more breakthroughs
in order to be competitive.
Despite being a later mover on CCS, China attaches great importance to its R&D
and demonstration, and has committed tremendous amount of funding for its devel-
opment over the past decade. In terms of the technologies of carbon capture, utiliza-
tion and sequestration, China is already on par with developed countries. In August
2018, the CCS facility in Jilin province had reached a storage capacity of 600,000
tons of CO2. Meanwhile, SINOPEC’s Qilu CCS project and Yanchang Petroleum’s
coal chemical CCS facility in northern Shaanxi province are able to capture 400,000
tons and 410,000 tons respectively. In the future, with strengthened efforts in CCS
technology demonstration, cost reduction, and steady scale-up, China may stand at
the forefront of low-carbon technology.
Despite its huge volume, carbon emissions in China are concentrated and easy to
capture. Given the sheer size of China, geographical sites for carbon sequestration are
readily available with enormous storage potential. Data show that the carbon seques-
tration potential of China can reach 3,088 billion tons in theory, and the capacity of
sequestration in deep brine layer is 3,066 billion tons, or 99% of the total theoretical
capacity. Sun et al. [14] evaluated the theoretical storage of CO2 in China’s sedimen-
tary basins, and concluded that China has a broad prospect for CO2 sequestration,
which is about 184.1 billion tons, over 190 times of total CO2 emissionsof 2015 in
China. Li Xiaochun et al. [15] estimated the CO2 storage capacity of China’s saline
aquifer at 1.43505 × 1011 tons by using solubility method.
Several barriers may hold down the progress of CCS in the future:
1. High costs. The high cost of CO2 capture largely determines the cost of
CCS, whose further reduction hinges on the development and maturity of the
technology. It’s crucial to make full use of exchanges between domestic and
foreign R&D institutions, and lay equal emphasis on independent R&D and
international cooperation for continuous CCS technology development [16].
2. Lack of relevant policies and legal systems. Nowadays, there are few poli-
cies and laws available for CCS, prompting government efforts to ramp up the
formulation and implementation of these policies and laws.
3. Leakage risk. CO2 leakage is a key concern of safety. Human health and life
would be under immediate threat in case CO2 mass fraction exceeds 8%. Even
though the possibility of leakage is very small, precautions in all respects should
be made [16].
4. Insufficient public awareness. Currently, the notion of CCS remains a novelty to
most Chinese people. It is important to promote CCS best practices at home and
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abroad through education and publicity. It will alleviate public concerns about
CCS leakage, building up popular support, and paving the way for its future
development [16].
5. Lack of a sound evaluation system. Many components of CCS technology need
to be evaluated. For example, the site selection for CO2 geological sequestration
should be reevaluated in a holistic manner based on the existing assessment
system. Only with proper assessment can the best storage site be selected.
2. BECCS Technology
BECCS refers to the technology that combines biomass and CO2 capture and
storage to achieve negative GHG emissions. The difference between BECCS and
fossil fuel CCS is that the latter could only contribute to zero emissions goal, while
the former could further achieve negative emissions [17]. The technological progress
of BECCS involves biomass utilization and CCS. Large-scale biomass utilization
technologies, such as biomass power generation, central heating, cellulosic ethanol
production, and F-T synthesis, can be installed with CO2 capture devices to make
for potential BECCS.
Statistics show that to date, there are 27 BECCS demonstration projects around
the world, and many of which have been called off or shelved. Largely concentrated
in theUnited States and Europe, these projects are based on existing plants of ethanol,
cement, pulp and paper, biomass mixed combustion, and biomass pure power [17,
18]. The BECCS Project (IL-ICCS) currently implemented in Decatur, Illinois of
the US is the largest project so far. The project, launched in April 2017, captures one
million tons of CO2 each year in the process of converting corn into ethanol. After
compression and dehydration, captured CO2 is injected into a sandstone formation
about 2.1 km deep at Mount Simon for permanent storage [19]. Currently, China has
not yet built BECCS demonstration project.
Many advanced biomass technologies for large-scale utilization, such as cellulosic
ethanol, F-T synthetic biofuels, and biomass gasification combined cycle (BIGCC),
are still under R&D and demonstration, and uncertainties abound for their future
development.ManyCCSprojects are also in the stage of demonstration,withmultiple
challenges ahead in terms of large-scale technology implementation.
BECCS is faced with four different uncertainties, including biomass availability,
technology maturity, economic viability of scale-up, and uncertainties of social and
ecological impact, which will greatly weaken the contribution of the technology.
The cost of BECCS also primarily depends on the cost of biomass and CCS.
BECCS is still under technology demonstration and has not beenmassively deployed
globally. So its cost analysis is mainly conducted based on certain assumptions.
Studies have shown that the cost of CO2 capture may not support CCS for small
biomass energy devices, thusR&Danddemonstration are required in the future. First,
the carbon chain is very long considering the cost of biomass and CCS; second,
biomass and CCS technologies come in great varieties, and great variance exists
regarding biomass cost and CCS technologies; third, growing energy crops will
result in a shortage of land needed for food production, pushing up food prices. The
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combination of biomass power generation and CCS has great potential for large-
scaleapplication.
Based on biomass availability and the uncertainty of BECCS, estimates [20] on
2050 emission reduction potential have been conducted on the low, median and high
level as well as upper limits. The result suggested that the ceiling of CO2 removed
by straw in 2050 in China is 830 million t/a; by forestry residue, 957 million t/a;
and by energy plants, 963 million t/a, which add up to a ceiling of 2.75 billion t/a
CO2 removal by BECCS. It’s expected that on the way toward the 2 °C and 1.5 °C
targets, the potential of emissions redcution by BECCS in China would be 0 ~ 27.51
billion tCO2 per year, of which the medium-value and high-value are 650 million ~
1 billion tCO2.
The following efforts must be made to support the future development of BECCS
in China:
First, it is important to build up the scientific understanding of BECCS under the
targets of 2 °C and 1.5 °C. Scaled-up implementation of BECCS-related negative
emission technologies can reduce costs andhelp to achieve the temperature targets.
However, further research is needed to strengthen the scientific understanding, and
take appropriate measures to reduce potential risks in the development of BECCS.
Second, promoting BECCS research and demonstration to enhance scientific
understanding and public acceptance. China should strengthen the technical
reserve by boosting BECCS demonstration. So far, China has launched commer-
cial demonstration of biomass and CCS, and the future priority is to integrate
the two for negative emission. Research and demonstration in such areas as
BIGCC+CCS should be to enable future emission reduction.
Third, BECCS should be incorporated into the framework of China’s climate
change strategy. Although BECCS still faces high uncertainty for its development
and application, it’s a safe bet that massive deployment of BECCS would be
required to achieve the 2 °C and 1.5 °C targets. That is, BECCS should be a
possible option for climate change mitigation. Meanwhile, the potential risks of
BECCS should be well awared.
3. Geoengineering Technology
Geoengineering is generally defined as “the planned, large-scale human interven-
tion in the climate system in response to global climate change”. A growing number
of international literatures are using “climate engineering” or “climate intervention”
to replace geoengineering to distinguish it from large-scale human activities for other
purposes.
In general, geoengineering techniques and methods include carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM). CDR removes or converts
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and reduces the greenhouse gas concentration in
the atmosphere through biological, physical or chemical methods, such as afforesta-
tion and forest ecosystem restoration, biological energy with carbon capture and
sequestration (BECCS), biochar for increasing soil carbon content, enhanced weath-
ering or ocean basification, direct air capture and storage (DAC), marine fertilizers,
etc. SRM, on the other hand, does not directly reduce the content of carbon dioxide
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in the atmosphere, but reduces the solar radiation reaching the ground to alleviate
the earth’s warming through methods such as stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI),
increasing cloud albedo modification over land or surface oceans, and increasing the
surface albedo modification on land or ocean surfaces.
In the latest Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C, IPCC makes a distinc-
tion between CDR and CCS. According to the report, CDR refers specifically to the
removal of carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere or the reduction of atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide by artificially increasing ocean or terrestrial carbon sinks. The
application of carbon capture, storage and utilization (CCS/CCUS) in the energy and
industrial sectors is classified as emission reduction technology, rather than CDR in
geoengineering (IPCC, 2018). Thus, in contrast to CCS, CDR stresses the removal of
carbon dioxide directly from the air or through enhanced biological or geochemical
methods. BECCS belongs to a special CDR technology, which combines biomass
and CO2 capture and storage to bring about negative GHG emissions.
Currently, no example can be found in large-scale geoengineering in the world.
Technologies in this regard vary in mechanism, characteristic, and level of maturity,
and are under varied stages of development. The most controversial SAI technology
in SRM is under theoretical and computer simulation research, and is very sensitive
to outdoor environment. The backlash from NGOs has forced such experiments to
be postponed or halted. The progress of SAI R&D has been very slow, primarily
because of its high risk and hugely uncertain global ramifications from artificially
altering the climate system through its massive adoption. Therefore, there has been a
groundswell of support for ramping up the international geoengineering governance.
Other technologies of SRM are sporadically tested on a small scale, hence limited
impact.
In contrast, the research and development of CDR related technologies have
boomed, and some technologies have seen commercial demonstration. About 6 oper-
ational projects andover 12 construction projects onBECCScanbe foundworldwide.
Professor David Keith from Harvard University actively supports and promotes the
commercial application of DAC. As a partner, he founded Carbon Engineering to
try out the application of DAC. The Canada-based Carbon Engineering has been
running a pilot CO2 extraction plant for direct air carbon capture since 2015. The
company uses a solution of hydroxides to capture carbon dioxide, which must then
be heated to high temperatures to release the carbon dioxide and store it and reuse the
hydroxide. The process employs available technology and is considered to be rela-
tively low-cost. Based on its design and economic assumptions, it costs between $94
and $232 to capture a ton of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The Swiss company
Climeworks has opened a commercial facility using amines in small modular reac-
tors. Some experts believe that commercial competition has unfolded in the space
of DAC, which can be rapidly and extensively deployed once the cost barrier is
shattered.
According to a paper published inNatureCommunications in July 2019 by Italian,
British and other academics, in spite of the two different technologies, capturing CO2
directly from the atmosphere and burying it underground is a viable option. Using
DAC means global emissions are likely to remain chronically high until 2050, with
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heavy use of negative emissions only later in the century. Annual negative emissions
in the 2080s would be about 30 billion tons (Gt/year), close to this year’s global
emissions of around 40 billion tons/year. That would mean building approximately
30,000 large DACCS factories. In comparison, there are less than 10,000 coal-fired
power stations in the world today. The technology will require as much as a quarter
of the world’s energy supply by 2100, up to 300EJ (1018 J) a year, equivalent to the
current annual energy demand of China, US, EU and Japan, or the global supply of
coal and natural gas in 2018 [21].
Marine fertilization is also a controversial CDR technology. For ecological and
ethical reasons, theConvention onBiologicalDiversity (CBD) explicitly stipulated in
2010 that geoengineering activities affecting biodiversity and climate are prohibited
except for small-scale scientific research.
Geoengineering sparks tremendous controversies worldwide, especially SRM,
for its high risk and great uncertainty. CDR is an unavoidable pathway of emission
reduction in the near and medium term under the 1.5 °C target, so it is imperative to
accelerate research and development and demonstration. Although CDR has entered
the commercial demonstration stage, large-scale application may also threaten land
use, water resources, and food security, and international governance needs to be
strengthened.
China’smedium- and long-term low-carbon strategymust attach great importance
to geoengineering. First, geoengineering should receive its due attention. Appreci-
ating the importance of geoengineering is, by no means, easing or weakening miti-
gation and adaptation efforts. Secondly, the research of geoengineering should be
strengthened to inform scientific decision-making; the complementation and integra-
tion of natural science and social science should be encouraged; and the comprehen-
sive research and talent training relative to science, technology, policy, ethics, law and
other aspects should be reinforced. Thirdly, the key technologies of geoengineering
CDR and SRM should be distinguished; and the geoengineering technology devel-
opment strategy should be carefully crafted from a strategic perspective of vision and
foresight. Fourth, China should actively participate in the international governance
of geoengineering.
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Chapter 8
Investment and Cost Analysis
for Implementing a Low Emission
Strategy
The topic of finance has received wide attention among the many issues of global
climate governance [1]. The size, source and management mode of climate finance
is one of the major elements in climate governance. In the planning of medium-
and long-term low emission strategy, it’s necessary to quantify the financing needs
to facilitate the cost—benefit analysis. In light of existing researches, this chapter
estimates the investment needs and energy cost by scenario.
8.1 Energy Investment Needs
Referring to the methodologies provided by the World Energy Investment [2] and
other related studies, energy investment can be defined in terms of supply-side and
demand-side in the implementation of the low emission strategy.
8.1.1 Investment on the Energy Supply Side
The investment on energy supply is calculated based on China Energy Infrastruc-
ture Investment Model, which, building on mid- and long-term energy supply and
demand data, describes the size, investment and funding sources of energy infrastruc-
ture required for supporting energy demand and high quality development, taking
into account the pathways, and optimization of energy infrastructure transition (see
Fig. 8.1).
The long-term deep decarbonization entails energy transition and corresponding
structural changes in energy infrastructure system. The investment priorities shall
transition from coal-fired power stations, coal transport corridors, coal ports, and
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Fig. 8.1 Framework of the China energy infrastructure investment analysis model
coal storage bases into composite energy infrastructure system that features a coor-
dinated complementation of coal, oil, gas and non-fossil fuels, and eventually into
a low carbon energy-dominated infrastructure system, including renewable power
stations, high efficiency transmission and distribution networks, hydrogen produc-
tion facilities, hydrogen storage facilities, and so on. Investment in energy infras-
tructure should balance the long-term and short-term interests. It ought to pursue
diversification in energy supply, and encourage joint participation and shared bene-
fits of multiple parties to build a more inclusive and resilient energy infrastructure
system.
Energy infrastructure investment mainly covers coal, oil, natural gas and elec-
tricity to ensure the demand, supply, distribution, and reserves of these resources
(see Fig. 8.2).
The investment needs of energy infrastructure is primarily measured by new
investment and investment for retrofitting existing infrastructure. It represents the
increase of investment driven by the transformation in energy infrastructure (see
Table 8.1).
New investment in infrastructure mainly covers power, oil and gas. First, the
new investment demand in each period is calculated separately according to the
cost changes of varied power generation facilities and their scale in different stages.
Second, based on the empirical relationship between the investment in power gener-
ation facilities and the investment in power transmission and distribution facilities,
the investment required for conventional grid facilities is estimated for each period,
on top of that, the additional cost of renewable energy access, electrochemical energy
storage, pumped storage and cross-region transmission are taken as the additional
new investment demand for connecting power generation and grid facilities. The
additional investment in renewable energy access also corresponds to the need for
improving distribution network to cater to increasing proportion of renewables. The
investment in trans-regional power transmission facilities mainly focuses on the
ultra-high voltage power grid for the trans-regional power flow. Third, based on the
analysis of the demand, supply, profit and loss, and flow of other energies, e.g.,
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Fig. 8.2 Key investment items
natural gas, the new investment required for natural gas pipeline, gas storage depot,
LNG receiving station, and so on, is calculated.
Investment for retrofitting existing infrastructure mostly caters to the goal of low-
carbon transition and meeting new demands at low cost, including the flexibility
improvement of existing coal power facilities to accommodate high proportion of
renewable energy, the installation of carbon capture devices on fossil power genera-
tors to attain the carbon emission goal, mainly targeting existing coal and gas power
facilities, and the expansion of existing LNG receiving stations to meet new gas
demand and ensure gas storage capacity. Investment in LNG storage is included in
the construction of LNG receiving stations. The new gas storage demand in different
periods will be invested according to the following cost sequence: underground gas
storage → expansion of existing LNG receiving station storage tanks → construc-
tion of new LNG receiving station storage tanks → construction of new small LNG
storage tanks.
All scenarios point to the fact that low-carbon transition will drive more energy
infrastructure investment. As shown in the figure, the cumulative energy infrastruc-
ture investment required for the policy scenario, reinforced policy scenario, 2°C
scenario and 1.5°C scenario from 2020 to 2050 is expected to surge from 54 trillion
Chinese Yuan Renminbi (CNY) to 138 trillion CNY at the constant price of 2015 (see
Fig. 8.3). The investment demand in energy infrastructure for the reinforced policy
scenario is 1.5 times that of the policy scenario, while that for the 2°C scenario and
the 1.5°C scenario is 1.8 times and 2.6 times that of the policy scenario respectively.
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Table 8.1 Types of energy infrastructure investment
Types of investment Category Types of infrastructure







Solar PV power station
Concentrating solar power station
Biomass power plant
Electrochemical energy storage
Power transmission and distribution
network
Oil Oil-chemical integration refinery
Fuel-oriented refinery
Natural gas LNG receiving station
Natural gas pipeline
Underground gas storage
Small LNG storage tank
CCS Gas-fired power plant with CCS
Biomass power plant with CCS
Heat Heat-supply pipeline
Other Hydrogen and other renewable energies
Investment for improving existing
infrastructure
Power Flexibility improvement of existing coal
power plant
Gas Expansion of existing LNG receiving
station
CCS CCS installation on existing coal power
plant
CCS installation on existing gas power
plant
8.1.2 Investment on the Energy Demand Side
Energy demand-side investment is analyzed by sectors, namely industry, transport,
and building sector, respectively.
(1) Industrial sector
Wholistically speaking, the potential of industrial energy saving and carbon reduc-
tion could stem from efficiency improvement, energy mix optimization, electrifica-
tion, rawmaterial and fuel substitution, and improvement of product quality. While a

















Fig. 8.3 Cumulative energy infrastructure investment from 2020 to 2050 under different scenarios
certain proportion of the investment may be allocated specifically for the purpose of
energy conservation and carbon reduction, the majority of the work lies in the invest-
ment for the construction of new projects, equipment replacement, and technological
innovation, etc. Thus, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the amount required for
energy conservation and carbon reduction. In addition, great discrepancies exist in the
potential and pathways of energy saving and carbon reduction between energy inten-
sive and non-energy intensive industries. Furthermore, due to the vast differences in
industrial output, technologies, and processes, the levels of energy saving, carbon
reduction and investment demand may vary greatly by industry. The following study
applies different methods to estimate the investment required for energy intensive
and non-energy intensive industries.
For steel, cement and other industries with relatively clearly-defined products and
processes, taking into account the project lifetime of about 30 years, the capacity
replacement method is adopted to estimate the cumulative investment required from
2020 to 2050.The potentials of energy conservation and carbon reduction are grouped
into three categories: “advanced process application”, “energy efficiency improve-
ment” and “low-carbon energy substitution”. The potential of energy conservation
and carbon reduction and investment needs are also assessed separately.
For industries with complex product cycle and production processes such as
chemicals, petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals and others, the demand for increased
investment is assessed individually for different scenarios based on available cases of
energy conservation and carbon reduction, and the economic analysis of cutting-edge
technologies, processes and equipment, through tracking changes in investment per
unit of energy conservation.
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Fig. 8.4 Incremental investment by category
For non-energy intensive industries and manufacturing industries, the need for
incremental investment is assessed individually in different scenarios based on the
available cases of electricity substitution, energy efficiency improvement of boilers
andkilns, and energy-saving enhancement ofmotor system, through tracking changes
in investment per unit of energy conservation.
The incremental investment needed for the industrial sector in the reinforced
policy scenario, 2°C scenario, and 1.5°C scenario stands at 393.7 billion CNY,
2270.8 billion CNY and 4517.6 billion CNY respectively (see Fig. 8.4).1 Applying
advanced process and using low-carbon energy are the main sources of incremental
investment, which contributes the most to energy saving and emission reduction. The
negative incremental investment in energy conservation and efficiency is partly due
to the limited potential to improve energy efficiency, which makes large investment
a challenge. Meanwhile, the reduced demand dramatically downsizes the capacity
of energy intensive products, resulting in a decrease in total investment despite the
increasing need for investment per unit of capacity, which also partly accounts for a
negative incremental investment.
Four energy-intensive industries of iron and steel, cement, chemicals and petro-
chemicals are the main sources of investment in energy conservation and emis-
sion reduction. Under the reinforced policy scenario, the four industries account for
24.1%, 7.6%, 19.1% and 22.1% of incremental investment respectively. Under the
2°C scenario, the share is 39.2%, 4.5%, 19.4% and 24.2%, and for the 1.5°C scenario,
29.8%, 5.3%, 20.4% and 22.6% respectively (see Fig. 8.5).
1 The incremental investment in the reinforced policy scenario refers to the increment compared to
the policy scenario; the incremental investment in the 2°C scenario is the increment compared to the
reinforced policy scenario; and the incremental investment in the 1.5°C scenario is the increment
compared to the 2°C scenario.
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Fig. 8.5 Incremental investment by industry
Figure 8.6 shows the incremental investment under different scenarios in the steel,
cement, chemical and petrochemical industries. The main incremental investment in
the steel industry goes to advanced process applications, in particular hydrogen steel
(a) Iron and steel (b) Cement
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Fig. 8.6 Incremental investment in major energy-intensive industries
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making. Most incremental investment in the cement industry flows to low-carbon
energy substitution such as carbon capture, storage and utilization. Incremental
investment in the chemical industry is mostly spent on the substitution of low-carbon
energy, especially the substitution of “green hydrogen” for “grey hydrogen”. The bulk
of incremental investment in the petrochemical industry ismade on advanced process
applications such as the production of olefins from light hydrocarbons.
It should be noted that considerable gaps exist in the production capacity of
energy-intensive products among varied scenarios. Generally speaking, more ambi-
tious targets in energy conservation and emission reduction would make for smaller
production capacity of energy-intensive products. Despite a substantial rise in invest-
ment per unit of capacity due to investment in energy conservation and emission
reduction - the investment per ton of steel capacity stands at 4,106 CNY, 6,844 CNY
and 10,750 CNY respectively, and the investment per ton of cement capacity is 840
CNY, 1,230 CNY and 1,590 CNY respectively in the reinforced policy scenario,
2°C scenario and 1.5°C scenario - negative incremental investment occurs in some
industries owning to the reduction in total capacity.
(2) Transport sector
Analysis of the transport sector takes into account the increased cost of EVs rela-
tive to traditional vehicles and the construction of charging piles. The cost increase
of EVs compared to traditional vehicles is estimated based on the number of new
EVs on the road and the ratio of varied types of vehicle. The medium and long term
investment of charging piles is projected based on the vehicle-to-pile ratio and the
proportion of diverse types of charging piles. The vehicle-to-pile ratio has improved
from 7.8:1 in 2015 to 3.1:1 in 2019 [3, 4]. In the long run, the vehicle-to-pile ratio
will be around 1:1.
On new investment in EVs, it is estimated that the average production cost of EV
in 2020 is 126,000 CNY - a difference of 62,000 CNY compared to gasoline vehicles
[5]. Considering the decreasing production costs of specific carmodels, it is projected
that by 2050, the average production cost of EVs will be lowered to 83,000 CNY,
and the difference with gasoline vehicles will be reduced to 16,000 CNY. Therefore,
the total investment in the four scenarios from 2020 to 2050 is approximately 9.0,
11.9, 15.0 and 18.6 trillion CNY respectively.
The new investment of charging piles is estimated based on the ratio of public
DC, public AC, and private charging piles and their cost changes. The average cost
in 2020 and 2025 is 4,400 CNY and 3,300 CNY per unit, assuming that it remains
unchanged afterward. In 2019, a total of 1.22 million charging piles were operational
nationwide. It is projected that the total investment between 2020 and 2050 is about
1.5, 2.1, 2.5 and 3.0 trillion CNY under the four scenarios in this study.
(3) Building sector
The emission reduction potential of the building sector mainly comes from main-
taining green and energy-saving behaviors, improving the performance of building
envelope, enhancing the efficiency of equipment system, optimizing energy mix,
and tapping into renewable energy. Currently, there are various methods to estimate
the investment need for low-carbon buildings, with different boundaries and defini-
tions. This study, centering around the building hulk and the northern heating system,
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makes the projections for improving the performance of building envelope and the
northern heating system.
The investment for performance improvement of building envelope includes the
increased cost of new buildings due to higher design standards and the cost of existing
building envelope renovation, of which the energy-saving renovation of existing
buildings in rural areas accommodates the usage of “part of the space” of rural
residents and gives priority to economic renovation [6].
Analysis on the improvement of heating systems in northernChina accommodates
the difference between urban and rural areas. For the urban areas, the focus is the
varied types of CHP and low-grade waste heat from industrial production process.
The use of waste heat requires the construction of heating pipelines for long distance
transport. And in areas where waste heat is out of reach, heat pumps with high
efficiency are preferred. Rural areas shall slash the use of bulk coal and inefficient
biomass, and encourage the use of new and efficient biomass boilers and heat pumps.
The cost data of this study is obtained by referring to previous engineering survey
and related cases [6, 7, 8, 9].
According to the estimates, 1.1 trillion CNY more investment is required in the
reinforced policy scenario than the policy scenario for the two main undertakings
proposed in this study; and additional 0.5 trillion CNY is needed in the 2°C scenario
compared to the reinforced policy scenario; and the 1.5°C scenario requires 0.06
trillion CNY less than the 2°C scenario.
As for the improvement of envelope performance, more aggressive targets for
energy conservation and emission reduction lead to an enormous downsizing of new
buildings, hence the reduced cost in this regard. Yet the cost of energy conservation
renovation for existing buildings is on the rise. By 2050, the additional cost for the
four scenario is estimated to be 0.65 trillion CNY, 0.15 trillion CNY and -0.18 trillion
CNY respectively.
Regarding heating upgrade in the north, the investment required by all scenarios
in the northern urban areas is on a steady rise due to the waste heat utilization, heat
pump installation and elimination of all boilers. For rural areas, the four scenarios
mostly feature a rising trajectory, except for the 1.5°C scenario that shows a drop in
overall investment due to the fact that fewer rural residents choose to embrace the
earlier electrification after they have already switched from bulk coal and inefficient
biomass to gas-fired wall-mounted furnace. The scenario difference of investment in
heating in the north is 0.48 trillion CNY, 0.37 trillion CNY, and 0.12 trillion CNY
respectively in 2050.
Specific scenario differences of investment to 2050 are shown in Table 8.2.
8.1.3 Total Investment Needs
Considering investment on both energy supply and demand side, the cumulative
energy investment from 2020 to 2050 stands at 71 trillion CNY, 100 trillion CNY,
127 trillion CNY, and 174 trillion CNY respectively under different low-emission
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Table 8.2 Investment differences between scenarios (in billion CNY)








Northern heating renovation 482.7 369.1 120.7
Urban areas 477.6 325.4 131.0
Rural areas 5.1 43.7 -10.3
Total 1131.8 521.4 -60.2
scenarios (Table 8.3, Fig. 8.7). Compared with the policy scenario, the cumulative
investment in the reinforced scenario, 2°C scenario and 1.5°C scenario rises by 29
trillion CNY, 57 trillion CNY, and 104 trillion CNY respectively. And the average
Table 8.3 Total investment from 2020 to 2050 (in trillion CNY)
Energy supply Industry Building Transport Total
Policy scenario 53.71 0.00 6.29 10.51 70.51
Reinforced policy scenario 77.89 0.39 7.42 13.99 99.69
2°C scenario 99.07 2.66 7.94 17.57 127.24
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Fig. 8.7 Total energy investment by scenario
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annual investment from 2020 to 2050 is 2.4 trillion CNY, 3.3 trillion CNY, 4.2 trillion
CNY, and 5.8 trillion CNY respectively.
8.2 Energy Cost Analysis
This research makes further estimates on the comprehensive power supply cost and
society-wide energy cost.
8.2.1 Cost of Electricity Supply
Electricity supply is one of the major costs of production and living. Generally
speaking, electricity price is the sum of the cost and profit of electricity supply. The
electricity supply cost in this study mainly refers to the weighted average cost per
kilowatt-hour of each generation technology. The long-term trend of power supply
cost varies greatly under different scenarios. The policy scenario features an overall
decline in the cost; the reinforced policy scenario is characterized by a stable and
slight increase in the cost over a fairly long period of time until a slump after 2033;
both the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios witness a pattern of an increase before a drop,
with the cost hitting the peak in 2028 and 2033, respectively which is 1.4 and 1.42
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Fig. 8.8 Trend of changes in power supply cost
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Fig. 8.9 Cost composition of power supply in 2050
witnesses a downward trend, and the cost in 2050 under the policy, reinforced policy,
2°C, and 1.5°C scenarios is 69%, 66%, 75%, and 90%of that in 2018 respectively (see
Fig. 8.8). Looking at the cost composition of electricity supply in 2050, higher costs
occur in the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios compared to the policy and reinforced policy
scenarios, this is mainly attributed to the higher fixed investment costs, operation
and maintenance, and power transmission costs (see Fig. 8.9).
Future cost reduction in power supply is primarily driven by the reduced fuel cost.
The cost of fuel in 2018 accounts for about 29% of the total cost of electricity supply.
In the reinforced policy and 2°C scenarios, fuel cost falls to 8.4% and 8.5% of cost
of electricity supply respectively as coal-fired power plant capacity downsize (see
Fig. 8.9). Despite minor increases in the cost of operating and maintenance, power
transmission, and energy storage in the long-term, the dramatic reductions in fuel
cost offset these increased costs.
8.2.2 Cost of Energy Use in the Entire Society
This study estimates the energy cost of the whole society based on the energy




Ei j × EPi j
ECj is the energy cost of the whole society in the jth year; i stands for five energy
varieties, including coal, oil, natural gas, electricity and others; Eij refers to the
consumption of different energy varieties in different years; EPij refers to the price
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Table 8.4 Energy cost of the
whole society (in trillion
CNY)
Scenario 2020 2030 2050
Policy scenario 9.1 11.7 11.3
Reinforced policy scenario 9.1 12.5 10.7
2°C scenario 9.1 13.3 12.2
1.5°C scenario 9.1 13.1 13.5
of different energy varieties in different years. The base year data of energy price is
from existing literature [10], and its variation trend over time is assumed based on
the trend of cost variation of different energy categories.
As shown in Table 8.4, it is estimated that the energy cost of the whole society
under the four scenarios sees continued increase from 2020 to 2030; the policy
scenario, reinforced scenario and 2°C scenario report a drop from 2030 to 2050; and
a steady climb is observed from 2020 to 2050 in the 1.5°C scenario. Under the four
scenarios, the total energy cost of the whole society in 2050 is approximately CNY
11–14 trillion.
8.3 Summary
Overall, there are notable discrepancies in the amount of investment under the various
scenarios. Between 2020 and 2050, cumulative energy investment in policy, rein-
forced policy, 2°C and 1.5°C scenario amounts to 71 trillion, 100 trillion, 127 trillion,
and 174 trillion CNY respectively, with the average annual investment of 2.4 trillion,
3.3 trillion, 4.2 trillion, and 5.8 trillion CNY respectively. Compared with the 2°C
scenario, the cumulative investment in the 1.5°C scenario increases by an additional
47 trillion, which averages to 1.6 trillion CNY additional investment on an annual
basis.
In terms of average power supply cost, both 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios witness
an increase before decreasing from around 2030. The costs in 2050 under the 2°C
scenario and 1.5°C scenario are markedly higher than that under the policy and
the reinforced policy scenario. The energy cost of the whole society sees continued
growth from 2020 to 2030, and might experience a fall from 2030 to 2050, reaching
roughly 11–14 trillion CNY by 2050.
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The previous chapters provide systematic analysis on the pathways of emissions
reduction and the subsequent economic impact under different scenarios in end-use
energy consumption sectors, power and energy systems, and non-CO2 greenhouse
gases. In view of the urgency of addressing climate change, it’s crucial for China
to explore the development pathway of low-carbon transition. In addition, the emis-
sion reduction targets and actions should be reinforced to implement the nationally
determined contribution commitment by 2030. While, research should be conducted
to determine the long-term low-carbon emission targets and approaches suitable for
China by 2050.Building on the analysis of previous chapters,we propose to study and
propose with recommendations for implementing and updating NDC targets before
2030 under the reinforced policy scenarios. After 2030, further actions should be
taken to strengthen the intensity of deep decarbonization, in linewith the Paris Agree-
ment target of keeping global temperature rise below 2 °C while pursuing efforts to
limit the increase further to 1.5 °C, study and explore the transition pathway to deep
decarbonization by 2050.
9.1 Implementing and Reinforcing NDC Targets
and Actions for 2030
9.1.1 Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions
Since China’s economy entered the “new normal” stage, the high quality economic
growth has spurred the transition from quantity-driven extensive growth to quality-
focused intensive development, industrial structure accelerated in transforming and
upgrading, while growth drivers also shifted. Attributed by the actions taken in the
12th Five-Year Plan and roadmap planned in the 13th Five-Year Plan, the share of
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the primary, secondary and tertiary industries in China’s GDP improved from 9.3,
46.5 and 44.2% respectively in 2010 to 7.1%, 39.0% and 53.9% respectively in 2019,
served to curb the fast growth of energy consumption [1]. In the long run, economic
growth is expected to fall back to a medium- to low-growth level. As per the previous
analysis and forecast by mainstream domestic research institutions, growth will slide
from the current 6% during the 13th Five-Year Plan period to around 4.5–5.0% by
2030.
Among China’s current NDC targets, the most important ones involving CO2
emissions include:(1) CO2 emissions intensity per unit of GDP to decrease by 60–
65% by 2030 from 2005 level; (2) non-fossil energy to account for roughly 20% of
the primary energy consumption mix by 2030; (3) CO2 emissions to peak around
2030 and ideally earlier. These NDC targets were evaluated and proposed before
2015 based on the fulfillment of the goal set out during the Copenhagen Climate
Conference in 2009, goals entailed a 40–45%drop in emission intensity by 2020 from
2005 level, and non-fossil energy to account for 15% the primary energy consumption
mix. These are also achievable targets in linewithChina’s economic and social reality
at that time and in the foreseeable future. China Statistical Abstract 2020 published
China’s total primary energy consumption by the end of 2019 is at 4.86 billion tce.
The improved energy mix features a further drop of coal in the primary energy
consumption mix to 57.7%, non-fossil energy and natural gas increase to 1.0 and 0.3
percent to 15.3% and 8.1% respectively, while oil making up 18.9%, on a par with
that in 2018 [2]. By this measure, China has achieved its goals set out in Copenhagen
of reducing CO2 intensity per unit of GDP by 40–45% and for non-fossil energy
to account for 15% of primary energy consumption by the end of 2019 ahead of
schedule, which laid a solid groundwork to implement and further strengthen the
NDC targets.
In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic plunged global economy into a severe contrac-
tion, presenting grave challenges to social stability. At present, it’s hard to gauge
the exact length and impact from the virus, but it has aggravated global geopolitical
issues, sparking a new wave of oil price volatility, and with an unprecedented disrup-
tion in global energy market. To reduce the shock of the pandemic on the economy,
the world will focus more on economic stimulus to secure social stability in the
short-term. And a growing number of scholars have called for “greener” and more
“sustainable” economic recovery.With the impact of Covid-19 in mind, this research
also adjusted the forecast of China’s economic growth amid the recent low-carbon
transformation.
According to the Strategy for Energy Production and Consumption Revolution
(2016–2030) [3] jointly released by National Development and Reform Commission
and National Energy Administration, power generation from non-fossil energy will
reach approximately 50% of total electricity use by 2030. Study in the report also
finds that over 50% of primary energy will be used for electricity production by
2030, which means that non-fossil energy is on track to comprise of roughly 25% of
primary energy consumption by 2030 with increasing electrification in the future [4].
With China’s attention shifting to low-carbon transformation of the energy mix, non-
fossil energy has gained some weight in primary energy consumption, but it still falls
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short of developed countries. In the short term, newly added non-fossil fuels can’t
adequately meet the needs of total additional energy demand with decarbonization
efforts. Natural gas, as a “relatively low carbon” “clean” energy option, will grow in
importance, serving as a “transition” toward a non-fossil centered energy mix.
By 2030, coal, oil, natural gas, and non-fossil energy as a percentage of China’s
primary energy consumption will be improved to 45%, 17%, 13%, and 25% respec-
tively from 57.7%, 18.9%, 8.1% and 15.3% respectively in 2019. Among them, the
share of non-fossil fuels will rise by another five percent compared with the current
NDC target of 20%, and coal-use can be further reduced through enlarging the size
of natural gas in primary energy consumption. By enhancing the energy mix, CO2
intensity per unit of energy consumption will drop from 2.085 kgCO2/ kgce to 1.75
kgCO2 / kgce, down 16%, paving the way for further reduction in CO2 intensity per
unit of GDP.
TheCovid-19 puts a brake on the economic growth in 2020, triggering a slowdown
of the annual GDP growth to 5.7% during the 13th Five-Year Plan period. Based on
the current progress of recovery, the annual GDP growth is expected to be above
5% in the 14th Five-Year Plan period (see Table 9.1). This new period features the
implementation of a new development philosophy which will steer new sources of
economic growth and new infrastructure investment towards the digital economy
and high-end technology sectors, with the saturation or reduction in the demand
for energy intensive raw materials and products such as steel and cement and a
reduced elasticity in energy consumption. Energy consumption per unit of GDP will
experience a decline equivalent to that in the 13th Five-Year Plan period, or no less
Table 9.1 Energy consumption under the enhanced NDC target and its CO2 emissions
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Annual GDP growth rate (%) 11.3 7.9 5.9 5.3 4.8
5-year decline in energy consumption per unit
of GDP (%)
19.1 18.5 14.3 14.0 14.0
Energy consumption (billion tce) 2.61 3.61 4.34 4.94 5.50 5.98
Energy consumption
structure
Coal (%) 72.4 69.2 63.7 57.0 51.0 45.0
Oil (%) 17.8 17.4 18.3 18.5 18.0 17.0
Natural gas (%) 2.4 4 5.9 8.5 11.0 13.0
Non-fossil fuel (%) 7.4 9.4 12.1 16.0 20.0 25.0
CO2 emissions per unit of energy
consumption (kgCO2 / kgce)
2.32 2.25 2.16 2.03 1.90 1.75
CO2 emissions (GtCO2) 6.06 8.13 9.37 10.03 10.45 10.46
5-year decline in CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP (%)
21.5 21.2 19.7 19.5 20.6
Decline from the 2005 level (%) 50.3 60.0 68.2
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than 14%. Total energy consumption could reach 5.5 billion tce and 5.98 billion tce
by 2025 and 2030 respectively. Given the economic growth prospect in this study,
with the prediction of total energy consumption and energy mix, CO2 emissions in
2030 will reach a total of 10.46 billion tCO2, with CO2 intensity per unit of GDP
falling by 68.2% from 2005 level, surpassing the upper limit of the 60–65% reduction
in China’s NDC target. CO2 emissions will reach a plateau around 2025 and hit the
peak before 2030. Table 9.1 illustrates energy consumption and CO2 emission levels
before 2030 with intensive energy conservation and carbon reduction policies and
measures, which will fully exceed the 2030 NDC target.
9.1.2 Policies and Measures for Enhanced NDC Targets
and Actions
As required by the Paris Agreement, countries should report and update their NDC
targets by the end of 2020. This includes not only the emission reduction targets of
each party, but also the goals and actions of enforcing the strategic measures and
policies on this front, which encapsulates the actions to fully implement the national
strategy on climate change. Given the achievements and strides China has made in
this regard, the following key considerations can be made to strengthen the 2030
NDC targets and efforts:
1. Strive to exceed the 2030 NDC targets. With non-fossil energy getting
momentum in recent years, its share in primary energy consumption is expected to
climb from 20 to 25% in 2030. A low-carbon energy system will facilitate a further
reduction of China’s CO2 intensity of GDP. Through the current efforts, progress and
active preparations in the 14th and 15th Five-Year Plan periods, China is on track to
cut its CO2 intensity of GDP by more than 65% around 2030 from the level in 2005,
and peak CO2 emissions before 2030.
2. Put forth guiding goals for curbing total energy consumption and
CO2emissions. A cap on total energy use has been introduced and executed in
the 13th Five-Year Plan period, and a similar cap on CO2 emissions should also
be imposed during the 14th Five-Year Plan period to be aligned with the policies
and measures to ensure a peak around 2030, which should gradually integrate or
replace the cap on total energy consumption. The cap on emissions should not put
a ceiling on energy consumption of local governments and enterprises. Rather, it
should encourage them to tap into new and renewable sources of energy in a bid
to propel a revolution in energy production and consumption. The cap could also
be aligned with the ongoing efforts to establish national carbon market to gradually
move from the right to energy use system toward the enterprise carbon allowance
system, demonstrating China’s reinforced efforts in climate change.
In view of the great uncertainty in future economic development and energy
consumption, especially the impact of Covid-19, GDP growth in the 14th Five-Year
Plan period still hangs in the balance. Therefore, a relatively looser cap should be
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adopted to allow some leeway. The total energy consumption should be capped at
5.5 billion tce, total emissions at 10.5 billion tons at the end of 14th Five-Year
Plan period, and a CO2 emission peak before 2030 capped below 11 billion tons.
A dual control mechanism with intensity reduction as the mainstay and caps as the
supplement should be created, which is also consistent with the characteristics and
reality of China’s current economic development.
3. Developed areas in the eastern coast of China should peak CO2emissions
earlier. The 13th Five-Year Plan has indicated “support to optimized development
areas to secure an earlier CO2 emission peak”. After 2025, China as a whole can
enter a peak period of CO2 emissions. Developed coastal areas in the east are well-
positioned to lead in the country, with some cities potentially reaching peak before
2025. Provinces and cities in the southeast region rich in renewable energy can also
strive to take the lead for CO2 emission peak. It’s important to develop situational
plans for different regions based on local realities, encourage the developed areas
in the eastern coast to set out peak targets in order to catalyze the midwest region
to transform development patterns. Encourage provinces and cities to create and
enforce related targets and policy measures, thereby driving low-carbon economic
and social transformation via the CO2 emissions peak targets.
4. Push for CO2emission peak before 2025 in energy-intensive heavy chemical
industries. Despite a reduced weight in GDP, the industrial sector still represents an
mix of energy-intensive industry that consumes more than 60% of the total energy
for end-uses in China, making it the most promising sector for energy saving. With
adjustment, transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure, the output of
heavy and chemical products will be saturated and with potential to decline during
the 14th Five-Year Plan period, prompting an earlier peak than transportation and
construction, etc. China can make active efforts to set the goal of peaking CO2
emissions of the heavy and chemical industry sector in the 14th Five-Year Plan,
striving for an earlier peak in the entire industrial sector through the leadership of
the heavy and chemical industry sector, thus setting the stage for a nationwide peak
by 2030.
5. Curtail non-CO2 greenhouse gases emissions. Non-CO2 greenhouse gas
emissions are mostly short-lived emissions. Despite the diminishing greenhouse
impact in their entire lifespan, their complicated sources make for high cost of tech-
nologies for emission reduction in the long run, which represent one of the hardest
obstacles to overcome for the net-zero emission target in the future. China’s current
implementation and commitment of NDCmainly focus on energy-related CO2 emis-
sions, with plenty of room for improvement in the capacity for managing non-CO2
sources. Thus, the 14th Five-Year Plan period should start to strengthen the manage-
ment and control of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions from industrial produc-
tion, agriculture, forestry, waste management, etc., especially for the production and
use of fluoride gas, and gradually establish a monitoring, reporting, and verification
system for all sources of greenhouse gas emissions, build capacity for the further
implementation of mitigation measures and actions, and adapt to the implementation
of the Paris Agreement.
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6. Deepen the administrative and market-based reform of energy and
CO2emission management system. Now, the burgeoning energy technologies and
industrial innovations have sped up the transformation of the energy industry, but
some institutional and policy barriers are yet to be overcome. It’s essential to advance
reform of the energy management and pricing systems, boost the development of
distributed renewable energy. Meanwhile, carbon market should be strengthened
through prompt efforts in expanding the unified national carbon market to the eight
designated energy-intensive sectors, and properly managing carbon allowance in an
effort to promote low-carbon transition of the energy and economywithmarket-based
tools during the 14th Five-Year Plan period.
9.2 Analysis of Long-Term Emission Reduction Pathway
Driven by the 2 °C Target
Based on previous analysis, more space is needed for carbon emissions and more
time is need for low carbon transformation in light of the current economic and
social development situation, it is difficult to switch to the 2 °C emission reduction
pathway in the near future. To enable long-term 2 °C pathway without sacrificing
near-term economic growth, a feasible option is to step up emission reduction efforts
based on the reinforced policy scenario before 2030, laying solid groundwork for
the transition toward the 2 °C. In addition, achieve carbon peak before 2030, with
additional emission reduction efforts and use the goal of staying within 2 °C by 2050
to force the leap toward the 2 °C target. This section builds the feasible long-term low-
carbon transition scenario based on enhancing NDC targets before 2030 elaborated
in Sect. 9.1, and facilitating greater emission reduction in the entire economy and
society toward the 2 °C scenario after 2030.
9.2.1 Comprehensive Analysis of the 2 °C Target Path
Scenario
The Paris Agreement sets its long-term temperature goal to hold global average
temperature increase “well-below to 2 °C above preindustrial levels and pursuing
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”. Under
the guidance of “the two-step strategy of new era”, China should also undertake its
mitigation efforts and contributions in combating climate change in accordance with
its development toward a great, modern socialist country. In this context, China’s
domestic long-term strategy of low-carbon development should be in line with the
long-term goal of the Paris Agreement by limiting the temperature rise to well
below 2 °C [5]. Based on the analysis of the reinforced policy scenario and the 2 °C
scenario in the previous sections, the emission reductions pathway can be gradually
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Fig. 9.1 CO2 emissions in different scenarios and the 2 °C target path
achieved in two stages as China embraces high-quality economic transition: before
2030 (Stage one), before 2030, we should strive for emission reduction actions
that are more ambitious than the enhanced NDC targets based on the reinforced
policy scenario in order to peak carbon emissions earlier, whch makes it highly
likely to transit toward the 2 °C scenario at the same time; after 2030 (stage two),
the priority should be given to the low-carbon energy system and improved energy
efficiency to speed up the transition toward the 2 °C target, thus achieving the goal
of emission reduction effectively under the 2 °C scenario by 2050. Accordingly, this
section provides the 2 °C target oriented transition scenario pathway (2 °C target
path shown in Fig. 9.1). The data of economic growth, energy mix assumptions, and
energy-related CO2 emissions in major years are illustrated in Table 9.2.
Before 2030, the enhanced NDC plan proposed in Sect. 9.1 should be adopted
to support the expected economic and social growth with a lower carbon-intensity
energy mix. In the meantime, steps should be taken to boost technological effi-
ciency and cut back emissions, further reduce energy consumption elasticity while
optimizing industrial structure, actively pursue more ambitious emission reduction
before 2030 than the enhanced NDC targets, laying the foundation for the transition
to 2 °C pathway after 2030. Energy-related CO2 emissions can be brought down to
10.46 billion tons by 2030, which signifies the start of a downward trend after peak
before 2030. From2030 to 2050, a lower carbon-intensity energymix can be achieved
with the share of non-fossil energy in primary energy consumption increasing from
25% in 2030 to 73.2% in 2050, and the share of coal, oil, and natural gas decreasing
from 45%, 17%, and 13% in 2030 to 9.1%, 7.7%, and 10.0% in 2050 respectively
(see Fig. 9.2). The new energy systemwith non-fossil fuels as the mainstay would by
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Fig. 9.2 Primary energy consumption and its mix in the 2 °C target path
then provide major buttress to the economic and social development, with increasing
decoupling of economic growth and energy consumption. By 2050, energy-related
CO2 emissions can be reduced to 2.92 billion tons. Considering CO2 emissions from
industrial process, carbon sink, and CCS, the net CO2 emissions would be 2.18
billion tons with a per capita CO2 emission of about 1.5 tons, which is lower than
the world’s per capita level under the 2 °C target path, paving the way for the prompt
achievement of net-zero emission after the middle of this century. Table 9.3 shows
the sectoral breakdown of energy consumption and CO2 emissions under 2 °C target
path.
Between 2030 and 2050, direct CO2 emissions from the industrial and electricity
sector remain the largest contributor to energy-related CO2 emissions. In 2050, the
direct CO2 emissions from the electricity sector (the carbon sink from CCS not

















Industrial 1.61 3.77 1.88 4.15 0.69 1.19
Building 0.55 1.00 0.51 0.88 0.26 0.31
Transport 0.49 0.99 0.54 1.09 0.30 0.55
Power 2.17 4.06 2.83 3.95 3.92 0.83
Other sectors 0.12 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.03 0.04
Total 4.94 10.03 5.98 10.46 5.20 2.92
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Table 9.4 Total CO2 emissions and their composition in the 2 °C target path (unit: GtCO2e)
2020 2030 2050
CO2 emissions from energy consumption 10.03 10.46 2.92
CO2 emissions from industrial production 1.32 0.94 0.47
CCS/BECCS 0.00 0.00 -0.51
Forest carbon sinks -0.58 -0.61 -0.70
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Fig. 9.3 CO2 emissions by sector in the 2 °C target path
included), driven by a lower carbon energy mix, are down by roughly 80% from
the 2020 level, providing low-carbon power to the end users. CO2 directly emitted
from energy consumption stands at 2.92 billion tons, and emissions from industrial
processes are about 470 million tons, the size of forest carbon sinks and CCS will
reach 700 million tons and 510 million tons respectively in 2050. The total net CO2
emissions in 2050 reach 2.18 billion tons, about a 80% decrease from the peak year.
The total CO2 emissions under 2 °C target path are shown in Table 9.4 and Fig. 9.3.
9.2.2 Pathway Analysis of the 2 °C Target Path Scenario
By comparing the CO2 emission trajectories of the 2 °C target path and the four
emission reduction scenarios mentioned earlier (see Fig. 9.1), the results show that
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Fig. 9.4 Indexes of GDP, primary energy consumption, and CO2 emissions (2020 = 1)
the 2 °C target path is somewhere between the reinforced policy scenario and the
2 °C scenario, in line with China’s current development stage and characteristics.
That is, before 2030, to ensure a smooth transition of the economy and society still
require certain space of carbon emissions, but the low-carbonization process of the
energy structure is expected to be further strengthened; after 2030, the entire economy
and society will experience a rapid transition, and meet the 2 °C scenario by 2050.
In the 2° C target path scenario, by 2050, the total GDP is 3.5 times larger than
that of 2020. After peaking around 2035, the total energy consumption gradually
falls, but new and renewable energy continue to develop rapidly. CO2 intensity per
unit of energy consumption spirals down. As CO2 emissions and GDP growth are
decoupled before 2030, the decrease of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP after 2030
will reach to 10% annually after 2040 (see Figs. 9.4–9.6). The change in energy mix
provides increasingly greater contributions as time goes on.
The year-by-year trend of energy conservation and energy substitution in the
reduction of CO2 intensity in GDP under the 2 °C target path are showed in Fig. 9.5.
Without considering the second-order infinite quantity [6], the annual decline of
CO2 intensity of GDP can be approximately expressed as the sum of the annual
drop of energy intensity of GDP (or referred to as the energy-saving effect) and
the annual decrease in CO2 intensity of energy consumption (or referred to as the
energy substitution effect). Data in the figure suggests that after 2030, with the swift
transition to the 2 °C target, CO2 intensity of GDP sees faster annual decline from
4.5% between 2025 and 2030 to 12.7% between 2045 and 2050. With the rapid
advancement of low-carbon energy mix, non-fossil energy gradually replaces coal to
become the mainstay in primary energy composition, making greater contribution to
carbon reduction. With the spread of energy-saving technologies, the future energy
intensity of GDP is likely to maintain an annual fall of 4–5%. This signifies that after

























Decreasing rate of CO₂ emissions per energy consumpion
Increasing rate of energy consumption
Decreasing rate of CO₂ emissions per GDP
Decreasing rate of energy consumption per GDP
Fig. 9.5 Analysis on the decline of GDP growth and CO2 emissions per unit of GDP
2040, energy substitution is set to be a greater contributor to the reduction of CO2
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Fig. 9.6 Greenhouse gas emissions under the 2 °C target path
9.2 Analysis of Long-Term Emission … 239
Two curves representing the expected GDP growth and the deceasing rate of CO2
emissions per capita GDP meets at point A, the year when the CO2 emissions peak
occurs. Point B is the focal point of the annual growth rate of energy consumption
and the annual rate of decline of CO2 intensity of energy consumption. It suggests
that the annual CO2 intensity in energy consumption is declining at a greater rate
than the annual growth rate of energy consumption, which also signals the CO2 peak
from an energy point of view. Point C represents the year with zero annual growth
of energy consumption when economic growth is officially decoupled from energy
consumption, that is, economic growth can be achieved without using additional
energy—a new stage of endogenous growth. Data in the chart shows that economic
growth is on track to decouple from energy consumption in the period from 2035
to 2040 under the 2 °C target path. Energy savings from technological progress and
profound economic restructuring can meet the energy demand of economic growth.
Overall, it shows a continuous downward trend of total energy consumption amid
economic growth.
Compared with the policy scenario, the 2 °C target path is characterized by
dramatic emission reduction in end users and the power sector, shown in Table 9.5.
Comparedwith the policy scenario, the 2 °C target path enables a 76.7% reduction
in emissions by 2050, with the biggest contributors being the industrial sector and
power sector (34.7% and 34.2% respectively) and CCS contributing 7.1% to as well.
9.2.3 Result of the 2 °C Target Path Through Different
Statistical Methods
In measuring renewable energy consumption, this report converts the power gener-
ated from renewables as hydro, wind, and solar into primary energy based on coal
equivalent calculation method, which is China’s traditional statistical methodology.
Some other countries and international agencies (e.g.: the IEA) do so based on the
method of calorific value calculation. In the case of around 40% efficiency of tradi-
tional fossil energy generation, there is a roughly 60% discrepancy between the two
methods might be found in the amount of primary energy. When renewables does
not take up a major share in primary energy consumption, no major discrepancy is
detected. But with the surge and increasing uptake of renewables in the future, signif-
icant variances will occur on the assessment of total energy consumption, energy
conservation and substitution, prompting the need for further diagnosis and compar-
ison. Table 9.6 compares the two methods of converting hydro, wind, solar and other
renewables into primary energy [7].
Both statistical methods have considerable bearing on total energy demand and
assessment on the contribution of energy conservation and energy substitution toCO2
emission reduction. Converting renewable power into primary energy by coal equiv-
alent calculation equivalent method underestimates the total energy demand, when
comparing to the traditional method of coal consumption from power generation.
Meanwhile, with the increase in share of renewables in primary energy, the method
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Table 9.7 Comparison of metrics in 2050 with 2030 under two statistical methods
Coal equivalent calculation Calorific value calculation
Decline in total energy consumption
(%)
13.0 34.6
Decline in energy consumption per
unit of GDP (%)
58.7 68.9
Decline in CO2 consumption per unit
of energy consumption (%)
67.9 57.3
Decline in CO2 consumption per unit
of GDP (%)
86.7 86.7
Decline in total CO2 emissions (%) 72.0 72.0
overestimates the decline in energy consumption per unit of GDP and underestimates
the decline of CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumption, thus transferring the
emission reduction contribution from energy substitution to energy conservation and
inflating the contribution of energy conservation to CO2 emission reduction.
From 2030 to 2050, the generating capacity of hydro, wind, and solar will surge
from 3.6 trillion kWh to 9.6 trillion kWh, with their share of power generation
soaring to 73% from 38.9%. The total energy demand in 2050 measured by the two
statistical methods is 5.2 billion tce and 3.5 billion tce respectively, with calorific
value calculation method 1.7 billion tce less, or 32.7% lower than the method of coal
equivalent calculation. This is not due to greater energy saving, but the difference
in statistical method. From 2030 to 2050, energy intensity per unit of GDP is down
by 58.7% and CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumption is down by 67.9%,
measured by the coal equivalent calculation method; whereas the calorific value
calculation method calculate the decline at 68.9% and 57.3% respectively. During
the same period, total CO2 emissions from energy consumption will decrease by
7.53 billion tons, down 72.0%. By the coal equivalent calculation method, energy
conservation contributes approximately 10% and energy substitution about 90% to
the decline; whereas the calorific value calculation method puts their contribution at
33% and 67%, respectively (Table 9.7). Thus the latter method suggests an illusion of
a greater contribution by energy saving. In this sense, when comparing and analyzing
with similar international studies and global data, one should be mindful of the
statisticalmethods used, as the results and conclusions produced by differentmethods
mostly are not comparable.
9.2.4 Analysis on Transition of All Greenhouse Gas
Emissions in 2 °C Target Path
Table 9.8 and Fig. 9.6 illustrate the structure and total amount of all GHG emissions
under the 2 °C target path. Until 2030, total net greenhouse gas emissions remain
at plateau at roughly 13.57 billion tCO2, in which energy consumption-related CO2
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Table 9.8 Makeup of greenhouse gas emissions under the 2 °C target path (unit: GtCO2e)
2020 2030 2050
CO2 emissions from energy consumption 10.03 10.46 2.92
CO2 emissions from industrial processes 1.32 0.94 0.47
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 2.44 2.78 1.76
Forest carbon sinks −0.58 −0.61 −0.70
CCS + BECCS 0.00 0.00 -0.51
Net emissions 13.21 13.57 3.94
emissions stand at 10.46 billion tCO2, emissions from industrial processes at 0.94
billion tCO2, non-CO2 emissions at 2.78 billion tCO2e, and forest carbon sinks at
610 million tCO2e. Energy consumption-related CO2 emission remains the most
important source of greenhouse gas emissions. In 2050, with the rapidly decar-
bonized energy mix, energy consumption-related CO2 emissions, emissions from
industrial processes, and non-CO2 emissions are 2.92 billion, 470 million, and 1.76
billion tons respectively, down 71.9%, 57.3%, and 36.7% from the level in 2030.
With the prospect of 700 million tons of forest carbon sinks and 510 million tons
of CCS/BECCS, net greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 are estimated at 3.94 billion
tCO2e, 71% less than in 2030. In 2050, without taking into account agricultural
and forestry carbon sinks and CCS, non-CO2 greenhouse gases emissions make up
34% of total greenhouse gas emissions, compared with 16% today. Non-CO2 emis-
sion reduction becomes an important source for curbing greenhouse gas emissions,
providing the rationale for earlier technological planning.
In the long run, further technological breakthroughs are needed to reduce non-CO2
GHG emissions, and effective new alternatives should be developed, which might
rapidly drive down the cost of emissions reduction. Under the 2 °C target path, it
is more important to strategically deploy research on non-CO2 emission reduction
technologies in advance, and explore more effective market mechanisms such as the
carbon market to accelerate non-CO2 emission reduction.
Compared with the policy scenario, the total greenhouse gas emissions without
CCS and carbon sinks in the 2 °C target path by 2050 decreases by 61%, and the total
greenhouse gas emissions with CCS and carbon sinks decreases by 69%, as shown
in Table 9.9.
9.3 Analysis of Net Zero CO2 Emissions Pathway Driven
by the 1.5 °C Target
At present, the call for establishing and achieving the target of holding temperature
rise below 1.5 °C has been getting stronger. Since the release of the IPCC Special
Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C, many countries have set out to layout and plan
relevant strategies and goals for net zero emissions by the middle of this century. In
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Table 9.9 Greenhouse gas
emissions under the 2 °C
target path and policy
scenario in 2050 (unit:
GtCO2e)
Policy scenario 2 °C target path









Forest carbon sinks −0.62 −0.70
CCS + BECCS 0.00 -0.51
Net emissions 12.55 3.94
particular, European Union, aims to be the first regional block to have committed to
going “climate-neutral” by 2050, and plays a leadership role of the global climate
change progress. China, as the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases with aiming the
goal of building a great modern socialist country by 2050, should undertake emission
reduction obligations which commensurate with the rising national power and inter-
national influence. Based on the detailed analysis of the 2 °C target-oriented scenario
in the previous section, this part is going to provide a further study and discussion
on the 1.5 °C target-oriented scenario, including transition pathway towards net zero
CO2 emission goal by 2050 and also deep decarbonization of other greenhouse gases.
9.3.1 Scenario Analysis on 1.5 °C Target-oriented Net-zero
Development Path
To bring about net-zero CO2 emission of the energy system by 2050, as shown in
Fig. 9.7, efforts should be made to achieve the carbon peak as soon as possible
by 2030, and promptly transition to the emission pathway of the 1.5 °C scenario.
Compared with the 2 °C target path, the 1.5 °C target-oriented net-zero development
path (1.5 °C target path) shows more notable decline in direct CO2 emissions of
the energy system after 2030. From 2030 to 2050, CO2 falls by 9.3% annually, 3.2
percentage point higher than the 6.1% in the 2 °C target path, meaning that the
period should be characterized by greater decarbonization of the energy mix, and
newly added non-fossil fuel consumption should rise by an extra 0.5 percentage point
to reach an annualized 5.5% growth.
To achieve the 1.5 °C target path, the key lies in accelerating the rise of non-fossil
fuels in primary energy consumption mix while curbing total energy use. Based on
the 2 °C target path analysis in the previous section, greater efforts should be made
in decarbonization of the energy mix to enable net-zero emission goal by 2050. The
relevant indicators of economic, energy, and CO2 emission are provided in Table
9.10.
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Fig. 9.7 Comparison of the 1.5 °C target path with other scenarios
To strive for net zero CO2 emission by 2050, total energy consumption should
peak around 2030, ideally under 5.87 billion tce, and energy consumption should also
show a downward trend after 2030. In the meantime, decarbonization of the energy
mix must accelerate, with coal, oil, natural gas, and non-fossil energy accounting for
45%, 17%, 13%, and 25% of primary energy consumption respectively in 2030, and
5.4%, 3.0%, 5.5%, and 86.1% respectively in 2050, with non-fossil energy making
greater contributions. From 2030 to 2050, the annual energy consumption per unit
of GDP can decrease at around 4%-5%, and the decline in carbon intensity of energy
consumption brought by the decarbonization of energy mix can be improved from
4.4% in 2030 to 13.7% in 2050, playing a crucial role in achieving the net-zero
emission in 2050. The total amount and composition of China’s primary energy
consumption under the 1.5 °C target path are shown in Fig. 9.8. After 2030, China
should push for a quick reduction in its consumption of fossil energy, especially coal,
and the installation of coal and other fossil energy units would risk massive early
retirement and huge stranded costs.
Figure 9.9 and Table 9.10 illustrate the CO2 emissions of major sectors under
the 1.5 °C target path. After 2030, more notable carbon reduction is observed in
all sectors. The industrial and power sector, in particular, need to strengthen their
efforts in emission reduction. By 2050, with the contribution of 780 million tons
of forest carbon sink and 880 million tons of CCS (BECCS), the economy-wide
CO2 emissions are reduced to about 60 million tons, basically achieving a net zero
emission target.
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Fig. 9.9 CO2 emission by sector in the 1.5 °C target path
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9.3.2 Comprehensive Analysis on GHG Emissions in the 1.5
°C Target Path
Under the 1.5 °C target path, China’s total greenhouse gas emissions and their compo-
sition in the future are shown in Table 9.11 and Fig. 9.10. In comparison with the 2
°C target path, total greenhouse gas emissions could drop to 1.33 billion CO2e by
2050, of which energy-related CO2 emissions make up approximately 1.47 billion
tons and industrial process CO2 emissions make up about 250 million tons. Forestry
carbon sinks, CCS (BECCS), by and large, can offset CO2 emissions from energy
consumption and industrial processes, thereby achieving net zero CO2 emission,
other greenhouse gases will see an over 50% reduction from the peak, laying a solid
foundation for net-zero emission of all greenhouse gases after 2050.
Table 9.11 All greenhouse gas emissions and their composition under the 1.5 °C target path (unit:
GtCO2e)
2020 2030 2050
CO2 emissions from energy consumption 10.03 10.31 1.47
CO2 emissions from industrial process 1.32 0.88 0.25
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 2.44 2.65 1.27
Forestry carbon sinks −0.72 −0.91 −0.78
CCS + BECCS 0.0 −0.03 −0.88
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Fig. 9.10 Greenhouse gas emissions by sector under the 1.5 °C target path
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9.3.3 Analysis on the Transition from the 2 °C Target Path
to the 1.5 °C Target Path
By 2050, the net CO2 emissions under the 2 °C target path will be 2.18 billion tons,
and the net greenhouse gas emissions will be 3.94 billion tCO2e. As for the 1.5 °C
target path, in addition to achieving net-zero CO2 emissions all greenhouse gases
emissions would also need to be reduced to 1.33 billion tCO2e. Figure 9.11 depicts
the efforts needed for further mitigation in various sectors under 1.5 °C target path.
Data suggests that industrial sectors should see significant reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions, building and transport should also strive for extreme reductions, and
the remainder can be offset by further deployment of CCS/BECCS technologies.
Under the 1.5 °C target path, non-CO2 emissions are expected to drop further with
technological breakthroughs, but the remaining emissions still run as high as 1.33
billion tCO2e, which would become the main challenge of net-zero emission of all
greenhouse gases. In the 1.5 °C target path, strengthening theR&Dofgroundbreaking
non-CO2 emission reduction technologies in advance is crucial for China to achieve
neutrality in all greenhouse gases. The initial cost of non-CO2 emission reduction
is relatively low, and emission reduction can be quickly obtained. However, the cost
of deep decarbonization is expected to be on a steep rise, requiring introduction of
groundbreaking technologies. At the same time, breakthroughs and development of
CO2 direct removal (CDR) technology is necessary to secure net-zero emission of
all greenhouse gases soon after 2050.
Fig. 9.11 Changes of sectoral contribution of emission reduction with shifting from the 2 °C target
path to the 1.5 °C target path
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9.4 Conclusions and Suggestions
(1) Difficulties and Challenges for Deep Decarbonization
Achieving “net-zero emission” by the middle of this century has become the
goal of many developed countries, and the global efforts to cap the temperature rise
within 1.5 °C have also gained more attention. At the end of 2018, the European
Commission announced the target of “carbon neutrality” by 2050, and introduced
“European Green Deal” policies package at the end of 2019 [8]. The UK also revised
its Climate Change Act in 2019, incorporating “carbon neutrality” by 2050 into the
Act, building the legal basis for deeper decarbonization of the UK [9]. The active
advancement of the 1.5 °C-oriented net zero emission target in developed countries
will not only accelerate their own low-carbon transformation of economy and society,
but also bring challenges and pressure to developing countries and less developed
nations for their efforts on this front.
The above analysis suggests that, China’s long-term low-carbon transition
pathway should compose of the short-term economic and social development with
the long-term global temperature control targets set out in the Paris Agreement. It not
only calls for greater reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the 14th and 15th Five-
Year Plans, but also further R&D of disruptive technologies including CCS/BECCS,
large-scale energy storage, hydrogen energy, and smart grid to accelerate deeper
decarbonization after 2030.
If the 1.5 °C target path proposed in this report is to be achieved by 2050, strength-
ened efforts should be made on top of the 2 °C target path. Compared with the 2 °C
target path, the consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas should fall by another 42.9%,
62.5%, and 47.0%,whereas non-fossil energy should grow by another 13.2%, and the
share of non-fossil in primary energy consumption should rise to 86.1%. To enable
deeper emission reduction, aside from applying necessary CCS in the power sector
and industrial processes, BECCS technology should be applied in the power sector,
and hydrogen production from renewable energy and hydrogen energy as secondary
energy should be used in fuel cell freight and steelmaking processes. However, these
new technologies are hampered by the barriers of technological development, as
well as uncertainties in the market penetration, which also brings major challenges
to deep decarbonization.
(2) Work Plans for Long-term Low-carbon Transformation
China’s long-term low-carbon transformation pathway should not only be consis-
tent with the stage and characteristics of its socio-economic development, but also
linked with the process of socialist modernization. It needs to accommodate both
domestic and international interests and deploy futuristic competitive strategy.Before
2030, NDC targets need to be enhanced to balance social-economic development
efforts in and energy conservation and carbon reduction, and cap both the inten-
sity and total amount of CO2 emissions to push for high-quality transformation.
In addition, great efforts should be taken to step up the R&D of technologies and
capacity building to lay a more comprehensive and solid groundwork for deeper
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decarbonization after 2030. Post- 2030, China should aim for the net-zero CO2 emis-
sions, and deep decarbonization for non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Manage all metrics
of China’s socio-economic development, and strive to fulfill the responsibilities of a
major power commensurate with its comprehensive national strength by 2050. Key
recommendations for China’s long-term low-carbon transformation.
(1) Strengthen the strategy-oriented development. The transformation of future
socio-economic development should be strategy-oriented, with the low-carbon
strategy embedded in every aspect of socio-economic development. Low-
carbon strategy should be aligned in a timely and phased manner with the
national long-term development strategy, and assigned to every five-year plan-
ning as well as sub-national strategies, thereby connecting the long-term low-
carbon strategy and the short-term socio-economic development to form a new
paradigm where the two promote and coordinate each other.
(2) Prioritize technological development. Technological development and revo-
lutions will direct influence on the progress and results of global low-
carbon transformation. Therefore, attention must be placed on the R&D
of technologies, with adequately preparation for comprehensive low-carbon
transformation. Particular focus should be placed on the R&D and demon-
stration of forward-looking technologies such as large-scale renewable
energy grid connection, hydrogen energy, energy storage, smart grid,
CCS/BECCS/DACCS, etc., to secure the bottleneck breakthroughs and tech-
nology industrialization, further enhance the international competitiveness of
China’s advanced technologies, and showcase China’s contributions to the
global low-carbon transformation.
(3) Boost capacity building. With the improvement of China’s comprehensive
national power, climate change actions should gradually expand to the entire
economy and all greenhouse gases in order to demonstrate China’s contribu-
tion as a responsible power. This requires an all-round strengthening of China’s
capacity to tackle climate change, including capacity building for greenhouse
gas measurement, verification and reporting, enhanced government’s capacity
to climate change response and more active engagement and practices of the
private sector.
(4) Enhance institutional framework. Strengthen institutional building, promote
climate change legislation, provide stronger legal ground for climate change
efforts, and boost synergies in addressing climate change and improving envi-
ronmental quality. Build stronger carbon trading market, and better harness
market forces to cut carbon emissions. Facilitate the coordination and integra-
tion of climate policies with those related to socio-economic development and
environmental protection, and leverage the synergy of policy systems.
(5) Promote comprehensive and active all stakeholders participation. Step up
education, publicity and training to further enhance the awareness, under-
standing, and support of the general public in addressing climate change, and
encourage low-carbon consuming behavior and lifestyle. Create an enabling
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environment for low-carbonparticipation andprovide broader space for various
stakeholders to take low-carbon actions actively.
References
1. National Bureau of Statistics (2019) China Statistical Yearbook 2019. China Statistics Press,
Beijing
2. National Bureau of Statistics (2020) China Statistical Yearbook 2020. China Statistics Press,
Beijing
3. NationalDevelopment andReformCommission,National EnergyAdministration. Revolution in
Energy Production and Consumption (2016–2030) [2020-4-5]. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/
zcssfz/zcgh/201704/t20170425_1145761.html
4. Hailin W, Jiankun He (2019) China’s pre-2020 CO2 emission reduction potential and its
influence. Front Energy 13(3):571–578
5. Jiankun He (2018) Post-Paris Agreement Global Climate Governance and China’s Leadership.
Environ Manag China 10(1):9–14
6. Jiankun He (2011) Economic analysis and effect evaluation of China’s CO2 emission reduction
target. Sci Res 1:9–17
7. Yi J, Lanbin L, Xiu Y (2006) Discussion on different energy accounting methods in energy
statistics. China Energy 28(6):5–8
8. European Commission. A European green deal [2020-03-29]. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/
priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en#documents
9. Committee on Climate Change. Net Zero the UK’s contribution to stopping global
warming. [2020–04–10]. https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/net-zero-the-uks-contribution-
to-stopping-global-warming/
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternationalLicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if you modified the licensed material.
You do not have permission under this license to share adapted material derived from this chapter
or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 10
Strategic Linchpins and Policy
Safeguards
10.1 Policies and Measures for China’s Low-Carbon
Development
10.1.1 Put in Place and Perpetuate a Complete
and Comprehensive Policy Framework
China has created a policy system for low-carbon development that covers a wide
range of sectors. Since the end of last century, the central government has deemed
climate change policy as part of its sustainable development policy, in particular
as part of its energy reform and economic development policy. Despite a milestone
in itself, this approach lacks clarity on the importance of climate change, which
results in the absence of clear policies for climate change mitigation and adaptation
[1]. Since the 12th Five-Year Plan, more independent policies have emerged in the
field of climate change, with setting clear and legally binding targets for curbing
carbon intensity for the very first time. A variety of low-carbon pilot projects, carbon
trading pilot projects, and MRV capacity building have also been launched. During
the 11th Five-Year Plan period, the Chinese government established the first energy
conservation policy system with binding targets as the centerpiece and performance
assessment as the safeguard, contributing to lower greenhouse gas emissions as well
as reduced energy intensity. With some revisions, most of the energy saving policies
were kept in the 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans. For instance, energy savingmandates
were expanded from the industrial sector to transport and buildings; the provincial
breakdown of energy saving targets were more science-based; targets were extended
from capping energy intensity at the national level to capping total energy consump-
tion and promoting industry-wide energy saving; and more focus was placed on the
role of market forces [2, 3]. During the 12th Five-Year Plan period, China set a target
for CO2 intensity for the first time, i.e. a reduction of 17% per 10,000 yuan of GDP,
with continued enforcement of the accountability system. The 13th Five-Year Plan
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went a step further to set a national target of reducing CO2 emission intensity by
18%.
Now, a complete and comprehensive climate policy framework has been created
inChina, comprising of not only administrativemandatory policies and best practices
withChinese characteristics, but also economic incentives (pricing, trading cap, fiscal
subsidy, etc.), regulations (laws, regulations, and standards), and policies for R&D
on low-carbon technologies. Meanwhile, there are other policies affecting climate,
such as electric power market reform, reform of taxes and fees, etc. At present,
the formulation of China’s “Law on Tackling Climate Change” is underway in a
steady manner. The 10th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 11th National
People’s Congress adopted the Resolution on Actively Tackling Climate Change
of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress on August 27, 2009,
vowing to make the strengthening of climate change legislation part and parcel
of the efforts to build and enhance the socialist legal system with Chinese char-
acteristics, and listing it on the legislative work agenda. Subsequently, legislation on
enhancing climate change management was incorporated in the 2010/15 legislative
plan in the National Development and Reform Commission. In 2011, the Leading
Working Group for Climate Change Laws and Legislation was set up, comprised
of 17 government agencies, including the Environmental Protection and Resources
Conservation Committee of the National People’s Congress, the Legislative Affairs
Commission of the National People’s Congress, the Legislative Affairs Office of
the State Council, etc. The National Development and Reform Commission served
as the lead for legislative research, survey and drafting, stakeholder opinions solic-
iting. The Climate Change Law (Draft) consists of areas including General Provi-
sions, Principles, Supervision and Management, Mitigation, Adaptation, Publicity
and Education, etc. [4]. At the moment, no consensus has been reached on the draft
law, with ongoing debates over the legislative framework, design of the core system
and the coordination with relevant laws.
At the local level, Shanxi, Qinghai, Shijiazhuang andNanchang have successively
carried out individual local legislation to address climate change and low-carbon
development. In 2010, Qinghai province promulgated the Measures of Qinghai
Province to Tackle Climate Change, defining the province’s climate change adapta-
tion and mitigation legal system. Shanxi Province released its measures in 2011 for
tackling climate change based on its own reality, including identifying key areas of
mitigation and adaptation, and lying out specific steps for greenhouse gas concen-
tration monitoring, greenhouse gases list compilation list, verifying regional and
corporate greenhouse gas emission output, and minimizing climate change’s impact.
Shijiazhuang introduced its city-wide regulation on low-carbon development in 2016,
which provided stringent provisions on the management of the operation, distribu-
tion and use of coal and oil, encouraged the development and utilization of new
and renewable energy, and devised incentive policies for building, transportation,
lighting, indoor temperature regulation, consumption reduction of daily necessities
and other daily residential consumption.
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10.1.2 Goal-Oriented Planning, Administrative Mandates,
and Market Measures
Asoppose towestern countries’ rule-based governance system centered around legis-
lation, law enforcement, and judicature, China’s climate change policy is generally
characterized by goal-based governance built upon the planning system, stressing
goal-oriented planning, administrative mandates, followed up by market measures
[5]. Though the special legislation on climate change is still being drafted, China has
incorporated a relatively comprehensive low-carbon planning regime with the “Five-
Year Plans” at the core,with detailed steps at the local, and sectoral and territorial level
[6]. The Five-Year Plans are one of the fundamental tools of national macro-control.
China views climate change management as a long-term strategic task for social
and economic sustainable development. Since the 12th Five-Year Plan, China has
incorporated carbon intensity as a binding target in the national economic and social
development plan, and launched national, regional and sectoral plans, programs and
strategies to cope with climate change. Revolving around the national binding target
of emission reduction per unit of GDP, efforts have been made to propel the low-
carbon transition in energy and economy. The National Plan for Tackling Climate
Change (2014–2020) was released in 2014. The 12th and 13th Five-Year Plan both
had work plans for curbing greenhouse gases, with low-carbon development plans
for various industries. These have provided a major boost to China’s climate change
efforts.
Administrative means are the most distinctive policy tools of China. In spite of
China’s increasingly full-fledged climate policies, the administrativemeans centering
around “goals” are still predominant [7, 8]. Among the different administrative
measures, performance assessment policies of emission reduction, energy conser-
vation and the phase-out of outdated production capacity for local governments and
major emitters stand out as typical policy instruments that have adapted to China’s
current system and institutional mechanism, ensuring the attainment of China’s
climate change goals. On the other hand, administrative means alone have their defi-
ciencies and adverse consequences. First, administrative means are mostly expensive
and economically inefficient. Secondly, this top-down stress escalation may not be
properly translated into the spontaneous desire of local governments and enterprises
to preserve energy and cut emissions. Thirdly, as the targets of energy conservation
and carbon reduction are assigned tomultiple levels of government, those at or below
the county level bear the responsibilities incommensurate with their administrative
authority. Caving in to mighty political pressure from above, grassroot governments
may resort to extreme measures such as power cuts to reach their goals, resulting in
adverse consequences [9].
Driven by international mechanisms, market-oriented policy system for climate
change have flourished from its infancy, marking its milestone with the creation of
the carbon market. Holistically speaking, China’s market mechanism for climate
change has experienced three stages of development [10]. The first stage, spanning
from 1992 to 2008, was the exploratory phase featured by mostly project-level,
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process-based and single-sided international transactions. As a developing country,
China can sell its “Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs)” to developed nations
helping them to meet their emission reduction targets through the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM). The second stage, from 2009 to 2015, is marked by efforts
to foster the carbonmarket through innovations by bottom-up, allowance-based local
pilots. In 2011, the Chinese government explicitly proposed in the 12th Five-Year
Plan to “gradually set up a carbon trading market,” recognizing the importance of
carbon market in energy conservation and emission reduction for the first time at the
national level. Later, to effectively implement the goals set out in the 12th Five-Year
Plan, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the Notice on the
Pilot Work of Carbon Trading at the end of 2011, approving the pilots in Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Hubei, Guangdong and Shenzhen. From 2013 to
2014, the above seven provinces, municipalities, and cities successively promul-
gated the Carbon Emission Trading Management Measures, officially launching the
seven pilots. The National Development and Reform Commission has provided each
provincial and municipal commission much leeway for building the seven pilots
that were distinctively designed in terms of the coverage, allowance allocation and
trading rules, gaining rich and diverse practical experience for creating a nationwide
carbon market. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 and the inclusion
of the emission peak target in the policy agenda, China is now embarking on the
third stage of market development to combat climate change. In December 2017, the
National Carbon TradingMarket Development Plan (Power Generation Sector)was
introduced, specifying that the power generation sector would be the springboard to
kick off the national trading system. The first 1,700 power generation companies
included in the national carbon market emit over 3 billion tons of CO2e annually,
accounting for about 1/3 of the country’s total emissions. By the end of 2018, nearly
800 million tons of carbon emissions had been traded in China. In March 2019, the
Ministry of Ecology and Environment released the Provisional Regulations on the
Management of Carbon Trading (Draft for Comments)—a milestone in the institu-
tional development of the national carbon market, providing the policy basis and
legislative guarantee for building a nationwide carbon market.
10.1.3 Strengthen the Coordinated Governance
of Environment and Climate Change
In recent years, it has become evident and trendy that coordinated governance
between environment and climate change have become increasingly prominent. In
the mid and late period of the 12th Five-Year Plan, air quality issues, in particular,
PM2.5 and ozone drew tremendous concern both domestically and internationally,
prompting swift actions by the Chinese government to introduce a spate of ambi-
tious policies for combating air pollution, including the Action Plan on Air Pollution
Prevention and Control, Three Year Action Plan for the Blue Sky Campaign and
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Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction of the
13th Five-Year Plan. These policies, through decarbonizing the energy mix, devel-
oping clean energy, enhancing energy efficiency, and gradually decrease the use of
fossil fuels, have managed to secure the coordinated governance of air pollution and
climate change [11]. For example, the central government has enacted policies for
curbing and reducing coal consumption, and started with the most polluted areas
for stringent restriction on coal use, which were gradually expanded to the entire
nation. Thanks to an array of interventions to curtail coal consumption, more than
950 million tons of coals were saved from the closure of small thermal power plants
in China between 2005 and 2020. Approximately 15.18 million tons of SO2 emis-
sions were prevented from the reduced coal use. With over two billion tons of CO2
emissions forestalled [12]. In a new round of organizational restructuring in March
2018, the climate change and emission reduction responsibilities of the National
Development and Reform Commission were integrated into the newly established
Ministry of Ecology and Environment, further benefit the coordinated governance
of environment and climate change.
10.2 Strategic Linchpins and Policy Safeguards for China’s
Long-Term Low-Carbon Development
Combating climate change involves every facet of the economy, society and environ-
ment. Climate change strategymust also be alignedwith the overall national develop-
ment strategy and integrated into the economic and social development strategies of
all industries and sectors, to enable coordinated governance andwin–win cooperation
among economy, society, environment and climate change. China’s 2050 long-term
low-carbon development strategy should, first and foremost, support the country’s
development, and assist in building a modern socialist country that is prosperous,
strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful. Meanwhile, the
strategy should seek to strengthen ecological civilization, green low-carbon circular
development, harmonious coexistence between human and nature and sustainable
development. It should fulfill the target of deep decarbonization aligned with the
global efforts to limit temperature rise well below 2 °C and ideally with 1.5 °C (see
Fig. 10.1). From the perspective of national macro strategy, China’s climate change
strategy and policy support need to highlight the following aspects:
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Fig. 10.1 Strategic framework for long-term low-carbon emissions transition
10.2.1 Defining Climate Change Strategy in National Priority
and Embed the Pathway of Deep Decarbonization
in the Overall Development Goals and Strategies
The 19th CPC National Congress incorporated progress of ecological civiliza-
tion in the foundation for building socialism in the new era, making a two-stage
strategic roadmap. First stage, from 2020 to 2035, aims to basically achieve socialist
modernization with fundamental improvement of the ecological environment and
the achievement of a beautiful China in general. Second stage, lasting from 2035
to mid-century, seeks to build China into a great modern socialist country that is
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful with
all-round ecological progress and fulfillment of a beautiful China. Climate change
efforts need to be aligned with the two-stage goal, the formulation of long and
medium-term and short-term climate plans needs to be integrated into the compre-
hensive strategies for the economical social environment. During the first stage in
2020–2035, it is important for the national economic and social development strategy
to harness the synergy of improving environmental quality and reducing CO2 emis-
sions, attain China’s NDC goals while lowering PM2.5 concentrations inmajor cities
and regions to below 35 µg/m3, thus achieving the coordinated governance and a
win–win scenario of the economy, energy, environment and climate change. There-
fore, it’s essential to specify the earlier peak of CO2 emissions as a major strategic
target at this stage, and put forth the peak emission targets and measures to spur
the energy revolution and economic transformation. Ideally, 2035 should witness
notable reduction in CO2 emissions from the peak year, with a continuous cut of
absolute emissions and the absolute decoupling of sustainable economic and social
development from CO2 emissions, which are to be aligned with a more ambitious
emission reduction targets in the second stage [13, 14].
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After 2035, as China achieves basic modernization, with ecological environment
fundamentally improved, urgency is placed on climate change response and green-
house gas reduction, which is amore daunting challenge. To fulfill the 2 °C target, the
annual decline of global greenhouse gas emissions must exceed 7%, far higher than
that of the developed nations before 2030. With this in mind, during the second stage
from 2035 to 2050, China’s climate change strategy should go beyond the domestic
need for resource utilization and environmental protection, it should accommodate
the pathway of emission reduction needed for preserving the ecological safety of
the earth, honor the historic mission by making contributions to humanity. Using the
benchmark of keeping temperature rise below2 °Cwith continuous pursuit for 1.5 °C,
formulate goals, strategies and pathways for a steep reduction in absolute emissions
across all greenhouse gases in the entire economy, and bring to fruition near-zeroCO2
emission and deep emission reduction from other greenhouse gases by the middle
of the century. The process of deep decarbonization of the energy system will also
effectively roll back the emissions of conventional pollutants, playing an instrumental
role in securing a PM2.5 concentration below 15 µg/m3 in major regions and cities in
China by 2050.With the continuous development of China’s comprehensive national
strength and international influence, China should proactively assume responsibili-
ties and obligations that echo its position in the greater world, placing climate change
goals at the center of the strategy of building a socialist modern society, steer the
world onto the path of climate-friendly low-carbon economic development, taking
on commitment to global ecological civilization, the shared interests of all humanity.
Demonstrate world-leading influence and leadership in combating climate change,
by historic contribution to the preservation of the earth’s ecological safety, and the
survival and development of all humankind.
The key to implementing the low-carbon development strategy today lies in
changing the mindset of policy-makers at all levels. It is crucial to adhere to the
development philosophy of the new era, with innovation at the core of development,
shift growth drivers, and transform the way of development. It’s imperative to enable
harmonious coexistence between human and nature and embark on a path of high-
quality green and low-carbon circular development. Policy-makers at all levels must
shift their mindset in development concepts, from sole pursuit of the quantity and
speed of GDP growth to a more comprehensive effort on the quality and efficiency
of economic growth, formulate and enforce binding targets and policy “red lines”
for resource conservation, environmental protection and CO2 emission reduction.
Governments at all levels should balance between economic growth, employment,
and life quality with resource conservation, environmental protection and carbon
emissions, carefully balancing GDP growth with its related losses of resources and
environment, to avoid a “dilemma” and enjoy a “win–win”. Efforts should be made
to take climate change as the centerpiece of building ecological civilization, placing
sustainable development strategy featuring green low-carbon transformation high on
the agenda of economic development, change the mindset and assessment criteria
of policy-maker, and strengthen the accountability of energy conservation, carbon
reduction, and ecological protection.
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Decision-makers at every position should fully recognize the importance and
strategic positioning of global cooperation in addressing climate change. It is an
indisputable scientific fact that human activities have caused global climate change,
and tackling climate change is a common cause for global cooperation in protecting
the ecological safety of the earth and the survival and development of humankind.
President Xi Jinping repeatedly stressed that “climate change affects the well-being
of everyone and the future of humanity.” China’s strategy for promoting low-carbon
transformation and combating climate change is not only an inherent demand for
sustainable development domestically, but also a major step forward to proactively
assume international responsibilities, and actively contribute to the progress of
humankind. The shared interests of all should be the center in the strategic goals
and roadmap for low-carbon transformation of China. It’s imperative to proceed
from and to take the leadership of the global trend for low-carbon development in
combating climate change, (develop competitive advantages for low-carbon tech-
nologies and execution capabilities for it to become a milestone in building of a
strong modern socialist country.)
10.2.2 Adhere to New Development Concept, Spur Industrial
Restructuring and Upgrading, and Facilitate Green,
Low-Carbon, Circular Economical Transformation
Since theChinese economy entered a period of “newnormal”, the central government
has put forth five development notions, namely, “innovative development, coordi-
nated development, green development, open development and shared development,”
using innovative development as the growth drivers, and green development as the
strategic target. The 19th National Congress also enshrined strengthened ecological
civilization and the building beautiful China as a fundamental strategy of China’s
socialist modernization, indicating the need to establish an industrial system that is
of green, low-carbon and circular development, build a clean, low-carbon, safe and
efficient energy system, and promote comprehensive conservation and utilization
of resources. This will help accelerate the strategic restructuring of the economy,
catalyze industry transformation and upgrade, enhance development efficiency and
quality. It is also a strategic action to reduce CO2 emissions.
Since the 11th Five-Year Plan period, China has seen remarkable achievements in
energy conservation and carbon reduction, with energy intensity and CO2 intensity
per unit of GDP on rapid decline. Given the unique characteristics of economic
structure and energy mix at the current stage of industrialization, the energy and CO2
intensity per unit of GDP are still at a relatively high level. The technical efficiency
of energy conversion and utilization and energy consumption per unit of product
in China are not far behind that of developed countries, with many areas at world
leading level. Yet China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP in 2017 was still 1.6
times that of the world’s average, and two to four times that of developed countries.
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This was mainly due to an excessively high proportion of the secondary industries,
especially the heavy chemical sector. Energy consumption from the industrial sector
accounts for 2/3 of the total national end-use, as opposed to no more than 1/3 in
developed countries in general. Moreover, China’s manufacturing products are at
the middle and lower end of the value chain with high energy consumption and low
added value. The structural factors of the above industries and products are the main
contributors to high energy consumption of GDP [15].
At present, the new wave of industrial revolution marked by digitalization and
smart technologies is flourishing worldwide with cross influence of two major
trends of economic green transformation and digital transformation. The growing
construction of data centers during digital transformation will spur up the demand
for electricity, and will also lead to tremendous improvement in the efficiency of
economic growth and resource utilization, cutting energy consumption intensity per
unit increase of GDP as a whole. Therefore, it’s vital to grasp and speed up the new
economic development marked by digitalization, optimize allocation of resources,
and accelerate the spread and application of suchdigital technologies, including artifi-
cial intelligence, 5G, cloud computing, and Internet of Things, during the low-carbon
transformation of energy and economy.
From2005 to 2018, about 1/3 of the decline inGDPenergy intensitywas attributed
to the technological energy saving from the improved efficiency of energy technolo-
gies, whereas around 2/3 was from the structural energy saving from the changes and
upgrading of industrial structure and product portfolio. In the future, the strategic
restructuring shall focus on accelerated high technology industry andmodern service
industry, reducing the share of the industrial sector, especially the heavy and chem-
ical sector with high energy consumption, while moving up manufactured goods to
the higher end of the global value chain. This is an important strategy for low-carbon
economic transformation.
It is necessary to establish and perpetuate an energy-saving and low-carbon
industrial system by adopting new industrialization trends, vigorously developing
circular economy, optimizing the industrial structure, revising the catalogue of indus-
trial restructuring, restoring the expansion of energy intensive and high emission
industries, speeding up the phase-out of backward production capacity, vigorously
fostering the service and strategically emerging industries, devising targets and action
plans for emission control in key industries, and studying and formulating standards
for greenhouse gas emissions in key industries. Measures should be made to enhance
energy efficiency through energy conservation, restrain emissions from key indus-
tries such as electricity, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, building materials, and
chemicals, and etc. Strengthen the management of carbon emissions in new projects,
actively control greenhouse gas emissions from industrial production, promote the
circular transformation of industrial parks and build a green, low-carbon and circular
industrial system.
Currently, China’s exports mainly comprise of manufacturing goods, and the
export of services is relatively low.However, thesemanufacturingproducts aremostly
medium and low-end with high energy consumption and low added-value, causing
persistently high implied energy and CO2 levels of export in goods, which accounted
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for more than 20% of China’s total emissions from 2005 to 2014, a percentage only
declined until recent years. The implied CO2 emissions from export in goods made
up 15.3% of total domestic emissions in 2018, while implied emissions from imports
stood at 542 million tons, and implied emissions from net exports contributed 10.8%
to total domestic emissions. Thus, it is imperative to actively place efforts in limiting
the extensive expansionary economic growth pattern driven by continuous rise in
investment, capacity building of the heavy and chemical industry and expansion in
export of manufacturing goods. The export structure should be optimized to curb
and reduce the export of energy-intensive products, promote export of higher-end
products in the value chain, reduce implied carbon transfer to foreign countries,
encourage and boost export of high technology and high-end service industries, and
work to strike a balance of imports and exports in terms of implicit carbon, a crucial
step to lower domestic CO2 emissions, and should be deemed a major component of
China’s low-carbon development strategy.With the ongoing economic globalization,
China’s efforts in developing export-oriented economy, improving the international
competitiveness of manufacturing products and technologies, and moving to the
higher end of international industrial value chain also constitute the country’s solution
to reducing CO2 emissions and securing low-carbon transformation [16, 17].
It is of great significance to develop a circular economy with improved efficiency
of resource utilization to cut energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Resource
utilization efficiency is an important bridge toward green and low-carbon circular
development. It emphasizes reduction, reuse and recycling of resources to obtain
more higher added-value and sustainable products and services with less resource
consumption and emissions. This also marks a key component of green and low-
carbon transformation and sustainable development.
By current universal standard, China consumes vast amount of material resources.
In 2017, China made up 1/3 of the world’s resource extraction. In terms of per capita
intensity, China’s per capita material resource extraction in 2017 was 23.6 tons,
ranking the third in the world, about twice the world’s average per capita of 12.2
tons. The resource output of China’s economic system is less than 1/10 of that of
Germany and Japan. One reason is structural. China is under rapid urbanization
and massive infrastructure construction that consume large quantities of material
resources, different from post-industrialized developed nations. Second, China is
relatively behind in the technology and management of primary resource reduction,
efficient processing and conversion, waste recycling, and etc. due to technical imped-
iments. China’s overall resource consumption will remain relatively high for a long
time in the future. Growing urbanization will keep increasing the stock of material
resources in the society, with explosive growth in urban wastes, prompting acceler-
ated efforts in the recycling and reuse of used and scrapped cars, home appliances,
photovoltaic components, and electric vehicle batteries. “Urban mines” will partly
replace natural minerals to become an important source of metals and non-metallic
material resources, with recycling making greater contributions to the guarantee of
strategic resources. Under this scenario, it is necessary to make the development of
circular economy and the improvement of resource utilization efficiency a crucial
component of the long-term low-carbon development strategy, and strive to double
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the output of major resources by 2035 and measure up to the world’s advanced level
of resource utilization efficiency by 2050. Similar to the proposal of the EU Green
Deal to decouple economic growth and resource utilization to embark on the path of
sustainable development featuring a green and low-carbon cycle [18].
10.2.3 Further Improvement in Energy Conservation
and Efficiency for End Use and Facilitate
the Substitution of Electricity and Hydrogen for Direct
Use of Fossil Energy
The industrial sector is the biggest end user of energy in China, accounting for about
65% of the total end-use of energy nationwide in 2018, of which 70% comes from
energy-intensive raw material sectors. China’s output of steel, cement, household
appliances and other products makes up about half of the world’s total. Aside from
accelerating industrial restructuring, transformation and upgrading, focus must be
placed on the phase-out of backward production capacity, swifter industrial tech-
nology upgrade and improve energy efficiency. In particular, for steel, cement, coal
and petrochemical industries where emission reduction remains a challenge, revolu-
tionary and deep decarbonization technologies such as hydrogen steel making and
hydrogen chemical technologies should be developed. Electric and hydrogen energy
should take up greater share in end-use energy composition to bring about the deep
decarbonization in the industrial sector. As a manufacturing powerhouse, China will
not completely follow the path of developed countries like the Americas and Europe
to relocate themanufacturing industry to less-developed regions in its futuremodern-
ization endeavors. By the middle of this century, China will maintain its strategic
positioning of a major and comprehensive manufacturing nation, with the added
value of industrial sector to percentage of GDP no less than the current average
level of developed countries. Despite the trend of urbanization, the projected rate of
growth and proportion of energy consumption and CO2 emissions in the construction
and transportation sectors will overtake that of the industrial sector, but the share of
energy end consumption in the industrial sector will remain higher than that in the
construction and transportation sectors. Given the great potential of industrial sector
for energy conservation and carbon reduction, it should enable an earlier peak of its
CO2 emissions prior to 2030 by ramping up industrial transformation and upgrading,
improving energy efficiency and promoting electric energy replacement [19].
In 2017, the end energy consumption of the construction sector accounted for 16%
of the total end use in China. To fully unleash the potential of energy conservation in
the construction sector, improve related policies on building energy efficiency, and
push for the 65% energy efficiency standard for all new buildings by 2020, enhance
the mix of energy end-use of buildings, so that renewables could contribute 25% to
all energy consumption of buildings by 2020. Accelerated steps should be taken to
revamp existing buildings and heatingmetering for energy conservation, government
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should lead the efforts with imposed cap on energy consumption of public buildings.
More importantly, the total number of public and civil buildings should be limited. In
2015, the construction industry consumed around 864Mtce of energy, approximately
20% of the national total energy consumption. In the future, the total building area
should be kept at about 75 billion square meters with roughly 1100Mtce in energy
consumption. Heating in northern China should better leverage the combined use
of waste heat and pressure in the power and industrial sector, strengthen distributed
renewable energy and electric energy replacement, boost the clean and efficient
utilization of biomass energy in rural areas, and strive for emission peak around
2030, support the nationwide peak target, and bring about near-zero emission in the
sector by the middle of this century [20].
A comprehensive green and low-carbon transport system should be established
to improve the transport structure. Develop railways, urban rail transit, waterways
and other modes of transport that are low energy consumption and enhance transport
demand management. Fuel consumption limits should be raised across the board
for vehicles and vessels with a timetable for phasing out gasoline vehicles. Green
mobility should be encouraged with promotions for more trips on public transport.
The composition of vehicle fuels should be improved by tapping into biofuels, espe-
cially for electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles. Oil and gas should be
replaced with electricity and hydrogen on a large scale. Smart management of trans-
portation must be strengthened to develop combined transport of land and sea with
enhanced efficiency. In 2018, 509 Mtce of energy was consumed in the transport
sector, equivalent to 10.7% of the country’s total energy consumption, with freight
taking up over 60%. The future will see increasing proportion of energy consump-
tion in passenger transport with reduced consumption in freight. By adopting proper
measures, China is on track to achieve the peak around 2035 in the transport sector,
and near-zero emission by the middle of this century [21].
With the end-use sector, promoting the substitution of electricity and hydrogen
energy for direct combustion of fossil fuels and utilization of raw materials is a vital
step in the low-carbon transition strategy. With the support of near-zero emission
energy system dominated by new and renewable energy, replacing fossil energy with
zero-carbon electricity and hydrogen generated from electricity is a crucial initiative
for the end users to achieve near-zero emission in the future. The share of power
in end-use energy consumption in China was about 24% in 2019, projected to rise
to over 30% in 2030, and around 55% in 2050 under the 2 °C scenario. Non-fossil
energy as a percentage of primary energy will also climb from 15.3% in 2019 to
25% in 2030 and over 70% in 2050. With the increase of non-fossil power in total
electricity consumption, more electric power substitution in the end use sectors will
be instrumental to lowerCO2 emissions.On the other hand, hydrogen as a clean, zero-
carbon secondary energy, can be used as a raw material in the process of industrial
production to replace fossil fuels such as coal, oil, coke and gas. It can also be used as
a means of energy storage to replace and reduce fossil fuel combustion and direct use
of the end users, and should therefore be included in China’s long-term low-carbon
development strategy as an important strategic resource [22].
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10.2.4 Speed up the Decarbonization of Energy Mix
and Ensure Clean, Safe, and Economical Energy
Supply
Since the 11thFive-Year Plan,China has pacedup the development of newand renew-
able energy and promoted the low-carbonization energy mix. The share of coal in the
total energymix has dropped from72.4% in 2005 to 57.7% in 2019, non-fossil energy
has risen from 7.4% to 15.3%, and CO2 intensity per unit of energy consumption has
fallen by 13.3% in 2019 from the level in 2015. However, the coal-based energy mix
is yet to be fundamentally transformed, with the CO2 intensity per unit of energy
consumption more than 20% higher than the world average and 35% higher than that
of the European Union. Accelerating the development of new and renewable energy
and reducing CO2 intensity per unit of energy consumption are important measures
to cut CO2 emissions on the premise of ensuring safe and efficient energy supply.
By the middle of this century, China is to build a near-zero-emission energy system
with new and renewable energy as the mainstay, actively develop technologies like
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage
(BECCS). These technologies can be applied for massive industrialization after 2030
and enable more than 500 million tonnes of CO2 capture and storage a year by 2050,
paving the pathway for earlier carbon neutrality.
By 2030, non-fossil power should comprise about 50% of the total power gener-
ated, with non-fossil fuels taking up about 25% of the primary energy mix before
rising up to 90% and over 70% respectively by 2050 under the 2 °C scenario, and
over 90% and over 85% respectively under the 1.5 °C scenario. This should be part
and parcel ofChina’s long-term low-carbon transformation strategy. China now ranks
first in the world in terms of installed capacity and new production capacity of hydro,
wind and solar power, which will all exceed 400 million kilowatts by 2030. Taking
safety into consideration, nuclear power should be developed on a large scale with an
installed capacity exceeding 100 million kilowatts by 2030, and 200 to 300 million
kilowatts by 2050. With its high load factor, nuclear power holds the key to the safe
and stable operation of grids with a high uptake of renewable energy. With the devel-
opment of technological innovation and new energy industry, the cost of wind and
solar electric power has fallen rapidly to a level on par with that of traditional fossil
power in most cases. Energy storage, electric vehicles and other technology costs
are also seeing rapid decline, ready to embrace massive industrialization and expe-
rience faster growth driven by technological innovation and policy support. Natural
gas, as a cleaner, more efficient and lower-carbon source of fossil energy than coal
and oil, enjoys its unique advantages and importance in the low-carbon transition
of the energy system, providing grounds for the exploitation and utilization of more
conventional and unconventional natural gas to replace and reduce the consumption
of coal and oil [23, 24].
At present, China is still highly dependent on oil and natural gas imports—apoten-
tial hazard for energy security.With the swift energy transformation, additional future
energy demand will be met mainly by newly developed energy sources in order to
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peak emissions by 2030. The consumption of coal, oil and natural gas will succes-
sively experience steady decline, and the oil and gas imports will see a decline. To
safeguard the security of national energy supply, focus should be placed on themacro
trend of energy transformation to accommodate short and long-term development.
The replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy is the ultimate solution to the
security of energy supply. Excessive dependence on coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas is not
desirable. Attempts to cut back imports of oil and gas by promoting coal consumption
run counter to the world trend of energy transformation, with no prospects for tech-
nological competitiveness internationally. The rapid industrialization and lower cost
of new and renewable energy is increasingly disrupting the traditional energymarket,
with growing interest from the finance and investment community for the zero-carbon
energy system. Traditional energy infrastructure and capacity expansion might risk
early retirement and elimination in the future, incurring huge stranded costs. By the
middle of this century, China should put in place a sustainable energy system based
on new and renewable energy to ensure the turnaround of environmental quality,
achieve the security of energy supply, end the country’s dependence on oil and gas
imports, thereby creating a clean, safe, economically appropriate modern system of
sustainable energy supply to support the goal of building a strong socialist modern
country and a “beautiful China” [25].
10.2.5 Push Forward the Reduction of Non-CO2 GHG
Emissions, and Take Measures to Reduce
Economy-Wide GHG Emissions
The Paris Agreement calls for absolute emission reduction of all greenhouse gases
in the entire economy of developed nations and encourages developing nations to do
the same step by step. China’s NDC targets and action plans under the Paris Agree-
ment mainly involve CO2 emissions related to energy activities, which embody the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. With the rise of China’s
comprehensive national strength and future progress in global response to climate
change, China should steadily press ahead on emission reduction from all green-
house gases across the economic sectors to rein in and reduce non-CO2 greenhouse
gas emissions, placing it as a crucial component of the long-term low-carbon devel-
opment strategy, set clear objectives and strategies, and develop holistic plans for
coordinated progress.
In 2014, China’s emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as methane,
nitrous oxide and fluorine-containing gases accounted for approximately 16% of
the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions involve a wide range
of industries from scattered sources such as methane leakage in oil and gas produc-
tion, gas emissions from coal mines, replacement of refrigerants for air conditioners
and waste disposal. Since the initial cost of emission reduction is fairly low with
immediate positive economic benefits, mitigation measures should be vigorously
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promoted. But if deep emission reduction or near-zero emission is to be achieved,
its marginal cost of emission reduction will mostly be on a nonlinear rise. With the
prospect of substantial CO2 reduction in the energy system, non-CO2 and other green-
house gas emissions will make up a larger share and become the biggest challenge for
emission reduction, thus taking a more vital role in the future deep decarbonization
scenario. To achieve near-zero and net-zero emissions of all greenhouse gases by
the middle of this century, China needs to spur innovation and industrial develop-
ment of non-CO2 emission reduction technologies. During the 14th Five-Year Plan
period, solutions should be crafted and implemented to cut non-CO2 greenhouse gas
emissions to gradually set up a policy framework and management mechanism for
reducing all greenhouse gases across economic sectors.
Methane is a short-lived greenhouse gas whose warming potential is 84 times that
ofCO2 in 20years (22 times in 100years).Methane emission reduction can contribute
greatly to controlling immediate temperature rise and is gaining more attention in
this regard. Relatively mature emission reduction technologies and measures are
available for methane leakage in coal, oil and gas production with low cost and
high potential economic benefits. It is necessary to vigorously disseminate these
technologies, propose emission reduction targets and plans, formulate industry stan-
dards, and incorporate them in national and regional development plans to take the
lead in achieving significant results in non-CO2 emission reduction.
Methane emissions are the most important source of non-CO2 greenhouse gas
emissions in China, comprising 56% of all non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions in
2014. It is also themost important area for emission reduction with the biggest poten-
tial and effective technology for implementation. Under the macro trend of energy
transition, activities in coal and oil and gas production will be reduced, resulting in
lower methane emissions. There is also a need for better management and techno-
logical progress to facilitate methane recycling and reuse, strengthened management
of rice paddies, improved animal feeding and solid waste disposal for the effective
control and reduction of methane emissions.
It’s vital to step up technological innovation, develop alternative technologies
and processes, enhance end-use recycling, reuse, disposal and decomposition, and
improve farming methods to effectively curb and reduce greenhouse gas emissions
such as nitrous oxide and fluorine-containing gases. By employing a mixture of
measures, China can manage to simultaneously peak non-CO2 greenhouse gases
and CO2 emissions. By 2050, non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, ideally, should
fall by more than 50% from the peak year.
The initial cost of reducing non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions is fairly low, with
some technologies bearing positive economic benefits, but the marginal cost shows
a steep rise. Technically and economically feasible tools and measures are not yet
available for deep emission reduction of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, which, nonethe-
less, are hopeful for a simultaneous peakwith CO2 by 2030 on condition of redoubled
efforts. But by 2050, there will still be more than one billion tons of CO2e in non-
CO2 greenhouse gas emissions that cannot be effectively reduced. To achieve prompt
carbon neutrality of all greenhouse gases after the mid-century benchmark, non-CO2
reduction will be a gigantic obstacle, which calls for the development of negative
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emission technologies (such as BECCS) and other CO2 removal technologies (CDR)
in the energy sector to offset the remaining emissions. Therefore, the vigorous devel-
opment of deep emission reduction technologies and tools for non-CO2 greenhouse
gases is vital to the future goal of carbon neutrality.
10.2.6 Attach Importance to Urban Energy Conservation
to Drive the Change of Consumption Patterns
and the Construction of a Low-Carbon Society
As China wraps up massive infrastructure construction from industrialization and
urbanization, the proportion of energy consumption and CO2 emissions needed for
the production of basic investment goods and raw materials decreases, and the share
of energy andCO2 emissions supporting the production of social andpublic consumer
goods and direct household consumption increases. In this context, promoting poli-
cies of energy saving and low-carbon consumption in urbanization will serve an
increasingly important role in realizing long-term emission strategy and pathway.
Urbanization is not only a powerful driver for spurring domestic demand, fueling
economic growth and improving people’s well-being, but also a major contributor
to increased energy consumption and CO2 emissions. China should seek balanced
and coordinated development among regions in the process of industrialization and
urbanization, devise holistic plans for urban and rural areas, and ensure social fair-
ness and harmony. At the same time, it is necessary to explore the model of social
production and consumption centering around ecological civilization and pave the
path of a new model of urbanization [26].
President Xi Jinping stressed the need to “give high priority to energy conser-
vation during urbanization, foster diligent and thrifty consumption, and speed up
the formation of an energy-conserving society.” Energy consumption is bound to
rise with the construction of urbanization infrastructure and the migration of rural
residents. Given the circumstance, endeavors should be made during urbanization
with focus on low-carbon urban planning, infrastructure, lifestyle and consump-
tion, and promote public awareness, and consumption habits. The overall transi-
tion strategy should revolve around city size and layout, transportation system and
way of travel, building structure and energy-saving standards, energy supply and
consumption pattern. Apart from more stringent standards for building energy effi-
ciency, enhanced energy efficiency of home appliances and improved automotive
fuel economy, among other energy saving measures, more focus should be placed
on the general layout and planning of low-carbon cities, the transition from luxury
spending and material pursuits of oversized luxury housing, large-engine vehicles,
etc. The change of consumption awareness and habits can effectively curb the final
energy demand of the whole society, and spark the transition of economic and social
development pattern. Caution must be exercised to avoid copying developed nations’
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traditional development model of carbon-intensive infrastructure in urban construc-
tion and luxury spending, and avoid the dilemma in which one can only seek low
energy consumption and low-carbon emission on specific facilities and individual
technologies because high energy intensity and high carbon are commonplace in
cities in the first place. Campaigns should advocate ecological civilization and a low-
carbon society, explore new models of low-carbon eco-cities and green lifestyle, so
as to embark on a new journey of ecological, low-carbon urbanization.
While stressing the shift of development concept and innovation of development
model as we build ecological civilization and materialize low-carbon development
transformation, priority should also be given to encouraging and reinforcing the
transformation and innovation of consumption awareness in order to lead a new trend
of consumption. With basic material needs met, clean air, clean drinking water, and a
livable environment are deemed more important than personal material comforts. A
high quality life is the shared experience andpublic interest of all,whichwill boost the
accumulation and sharing of publicwealth, and fairness andwin–win outcomes for all
countries and social strata. Therefore, it is crucial to steer the whole society’s interest
from the path of industrial civilization featuring the one-sided pursuit of economic
output and productivity onto the course of ecological civilization characterized by the
harmony between human and nature, economy and environment, human and society
and sustainable development, and shift from the preoccupation with material wealth
maximization to amore healthy, moderate and simple way of consumptionwithmore
focus on the ethical and cultural advancement to avoid extravagant consumption
and waste, thus prompting the transformation of economic and social development
through innovation in people’s mindset [27].
The transformation of the way of consumption requires direction from public
opinion and media outlets. The dissemination of information should be reinforced
to popularize the knowledge and raise public awareness for climate change, and
encourage the public to take voluntary actions together through grass-root organi-
zations and associations within various initiatives and joint actions, so that resi-
dents can willingly change their consumption behaviors and lifestyles. Moderate
and frugal low-carbon consumption pattern and behaviors should be viewed as social
morality and the communication and education of low-carbon consumption concepts
and behaviors should be strengthened. Public institutions must lead by example by
carrying out energy-saving and low-carbon campaigns in institutions, campuses,
hospitals, gymnasiums and military barracks to promote moderate consumption and
the use of energy-saving and low-carbon products, curb extravagance and waste. The
recycling and classification of waste products should also be improved.
Urban development policies and mechanisms should entail incentives for low-
carbon consumption to guide, regulate and encourage reflected individual consump-
tion behaviors, and create an enabling environment for low-carbon consumption in
accommodation, transportation, food consumption, among others. The shift in the
awareness and pattern of public consumption will also trigger the transformation
of production pattern. The public preference for low-carbon household appliances
and daily consumer goods will incentivize energy saving and carbon reduction in
the production process. Through carbon labeling and low-carbon certification of
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manufacturing products, consumers and producers can join hands in prompting the
low-carbon transformation of the entire society.
Efforts to build smart cities have become the latest urban trend. The application
of smart technologies in managing cities and running infrastructure is conducive to
efficiency improvement, resource allocation enhancement and energy and material
consumption reduction. It promotes the smart distributed energy system, optimizes
thematch of power source, grid and load, boosts the development of the urban energy
network, and energy block chain, and ultimately drives and secures low-carbon urban
development. Thus, smart technologies and low carbonization programs should be
integrated as two strategic pillars and path for implementation during China’s new
urbanization.
10.2.7 Promote Coordinated and Balanced Regional
Development and a Differentiated Low-Carbon
Transition in Line with Local Conditions
Like many developing countries in the world, China faces serious regional dispari-
ties. The eastern coastal provinces and municipalities are more economically devel-
oped and classified as priority development zones, whereas the central and western
regions lag behind, with some being key development zones and some others falling
under the category of key ecologically functional zones or restricted development
zones. Different regions vary in their energy and resource endowments, hence varied
positioning of industries. For instance, Shanxi and northwest China are rich in coal
resources, so the bulk of their income comes from high-energy-consuming rawmate-
rial and coal chemical industry with high energy consumption and high carbon inten-
sity per unit of GDP. With abundant hydropower resources, southwest China is the
national hydropower base that is well positioned to foster energy-intensive heavy
chemical industry, big data processing and other energy-intensive IT industries.
In comparison, the eastern coastal regions lack energy and resources but outper-
forms in terms of economy and technology. Thus these regions should speed up
economic transformation and develop high-tech and modern service industries. On
the other hand, China’s renewable energy resources are unevenly distributed, with
the northwest rich in wind and solar and southwest rich in hydro. Besides meeting the
regions’ own needs, these renewables can be transmitted to the mid-east regions of
China to complement the distributed energy power there, thus achieving an ambitious
uptake of renewable electricity in the country. Therefore, during the national low-
carbon energy and economic transformation, disparities regarding the positioning,
economic structure, energy and resource endowment of each region, province and
municipality must be taken into account in order to devise holistic plans to ensure
the coordinated, balanced and inclusive development among all regions and advance
nationwide low-carbon development.
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Pursue innovations in the low-carbon development model by promoting trials
of low-carbon provinces, autonomous regions and cities, carrying out pilot low-
carbon cities (towns), industrial parks, communities, businesses and transportation,
exploring diverse low-carbon development models with distinctive characteristics,
and studying effective solutions to carbon emissions in different regions and cities
so that such cities will feature rational spatial distribution, intensive utilization of
resources, low-carbon production, high efficiency and green and livable environment.
Research should focus on trying out and promoting a low-carbon certification and
honor roll system in order for products with low-carbon footprint to be certified and
labeled.
Implement customized regional strategies and policies to address climate change.
Differentiated targets, tasks and approaches for climate changemitigation and adapta-
tion should be determined in light of the resource endowments and industrial structure
of the east, central, northwest, southwest and northeast China as well as the federal
government determined positioning of the different functional priority zones. Cities
under optimized development in eastern China must put strict limit on the consump-
tion of coal and other fossil fuels, with the aim to peak CO2 emissions first in
China. Cities under prioritized development must step up control of carbon inten-
sity, with the old industrial bases and resource-intensive cities in northeast China
ensuring faster transition to green and low-carbon development. Southwest China,
a region rich in renewable energy resources, could prioritize pursuing 100% renew-
able energy in the cities, and some provinces and cities can also aim for an earlier
peak. Major agricultural products production regions for should build more small
to medium-sized cities and towns, encourage proper concentration of population,
actively promote a controlled level of agricultural mass production and industrial-
ization. In key ecologically functional zones, ecological red lines should be strictly
enforced, and stringent industrial development catalogue formulated to restrict new
high-carbon projects. Industries that do not meet their main functions should be
withdrawn from the system. Distinctive low-carbon industries should be fostered
based on local conditions. Differentiated and inclusive low-carbon transformation
should be implemented with a particular focus on the marginal impoverished rural
population to improve their work and living conditions and secure the supply of high
quality clean energy. Distributed renewable energy programs should be tailored to
the local reality and its certified emission reductions (CCER) should be included in
the national or provincial/municipal carbon market as an offset mechanism to spur
sustainable development in less developed regions.
At present, it is essential to facilitate an orderly peak in CO2 emissions among
regions. Provinces and municipalities in the priority development zones in the east
should reach the peak during the 14th Five-Year Plan period. The central, southwest
and northeast should hit the peak around 2030, and those in the northwest around
2035, ensuring a roughly nationwide peak prior to 2030.
Regional strategic priorities and measures for near-zero CO2 emissions by 2050
will vary. Drawing upon the experience of low-carbon pilot cities, a number of zero
carbon cities, development zones and communities should be built based on local
realities. In the southwest region that possess abundant renewable resources, some
274 10 Strategic Linchpins and Policy …
cities can experiment 100% renewables ahead of their peers. The eastern and central
regions should gradually build and scale up near-zero-emission cities underpinned
by renewable energy.
10.2.8 Harmonize Measures for Economic Development,
Environmental Protection, Climate Change,
and Biodiversity Improvement
TheParisAgreement stresses the inherent linkagebetween addressing climate change
and the sustainable development. China’s climate change strategy also highlights the
coordinatedmanagement and solutions for overall economic and social development,
ecological and environmental protection and greenhouse gas emission reduction to
drive the transformation toward green, low-carbon and circular economic devel-
opment. Advancement in ecological progress is needed for the harmonious coexis-
tence and sustainable development between human and nature. Therefore, increasing
focus has been placed on the coordinated and win–win strategies for tackling climate
change, boosting economic growth, improving people’s livelihood, enhancing envi-
ronmental quality and protecting biodiversity, of which nature-based solutions (NbS)
have drawn increasing attentions worldwide.
Through climate change management and accelerated transition to low-carbon
energy and economy, a near-zero-emission energy system primarily based on new
and renewable sources of energy should be up and running by the middle of this
century, curbing and reducing the emission of conventional pollutants at the source,
helping to meet environmental quality standards. For instance, PM2.5 concentration
in major regions will be limited to below 15 µg/m3, and most regions below 10
µg/m3by 2050 [28].
NbS refers to the practice of following the rules of natural ecological system
through the protection, remediation, improvement and strengthened management of
the ecosystem to enhance its functionality, thus effectively and adaptively easing the
strain of climate change on society, upgrading climate resilience, preserving biodi-
versity while producing benefits for human well-being and biodiversity. Through
enhancing carbon storage capacity of forests, grasslands, wetlands and agricultural
land, emission sources would be reduced and carbon sinks increased, generating
new economic growth and jobs, improving water, soil, air quality and food safety,
among other synergies. The UN Climate Summit held in September 2019 identi-
fied NbS as one of the nine priority areas for coping with climate change, where
China and New Zealand jointly hosted the thematic forum on “Nature-based Solu-
tions”, arousing strong interests from across the world. It also affirmed that NbS is
part and parcel of the implementation of the Paris Agreement, stressing the impor-
tance of NbS in boosting harmonious coexistence between human and nature, and
ecological progress. It is economically efficient and sustainable, hence an effective
approach to a holistic human-centered response to climate change. Since then, NbS
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has increasingly become a major strategic and policy option for countries’ climate
change efforts.
NbS involves agriculture, forestry, grassland, wetland, and etc. It preserves the
ecology, improves the environment, prevents and controls desertification, enhances
biological diversity, upgrades the quality of life and health, and increases the ecolog-
ical and economic value of natural systems with greater economic output, among
others. It is a strategic move to bring about the harmonious development of human
and nature, thus a win–win outcome.
The broader ideology of eco-civilization, envisaged by President Xi Jinping,
contains a range of expressions, including “the harmonious coexistence between
man and nature”, “green is the new gold”, “mountains, waters, forests, fields, lakes
and grassland are a community of life”, “good ecological environment represents the
greatest well-being of the people”, “preserving ecological environment through the
most stringent system and the rigorous rule of law”, etc. These ideologies provide
guiding principles for the implementation of NbS, a notion that echoes ecological
civilization featuring “ecology first” and “harmonious development of human and
nature”, respects nature and relies on the functional enhancement of natural ecosys-
tems to cope with the global ecological crisis—a new paradigm andmajor avenue for
coordinated and sustainable development of the economy, society and environment.
NbS should be guided by and embedded into the framework of ecological civiliza-
tion in order to showcase its rigor and dynamism, both theoretically and practically
speaking. Bearing in mind the harmonious coexistence between human and nature,
one should by nomeans detach the concept from ecological civilization in improving
the functionality of natural ecosystem to solve the earth’s ecological crisis including
climate change and biodiversity, and refrain from stressing or expanding themeasures
and potential of NbS in an isolated and single-sided manner.
To fulfill the promise of NbS, it is essential to uphold ecological civilization,
holistically advance the institutional development of ecological civilization and the
coordinated governance of economy, resources, environment and climate change. It is
also important to combine adaptation and mitigation of climate change with policy
measures in resources-conservation and ecological and environmental protection.
For example, formulating balance sheet of natural resources, identifying ecological
red line, providing comprehensive governance of mountains, waters, forests, fields,
lakes, grassland and other ecological systems, carrying out projects to remediate
ecology, reducing and sequestering carbon, preventing and controlling soil erosion
and desertification, and preserving biodiversity conservation. NbS should be inte-
gratedwith efforts on agricultural modernization and “beautiful countryside”, as well
as improvement of crop cultivation techniques and methods, reduction of fertilizer
use, development of ecological agriculture, and cutting of methane emissions from
rice fields and livestock. Efforts should be made to utilize and improve marginal
land, promote afforestation or planting of energy crops, boost forest management
and grassland restoration, convert farmland to forest and grassland, strengthen the
modernization of rural areas, enhance the comprehensive and safe use of rural waste,
and step up the commercial use of biomass resources, etc. Overall, NbS for climate
change should be incorporated in the overall national strategy for economic and
276 10 Strategic Linchpins and Policy …
social development as well as the strategy and measures of relevant government
authorities so as to maximize the synergy of economic development, social progress,
environmental protection, desertification control, biodiversity conservation, green-
house gas reduction and carbon sink increase, thus catalyzing ecological progress
and sustainable development in China.
Major steps should be taken to increase carbon sink, such as afforestation and
greening, voluntary tree-planting, continued natural forest protection, grain for green,
sandstorm sources control in Beijing and Tianjin, shelterbelts planting, comprehen-
sive treatment of stony deserts, water and soil conservation, strengthening of forest
tending and management, etc. Work should also be done to ramp up prevention and
control of forest disasters, strengthen protection of forest resources, reduce emis-
sions from deforestation, reinforce protection and restoration of wetland to improve
carbon storage, continue to return grazing land to grassland, ensure the balance
between pastures and livestock, curb grassland degradation, restore grassland vege-
tation, step up the prevention of grassland disasters and farmland conservation, and
improve soil carbon storage capacity.
The goal of limiting global temperature rises to 2 °C or even 1.5 °C means that
carbon neutrality should be achieved by the second half or middle of this century.
NbS is of vital importance for achieving carbon neutrality amid deep global emis-
sion reductions. During global low-carbon transformation, deep emission reduction
can be materialized in energy, industry, transportation, construction and other sectors
through the development and application of various emission reduction technologies,
but to enable net zero emission, the marginal cost of emission reduction will experi-
ence a nonlinear spike. The initial emission reduction of non-CO2 greenhouse gases
such as methane can be achieved at a fairy low or even negative cost, but no feasible
technology is available to support near zero emission. Therefore, the implementa-
tion of NbS can harness the potential of agriculture, forestry, land use and land use
change for reducing carbon sources and increasing carbon sinks, sequestering more
carbon to offset the remaining greenhouse gas emissions from sectors where further
reduction is a challenge, and secure carbon neutrality as a whole. China’s additional
annual carbon sink in agriculture and forestry could be kept at approximately 700
million tons by 2050, holding the key to offsetting the remaining emissions from
hard-to-crack sectors.
The implementation of NbS hinges on the innovation of science and technology,
calling for scientific research to understand and grasp the law of natural ecosystems,
protect, restore, and enhance the service of natural ecosystems, and leverage the force
of nature to tackle global ecological crisis, especially climate change, as opposed to
the sole dependence on technology-based solutions.
Indeed, amid theurgent low-carbon energy and economic transformationunder the
global actions against climate change, parallel efforts should focus on continued inno-
vation and development of emission reduction technologies to be used in conjunction
with NbS. Most of the technical measures for saving energy, improving energy effi-
ciency and strengthening energy substitution also produces the synergy of resources
conservation, environmental protection and sustainable development, which repre-
sent the main options for low-carbon transformation. The technological solutions
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must go hand in hand with NbS to complement and reinforce each other with greater
focus on the synergy and joint actions for addressing climate change and sustainable
development. On the other hand, implementing NbS also requires technology-based
innovation and industrialization. For example, technologies for the comprehensive
and safe utilization of agricultural and ruralwaste, commercial biomass fuel, compre-
hensive treatment of saline and alkaline land, energy crop planting and manage-
ment and modern ecological agriculture would require more R&D and realization of
advanced technologies for close coordination and joint progress [29].
10.2.9 Improve the Institutional Arrangement for Addressing
Climate Change and Form a Policy System, Investment
and Financing Mechanism, and Market System
First, push for climate change legislation to provide the legal support for the imple-
mentation of climate change strategies, mechanisms and policy systems and the
attainment of long-term emission reduction targets. The institutional building for
low-carbon development is one of the centerpieces of that for ecological civiliza-
tion. Given the characteristics of China’s current policy framework, it’s crucial to
sharpen the legal and market tools while maintaining the advantageous adminis-
trative measures. it is of fundamental importance to put in legislation efforts as
soon as possible in order to lay the basic legal groundwork for nation-wide climate
change actions, involving awide spectrum of fields and issues. Dedicated lawswould
provide clear legal directions to actions at the national level. What’s more impor-
tant is to specify medium—and long-term quantified emission reduction targets and
strategic measures within the climate change law to galvanize low-carbon energy
and economic transformation. Internationally, the UK was the first country to pass
the Climate Change Act, which has incorporated a carbon neutrality target by 2050
through a recent revision. Japan andMexico also introduced their climate legislations.
The EU has scheduled legislation in 2021 via GreenDeal to support carbon neutrality
by 2050. China is in dire need of a dedicated law to ensure continued progress of
energy conservation and emission reduction. Carbon market, for example, currently
operates under only departmental regulations of related ministries and commissions
with low legal recognition and limited terms of reference, thus unable to secure the
progress and operation of carbon market.
Develop of green finance and establish green investment and financing mecha-
nisms. The transformation of low-carbon development entails financial support, and
there are increasing incentives for investing in low-carbon technologies and indus-
tries worldwide. The EU Green Deal states that to meet the 2030 climate and energy
targets, an average of an additional e 260bn in investment will be needed annually,
equivalent to approximately 1.5% of EU’s GDP in 2018. In terms of funding chan-
nels, 25% of the EU budget and at least 30% of the European Investment Fund will
be spent on combating climate change. The European Investment Bank (EIB) will
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also ramp up climate-related investment from 25 to 50% by 2025, with a focus on
mobilizing private sector for green investment and engaging international investors
through the new international sustainable finance platform. In addition, the EU will
further push the reform of budget and taxation system to encourage public invest-
ment, consumption and taxation in green priority areas through pricing and incentive
mechanisms, repeal subsidies that goes against green development (e.g.: subsidies
for fossil energy) to make for the shift of tax revenues from labor to pollution.
China also attaches great importance to the development of green finance, creating
and implementing a selection of mechanisms and policies for green investment and
financing. A guideline on green project investment was formulated to enhance the
green credit system, offer green credit asset securitization (ABS) and green bonds,
establish mechanisms for green loan incentives and guarantee, improve green review
and supervision for investment projects, enhance government green purchase system,
and incentivize enterprise and social investment. Along with the development of
carbon market, the auctions of emission allocation will be gradually increased, with
the future proceeds from the auction or the carbon tax revenue used in an integrated
manner to advance the institutional progress of national low-carbon development
and key action agenda. At present, the global financial community is devising the
guidelines and norms of green investment, rejecting and withdrawing investment
in coal, oil and other high-carbon industries and projects. An enabling policy envi-
ronment for encouraging green investment is being formed in various countries.
China’s energy and economic low-carbon transformation will entail huge invest-
ment—approximately 40 trillion RMB for NDC targets and action plans by 2030
and around 100 trillion RMB for energy and power systems to fulfill the deep decar-
bonization target by 2050. On the other hand, the gigantic investment in energy
and economic transformation also serves as a strong buttress for economic growth,
tapping into new sources of low-carbon economic growth and new green jobs to
bring about high-quality economic development. Therefore, the government should
constantly develop and enhance the green investment and financing mechanism,
which should also be embedded in the “Belt & Road” cooperation projects and
mechanisms [30].
Presently, it is of pressing importance that the reform of energy system should
lay particular emphasis on carbon market development. With the urgency of global
actions against climate change, the scarcity of carbon emission and its nature as
a production factor are growing increasingly evident. Market levers should be
employed to quantify the value of carbon emissions and allowance, prompting emis-
sion reduction at the corporate level to enhance the economic output per unit of
carbon emissions. The European Union, California of the United States, South Korea
and other countries and regions have successively established the carbon markets,
with more on the way to advance efforts on this front. During the 12th Five-Year
Plan period, China launched a unified national carbon market, apart from the trials of
carbon trading in five cities and two provinces, reinforcingmarket incentives for low-
carbon transformation. The uniform national carbon market started with the power
sector and would gradually expand to other energy-intensive industries including
petrochemicals, steel, building materials, non-ferrous metals, paper making, civil
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aviation and chemicals, accounting for about half of the country’s total CO2 emis-
sions. Swifter progress is needed for carbon market in China with enhanced systems
of corporate emission accounting, monitoring, reporting and verification and emis-
sions. Carbon pricing signal should be deployed to push mitigation measures in busi-
nesses, incentivize private investment and lower the cost of the entire society while
safeguarding national emission targets. By quantifying and monetizing the value of
carbon allowance, carbon market will spawn a string of financial products in the
future. The market itself and carbon finance will also evolve into major instruments
in the international competition for low-carbon development [31].
Institutional safeguards for green and low-carbon development should be strength-
ened. The accountability system of governments at all levels for energy conservation
and carbon reduction should be reinforced, and targets for energy saving and carbon
reduction included in national and local five-year development plans. Meanwhile,
innovations must be explored in the macro-control of energy system to establish and
improve the energy legal system, reform and enhance the fiscal, taxation and finan-
cial policy systems for low-carbon development, facilitate green finance and reform
of the pricing mechanism for energy products and the system of resource and envi-
ronmental taxes and fees. Advancement for reform of the energy market mechanism
to put in place a unified and open market structure and system that are just, fair, and
conducive for competition. Market monopolies in certain areas should be eliminated,
and disorderly market competition should also be rectified and forestalled. Currently,
the pricing mechanism for China’s fossil energy fails to fully reflect its social costs.
To illustrate, the social costs of air andwater pollution and public health damage from
coal burning are equivalent to over 50% of the current coal price, but these social
costs are yet reflected in the price, and a sound taxation and fee system to transfer the
income accordingly is also absent. The internalization of the social cost of resource
and environmental losses through the reform of the resource and environmental tax
system and the carbon market will help save fossil energy, encourage the develop-
ment of new and renewable energy, and spur the transformation of energy mix. The
reform of energy prices, such as time-of-use and tiered pricing, serves to conserve
energy and ensure low-income families equitable access to quality energy services,
thereby boosting harmonious social development. On the other hand, technical stan-
dards for energy conservation, commodity labeling of energy efficiency, and industry
access policies must be tightened. The management of corporate energy use rights
and that of carbon allowance should be coordinated with the development of the
national carbon market. The medium- and long-term national strategies and goals
should be followed to reinforce government binding targets, mandatory standards,
fiscal, tax, and financial policies, which should be deployed in parallel with market
mechanisms to provide stronger institutional guarantees for the energy revolution
and low-carbon development.
It is crucial to promote the institutional building and policy safeguards of tech-
nological innovation and industrialization of advanced technologies. Technological
innovation is the bedrock for low-carbon transformation. China is working in parallel
with developed countries on the R&D of a spate of advanced energy technologies,
with its own characteristics and advantages. It is important to ramp up the R&D
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and industrialization of advanced energy technologies, leverage the market size of
China to sharpen the competitive edge of superior technologies of energy enterprises,
harness technological innovation for industrial and technological upgrade and energy
system reform, gain an upper hand in technological competition amidst the revolution
of world energy system, and enhance the competitiveness of in-house technologies,
industries andmarkets.With the progress of low-carbon energy transformation in the
future and the increasing urgency of emission reduction, revolutionary and strategi-
cally advanced technological breakthroughsmust bemade to overcome the nonlinear
spike of the marginal cost of emission reduction in most cases under the deep decar-
bonization scenario of holding temperature rise within 2 °C. More efforts are needed
in the R&D and proliferation of deep CO2 emission reduction technologies, such
as large-scale energy storage and smart grid technologies in the context of a large
uptake of renewable electricity, BECCS technology for negative CO2 emission, the
technology for producing, storing and utilizing hydrogen as a clean secondary zero
carbon energy, technology for producing zero carbon chemical, steel, cement, petro-
chemical and other raw materials. The R&D and demonstration of technologies for
deep emission reduction of such non-CO2 greenhouse gases as methane should also
be strengthened so as to enable deep emission reduction of all greenhouse gases.
At the same time, financing services and policy incentives should be provided for
small andmedium-sized start-ups to encourage all forms of technological innovation.
China should proactively develop and demonstrate the pioneering technologies and
ensure their prompt breakthroughs and industrialization, making them technically
mature and economically viable, in order to gain long-term technological compet-
itiveness in leading the global climate governance and low-carbon transformation
under the macro-trend of climate change management and low-carbon economic
and social transformation [32].
10.2.10 Promote Global Climate Governance
and International Cooperation, and Advance
the Construction of Global Ecological Civilization
and a Community with a Shared Future
for Humankind
China has taken an active part in global climate governance, pioneering international
cooperation on climate change, and becoming a major participant, contributor and
leader in global ecological progress. As President Xi Jinping pointed out, it is the
common cause and interest of all humankind to jointly facilitate global ecological
progress and tackle climate change. The Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civi-
lization and the vision of building a community with a shared future for humankind
embody China’s wisdom and proposal for building a fair, reasonable and win–win
governance system and cooperation process.
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China has been working actively to build ecological civilization, put in place a
green, low-carbon and circular economic system, create a clean, low-carbon, safe
and efficient energy system, and bring about the coordinated governance and win–
win scenario of the economy, energy, environment and climate change. The theories
and practices in this regard will provide the world, especially developing countries
with successful experiences and useful examples in implementing their strategies of
low-carbon development.
China adheres to the goals and principles set forth in the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement, and has promoted the progress and implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment in a comprehensive, balanced and effective manner. It observes the principle of
fairness and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,
and accommodates the varied national conditions to ensure the balanced progress of
the ParisAgreement inmitigation, adaptation, funding, technology, capacity building
and transparency, advance win–win cooperation across the world and, in the mean-
time, build the synergy of climate change management and sustainable development
in all countries, especially developing nations. On the other hand, China is also
actively engaged in non-UNFCCC cooperation agenda, including initiatives that set
standard development of green and low-carbon technologies and products or industry
codes of conduct, and joint actions in various international arenas to incentivize
low-carbon transformation [33].
China has actively advanced international cooperation on climate change, espe-
cially South-South cooperation, promoting “Green Belt & Road” and highlighting
climate change policies in “Belt & Road” projects. Use the South-South Climate
Cooperation Fund with a Chinese commitment of 20 billion yuan for more green
financing options and transfer of green and low-carbon technologies. Stringent
environmental protection and energy efficiency standards should be advocated and
enforced in “Belt & Road” cooperation projects to avoid high carbon infrastructure
and capacity expansion, and joint efforts should bemade to explore the strengthening
of bilateral or multilateral cooperation on carbon pricing and carbon market mecha-
nisms under the market mechanism framework of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement,
so as to jointly promote the implementation of the Paris Agreement and its global
cooperation. Meanwhile, China should step up cooperation with developed countries
or their local governments or cities, and boost cooperation among businesses, civil
society and scientific research institutions, so that climate change governance will
set an example for building a community with a shared future for humankind [34].
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11.1 The History of Global Climate Governance
Since the 1980s, global climate change has drawn increasing attention from the
international community. In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) was set up by the United Nations to organize thousands of scientists around
the world to assess the scientific facts, causes, impacts, options for adaptation and
mitigation and cost effects of climate change. Five assessment reports have been
issued so far, and the sixth one is under preparation. The IPCC assessment report
is a scientific report based on facts and research findings, and also the most impor-
tant scientific basis for international climate negotiations and global governance
decisions.
As global climate change endangers the survival and development of mankind,
global cooperation in combating climate change is growing into a consensus of
the international community. At the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development in 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change was adopted, kicking off the global process of tackling climate change. The
UnitedNations FrameworkConvention onClimateChange (hereinafter referred to as
the Convention) envisaged the goals of the human society to address climate change:
curb global greenhouse gas emissions from human activities; stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases; prevent a spike in surface temperatures; ensure
that the earth’s ecosystems can adapt naturally to climate change; and protect grain
production from threats. At the same time, the Convention has also put forward the
basic principles to dealwith climate change, amongwhich two principles are themost
important. The first is “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”, primarily in
view of the high emissions since the industrial revolution in the developed countries,
who were deemed the major contributor to the current climate change and should
bear the historical responsibility to take the lead in emission reduction and provide
developing countries with funding, technology and capacity building support for
them to adapt to and mitigate climate change. The second principle—“Sustainable
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Development”, pointed out that the economic development and poverty eradication
of developing countries are still the top and overriding priorities at present. Therefore,
developing countries need to closely integrate climate change efforts with sustainable
development.
In accordance with the goals and principles set forth in the Convention, the Kyoto
Protocol was adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties held in Kyoto, Japan,
in 1997, stipulating quantified obligations for developed countries to cut greenhouse
gas emissions. Developed countries as a group should reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 5% from 1990 levels, during the first five-year “commitment
period” from 2008 to 2012. This overall obligation to reduce emissions has been
broken down into each developed country (i.e. Annex I countries in the Convention).
The signing of the Kyoto Protocol marks the beginning of substantial progress for
human society to cope with climate change [1].
The 13th Conference of the Parties was convened in Bali, Indonesia. The confer-
ence launched the “Bali Roadmap”, charting the course for new negotiating process
to determine how developed nations would further quantify obligations of emissions
reduction after the end of the first commitment period in 2012, and to discuss how to
meaningfully engage developing countries in the global actions to reduce emissions.
With the consultations and hard work of all parties in Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban
and Doha climate talks, the second commitment period (2013–2020) for developed
countries was finally adopted, and so was the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,
which launched a new process to negotiate a post-2020 climate regime for more
ambitious emissions cut in all countries at the end of the Paris climate conference
in 2015. The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol lost its substantive
relevance as the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia and other devel-
oped countries did not sign/ratify it, and the Paris Agreement has become the new
institutional framework for global climate governance beyond 2020.
Unanimously adopted by the Conference of the Parties, the Paris Agreement is
a legally binding document that applies to all countries under the Convention in
accordance with the targets and principles of the Convention. It defines the insti-
tutional framework of global cooperation and actions on climate change beyond
2020 and embodies the political will and common actions of all countries involved
to tackle climate change [2]. Though playing down the “dichotomy” of the devel-
oped and developing countries in terms of their responsibilities and obligations, the
Paris Agreement reflects the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibil-
ities” in a range of elements, including mitigation, adaptation, capital, technology,
capacity building, transparency and global stocktake, and demonstrates flexibility
for developing countries by providing a balanced arrangement.
The Paris Agreement sets the long-term global goal of “holding the increase
in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial
levels” in a bid to substantially reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.
To achieve this goal, the Paris Agreement calls for reaching “global peaking of
greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible” and achieving “a balance between
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in
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the second half of this century” which means achieving global net zero emissions by
the second half of the century. This global long-term goal is built upon Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs), which requires all Parties to propose their NDC
targets and action plans in a “bottom up” fashion under the guidance of “holding
the global temperature rise to well below 2 °C and preferably to 1.5 °C”. In order to
achieve the global long-term goals, the transparency of national mitigation actions
and funding support should be enhanced.Meanwhile, a global review or stocktake on
the worldwide actions should be conducted every five years to evaluate the collective
progress of agreement implementation and long-term goals, prompt further update of
NDCs, strengthen actions and funding support, and narrow and bridge the emissions
gap with long-term global temperature goals.
The new international institutional framework established by the Paris Agree-
ment signifies a key turning point in the model and philosophy of global governance.
On the one hand, it represents an unprecedented consensus and a shared political
will across the world to deal with the “urgent and potentially irreversible threat
that climate change poses to human societies and the planet”. On the other, the
Paris Agreement, by designing bottom-up mechanisms to encourage countries to
set ambitious goals and action plans, rather than imposing top-down responsibilities
and obligations, demonstrates the shift in thinking from the “zero-sum game” to
a “win–win outcome”. The new institutional framework seeks to spur low carbon
economic transformation in all countries, and facilitate the coordination between
climate change management and promotion of equitable access to sustainable devel-
opment and poverty eradication, and achieve the dual benefits of “development”
and “carbon reduction”. At the same time, it stresses the joint actions on sustain-
able development and climate change initiatives, promoting win–win cooperation
between the countries.
China has made outstanding contributions to the adoption and enforcement of
the Paris Agreement. The US-China and France-China joint statements on climate
change before the conference had already built consensus on the core and focal
issues of the negotiations, which ultimately served as the basis for consensus among
all Parties. Thewithdrawal of theTrump administration from the ParisAgreement has
undermined global climate governance, and might shake the confidence and actions
of the international community on climate cooperation, and fuel unilateralism and
protectionism, and affect the willingness and strength of other developed countries
in providing climate financing and technical support. In contrast, the global “bottom-
up” collaborative efforts are booming. For instance, twenty US states that represent
over 60% of US population and GDP formed the US Climate Alliance and vowed to
uphold the Paris Agreement within their borders. Due to China’s remarkable achieve-
ments in energy conservation and carbon reduction at home and its responsible and
constructive attitude in global climate governance, the international community has
full expectations for China’s leadership.
Clouded by unilateralism of some developed countries, the UN Climate Change
Conference held in Madrid (COP25) in December 2018 failed to complete the unfin-
ished tasks at COP24 in Katowice of reaching agreement on the detailed rules for
implementing Paris Agreement (that is, market mechanism under Article 6 of the
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Paris Agreement). The failure to produce the desired outcome sparked concerns of
the international community about the mechanism and capability of global climate
governance under Paris Agreement. The global outbreak of COVID-19 in the end of
2019 has shifted the priority of policy agendas in all countries to shoring up economic
weakness, improving industrial chains and accelerating economic recovery, which
would inevitably put the brake on green and low-carbon transformation. At the
same time, the pandemic has further heightened the sense of sovereignty and
national consciousness of all countries, as evidenced by the all-round escalation
of rivalry between China and the United States and other developed countries, with
mounting “deglobalization” and “anti-globalization” sentiments. This means that the
comprehensive, balanced and effective implementation of Paris Agreement is facing
extremely daunting challenges.
A lookback of global climate governance history reveals a process of constant
evolution of China’s strategic positioning in global climate governance. When
UNFCCC was adopted in 1992, China’s carbon emissions were still fairly low, and
the strategic positioningwas to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests as a devel-
oping country. The negotiation was conducted in a way to ensure sufficient emission
space before 2030 to support economic and social development. With the contin-
uous rise of its comprehensive national strength, China’s positioning and mission
for global climate governance have undergone notable evolvement. Especially after
the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the government intro-
duced the new strategic positioning of “steering international cooperation on climate
change and becoming a major participant, contributor and torchbearer in the global
endeavor for ecological civilization”. China’s current and near-to-mid-term climate
strategies mainly center around the demand for sustainable development of domestic
resources and environment and focus on the synergy of carbon emission reduction
and environmental protection. But by the middle of the twenty-first century when
China evolves into a modern socialist powerhouse with the largest economy in the
world, it must assume the responsibility of a major country to contribute to the devel-
opment of human societies, protect the ecological safety of the Earth, and provide
more public goods for the world. This is also the historical mission of the Commu-
nist Party of China. Therefore, China’s long-term low-carbon development strategy
must go beyond the domestic needs for sustainable development and proactively
take on the international responsibility of addressing climate change. While China’s
current low-carbon strategy can well achieve its nationally determined contributions
(NDCs), it falls short of the goal of 2 °C and the mission of protecting the ecological
safety of the Earth. The 2 °C scenario must be taken as the target in a prompt manner
to drive the transformation.Moreover, the current policies should be reinforced in the
next decade (14th and 15th Five-Year Plan periods), and the transformation should
be sped up after 2030 to move toward the 2 °C scenario. Failure to do so would
exponentially increase the difficulty and cost of emission reduction in the future.
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11.2 Several Core and Focal Issues in Global Climate
Governance
11.2.1 The Principle of Equity and Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities
In the process of global cooperation on climate change, each country faces different
prominent problems and conflicts in achieving its own sustainable development on
account of varied national conditions and stages of development, hence different
standpoints and requests are reflected in global climate governance. But climate
change is a global challenge. In balancing the overall interests of the world and
the local interests of individual countries, the governance system would inevitably
involve the sharing of responsibilities and obligations, which, more often than not,
sparks conflict and tensions between countries. Therefore, the establishment of a
fair and effective international institutional framework becomes the cornerstone for
the world’s multilateral mechanism on climate change. With the progress of climate
governance, the notion of equitable access to sustainable development has become
a request and principle shared by all developing countries in the negotiations of the
international climate change system, and an integral part in building the system of
international sustainable development.
Climate equity has always been at the heart of climate negotiations and the bedrock
for the international governance system of fairness, justice and win–win coopera-
tion. The Paris Agreement is the institutional framework applicable to all coun-
tries. It is guided by the principles of the Convention, including equity, common but
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities. Though watering
down the “dichotomy” between developed and developing countries in terms of their
responsibilities and obligations laid out in Kyoto protocol, it brings to the fore the
principle of CBDR in the elements of mitigation, adaptation, capital, technology,
capacity building and transparency, etc., with flexibility for developing countries.
On mitigation, for instance, the Paris Agreement stipulates that developed countries
should continue to take the lead by taking economy-wide absolute emission reduc-
tion targets, and that developing countries should continue to ramp up their mitiga-
tion efforts, and are encouraged to move over time toward economy-wide absolute
emission reduction in the light of different national circumstances. On funding, for
another example, the Paris Agreement sets that “developed country Parties shall
provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both
mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the
Convention”, and requests developed countries to raise at least $100 billion every
year before 2025 to support developing countries, and encourages other Parties “to
provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily” [3].
The CBDR principle established in the Convention stems from the notion of
“corrective justice” and reflects “distributive justice”. The principle comprehen-
sively delineated the different responsibilities between developed and developing
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countries relative to global warming, stating that developed countries bear the histor-
ical responsibility of global warming, and that the need of developing countries for
greenhouse gas emissions must be accommodated to secure their transformation
toward sustainable development. Under this circumstance, the Convention requests
developed countries to take the lead in emission reduction, and provide developing
countries with funding, technology and capacity building for them to adapt to and
mitigate climate change. In order to underline the importance of balancing responsi-
bilities and capabilities for climate equity, the principle of “respective capabilities”
has always been accompanied by the principle of CBDR in the Convention and
the subsequent negotiations as well as the outcome of Rio+20. Especially after the
Cancun Conference when the notion of climate justice featuring “equitable access to
sustainable development (EASD)” cropped up, there was a perspective of develop-
ment that said the global climate governance justice system that focused on the past,
present and future had been formed, that is, the CBDR principle which primarily
traces the history is mainly used to identify historical responsibilities; the reality-
based principle of “respective capabilities” mainly caters to the differences in devel-
opment stages; and the future-oriented principle of “Equitable Access to Sustainable
Development” mainly accommodates the long-term right to development [4].
The Convention is a fundamental legal document for global climate governance
and the cornerstone for the establishment of an international climate governance
system. Its basic principles have been observed and reaffirmed under the Paris
Agreement. The creation of the global climate system must showcase the concept of
“fairness”, requiring equal consultation and broad participation of all countries and
comprehensive and balanced solicitation and reflection of requests from countries
under different national conditions and development stages. It should also adhere
to the concept of fairness, historical responsibilities and respective capabilities in
terms of code of conduct, and embody the CBDR principle. The Paris Agreement
also emphasizes the “intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, responses
and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable development and eradication
of poverty”. The equitable access to sustainable development is the shared request
and principle for developing countries in global climate governance talks, and the
central element in the global climate governance system [5].
In the process of industrialization and modernization, developed countries reck-
lessly consumed the planet’s mineral resources and discharged wastes in a way that
severely exceeded the Earth’s capacity, and thus bears the historical responsibility
for climate change in the past century. In contrast, on the way to industrialization and
modernization, developing countries no longer enjoy the same resources and envi-
ronment endowment, and could not follow the path of high resource consumption
and eco-environmental damage for the sake of development as their developed coun-
terpart did. Their modernization endeavors will be severely hampered by the capacity
of the Earth’s environment and carbon emission limit, prompting a path of resources-
saving, environmentally-friendly, and low carbon development to bring about green
and low carbon transition for the energy system and economic development. Now
and in the future, only with ambitious emission reduction by developed countries can
it reserve sufficient room for carbon emissions by developing countries to support
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their economic transformation and sustainable development. The pressing lowcarbon
transformation of developing countries also requires financial and technical support
from developed nations to ensure equitable access to modern high-quality energy
services for the people in the developing world, eliminate poverty, improve people’s
livelihood, promote fairness and sustainability and, in the meantime, achieve low
carbon economic development. The tighter the schedule for global carbon neutrality,
the less carbon emission is permitted for the growth of developing countries. So it
is essential for developed countries to lead the transition to net zero emissions, and
also for developing nations to rapidly follow up for deep emission reduction, but the
two would by no means become carbon neutral at the same time.
During the current implementation of the Paris Agreement, developed countries
increasingly sought to downplay and forsake the CBDR principle by pushing the
rhetoric of collective responsibilities and actions and more ambitious efforts by all
parties, and ignoring their responsibility to assist developing countries in terms of
funding, technology and capacity building in order to mitigate and adapt to climate
change. The CBDR principle is the bedrock for a global climate governance system
featuring fairness, rationality and win–win cooperation. It represents an institutional
safeguard for achieving sustainable development by all countries and addressing the
climate crisis in a coordinated and win–win manner. It is also the guiding principle
that must be observed in global climate governance and international cooperation
for a long time to come. China should adhere to the strategic positioning of devel-
oping countries, consolidate and build the strategic support for developing countries,
maintain and uphold the basic principles enshrined in the Convention and the Paris
Agreement, and promote the building of a global climate governance system and
cooperation process featuring fairness, justice and win–win cooperation.
11.2.2 Positioning China as a Developing Country
The distinction between developed and developing countries in global climate gover-
nance is a political and historical concept of responsibility. Annex I to the Conven-
tion adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in 1992 designated 41 countries undertaking the responsibilities and obli-
gations of developed countries, including the countries of the former Soviet Union
and the economies in transition in Eastern Europe, aside from the traditional post-
industrialized economies. These countries enjoyed relatively developed economies
with a higher per capita GDP. Their per capita greenhouse gas emissions have been
much higher than those of developing countries. These countries have the histor-
ical and realistic responsibility for global climate change. In the context of global
actions against climate change, these countries belong to developed nations, while
non-Annex I countries fall under the category of developing countries. China is a non-
Annex I country, which means that its status as a developing country is recognized
under the Convention.
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Both of the negotiations of theKyoto Protocol adopted by theUNClimate Confer-
ence in 1997 and the Post-2007 Bali Roadmap insist on binding quantified absolute
emission reduction obligations for developed countries, while developing countries
are only required to take appropriate mitigation actions of their own in their sustain-
able development priority areas. As a developing country, China has not undertaken
the obligation of quantitative emission reduction under the Kyoto Protocol, nor is
it obliged to contribute to the “Green Climate Fund”. Under the “Bali Roadmap”,
China set the NDC targets of a 40 ~ 45% drop in carbon dioxide emissions per unit
of GDP by 2020 from the 2005 level, 15% of non-fossil energy, and forest stock
growing to 1.3 billion cubic meters, etc., which are the voluntary emission reduction
efforts in the priority areas of sustainable development such as energy transformation
and ecological protection—in line with China’s status as a developing country.
The Paris Agreement adopted by the UN Climate Conference at the end of 2015
established the post-2020 new global climate governance mechanism, which sought
to keep global temperature rise below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing
efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C. It also created a new bottom-up structure where
countries submit their own targets and action plans for NDCs—a new framework
applicable to all Parties. Meanwhile, the mechanism also observed the principles
of the Convention: equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities, taking into account the varied national conditions. The elements of
climate change mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and
transparency still demonstrate the flexibility of differentiated responsibilities and
actions for developing and developed countries.
More than twenty years since the signing of the Convention, major changes
have taken place in the economic development and greenhouse gas emissions of
both developing and developed countries. In 1990, developed countries in Annex I
accounted for only 22.2% of the world’s population, 83% of the global GDP, nearly
70% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and 82% of global cumulative emissions
since the industrial revolution. This confirmed the primary responsibility of devel-
oped countries for global climate change, and their due obligations were identified
accordingly. By 2016, developed countries in Annex I saw their share of global GDP
dropping to 63%, their emissions to 38%, and cumulative historical emissions to 68%.
In contrast, emissions in developing countrieswere surging,with the per capita carbon
dioxide emissions increasing from 12% to 34% of that in developed countries. This
showed that, for one thing, with the economic development and emissions increase,
developing countries should continuously scale up efforts to slash emissions and
assume more responsibilities and obligations. For another, the historical and real-
istic responsibilities of developed and developing countries remained unchanged at
the core, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities would be
relevant for a long time to come.
In 1990, China only produced 10% of the world’s CO2 emissions, and the per
capita emissions was less than half of the world average. Yet by 2016, China’s
emissions had made up 28% of the world’s total emissions, more than the US and EU
combined; China’s per capita had reached 1.5 times of the world average, exceeding
that of the EU; its share of cumulative global CO2 emissions had risen from 5.2% in
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2005 to 12.7%, which was still much lower than the US share of 25%, and the per
capita cumulative emissions was only 68% of the world average. On the one hand,
this means that the characteristics and status of China as a developing country had
not been fundamentally reversed and would be maintained for a considerable period
of time in the future; On the other hand, with the economic development, growing
comprehensive national strength and rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emissions,
China and other emerging developing countries must ramp up their actions in the
global fight against climate change and enhance their NDC targets in order to make
greater contributions.
In view of China’s rising national strength and growing proportion of its green-
house gas emissions in the world, there have been voices in the international commu-
nity that questioned and challenged China’s status as a developing country. U.S.
climate negotiators even proposed to create a “graduation” for developing coun-
tries by delisting China, South Korea, Singapore and other emerging countries from
non-Annex I so that they would undertake similar responsibilities and obligations as
Annex I developed countries. However, this involves a modification of the Conven-
tion and a consensus by all parties, and therefore is hard to be put on the negotiation
agenda. The division between Annex I developed countries and non-Annex I devel-
oping countries will not change and cannot be changed for a long time to come. Of
course, flexibility should be shown in terms of the responsibilities and obligations in
case of changed national circumstances in some countries.
The CBDR principle and flexibility embodied in the bottom-up NDCmechanism
and all elements of the Paris Agreement are conducive to China’s long-term strategic
positioning as a developing country, providing space and the opportunities for China
to safeguard national interests and play an active role in global climate governance.
China’s NDC targets by 2030 under the Paris Agreement—60% ~ 65% reduction in
CO2 emission per unit of GDP from the 2005 level, 20% non-fossil energy share in
primary energy consumption, andpeaking ofCO2 emissions around2030 andmaking
best efforts to peak earlier—were based on the principles of Paris Agreement and
China’s status as a developing country.These ambitious targets for emission reduction
are aligned with its national conditions and development stage. China’s NDC targets
only cover energy-related CO2 emissions and are relative emission reduction targets
for cutting CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, which is different from the quantified
economy-wide absolute greenhouse gases emission reduction targets implemented
by developed countries. With economic development and increasing overall national
strength, China will also need to ramp up emission reduction efforts and take the
initiative to assume more international responsibilities in the future. After peaking
CO2 emissions before 2030, China needs to strive for an economy-wide absolute
reduction of all greenhouse gas emissions.
OnMay 20, 2020, theWhite House released the United States Strategic Approach
to the People’s Republic of China, further demonstrating its strategic intent to
suppress and contain China. It strenuously denies China’s status as a developing
country, stressing that China is already a “mature economy” but still gains many
benefits that are not accessible to the United States through the title of a devel-
oping nation. The document emphasizes that the United States views China as an
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equal rival, and will examine the benefits arising from China’s being a developing
country in international institutions and rules and ask for revisions to turn China
into a “developed country”. Upholding and cementing China’s developing country
status echoes China’s national conditions and stage of development and safeguards
China’s legitimate rights and interests in international affairs. It is also conducive
to expanding the strategic support of developing countries to defuse the plots and
measures of the United States and other western countries to isolate and suppress
China. Global climate change has always been an important area for developed and
developing countries to compete and for big powers to contest. It will also be a major
arena in which the United States and other western countries deny China’s status
as a developing country, disunite China and other developing countries, and apply
pressure on and shift their responsibilities and obligations to China. In the wake of
COVID-19, the United States will amplify its demands and position for China to
take equal responsibilities and obligations in the field of climate change, and will
continue to put pressure on China’s emission reduction and funding commitments.
Consolidating and maintaining China’s strategic positioning as a developing country
in global climate governance can strengthen China’s solidarity with the vast number
of developing countries, strive for a relatively loose carbon emission space for China
to realize modernization, and set an example for China to maintain its developing
country status in other fields.
11.2.3 The 1.5 °C Global Temperature Target
The objective of the Convention, adopted by the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in 1992, is to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system”, and “such a level should be achieved within a time frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in
a sustainable manner”. Due to the lack of scientific research at that time, no specific
control targets of temperature rise was proposed. With the progress of scientific
research, the European Union first proposed to set a global climate target of keeping
temperature rise below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. The Copenhagen Climate
Conference in 2009 failed to reach agreement on the second commitment period of
the Kyoto Protocol, but managed to build consensus on the 2 °C goal. Later, the
European Union, Small Island States and the Least Developed Countries went a step
further by raising the target to 1.5 °C, and their voices were getting louder. There-
fore, the Paris Agreement, after balancing various opinions, put forward “holding
the increase in the global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C above
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C
above pre-industrial levels”, and requested IPCC to submit a technical document
on the impact of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related
pathways of global greenhouse gas emissions.
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In October 2018, IPCC issued the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C,
suggesting that the 1.5 °C target is technically feasible and could enable notable
reduction in climate risks and negative impacts compared to 2 °C, and is gener-
ally conducive to achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of
the United Nations [6]. However, the 1.5 °C target requires more urgent efforts in
emission reduction. Specifically, net zero CO2 emission and deep emission reduction
of other greenhouse gases should be achieved by the middle of this century, which
would incur a marginal cost 3 to 4 times larger than the 2 °C target. The release of the
special report sparked worldwide repercussions. The United Kingdom has revised
its Climate Change Act to introduce a carbon neutral target for 2050. The European
Union updated its climate ambition for 2030 in the Green Deal, with a 50–55% cut
in greenhouse gas emissions from the 1990 levels and a target of net zero emission
(i.e., carbon neutral) by 2050, which will be protected by legislation. Some states
in the United States, such as California and New York, also set targets for carbon
neutrality by the middle of this century. Now, developed countries, including New
Zealand, France, Canada, Spain, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and developing
countries such as Chile, Ethiopia, Costa Rica and Fiji have also outlined their own
goals of achieving net zero emission by 2050 or before. COP26, which has been
postponed to 2021 due to the pandemic, will continue to focus on strengthening
emission reduction efforts of all countries. And it is expected that more countries
will commit to a carbon neutral target with net zero emissions by 2050 in their low
emission development strategies for the mid-century to be submitted in 2020.
The 1.5 °C target requires that global carbon emissions peak as soon as possible
and begin to decline rapidly afterwards, so much so that CO2 emissions are reduced
by 45% by 2030 compared to 2010, global net zero emission is achieved by 2050, and
achieving deep reductions in other greenhouse gases. According to the NDC targets
of all countries under the Paris Agreement and the current trend, global greenhouse
gas emissions will continue to rise by 2030, and there will be an annual emission
reduction gap of about 11 ~ 21.5 billion tons to achieve the 2 °C target. Global
warming is likely to reach 1.5 °C between 2030 and 2050 and to reach about 2.7 °C
or even exceed 3 °C by the end of this century. If the current rate of global warming
continues, the 2 °C target will not be achieved, not to mention the 1.5 °C target.
Therefore, it is essential for all Parties to significantly enhance and update their
NDC targets and actions and encourage all stakeholders to step up their ambitions.
As the all-round implementation of the Paris Agreement settles in, the top priority
is to adhere to the goals and principles of the Paris Agreement, facilitate its compre-
hensive, balanced and effective enforcement, encourage all parties to ramp up their
own efforts and boost joint international actions. COP26 should press for consensus
on the market mechanism of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, wrap up negotiations
on the Paris Rulebook, and promote cooperation under the global marketmechanism.
It should review global emission reduction actions before 2020 and the implemen-
tation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It is also necessary
to focus on how to ensure the delivery of US$100 billion each year committed by
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developed countries and other pressing issues such as climate disasters and adap-
tation in vulnerable areas of developing countries, and avoid empty talk on grand
visions without concrete immediate action in order not to delay global joint response.
To keep global temperature rise under 1.5 °C, the world as a whole should become
carbon neutral by themiddle of this century. The historical and current high emissions
of developed countries are self-evident, and the cumulative carbon emissions so far
alone could push up the temperature by 1.2 °C. With increasing urgency of global
long-term emission reduction, the pressure and risks for ensuring equitable access to
sustainable development are mounting, as developing countries are left with smaller
emission space in the process of modernization. To attain the 2 °C target, a maximum
of 117 ~ 150 billion tons of carbon emissions are allowed in the future. To achieve
the 1.5 °C target, the future emission space is 42 ~ 58 billion tons, which is 1/2 ~ 2/3
less than the 2 °C scenario, and primarily come from increased efforts by developing
countries where more urgent and ambitious low-carbon transition is required for
sustainable development. This points to the need for greater financial and technical
support from developed countries. Under the 1.5 °C target, the world as a whole
should achieve net zero CO2 emissions by 2050. However, it is impossible for all
countries to achieve net zero emissions simultaneously. Developed countries should
take the lead in achieving net zero CO2 emissions around 2035, and achieve a certain
level of negative emissions of all greenhouse gases by 2050, so as to leave the
developing world necessary carbon emissions space for their modernization efforts
and an equitable access to sustainable development [7].
The establishment of the long-term goals of tacking climate change is a multi-
lateral political decision under the Convention. The description of the long-term
global temperature target in the Paris Agreement embodies the hard-won consensus
by all Parties. It’s built on the scientific assessment of the interplay between climate
change and the economy, society and environment, accommodating the impact and
loss of climate change, adaptation and mitigation, and cost and sacrifices for emis-
sion reduction.Due to varied national conditions and stages of development, different
countries face different climate risks and have different priority areas of sustainable
development. This underscores the importance of coordinating the diverse interests
and requests of all parties and global cooperation, and promoting joint actions for
win–win cooperation. China should continue to play its role as a responsible major
country in global climate governance, actively leverage its influence as major devel-
oping country, boost exchanges and communication with other countries and inter-
national organizations, and lay the groundwork for building consensus on COP26
related issues.
China will still in the stage of building modernization before the middle of this
century, and will face greater challenges for achieving carbon neutrality compared
to developed countries. It entails faster and more drastic transformation of China’s
energy and economic systems. In the United States, for instance, the average age of
coal-fired power plants is already about 45 yearswith a higher cost of generating elec-
tricity than that of natural gas and renewable energy. It’s natural for them to be natu-
rally decommissioned or replaced by clean electricity technologies. By comparison,
the median age of coal-fired power plants in China is only 12 years. Most advanced
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supercritical and ultra-supercritical large coal-fired power plants were built in the
past decade, and huge stranded infrastructure cost would be incurred should these
plants are rapidly phased out. Furthermore, a large uptake of renewable power would
place mounting strains on the grids, energy storage and peak shaving and stable oper-
ation, requiring groundbreaking technologies in the space of battery energy storage,
hydrogen storage, smart grid, etc. It also involves faster and greater electrification
penetration for energy end-users, which can only be made possible through innova-
tions and industrialization of state-of-the-art technologies. The very frontier and hot
spots of the world’s technology competition, these technologies are a symbol for a
country’s technological innovation capabilities and technological competitiveness.
This research found that China is currently not technologically prepared for carbon
neutrality by 2050, and the cost of deep emission reduction will rise steeply in a non-
linear fashion. Therefore, more in-depth research and analysis are required for the
economic evaluation on the emission reduction pathways and technology options for
carbon neutrality, study on the costs of urgent transformation, thus providing China’s
wisdom and solutions for a global validation of the long-term targets.
11.2.4 Carbon Pricing and Carbon Border Tax
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement calls for the creation of a global mechanism for
carbon market cooperation to boost national emission reduction and international
cooperation. Similar to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto
Protocol, it encourages collaborative emission reduction between developed and
developing countries. While contributing to emission reduction of developed coun-
tries at a lowcost, it helps promote low-carbon transition and sustainable development
of developing nations. The cooperation of market mechanisms among nations under
the Paris Agreement will spur the development of global carbon pricing mechanism,
cement the Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system of all countries,
foster technological innovation for emission reduction and international cooperation,
and enable global collective emission reduction at a lower cost. The negotiations of
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on international market mechanismmainly involved
measures for preventing carbon leakage and double-counting of emission reductions
to ensure environmental integrity, and coordinating interests of parties with CDM.
The international community also cherishes a desire forCOP26 to reach agreement on
the implementation rules for Article 6, so as to promote cooperation among countries
and their own capacity building.
The urgency and trend of global low-carbon transformation will also trigger
changes and disputes in global economic and trade rules. To illustrate, some devel-
oped countries erect “green trade barriers” by raising the standards for energy effi-
ciency or eco-friendliness of commodities, and suppress the growing trade compet-
itiveness of developing countries through trade protectionism. The European Union
(EU), the United States (US) and other developed countries have been planning
to implement Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs) such as carbon tariffs. Prior to
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COP25 inNovember 2019, the EU launched theGreenDeal, establishing the target of
50% to 55% of emission reduction by 2030 and net zero emission by 2050 through
legislation, making Europe the first climate-neutral continent [8]. The EU policy
package also included carbon border adjustment for selected industries before 2021
as a critical component of Green Deal on the diplomatic front, which would be the
centerpiece for EU’s future climate negotiations. The Republican and Democratic
think tanks in the US are also contemplating the possibility and planning of carbon
tariffs on imported products and carbon benefits at home in case US returns to the
Paris Agreement in the future. Such unilateralism and protectionism tendencies in
global climate governance needs a meticulous review and high vigilance.
The unilateral imposition of carbon tariffs by developed nations does not conform
to the principles of the Convention. Article 3.5 (Principles) of the Convention clearly
states: “the Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development
in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to
address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change,
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” The carbon border
tax levied by developed countries for the sake of domestic emission reduction policies
and actions obviously contradicts this clause.
For emerging developing countries whose exports are mostly medium and low-
end manufacturing products with high-energy consumption and low added value,
carbon tariff will seriously erode their trade competitiveness [5]. The input–output
method is employed to make the following calculations based on the latest foreign
trade data from the Statistical Office of the European Union and China Trade and
External Economic Statistical Yearbook: 1.53 billion tons of CO2 emissions were
embodied in China’s exports in 2018, and 542 million tons for imported goods.
CO2 embodied in the net exports comprised roughly 10.5% of the total national
emissions, of which 270million tons were exported to the EU, accounting for 17.6%;
286 million tons went to the US, or 18.7%. Imported carbons from the EU and
US were 31 million tons and 44 million tons respectively, making China the net
exporter of embodied CO2 emissions. The EU adopted carbon border tax on grounds
of preventing carbon leakage, targeting imports with higher embodied CO2 than
domestic products that might push up global carbon emissions. The details of the
EU carbon border adjustment mechanism and its target countries and its coverage
of sectors and products are not yet clear. The measures might include a carbon tariff
on specific industries or products, or imposing mandatory purchase of emission
allowance under the EU carbon market on imported products, or a domestic carbon
tax rebate or purchased allowance for exported products. In short, the purpose is
to preserve the competitiveness of local enterprises in the EU and the international
market, transfer the cost and pressure of emission reduction to countries that “have
not made proper commitments”, namely developing countries. If a carbon tax of 40 ~
60 US dollars per ton is charged on China’s exports to Europe and the United States,
the tax would make up 2.6% ~ 4.0% of the total export, which would put the strain
on China’s exporters.
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The trend of global economic integration has accelerated the adjustment and divi-
sion of labor in the global industrial chain.Whilemassively transferring high-energy-
consuming raw material and low-end manufacturing industries to developing coun-
tries, developed countries have focused on the development of high-tech and modern
service industries, thus occupying a top position in the international industrial value
chain. The developing world, on the other hand, is pushed to the middle and low-end
with low added value, high energy consumption and emission intensity, producing
textiles, household appliances, motorcycles and other daily consumer and low-end
manufacturing goods to be exported to developed countries. While these mid—and
low-end products are produced in developing countries, they are consumed in devel-
oped nations. But under current rules, energy consumption and CO2 emissions are
calculated based on the origin of production. Developed countries consume these
products, but are not accounted for emissions in the manufacturing process. That
is, in fact, a shift of emission responsibilities and obligations in the form of carbon
transfer or carbon leakage. Developed countries are obliged to assist developing
countries to enhance energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions during the produc-
tion of these products, reduce the amount of emissions transferred to developing
countries, and share the responsibility of cutting the transferred emissions.
In developed countries, the ambitious emission reduction targets and the imple-
mentation of carbon tax or carbon emission trading policy would increase the cost
of emission reduction for enterprises. For example, imposing carbon border tax on
imports from developing countries on grounds of protecting local enterprises is tanta-
mount to a transfer of emission reduction cost to their developing counterparts. By
relocating the high energy-intensive and low-end rawmaterialsmanufacturing indus-
tries to developing countries, developed countries have brought down their emissions
and passed on domestic emission reduction costs to developing countries through
imposing carbon tax on developing countries’ products and using the collected tax
proceeds to subsidize or encourage domestic enterprises’ technology innovation and
emission reduction. Currently, some developed countries are planning to implement
a carbon tax rebate for their exports to developing countries, that is, to refund the
increased cost of domestic enterprises under their own carbon tax or carbon market
mechanism at the time of export so that they can stay competitive in the international
market. This is a unilateral act of using carbon tax policy to safeguards own interests
in international economic and trade competition.
As the world gears up for more urgent emission reduction, the unilateral imple-
mentation of carbon border tax by developed countries is, on the whole, an unfair
act of trade protectionism through the transfer of responsibility and cost of emission
reduction in the name of combating climate change. It not only harms global coop-
eration on climate change, technology innovation, emission cost reduction, and the
related targets and pathways, but also gives rise to a new round of trade disputes and
frictions, undermines WTO rules, and overshadows the prospect of a fair and just
international climate governance mechanism for win–win cooperation as well as the
process of global cooperation on climate change. It would only jeopardize its own
image and undercut its influence and leadership in global climate governance. Under
the mega trend of global economic and industrial convergence, developed countries
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should ramp up technology transfer and financial support to developing countries,
promote technological innovation, energy conservation and efficiency improvement,
and emission reduction in developing countries, thereby promoting carbon emissions
reduction and fostering win–win cooperation among all countries in the world.
The pretext for EU and other developed countries to implement carbon tax is that
the insufficient emission reduction efforts and the low emission reduction cost of
companies in developing countries have created unfair advantages over companies
in developed countries. In response to this concern, China should consolidate and
speed up the development of the domestic carbonmarket and gradually includemajor
high-emission sectors in the carbon market, as a clear signal of carbon pricing for
energy-intensive products to write off or weaken the basis for developed countries to
impose carbon border tax, and play a leading role in the development of the global
carbon market and the carbon pricing mechanism in the future.
At present, most of China’s export manufacturing products are at the middle and
low-end of the international industrial chain with high energy consumption and low
value rate. As a result, China has become a net exporter of embodied CO2 emissions
in foreign trade. While accelerating the transformation towards green, low-carbon
and circular economy under the new development concept, China should also drive
the transformation and upgrading of export-oriented enterprises, optimize the export
mix, control and reduce the export of energy-intensive products, and move toward
the higher end of the value chain to enhance quality and efficiency. At the same time,
China should actively promote the export of new and high technologies and modern
services, increase the weight of services in its export, effectively reduce the outward
transfer of embodied carbon emissions, and gradually balance embodied emissions
from imports and exports. This is the fundamental countermeasure for China to deal
with the carbon border tax of developed countries in international trade and build
the international competitiveness of its products and technologies. It is also a major
step to reduce the total amount of domestic CO2 emissions and should be a critical
component of China’s strategy of green and low-carbon economic transformation
and high-quality development.
11.3 Intensive Engagement and Active Leadership
in Global Climate Governance and International
Cooperation
11.3.1 Xi Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization Is
of Important Guiding Significance to Global
Low-Carbon Development and Transformation
Upholding Xi Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization, promoting global
ecological progress and achieving harmonious development betweenman and nature
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is the ultimate solution to climate change and an inevitable path toward global sustain-
able development. Xi’s ideology of eco-civilization contains a range of expressions,
including “the harmonious coexistence between man and nature”, “green is gold”,
“good ecological environment represents the greatest well-being of the people”,
“mountains,waters, forests, fields, lakes and grassland are a community of life”, “pre-
serving ecological environment through the most stringent system and the rigorous
rule of law”, etc. This notion of eco-civilization is universally relevant for all coun-
tries, especially the developing nations. It provides directions for them to build
ecological culture systems based on ecological values, coordinates economic devel-
opment, social progress and environmental protection, facilitates low carbon transi-
tion of the energy and economic systems, and embarks on a path of climate-friendly,
low carbon economic development. In his proposal for building global ecological
civilization, Xi Jinping underlined the importance of “putting in place an ecological
system with the respect for nature and green development at the heart, addressing
the problems brought by industrial civilization, pursuing harmony between man
and nature, and realizing sustainable development of the world and all-round devel-
opment of man.” The notion of global ecological civilization will also be a vital
guiding ideology for global collaborative actions against ecological crisis, in partic-
ular climate change, prompting the transformation of human society from industrial
civilization to ecological civilization, steering a paradigm shift of world economic
and social development, and achieving the harmonious development between man
and nature [9].
Xi Jinping’s Thought on Eco-civilization advocates the establishment of a green,
low carbon and circular economic system for sustainable development through the
building of a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy system, development of
green finance and creation of a legal and policy framework for green production
and consumption, etc. It contributes China’s wisdom and expertise to the global
cooperation on climate change and other ecological crisis of the planet, promotes
the harmonious coexistence between man and nature and efforts to build a clean and
beautiful world, thus driving the progress of global environmental governance and
global ecological civilization.
Guided by Xi Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization, China is firmly
committed to the path of civilizeddevelopment featuring increasedproductivity,well-
being of the people and sound ecology. It implements the strictest system for ecolog-
ical and environmental protection in an effort to build a beautiful China. It adheres to
the concept of green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable development in line with
the path of climate-friendly, low-carbon economic development encouraged by the
Paris Agreement. China seamlessly integrates climate change efforts with sustain-
able development at home, creating a win–win scenario for the economy, people’s
livelihood, energy, environment and CO2 emission reduction, and making enormous
strides in energy reform and CO2 emission reduction. It has become an important
contributor and torchbearer in advancing energy reform and low-carbon economic
transformation in the world. China’s successful experience in energy and economic
transformation, new urbanization, industrial transformation and upgrading, environ-
mental governance, as well as its policy framework of energy conservation, carbon
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reduction and ecological civilization can inform and inspire other developing coun-
tries. Its remarkable achievements and successful experience in ecological progress
and environmental protection, as well as the concept and practice of building an
economic, institutional and ecological safety system for ecological progress will
shed a new light on the world ecological progress and sustainable development.
The report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China reaf-
firmed China’s commitment to peaceful development in the new era, underscoring
China’s stance in building a community with a shared future for mankind, upholding
the notion of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in global
governance, and actively participating in the reform and development of the global
governance system, and constantly contributing China’s wisdom and expertise. The
report also highlighted China’s pledge to environmental friendliness, cooperation in
tackling climate change, protection of the planet, and contribution to global ecolog-
ical safety. Xi Jinping’s Thought on Global Ecological Civilization and the concept
of building a community with a shared future for mankind embody Chinese wisdom
and proposal for global environmental governance, and will play an important role
in guiding the global efforts in building ecological civilization and moving toward a
climate-friendly and low-carbon development path.
11.3.2 Actively Promote and Lead the Process of Global
Climate Governance and Climate Negotiations
China will continue to assume responsibilities and obligations as a developing
country for a long period of time. But in the long run, its strategic positioning shall
be adjusted as its development stage changes. By the middle of this century when
China becomes a great modern socialist country, it must gradually water down its
status as a developing country, and proactively undertake the international respon-
sibility for climate change, and actively promote and lead the process of global
climate governance and climate negotiations in order to measure up to its rising
status as a major country. As pointed out in the report to the 19th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China, “taking a driving seat in international cooperation
to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant, contrib-
utor and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization”. Xi Jinping
also stressed that China should “implement a proactive strategy on climate change
management, promote and guide the establishment of a fair, reasonable and win–win
global governance system, showcase its image as a major responsible country, and
build a community with a shared future for mankind”.
The pioneering role in climate change negotiations is best seen in the capability to
coordinate the varied positions and interests of parties, and to show impact, inspira-
tion and leadership in building common ground of global targets and positions of all
parties and seeking balance of varied interests. The ability to do so would facilitate
consensus-building and unanimously accepted action plans, guide the direction and
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pace of global climate governance rule-making and cooperation process, thus taking
the international moral high ground, improving international image and leadership,
better safeguarding and expanding national interests, and demonstrating a country’s
soft power.
In the course of chronic climate negotiations, countries in the world are divided
into three forces, namely, the “two camps”—developing countries and developed
countries; the Umbrella Group headed by the EU and the United States; and the
group of developing countries—“G77+ China” with the “Basic Four” as the core.
China, in reality, has become the “backbone” of the “BASICCountries” and the group
of developing countries, and hasmaintained close communication and dialogueswith
major developed countries. It has actively bridged differences of all parties in climate
negotiations and built mutual trust for cooperation, and has demonstrated its rising
influence and leadership. China has become the “go-to” nation for coordinating
differences for Paris climate conference and subsequent hosts of COP conferences
and the secretariat of UNFCCC.
The China’s leadership and pioneering role in global climate governance does not
mean that it should contribute beyond its capabilities, given its current national condi-
tion and stage of development; nor should it share extra obligations that the United
States has given up at greater cost. Rather, China should properly capture and lead the
principles and trends of global climate governance, and set the stage for the reformand
development of a fair and just international governance system. In the negotiations
and full implementation of theParisAgreement,China should adhere to the principles
of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, consolidate the solidarity of developing
countries, expand strategic support for developing countries, strengthen the coordina-
tion and communication with developed countries and promote the comprehensive,
balanced and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement in terms ofmitigation,
adaptation, funding, technology, capacity building and transparency. China should
also urge developed countries to fulfill their obligations to take the lead in emission
reduction and provide financial and technical support to developing countries, so
as to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of China and other developing
countries [3]. China advocates for a new concept of global governance featuring
mutual respect, fairness, justice and win–win cooperation. China takes addressing
climate change as an opportunity for sustainable development of all countries and
promotes mutually beneficial cooperation for collaborative development. This is
conducive to expanding the areas and space for voluntary cooperation among coun-
tries and building the shared interests of all parties for a shift of climate negotiations
from a “zero-sum game” to win–win cooperation. The new type of leadership and
pioneering role that China has demonstrated in climate governance concepts and
cooperation approach—different from the United States and Europe—are gaining
increasing recognition by the international community. Addressing climate change
represents the shared interest of mankind and enables more common ground and
potential for win–win cooperation than other global risks and regional hotspot issues
in the political, economic and social arenas, promising broad prospects and political
will for cooperation. Climate change provides a stage for China to actively engage in
the reform and development of global governance. China can make efforts to make
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it a pioneering and successful example of building international relations featuring
mutual respect, fairness, justice and win–win cooperation in the new era and building
a community with a shared future for mankind.
11.3.3 Actively Promote International Cooperation
on Climate Change and South-South Cooperation
on Climate Change Under the Belt and Road Initiative
At present, the issue of how to strengthen low-carbon transition in the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) projects to address climate change has drawn wide attention from
foreign media and sparked concerns, doubts and critiques. To dispel the misgivings,
China should take concrete actions and make actual progress to let the fact speak for
itself. Therefore, theBRI cooperation should highlight the ideologyof buildingglobal
ecological civilization and the notion of green, low-carbon and circular development,
strengthen the targets and policy incentives for tackling climate change, and create
a bright spot of international pragmatic cooperation on climate change.
In facilitating “Belt and Road” cooperation, China is taking pragmatic actions
to put into practice the new concept of global governance of building a community
with a shared future for mankind, and to achieve win–win cooperation and common
development. Over the course of “Belt and Road” cooperation, China should follow
the guiding principle of ecological civilization and the notion of green development
so that it can be aligned with the sustainable development strategies of the countries
involved. China should improve the “connectivity” among countries and regions, and
take green and low-carbon development as the cardinal principle for promoting the
development of and cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative.
“Green and low-carbon” is the key to addressing the negative impacts of disputes
on the Belt and Road Initiative (such as investment in coal-fired power plants and
the transfer of high-carbon and high-polluting capacities). In the future, China needs
to summarize its best practices in climate change management and environment and
climate governance, come up with tailored solutions of green low carbon technolo-
gies, project financing, business models based on the specific needs of countries
involved in BRI, and assist BRI countries and regions to achieve their NDC targets
and sustainable development goals. On the other hand, China can use a variety of
instruments to expand climate financing channels to secure funding for the green BRI
projects, for example, exploring innovative investment andfinancingmodels to attract
more investors for the low-carbon development in BRI countries; harnessing the role
of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk Road Fund and South-South Cooper-
ation Fund on Climate Change, etc. to create synergies, in conjunction with bilateral
development aid, investment from multilateral development banks, private invest-
ment funds and philanthropic funds. Financial institutions should follow the Green
Investment Principles and take low carbon and sustainable development as guiding
principles for BRI investments. By vigorously tapping the potential of the PPPmodel
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of third-party cooperation and win–win cooperation, it will enable BRI projects to
gain financial and credit support from local governments, strengthen the coordina-
tion between local governments and investors and operators of green and low-carbon
projects, and enhance climate risk management and cash flow management.
China’s South-South cooperation on climate change refers to China’s cooperation
with one or more developing countries, as well as with developed countries or UN
agencies, in jointly supporting developing countries in enhancing their capacity to
cope with climate change and advancing project cooperation. As a part of China’s
foreign aid, China’s South-South cooperation on climate change follows the prin-
ciple of non-interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries and aims at
mutual benefit, “win–win” and “self-reliance”. China’s south-south cooperation,
primarily through foreign aid, involves cooperation at bilateral, multilateral, regional
and interregional levels. In the past few years, China has focused on some small and
medium-sized projects in neighboring countries to meet their practical needs. For
example, China assisted the construction of a residential housing project dubbed
“safe island” in the Maldives to protect local residents from tsunamis and seawater
erosion; China helped Bangladesh and the Maldives set up extreme weather warning
systems to improve their ability to warn against climate and natural disasters; China
StateOceanicAdministration established the Framework Plan (2011–2015) for Inter-
national Cooperation in the South China Sea and Adjacent Seas, which listed “ocean
and climate change” and “marine disaster prevention and reduction” as the main
funding areas; China worked with surrounding countries in conducting the research
projects of “ocean–atmosphere interaction and observation of the tropical sea in
southeast Indian Ocean” and “observation of the Indian monsoon outbursts”. China
has also strengthened scientific and technological cooperation with Africa, imple-
menting more than 100 joint scientific and technological research demonstration
projects. Since 2012, China has offered climate change foreign aid in conducting a
wide array of projects, including research and capacity building for renewable energy
utilization and marine disaster warning; development, popularization and applica-
tion of LED lighting; technology demonstration on the comprehensive utilization of
straw; research on utilizing and promotingwind-solar complementary power produc-
tion system; experiment and demonstration on the efficient utilization of drip irriga-
tion, etc., assisting developing countries in improving their ability to tackle climate
change.
Developing countries that involved in key cooperation projects under the Belt
and Road Initiative should be the target countries for South-South cooperation on
climate change. During infrastructure construction and production capacity coop-
eration in these countries, Chinese companies should bear in mind the impacts of
climate change and take into account the impacts of extreme natural disasters caused
by climate change in the project design, and in the meantime, maximize the use of
energy-saving and low-carbon technologies, adopt the same or higher standards for
environment and energy efficiency, and promote the resource-saving and circular
industrial development model across the whole industry chain, and jointly build low
carbon industrial parks or demonstration zones. Chinese companies should select
suitable projects and build buildings, infrastructure and production capacity that are
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green, low-carbon and recognizable. These projects should be included in the South-
South flagship climate cooperation scheme for setting up 10 low-carbon demonstra-
tion zones, launching 100 mitigation and adaption programs, and providing 1,000
places on climate-change training programs to meet the needs of these countries for
low carbon infrastructure under their national climate change strategies, improve
their ability to respond to climate change, and enlarge the scope of their cooper-
ation with China and explore more investment opportunities. Chinese companies
should also assist host countries in planning and implementing adaptation, mitiga-
tion and capacity building projects within the framework of international cooperation
on climate change, and seek international financing sources (e.g., the Green Devel-
opment Fund) and funding from international institutions (e.g., theWorld Bank). In a
word, China should make the joint response to climate change a crucial component,
guiding principle and bright spot of the BRI strategy to enhance its international
image and influence.
It is also necessary to strengthen South-South scientific and technological coop-
eration and technology transfer on climate change. Amidst low-carbon transition,
the vast number of developing countries have huge demand for technology and the
market potential is enormous. China has advanced, practical and low-cost low-carbon
technologies that are urgently needed by developing countries, such as energy conser-
vation and new energy. When conducting international production capacity coopera-
tion in foreign markets, Chinese businesses should pay more attention to technology
cooperation and transfer. China should actively promote joint R&D and technology
transfer platforms or technology parks with the host country to address the key chal-
lenges of localization and industrialization in the process of advanced low-carbon
technology transfer. This will not only improve innovation and industrialization of
advanced technology in host countries, but also enhance the international compet-
itiveness of China’s leading technologies. China should play a pioneering role in
exploring the model for technology transfer and the mechanism and pathway for
mutual benefits within the framework of addressing climate change, and upgrade it
to strategic cooperation at national level, which will certainly have a broad impact
on the international community, drive and promote the development of financial and
technical cooperation and related actions under the framework of climate change
management.
Efforts should be made to quickly implement and make good use of the China
South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. China has announced that it will invest 20
billion RMB to establish the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund and has
launched the flagship climate cooperation scheme for low-carbon demonstration,
adaptation, mitigation and capacity building in developing countries, which were
well-received by the international community and anticipated by developing coun-
tries. Now it is urgent to secure the funding sources and finalize the management
mechanism to make use of the fund as soon as possible. The South-South Climate
Cooperation Fund should not be operated or used in isolation. Rather, it calls for
overall planning and inter-departmental coordination. It should be deemed as a seed
fund or guiding fund to leverage and marshal other sources of funding, including
funds from public and private sectors, and be channeled to projects via grant and
11.3 Intensive Engagement and Active Leadership … 307
commercial and mutually beneficial cooperation to maximize the role of the fund.
Various channels for China’s foreign aid and foreign cooperation can embed the
element of climate cooperation, add and improve project selection and design to
accommodate the policy incentives and technological pathway for mitigating natural
disasters, saving energy and reducing carbon, so that these channels can be integrated
into the framework of South-South climate cooperation to produce more visible and
influential outcome on a large scale. Meanwhile, technical assistance and personnel
training should be provided to developing countries to address the pressing issues
pertaining to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for example, greenhouse
gas inventory development, MRV system building, and long-term low emissions
development strategy preparation, etc. Developed countries have counted all chan-
nels of their financial support to developing nations as climate support, which greatly
exaggerated the amount of their financial assistance. China also needs to sort through
its financial support to developing countries under the Belt and Road Initiative, high-
light policy incentives for tackling climate change, and integrate various financial
sources to enable greater outcome and impact.
On one hand, China should continue to step up the cooperation with the European
Union and other developed countries and regions, especially in the field of creating
carbon emission trading market. By learning from the experience and lessons of
international carbon markets, China can enhance the top-level planning of its carbon
market and anticipate potential problems. On the other hand, the design and pathway
of China’s carbon market based on its institutional system at the current stage of
development also provide important reference for other developing countries. So
far, many developing nations have expressed their willingness to learn from China’s
experience in carbon market. With the steady progress of China’s carbon market, its
impact on the global carbon market will see a major boost, whether measured by
its market size or pricing power. China should actively participate in international
rule-making during the development of global carbon pricingmechanism andmarket
mechanism under the Paris Agreement. Enhancing international cooperation on the
carbon market will not only benefit the long-term development of China’s carbon
market, but also contribute to China’s strategy of opening up and better align with
China’s efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind.
The Paris Agreement calls for active participation and voluntary actions by all
sectors of society of non-parties except those at national level. At present, various
types of climate coalitions and associations formed by local governments, cities,
industries, enterprises and civil society are cropping up, such as the World Alliance
for Low Carbon Cities and the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative. These organizations
not only put forward and develop common low carbon targets and action plans using
a “bottom-up” approach, but also advocate code of conduct at the city, industry,
corporate, financial investment and social levels. They recommend advanced tech-
nical standards, promote carbon labels and low-carbon certification, encourage green
investment, strengthen self-discipline actions and cooperation, communicate and
share their experience, becoming a vital force in advancing the implementation of
Paris Agreement. Currently, with the active participation at all levels, China should
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make holistic planning and guide the directions for stakeholders to expand all-
round influence, catalyze positive momentum in all fields, build its own competi-
tive advantages, and contribute to the improvement of the comprehensive national
competitiveness and international influence.
Its’ crucial to reinforce exchanges and communication among international think
tanks in the field of climate change and harness the role of public diplomacy. The
exchanges and cooperation among think tanks contribute to mutual understanding,
promote mutual trust, and help publicize China’s climate governance concepts and
domestic actions and results, disseminate China’s values of ecological civilization
and expand global influence. This is also an important area for China to enhance inter-
national influence and discourse power, and a symbol of the country’s soft power.
China should foster the growth of climate change think tanks and strengthen the
coordination and cooperation among think tanks from different disciplines and with
research focus. These think tanks are expected to study China issues under a global
horizon and analyze global issues from a Chinese perspective. They should conduct
comprehensive research and build discourse power in climate science, policies, tech-
nologies, etc., and showcase their influence and credibility in the field of science and
policies in order to provide scientific and technical support to China’s torchbearer
role in global climate governance.
11.3.4 Actively Respond to the Post-Covid Global Governance
The raging COVID-19 represents a global public crisis that will profoundly affect
and reshape the world political, economic and trade landscape, and intensify the
turbulence of once-in-a-century transformation. Global climate change is a long-
term ecological crisis for mankind. Enormous uncertainties exist for the post-Covid
global climate cooperation, which will inevitably spark international concern and
competition among major countries. The Paris Agreement mandates all parties to
report by 2020 their efforts in implementing and enhancing NDC targets and action
plans, and to submit long-term low-carbon emission development strategies for 2050.
The international community has great expectations on major countries in the world,
andChina has particularly come under the spotlight. Now, as China is fighting against
the pandemic and planning for economic recovery and development, it should take
into account both domestic and international situations to make overall planning for
domestic high quality development and economic security and global response to
climate change and low carbon transition. It should spearhead global energy revolu-
tion and low carbon economic development trend, showing the spirit of a major
country that is responsible for the common interests of mankind, thereby influ-
encing the trend of international public opinion and dealing with a more complicated
international situation after the pandemic.
The COVID-19 has complicated relations betweenmajor countries. It has become
more prominent that the United States and other western countries have ramped up
their long-term strategies and actions to contain China’s peaceful rise. The pandemic
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has plunged the world into a severe economic recession, and the top priority of
economic recovery for all governments is to safeguard people’s livelihood and shore
up the weakness in their industrial chains and enhance the safety and competitive-
ness of key industries, which inevitably undercuts the priority of the green and
low-carbon transformation of energy and economy. Plus, the reduced supply of
funding in the wake of the pandemic dampens the investment and actions needed to
combat climate change. Frequent exchanges and dialogues are underway between
major countries, think tanks, and international agencies on the coordination of the
response to the pandemic and the long-term climate crisis. TheUNSecretary-General
António Guterres urged governments to place addressing climate change at the heart
of economic recovery efforts as climate change is the deeper crisis of the world.
Therefore, adhering to the post-pandemic policy orientation of “green economic
recovery” and reinforcing NDC targets and actions under the Paris Agreement have
increasingly become the consensus and shared focus of the international community.
At present, the EU and other developed countries and some international organi-
zations are pushing for the emission reduction target in line with the 1.5 °C future
in climate negotiations. In the “European Green Deal”, the EU set out a strategy of
carbon neutrality by 2050. The UK has amended its Climate Change Act to include
carbon neutrality by 2050 into the legislation. The US Climate Alliance—covering
California, New York and other states with over 65% of the US population and
GDP—has been formed, with most of the states announcing carbon neutrality by
2050. Similar goals have been announced by some developing countries, such as
Chile, Ethiopia and some small island states and least developed countries. Quite
many countries and cities have declared to go 100% renewable in 2030–2050, and
laid out timetable for phasing out coal and coal power as well as gasoline vehicles.
The willingness and actions for deep decarbonization worldwide during and after
the pandemic might be weakened in the short run, but it has become increasingly
urgent for the medium- and long-term transitions towards low-carbon energy system
and economy.
Climate change will become an ever-important arena for the post-pandemic
competition between major countries. Despite the withdrawal of the Trump adminis-
tration from the Paris Agreement, the US remains a Party to the UNFCCC. Adhering
to the “America First” unilateralism during climate negotiations, the US has repeat-
edly asked China and other emerging developing countries to shoulder the same
obligations as itself. President Joe Biden declared that the US must lead again on the
global stage and will rejoin the Paris Agreement on his first day in office, followed by
a summit of the world’s major emitters to accelerate global progress. Massive emer-
gency investmentswill bemade to secure a clean energy systemand economywith net
zero emissions by 2050. He also publicly declared to form a united front with demo-
cratic allies of shared values and take tough actions against China through carbon
border tax and stringent standards for investment and financial subsidies. In response
to this, China should cooperate with India and other emerging developing countries
and those who share similar positions, adhere to the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities in the light of different national circumstances, boost exten-
sive and pragmatic cooperation and joint actions with countries of different types
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and stages of development as well as national organizations, strengthen multi-level
exchanges and dialogues with developed countries, pursue cooperation on the shared
interests of mankind, and defuse the growing tensions with major powers. On the
other hand, China should double down on domestic strategies and urgent actions,
formulate and announce the targets, strategy and implementation pathway of deep
decarbonization by 2050 with the goal of keeping global temperature rise below 2
°C and striving to hold it under 1.5 °C, adapt to the current urgent situation of global
emission reduction and showcase the posture of a major country that proactively
assumes international responsibilities. It’s essential to follow Xi Jinping’s thought
on ecological civilization and the concept of building a community with a shared
future for mankind, and actively promote the development of global governance
system and the international cooperation.
Tackling climate change is in the common interest of mankind. It represents the
international moral high ground contested by major countries, and calls for close
cooperation and concerted actions by all countries. The current global climate gover-
nance follows the multilateral mechanism of broad participation and equal consul-
tation by all countries, which requires extensive communication and consultation
between developed and developing countries. China has demonstrated growing influ-
ence and coordination capability in the field of climate change, and the international
community also expects China to show further leadership and bridge more differ-
ences. Therefore, there is also room and need for China, the US and other developed
countries to carry out dialogue, consultation and cooperation in the post-Covid-19
era. China should give full play to its diplomatic strength in global climate gover-
nance and adhere to multilateralism to respond to the unilateralism of the US and
resolve the challenges and pressure.
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Based on the analysis from this research project, the following considerations and
recommendations are presented for China’s formulation of goals and pathways for
its long-term low carbon development strategies.
12.1 China Should Formulate Domestic Long-Term
Low-Carbon Development Strategy
Climate change is the greatest threat facing the sustainable development of human
society. It has become a universal consensus internationally to protect the ecological
safety of the earth and to address this challenge cooperatively. The core of climate
actions is to mitigate anthropogenic GHG emissions – primarily CO2 emissions
from fossil fuel consumption. This has been the driver for the revolutionary reforms
of the energy system and the low-carbon transformation of economic development
patterns around the world. Developing advanced energy and deep decarbonization
technologies are in the center stage for global technological innovation, thus the
center of competition for every nation’s advanced technological core competitive-
ness. Furthermore, a country’s ability to develop advanced technologies in the energy
and economic low-carbon transition would become a manifestation of a country’s
economic, trade, and technological competitiveness. Establishing and forming of
a clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient energy system and a green, low-carbon
and circular economy have become a fundamental feature of modern energy and
economic systems.
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China set the goal and
overall strategy of building China into a great modern socialist country by the middle
of this century. Xi Jinping’s thought on ecological civilization is an important guid-
ance for realizing the harmonious development between human and nature and
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building a beautiful China. It’s also crucial to embark on the path of green, low-
carbon and circular development, promote coordinated governance and comprehen-
sive strategies of the economy, society, environment and climate change, and accel-
erate low-carbon transformation of energy and economy, which is the ultimate solu-
tion to advancing ecological progress and sustainable development. China’s policy
and best practices in ecological civilization and low-carbon transition of the energy
and economic systems will provide Chinese wisdom and experience to the world’s
energy and economic low carbon revolution, making new contributions to boosting
global ecological progress, protecting eco-safety of the Earth, building a community
with a shared future for mankind, and spurring new progress of humanity.
The Paris Agreement has set the global climate goal of limiting global temperature
rise to well below 2°C and striving to keep it below 1.5°C. This is the political
consensus and shared vision of all nations around the world based on the scientific
assessment of the IPCC, and is the long-term goal of the global climate governance.
Urgent actions on emission reduction are needed to achieve the goal, which involves
a global net zero emission of GHGs – or global carbon neutrality - in the second
half or even the middle of the century. The Paris Agreement also requires Parties to
submit their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies by 2020
in a joint effort to achieve long-term global emissions reduction targets. Currently,
121 countries have announced their goals and vision of achieving carbon neutrality
by 2050. Many countries and cities have also vowed to go 100% renewable from
2030 to 2050, together with timetables for the phase-out of coal and coal power and
the banning of gasoline vehicles.
The willingness and actions for deep decarbonization worldwide during and after
the pandemicmay beweakened in the short run, but the urgency of low-carbon energy
and economic transition in the medium and long term will be ever more apparent.
The international community places high expectations on China to announce ambi-
tious long-term low-carbon development goals and strategies. Following President
Xi Jinping’s instruction on addressing climate change to “promote domestic develop-
ment and build international reputation”, China should pursue a pathway of long-term
emission reduction to keep global temperature rise well below 2°C and ideally below
1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels, coordinate domestic sustainable develop-
ment and global climate governance, define the goals and measures for low carbon
transformation by 2050, and incorporate them into the overall strategy and planning
of China’s socialist modernization by the middle of the century.
By the middle of the century, China will achieve the long-term goal of deep decar-
bonization, build a clean, low-carbon, safe and highly efficient energy system based
on new and renewable energy, and largely phase out fossil energy. This will effec-
tively curb the discharge of conventional pollutants from the source, and ultimately
ensure the compliance with the PM2.5 targets in key polluting regions in China as
the potential of end-of-pipe control diminishing. The clean energy system, primarily
consisting of new and renewable energy by 2050, will ensure that most cities achieve
the PM2.5 concentration less than 15 µg/m3, and more than 80% of cities achieve the
high standard value of less than 10 µg/m3. Meanwhile, the advent of smart renew-
able energy supply systemwill provide the fundamental safeguard to national energy
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security, and decouple economic growth and social development from resource use
and environmental impacts.
The goals, scenarios and implementation pathways of China’s medium- and
long-term low-carbon development should, on the one hand, be grounded on the
country’s national conditions, capabilities, andmodernization process with a outlook
to ensuring the realization of China’s goals for socialist modernization in the new
era, and on the other hand, enable China to undertake its international responsi-
bilities and contributions for ecological safeguard of the Earth and the common
cause of humankind in in tandem with its growing comprehensive national strength
and international influence. Its responsibilities and process should be different from
that of developed nations. The goal and vision of China’s low-carbon transition
could be achieved through long-term efforts that would be widely recognized by the
international community and would enhance China’s competitiveness and influence.
12.2 The Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategy is
a Goal-oriented Comprehensive Development Strategy
Development lies at the heart of the long-term low-carbon development strategy that
prompts the transition towards green, low-carbon, and sustainable economic and
social development and the harmonious co-existence between people and nature.
Therefore, China’s long-term low-carbon development strategy should not only
ensure the realization of developing China into a great modern socialist country
that is prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful by the
middle of the century, but also follow the pathway of deep decarbonization towards
the goal of limiting the global warming well below 2°C and ideally within 1.5°C. In
other words, the long-term low-carbon development strategy is oriented toward the
both the goal of building a modern socialist country and the global climate target
of long-term emission reduction. It is a crucial component of the overall goals and
strategies of China’s socialist modernization in the new era, and is incorporated into
overall all development strategy. China’s domestic and international imperatives can
be coordinated to rejuvenate theChinese nation and, in themeantime, enableChina to
contribute in new ways to global ecological civilization and to building a community
with a shared future for humankind.
The long-term low-carbon development strategy should provide holistic coordina-
tion of the goals and visions of economic development, social equity and prosperity,
resource conservation and efficient utilization, ecological and environmental protec-
tion and climate change. It should aim for collaborative and integrated governance to
create a win–win situation for sustainable development, rather than a single strategy
of emission reduction. The long-term low-carbon development strategy should not
only strengthen energy and economic transformation and implement advanced tech-
nological innovation policies and measures, but also pay more attention to the imple-
mentation of nature-based solutions (NbS). By protecting, restoring, improving and
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enhancing the functionality of ecosystems, improving climate resilience, strength-
ening carbon storage of forests, grassland, wetlands, and agricultural land, reducing
carbon sources and increasing carbon sinks, thiswould provide synergetic co-benefits
in creating opportunities for economic growth and employment, improving the envi-
ronmental quality of water, soil and air, ensuring food safety, and protecting biodi-
versity. Such efforts are guided by the notion of ecological civilization, which priori-
tizes ecology and promotes the harmonious co-existence between human and nature.
NbS offers an important way to tackle climate change and promote coordinated
governance and development of the economy, society, environment, and climate
change, paving the way for building a beautiful China. Thus, it’s vital to integrate
policies of climate adaptation and mitigation with those of resource-saving and envi-
ronmental protection to enable comprehensive management of ecosystems such as
mountains, rivers, forests, farmland, lakes and grasslands. Vigorous steps should
be taken to enhance afforestation, protect natural forests, return farmland to forests
and grasslands, build forest shelterbelts, comprehensively control desertification,
preserve water and soil and carry out other ecological projects to reduce carbon
sources and increase sequestration. NbS is of great significance for achieving carbon
neutrality in the future. In China, the annual increase of carbon sinks such as forests
could reach around 700 million tCO2 by the middle of this century. NbS will play an
important role in offsetting the remaining greenhouse gas emissions from industrial
production, land use, land use changes and other hard-to-abate sectors.
12.3 Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategy
Should Demonstrate the Coordination of the “two
Stages”
The characteristics ofChina’s current industrialization and urbanization stagesmakes
it more challenging for China to achieve deep decarbonization by the middle of this
century compared with developed countries. The targets and pathways of low-carbon
transformation should be formulated in coordination with the overall goals and tasks
of the “two stages” of socialist modernization.
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of
China set forth goals and overall strategies for realizing socialist modernization in
the new era. It comprehensively analyzed the international and domestic environ-
ment and the conditions for China’s development, and developed arrangements and
roadmaps for the two stages. In the first stage of 2020 to 2035, to achieve socialist
modernization on thewhole, China needs to reach the goal of a fundamental improve-
ment in the domestic ecological environment, fulfill its international commitments
on emission reduction, promote high-quality economic and social development, and
solidify the technological, industrial, policy and market groundwork for achieving
deep decarbonization by 2050. In the second stage of 2035 to 2050, on the path
to building a great modern socialist country and a beautiful China, China needs
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to achieve deep decarbonization that is consistent with the goal of limiting global
temperature rise well below 2°C and striving to keep it below 1.5°C and pave the
way for achieving net zero emissions of all GHGs as soon as possible after 2050.
In thefirst stage (2020–2035),China’s emission reduction targets andmeasures are
mainly based on the internal demand and planning for domestic sustainable devel-
opment, including resource conservation, environment protection and air quality
improvement, in an effort to strengthen the policy lever of CO2 emission reduction
for maximized synergies. This strategy is formulated based on the integrated assess-
ment of domestic and international circumstances. In the second stage (2035–2050),
with China’s advancing modernization, growing comprehensive national strength
and the increasing urgent need to reduce global emissions, China should give more
prominence to the 2°C pathway and proactively take on international responsibilities
that echo China’s growing comprehensive national strength and international influ-
ence. From the perspectives of enhancing international competitiveness, impact and
torchbearer role in the process of low-carbon transformation, China should continue
to ramp up its emission reduction efforts and achieve the deep decarbonization goal of
near zero emission by 2050, which mirrors China’s comprehensive national strength
and international influence as a leading modern socialist country.
12.4 Goals and Transition Pathways for the 2050
Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategy
Should Be Clarified
China’s Energy Production and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016–2030)
published in 2016 unveiled the tentative target of non-fossil energy comprising over
half of primary energy consumption in 2050, which is used as assumptions for the
reinforced policy scenario in this study. Under the reinforced policy scenario, CO2
emissions will amount to 6 ~ 6.5 billion tons by 2050, still far from achieving the 2°C
target. China’s long-term low-carbon strategy for themiddle of the century should use
the 2°C target as guidance for emission reduction, aligned with the current policy of
energy conservation and carbon reduction and the 2030 NDC targets and implemen-
tation plan to peak emissions by 2030, after which China should continue to accel-
erate absolute CO2 emission reduction, transit from the reinforced policy scenario
to the 2°C scenario, promote the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS)
technology and increase carbon sinks from agriculture and forestry to enable a deep
decarbonization pathway that is in line with the 2°C target.
The deep emission reduction pathways for achieving the 2°C target by 2050 entails
near-zero CO2 emissions, implying that the net CO2 emissions should be reduced
to about 2 billion tons, which is equivalent to the projected world average of 1–1.5
tons of per capita emissions by 2050, equivalent to about 80% reduction from the
peak of CO2 emissions around 2030. Non-CO2 GHG emissions should also peak
around the same time with CO2 emissions. Emission reduction efforts should be
318 12 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
continuously strengthened so that by 2050, all GHG emissions will be reduced by
70% from the peak. The total energy consumption should also peak around 2035
at somewhere below 6.5 billion tce and, in 2050, should be reduced by more than
20% from the peak level. Non-fossil energy should account for more than 70% of
primary energy consumption, and about 90% of the total electricity generation would
come form non-fossil electricity, building a near-zero carbon emission energy system
mainly comprising of new and renewable energy with the safety of energy supply
fundamentally guaranteed and the emissions of conventional pollutants controlled at
source. By 2050, China would see a ten-fold increase in GDP compared to 2005, an
over 80% reduction in energy intensity per unit of GDP from that of 2005, and an over
95% drop in CO2 intensity, and be able to decouple sustainable economic and social
development from CO2 emissions. To enable the deep decarbonization to achieve
the 1.5°C target by 2050, China needs to further strengthen economy-wide emission
reduction of all GHGs, peak CO2 emissions around 2025, achieve net-zero emissions
of CO2 and reduce all GHG emissions by 90% by 2050. After 2050, China needs to
ramp up efforts to strengthen emission reduction of non-CO2 GHGs, increase carbon
sinks, and use negative emissions technologies such as BECCS and CDR to achieve
net-zero emissions of all GHGs and carbon neutrality at the earliest time possible.
This would require more arduous efforts, larger investments and incur greater costs.
Establishing positive and clear long-term low-carbon goals and strategy not only
provides top-level planning for China’s long-term low-carbon development, but also
conforms to and promotes the global climate governance process, and reflects the
“common but differentiated responsibilities” between developing countries such as
China and developed countries. Aiming at deep decarbonization with zero CO2 emis-
sions by 2050, China will fundamentally form a clean energy system with new and
renewable energy as the major energy source and reduce conventional pollutants
from the source which will help maintain the PM2.5 concentration below the stan-
dard of 1 5 µg/m3 in key polluting regions and even below 10 µg/m3 in more than
80% of cities, contributing to the construction of a Beautiful China.
China’s 2050 deep decarbonization goal will require large investment for the
transformation of energy infrastructure and the large-scale grid integration of renew-
able energy that involves construction of energy storage facilities and smart grids.
Specifically, the total investment required for the 2°C pathway is around 100 trillion
RMB during the period from 2020 to 2050, equivalent to 1.5–2.0% of GDP annu-
ally; and the 1.5°C pathway requires around 138 trillion RMB investment for the
energy system over the next 30 years, which is more than 2.5% of GDP annually.
The rapid transformation of energy and power technology system would initially
increase the cost of energy and electricity supply in the short-term, which would
decline in the long-term. In addition, the rapid transformation would result in early
retirement of traditional energy infrastructure including coal-fired power plants and
incur economic losses from stranded assets. Wholistically speaking, the low-carbon
transformation of energy and economy under the 2°C or even 1.5°C scenario is
technically feasible and economically viable, but needs to overcome obstacles in
areas such as technology diffusion, financing mechanism, and management system.
The development of advance energy technologies and transformation of the energy
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systemwill foster new drivers of economic growth and employment, accelerate elec-
trification of end-user sectors such as industry, transportation and building, enhance
energy efficiency, promote the digital transformation of industries and society, and
enable China to spearhead global economic and social transformation.
China’s long-term low-carbon emission strategy should also strengthen regulation
and control of non-CO2 GHGs such as methane, nitrous oxide and fluorine gases,
so as to achieve economy-wide deep reduction of all GHGs emissions. At present,
non-CO2 GHGs account for 16% of the total GHG emissions. As the costs of initial
emission reduction are relatively low, it is possible for non-CO2 GHG emissions
to peak around the same time with CO2 emissions. However, the marginal costs
for achieving deep emission reduction would increase steeply. Deep reduction of
non-CO2 GHG emissions by 2050 would be more difficult than CO2 reduction.
Therefore, it requires R&D of groundbreaking deep emission reduction technologies
and proliferation of GHG removal and other negative emissions technologies such as
CDR, in order to offset the remaining non-CO2 emissions under the future scenario
of deep decarbonization.
12.5 China Should Enhance and Update its 2030 NDCs
China’s NDCs under the Paris Agreement include: by 2030, the CO2 emissions per
unit of GDP should fall by 60–65% from the 2005 level; the share of non-fossil fuels
in primary energy consumption should increase to around 20%; the forest stock
should increase by 4.5 billion m3 on the 2005 level; and total CO2 emissions should
peak in around 2030 and making best efforts to peak earlier. These targets were
formulated based on China’s 2020 NDCs, which China pledged during the 2009
Copenhagen Climate Conference. With the efforts made during the 12th and 13th
Five-Year plan periods, by the end of 2019, China’s CO2 emissions per unit of GDP
fell by 48.1% from the 2005 level, which exceeded the target of 40–45% by 2020;
the forest stock increased by 1.3 billion m3 compared to 2005, ahead of the 2020
timeframe; the proportion of non-fossil fuels reached 15.3% by 2019, exceeding the
target of 15% by 2020. These progress and achievements laid the groundwork for
the implementation of the 2030 NDCs, setting the stage for the further enhancing
and updating the 2030 NDCs.
The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to submit their reports on the implemen-
tation and update of NDCs and actions by the end of 2020. Currently, 114 countries
have announced that they will enhance and update their NDCs; the EU has pledged to
increase the 2030 emissions reduction target from 40% to 50–55%. The international
community is eyeing China for its enhanced and updated NDCs for 2030, and the
expectations are running high.
China adheres to the new development concept in a new era, promoting ecological
progress, enhancing policies for the establishment of a green, low-carbon, circular
industrial system as well as a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy system.
Building on the targets and policy measures of strengthened energy conservation and
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CO2 emissions reduction during the 14th Five-Year Plan period, the 15th Five-Year
Plan would keep and reinforce the trend and pace of the low carbon transition. By
2035, China would attain goal for the first stage of modernization, with a modern
country taking shape. If we assume that China’s GDP will double over the next 15
years and the per capita GDP is calculated at the current constant price of USD
20,000, then the average annual GDP growth rate is expected to be about 4.8% over
the next 15 years. The average annual GDP growth during the 14th Five-Year Plan
period might slow down compared with that of the 13th Five-Year Plan period, but is
still expected to exceed 5%. From2020 to 2030, China’s annual GDP growth ratewill
remain at around5%onaverage, and its energy intensity per unit ofGDPwill continue
to decrease at relatively high rate of no less than 14%. By 2030, China would keep its
total energy consumption under 6 billion tce, fulfilling the total energy consumption
target set by the Energy Production and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016–
2030) while sustaining economic growth. New energy and renewable energy will
continue to grow rapidly. While meeting the rising energy demand, the development
potential of renewable energy would be further released, and its share would increase
rapidly to about 25% by 2030, exceeding the NDC target of 20%. By then, the
proportion of primary energy in power generation would increase from the current
45% to about 50%, which is in line with the China’s target of generating 50% of the
total electricity from non-fossil fuels by 2030 as stated in the Energy Production and
Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016–2030). Owning to the dual effect of energy
conservation and substitution, by 2030, CO2 emissions per unit of GDP would fall
by 65–70% from the 2005 level. The installed power generation capacity of hydro,
wind and solar energy would reach approximately 500 GW respectively, producing
new sources of economic growth and creating new jobs. Under this circumstance,
CO2 emissions would enter a peak plateau by 2025 and reach a stable peak by 2030.
According to forestry development plans, China’s forest stock would amount to 21
billion m3 by 2030, an increase of 5.5 billion m3 more than that in 2005. In 2030,
there is potential and possibility for all NDC targets to be over-achieved and achieved
ahead of schedule.
Based on the above analysis, China should further enhance and update the 2030
NDC targets, which would promote low-carbon transformation and high-quality
development of the energy system and the economy, respond to the expectations of
the international community, and advance the global climate governance.
12.6 China’s Goals and Policy Measures for Addressing
Climate Change Should Be Strengthened in the 14th
Five-Year Plan
China is the first country to have contained the Covid-19 pandemic and achieved
economic recovery. The global spotlight is on how to embody the concept of green
and low-carbon development and how to strengthen targets and policy guidance for
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energy conservation and carbon reduction in the 14th Five-Year Plan. They are also
expected to become the “weathervane” for the world’s realization of post-pandemic
high-quality and sustainable green recovery. The 14th Five-Year plan period is a key
stage for China to accelerate economic transformation and upgrading and promote
high- quality development. The 14th Five-Year Plan should be aligned with the
short- and- long-term efforts to enhance China’s 2030 NDC targets as a whole. It’s
recommended to strengthen climate goals and measures in the 14th Five-Year Plan
and to include a dedicated plan for addressing climate change in it to specify the
goals, tasks, policies and actions.
The impact of Covid-19 pandemic on the global industrial chain as well as
supply and demand will create uncertainties for the future economic development
and energy transition. While securing steady progress of its economy and society,
China needs to follow the new concept of development, accelerate industrial trans-
formation and upgrading and the high-quality development, endeavor to develop the
digital economy and high-tech industries technologies, and spur the transition of an
economy driven by scale and speed to one that centers on quality and efficiency.
During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, China should aim for a drop in energy inten-
sity per unit of GDP of at least 14% and a cap of total energy consumption at 5.5
billion tce while securing an annual GDP growth of over 5%. As wind, solar and
other renewable power become increasingly cost-competitive with coal-fired power
generation, non-fossil energy during the 14th Five-Year Plan period could maintain
an average annual growth of about 7%, the average annual growth rate during the
13th Five-Year Plan period. There is considerable potential for the development of
corresponding energy storage systems and smart grids. By 2025, non-fossil energy
would account for 20% of primary energy consumption. With the rapid development
of new energy and renewable energy, new power demand during the 14th Five-Year
Plan period can be mostly met by the increasing power supply from non-fossil fuels
to effectively curb the rebound of coal power supply and coal consumption. During
the 14th Five-Year Plan period, newly built coal-fired power plants should be strictly
controlled, unless they are built for peak shaving, district heating and other essential
needs. The dual effect of energy saving and energy mix improvement could reduce
the CO2 intensity per unit of GDP by 19–20%, and reduce the total CO2 emissions
to less than 10.5 billion tons at the end of the period.
It’s important for the 14th Five-Year Plan to keep the targets of energy-saving and
CO2 emission reduction stated in the 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans. In particular,
the binding target for the reduction of CO2 intensity per unit of GDP should be kept
and highlighted because it’s a landmark for China’s NDC commitment under the
Paris Agreement. Based on this, China could implement and realize the phased NDC
arrangements of cutting CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60–65% from the 2005
level. It would showcase China’s consistent climate policies and positive attitude of
continuously reinforcing policy actions, and help China respond to the international
community’s concerns and expectations for China to continue to drive the global
cooperation on climate change.
The 13th Five-Year Plan put forward the expected goal of holding total energy
consumption under 5 billion tce at the end of the period, and this goalwill be achieved.
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During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, it is recommended to set total CO2 emissions
cap target to buttress China’s efforts to implement and fulfill its commitment of
peaking CO2 emissions in around 2030. In fact, setting the targets for total energy
consumption and non-fossil fuels as a percentage of primary energy consumption
would be sufficient to control total CO2 emissions. Adding CO2 cap target would
better underscore China’s policy determination and new actions for tackling climate
change. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, CO2 peaking activities should be
conducted at the regional and sectoral level, and developed provinces and cities in
the eastern coast and energy-intensive and high-carbon emission industries should
be encouraged to set their peak targets first. Furthermore, the Ten-Year Action Plan
for Peaking CO2 Emissions should be formulated and executed in a way that seam-
lessly connects with the 14th Five-Year Plan and ensures regional coordination, both
near and long term, thus providing the policy safeguard for an earlier peak of CO2
emissions.
12.7 China Should Improve Policies and Institution
Building for Addressing Climate Change
Institutional building for addressing climate change is a fundamental guarantee for
China’s long-term low-carbon development strategy, as well as a critical compo-
nent of the institutional building for ecological civilization. China should establish
a sound system of laws, regulations, and fiscal, taxation and financial policies and
implementation mechanisms.
Climate legislation should be strengthened to secure the implementation of climate
strategies, mechanisms and policy systems and the realization of long-term emis-
sion reduction targets. The enactment of dedicated laws is conducive to providing
clear legal guidelines for nationwide climate actions, and to ensuring the realiza-
tion of long-term strategic goals and measures against climate change. It’s essential
to strengthen and enhance the fiscal, financial and taxation policy framework to
underpin the long-term low-carbon development, and governments should increase
financial input and tax incentives to create an investment and financing mechanism
that favors a low-carbon transition. It’s also crucial to establish green investment
guidelines, improve the green credit mechanism, issue green securitization products
and green bonds, and put in place green credit incentives and guarantee mechanisms
to encourage enterprises, financial institutions and private investors to invest in green
growth.
Efforts should be made to accelerate the construction of a national carbon market
and harness the fundamental role of market mechanisms in promoting low-carbon
energy and economy transformation. The 13th Five-Year Plan period has witnessed
notable progress in the carbon market pilots in five cities and two provinces, which
has generated positive impact across the world and paved the way for a national
carbon market. Now, it’s vital to follow the direction of President Xi Jinping to
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launch a national carbon market, enhance policies and regulations, start the trading
as early as possible, and expand its coverage from the power industry to the iron
and steel, cement, aluminum, petrochemical, chemical, aviation and other energy-
intensive industries as soon as possible, leverage the crucial role of market mech-
anisms in reducing GHGs emissions, and reduce economy-wide emission reduc-
tion costs. The market mechanisms should be combined with government regu-
latory measures to ensure the realization of national emission reduction targets.
Market carbon price signals should be used to guide private investment and industrial
technology upgrading so as to promote enterprises to conserve energy and reduce
CO2 emission reduction. At the same time, carbon allowances should be properly
distributed to shape a system for capping total CO2 emissions and a carbon emission
monitoring, reporting and verification system at the corporate level. This would facil-
itate the institutional building for addressing climate change. A robust carbon market
system with sound carbon pricing mechanism not only represents the fundamental
institutions of China’s long-term low-carbon development, but also is an effective
institutional tool for hedging and countering the “carbon border adjustment” that the
EUand theUShave planned to adopt in international trade. Itwould also enableChina
to actively play an influential and guiding role in the establishment and development
of a global carbon price mechanism.
It’s important for China to deepen reforms and strengthen the leading role of
the government in implementing the low-carbon transformation strategy. A target-
oriented accountability for energy conservation and carbon reduction should be
reinforced for governments at all levels, and targets for energy conservation and
carbon reduction should be included in national and local five-year plans. It is also
important to make innovations in the macro-control system for energy, establish and
enhance energy legislation, and reform and improve the fiscal, taxation, and financial
policy framework for promoting low-carbon development, the pricing mechanism
for energy products, and the resource and environmental taxes and fees system.
It’s crucial to strengthen the reform of the energy market mechanism, establish a
uniform and open market structure and system that promote just, fair and effec-
tive competition, and strengthen the standards for energy-efficient technologies and
energy efficiency labeling and policies for industry access. Guided by the national
medium- and long-term strategies and goals, government binding targets, mandatory
standards, fiscal, tax, and financial policies should be reinforced and integrated with
market mechanisms to improve the institutional safeguard for energy revolution and
low-carbon development.
China needs to strengthen the institutional building and policy support systems
for technological innovation and industrialization of cutting-edge technologies, plan
ahead the R&D and industrialization of revolutionary deep decarbonization tech-
nologies, leverage China’s huge market to support the technological upgrading of
industries and the reform of the energy system via technological innovation, so as
to sharpen the technological strength and market competitiveness of energy enter-
prises. Under the future 2°C scenario of deep decarbonization, the marginal cost of
emission reduction in most cases would feature a steep rise in a nonlinear pattern,
which requires revolutionary and strategic breakthroughs in frontier technologies. It’s
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important to step up the R&D and penetration of deep CO2 emission reduction tech-
nologies such as large-scale energy storage and smart grid technologies in the case of
large-scale grid integration of renewable energy, BECCS for negativeCO2 emissions,
technologies for the production, storage and use of hydrogen as a clean, zero-carbon
and secondary energy source, and zero-carbon technologies for producing chemical,
steel, cement, petrochemical and other raw materials. Moreover, it is necessary to
ramp up R&D and demonstration of technologies for deep emission reduction of
methane and other non-CO2 GHGs, so as to enable deep emission reduction of all
GHGs. China should spearhead the R&D and demonstration of these revolutionary
technologies, achieve technological breakthroughs and industrialization as soon as
possible, and make these technologies mature and affordable, so as to play a leading
role in driving the low-carbon transformation of the global economy and society.
12.8 China Should Take a Proactive Role in Responding
to the New Situation of Global Climate Governance
in the Post-Covid-19 Era
The world economy has been hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic. The US’s attempts
in reshaping the world economic order in the wake of the pandemic features a clear
strategic intention to contain and isolate China across the board. Coping with climate
change would be an important area of competition among major economies. China
is also confronted with the arduous task of restoring the economy, securing people’s
livelihood and shoring up weakness in the industrial chain, with a grim situation with
uncertainties both at home and abroad. Though the current and short-term scourge
of Covid-19 might weaken the global response to climate change and low-carbon
transition, the long-term trendwould remain unchanged and itwould become increas-
ingly urgent for the low-carbon transition. In the post-Covid-19 era, it has become a
consensus of the international community to adhere to the policy of “green recovery
and low-carbon transformation” and to enhance the NDC targets and international
cooperation under the Paris Agreement.
China’s achievements in implementing its climate strategy and curbing CO2 emis-
sions are globally recognized. China has made a historical contribution to the adop-
tion and enforcement of the Paris Agreement, and has become the backbone of the
developing countries in the climate tussle between developed and developing nations.
Tackling the global climate crisis represents the shared interest of the entire humanity
and the international moral high ground for major power competition. At present,
global climate governance adheres to a multilateral mechanism featuring broad
participation and consultation on an equal footing, and requires extensive commu-
nication and consultation between developed and developing countries. China has
already exhibited increasing influence and coordination capability on climate change
issues, and the international community also expects Chinese to further assume lead-
ership and play a “bridging” role. Despite the plummeting relations between China
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and the US, there are still space and opportunities for the two sides to consult, nego-
tiate and cooperate on climate change. Active participation in and promotion of
global climate governance would help China build up the strategic support of devel-
oping countries. China should continue along the path of multilateralism in respond
to unilateralism of the US and should expand its diplomatic advantage in the field of
climate change, striving to resolve any challenges or pressure.
With the complex and hugely uncertain international circumstances in the post-
Covid era, China must actively promote global climate governance and coopera-
tion and should foster the institution building of a fair, just and win–win global
climate governance system. China should uphold the principles of equity, common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, strengthen exchanges
and communications with countries and nation groups with varied national condi-
tions and in different stages of development, and promote comprehensive, balanced
and effective implementation of the elements and provisions pertaining to mitiga-
tion, adaptation, funding, technology, capacity building and transparency in the Paris
Agreement. China should strive to promote a conclusion in the negotiations onArticle
6 of the Paris Agreement and an all-round adoption of the Paris Rulebook at COP26
and promote pragmatic cooperation of the international community. China should
endeavor to make addressing climate change a pioneering and successful example of
Xi Jinping’s thoughts on building a global ecological civilization and a community
with a shared future for mankind.
Actively promoting South-South cooperation in addressing climate change is a
key step for China to expand its strategic support in climate field and live up to its
responsibility as a major country. In the green BRI development and project coop-
eration, China should adhere to green and low-carbon guidelines and standards, and
strictly rein in the export of coal-fired power plants and other high-carbon projects.
It’s important to fulfill President Xi Jinping’s pledge at the Paris Climate Confer-
ence to set up a 20 billion RMB South-South Climate Cooperation Fund to support
and assist developing countries in capacity building, and ease the pressure from the
international community for China’s funding contribution.
To sum up, amid the complex circumstances at home and abroad, China should
maintain its strategic focus, ramping up the planning and actions on climate change
at home. Follow the guidance of building socialism in the new era, China needs to
coordinate short-term and long-term aspects, and domestic and international inter-
ests. China should specify the targets, policies and measures for energy conservation
and CO2 emission reduction in the two documents which are due to be submitted
to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 2020, namely, the report on the implementation and
update of 2030 NDCs and the low-carbon emission strategy by the middle of the
century, and in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan. On the domestic front, China should
promote industrial transformation and upgrading and high-quality development, and
foster a coordinated governance and win–win situation for economic development,
energy security, environmental protection and addressing climate change. On the
international stage, China should respond to the general expectations of the inter-
national community, resolve such pressures as emissions reduction and financing,
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thereby building up a reputation of a major developing country taking responsi-
bility for a shared vision of the world and constantly improving its international
competitiveness and influence.
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Annex I, II and non-annex in Chapters 6 and 11 are referring to three main groups
under the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries
with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation,
the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. Annex II Parties
consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties. Non-Annex I
Parties are mostly developing countries. For more detail, please find in the link:
https://unfccc.int/parties-observers.
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